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This thesis deals primarily with the eastern Islamic world 
during the period 1000-40. It attempts to delineate the structure 
of the Ghaznavid empire, its personal and administrative aspect 
(Part I) and its military aspect (Part II). The material used in 
Part II has already appeared in substantially similar form as 
"Ghaznevid military organisation" in Der Islam, XXXVI, 1960, 37-
-77. Against this background, the province of Khurasan under 
Ghaznavid rule, and in particular, the city of Nishapur, are descr-
ibed (Part III). The irruption of the Seljuqs is treated in Part 
V. However, a survey of what is known of the Oghuz before these 
migrations is prefixed to this (Part IV). It summarises presently-
-held views, attempting to synthesise the work of Central Asian 
specialists, Turcologists, historians and archaeologists, who alone 
are competent to investigate at first hand this difficult subject. 
The scope of the thesis is therefore that of the decline of 
Ghaznavid power in the west, and it is this aspect which has been 
concentrated upon, for the early years of the Great Seljuq dynasty 
have already been extensively covered by such scholars as Cl. 
V 
Cahen, i. Kafesoglu and M.A. K6ymen, and the administrative system 
of the Seljuqs has been examined by A.K.S. Lambton in her London 
University thesis on Seljuq institutions. 
This thesis has been prepared under the joint supervision of 
the Rev. Dr. w. Montgomery Watt and Mr. J.R. Walsh, to whom I am 
greatly indepted for help and encouragement; from the latter, in 
particular, I have enjoyed much stimulating conversation and 
judicious guidance through the literature of the period. 
Note on transliteration 
The system employed for the transliteration of Arabic is 
that recommended by the Royal Asiatic Society. In regard to Persian, 
waw is rendered by '!!. or v and the majhUl vowels are ignored. The 
transliteration of Turkish names presents some difficulty. An 
attempt has been made to render a close equivalent of the true form, 
where this is determinable, and the vowel-system of modern romanised 
Turkish orthography has been used. However, the Arabic orthography 
of the texts has often been indicated in brackets after the first 


























Baihaqi, Ta'rikh-i MasCudi 
al-Baladhuri, F\utu~ al-buldan 
Gardizi, Zain al-akhbar 
Hudud al-Calam ··-------
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi't-ta'rikh 
Ibn Ba~~u~a, Ri~la 
Ibn ijauqal, Kitab ~tirat al-Carq 
Ibn Khallikan, Vva.fayat al-acyan 
I~~akhri, Kitab masalik al-mamalik 
Jurbadhqani, Tar juma-yi ta '.rikh-i Yamini 
Mirkhwand, Rauqat a~~~afa' 
Miskawaih, Tajarib al-umam 
Ibn al-Ja.uzi, al-Munta~~ 
al-MasCudi, Muruj adh-dhahab 
Narshakhi, Ta.•·rikh-i Bukhara 
Kai Ka'Us, QabUs-nama 
Rawandi, Rahat a~~~udur 
Ni~am al-loilulk, Siyasat-nama 
Ibn Funduq, Ta'rikh-i Baihaq 
Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Na~iri 
Ta'rikh-i Sistan 
ijusaini, al-CUraqa fi'l-~ikayat as-saljuqiyya 
al-CUtbi, at-Ta'rikh al-Yamini 
(b) Periodicals, encyclopaedias, series, etc. 
AbhPAW 
AO 
Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der l.'{issen-
schaften, Phil.-Hist. Kl. (Berlin) 




























Bibliotheca Geographicorum Arabicorum (Leiden) 
Btilletin of the John Rylands Library (Manchester) 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental [and African] 
Studies (London) 
Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden) 
Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur 
(Leiden) 
Geographical Journal (London) 
Gibb Memorial Series (London) 
islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul) 
Islamic Culture (Hyderabad) 
Islamic Quarterly (London) 
Journal Asiatique {Paris) 
Journal of the American Oriental Society (New Haven, 
Conn.) 
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta) 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient {Leiden) 
Journal of Near Eastern Studies (Chicago) 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (London) 
K6r5si Csoma Archivum (Budapest) 
Muslim World {Hartford, Conn.) 
Orientalistische Literaturzeitung {Leipzig, Berlin) 
Revue des Etudes Islamiques (Paris) 
Rocznik Orientalistyczny {Cracow) 
Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
Phil.-Hist. Kl •. (Vienna) 
TUrkiyat Mecmuasr (Istanbul) 
T'oung-Pao (Leiden) 
Ural-Alt~ische JahrbUcher (Wiesbaden) 






Zeitschrift far Assyriologie (Weimar, etc.) 
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesell-
schaft (Leipzig, Berlin) 
Zapiski Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago 
Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva {St. Petersburg) 
Bibliographical Introduction 
Note 
The bibliographical survey which follows is a selective one. 
It deals only with the principal works on early Ghaznavid history 
and on Khurasan at the time of the Seljuq invasions, and concentr-
ates on contemporary and near-contemporary primary sources and on 
some recent important secondary ones. These are, however, treated 
in some detail. A useful survey of the sources for early Ghaznavid 
history will be found in Nazim's The life and times of Sultan --------------------------·--
Ma4IDud of Ghazna, 1-17; Nazim is almost exhaustive in his list, 
dealing with works no longer extant and with later, derivatory sources 
as well as with the earlier ones, although he does not give a detailed 
consideration to all the authorities mentioned. 
Barthold treated of the sources bearing on the history and 
geography of eastern Persia and Central Asia in the Introduction to 
his Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion, 1-63. This exhaustive 
treatment will for ever remain a model of its kind in its great 
bibliographical detail, attesting to Barthold's unrivalled knowledge of 
the field, and in the acuteness of its critical estimates. It may 
be supplemented and brought up to date by the excellent bibliography 
in Spuler's Iran in frah-islamischer Zeit, 532-94· The list contains 
3. 
a few critical annotations, and Spuler has also prefixed to his book 
a brief, critical analysis of the sources fbr the early history of 
Muslim Persia (XV -XXXII). J:/Iany useful references, especially to 
recent Russian works, will be found in Frye's notes to his trans-
lation of Narshakhi's History of Bukhara. 
No attempt has been made to give an analysis of sources on 
the early ~eljuqs. V.A. Hamdani devoted an Oxford D.Phil. thesis 
to the sources for early Seljuq history (see o.u. Abstract of 
dissertations, 1939), a.nd more recently, A.k.S. Lambton has exar11ined 
the sources which bear on Selju~ administration in her London Ph.D. 
thesis, Contribution to the history of Seljuq institutions. 
Mention should, however, be made of Cl. Cahen's irJportant article, 
11 Le Malik-Na.meh et l'histoire des origines Seljukides", Oriens, II, 
1949, 31-65, where he examines the dependence of later sources on 
the lost Malik-nama and utilises this information; and of the recently-
-published (Tehran 1332/1953) Seljuq-na.ma of ~ahir ad-Din hishapliri 
(d. c.582/ll86-7), the basis of Rawandi's Ra}J.at a~~udur and of 
many other later authors. 
4. 
Primary Sources 
The importance of the Ta'rikh al-Yamini of Abu Na~r Mu~ammad 
b. CAbd al-Jabbar al-CUtbi has been recognised in Europe since the 
end of the 18th century when de Sacy analysed its contents, using 
the Persian version of Jurbadhqani (see below) (Notices et Extraits, 
IV, 1798, 325-411). The Arabic original was not widely known until 
the middle of the 19th century, when Sprenger published a litho-
graphed text (Delhi, 1847) and N~ldeke used four Vienna Mss. to 
examine the relationship between the Arabic and Persian versions 
(SBWAW, XXIII, 1857, 15-102). l 
The exact date of cu.•s birth is not known, but he came from 
an Arab family settled in Ray. The connections of the CUtbi family 
with Khurasan and Transoxania and the opportunities for employment 
in the Samanid empire, attracted him eastwards. He entered the 
Samanid bureaucracy, where his relatives were well entrenched, becoming 
~a~ib-Barid of Nishapur; then he served as secretary to first Abu 
CAli Simjuri and then to Qabus b. Washmgir. When the Samanids were 
patently in decline, he transferred to the service of Sebuktigin, 
where he worked alongside Abu'l-Fat~ Busti and enjoyed the patronage 
of Maimandi. He became ~a~ib~Barid for Ma~ud of Ganj Rustaq in 
Badghis, but was dismissed through intrigues by the local governor. 
He remained in retirement till ,his death in the latter half of 
2 
MasCud' s reign. rrhus like Baihaqi, cu. brought with him into the 
Ghaznavid empire a rich background of administrative experience in 
Khurasan and the old S~m~nid lands. 3 
The Yamini covers the reign of SebUktigin and that of Ma~ud up 
to 411/1020. Flor the remainder of the reign, we have to rely on Gard-
izi, supplemented by backward glances from Baihaqi's Ta'rikh-i MasCudi. 
cu. used Arabic for his book, at the request of Prince Mu~ammad and 
so that Ma~mud's exploits might be publicised in the Arab-speaking 
4 
lands of the Caliphate. It will be remembered, too, that the Vizier 
Maimandi was at this time promoting the official use of Arabic rather 
than Persian. The florid (according to Storey, "turgid") style of 
the Yamini is freely interspersed with verses from the Arabic poets 
and by cu. himself. The style of historians of the preceeding two 
generations, such as Miskawaih, al-Jahshiyari and a~~uli, had still 
been comparatively simple, but cu. used for his book the epistolary 
style favoured by writers like the ~a~ib Ism~Cil b. CAbb~d and Abu'l-
-F'at~ BustY. He says explicitly that Hilal a~-~abi' 's Taji (properly, 
K. at-taj fi daulat ad-Dailam), which had been written i~an exagerrated 
style for Taj al-Milla CAQ.ud ad-Daula, was his model, but cu. carried 
this style to a new peak. His book was as much admired in the eastern 
Islamic world for its style as for its subject-matter, and he must 
be considered as a pioneer user of the insha' style which became all 
but universal by official chancelries and by writers outside them in 
Seljuq times and after. 
The Yam!ni is a panegyric, yet as Barthold noted (Turkestan, 19), 
cu. does not gloss over the darker sides of Ghaznavid rule: the exact-
6. 
ions in Khurasan by the Vizier Isfara'ini; the ravages there of fam-
ine, which were aggravated by fiscal oppression; the reign of terror 
set up in Nishapur by the Sultan's prot~g~ and head of the Karamiyya 
sect, Abu Bakr Muqammad. It is not therefore true, as Nazim asserts 
(Sul~an Maqmud, 5) that cu. tells us nothing of the"dumb million" of 
subjects, but his information here must be integrated with scattered 
items from other sources. The greatest handicap in using the Yamini 
lies not in any bias, which can be detected and controlled, but in 
the inexplicitness arising from the author's aim at literary effect 
rather than at the conveyance of information. cu. is very sparing 
With dates and with geographical and other details of Ma~mud's wars. 
The accounts of the Indian campaigns are especially vague. He does 
not seem ever to have visited India himself, and the freshness of 
first-hand experience which we find in Baihaqi is quite absent. 
that 
Naldeke pointed out/cu. is more interested in events in the western 
parts of the empire than in those on the other side and that later 
historians like Mirkhwand and Firishta are often fuller on the Indian 
campaigns. 
The literary excellence of the Yamini ensured a wide diffusion 
5 of the work, and Mss. are numerous. There are also several comment-
aries on it, all dealing with the text from a linguistic rather than 
a historical point of view. A Persian version was made as early as 
c. 1206 by Abu'sh-Sharaf Na~ilt Jurbadhqanr (Persian, "Gulpayagani"), 
probably for one of the Atabegs of Azerbaijan. J.'s simplified 
version retains some of the florid metaphor of the original, includ-
ing the Arabic poetry quoted therein, but he omitted the autobio-
graphy which cu. appended to the original work. The Yamini was used 
extensively for Ma~ud's reign by later historians such as Ibn al-
-Athir, Mirkhwand and Khwandamir; Rashid ad-Din's section on the 
6 
Ghaznavids is lifted almost verbatim from Jurbadhqani's translation. 
The Zain al-akhbar of Abu SaCid CAbd al-ijayy b. a4-~a44ak b. 
Mao/nud Gardizi, a general history of Persia from legendary times 
onwards, is a valuable authority for the history of Khurasan down to 
the 11th century and for the history of the early Ghaznavids. The 
author must have been connected with the Ghaznavid court or administr-
ation (see below), although the extant portion of Baihaqi makes no 
mention of him. His dates are unknown: all that can be said is that 
he was a native of the Ghazna-Gardiz area, as his nisba and perhaps 
ad-
the name "Ibn/~~4l].ak" show; 7 that during Mal].mud's reign he was 
usually close to the Sultan; and that he dedicated his history, 
being probably an old man at this time, to Sultan Zain al-Milla CAbd 
ar-Rashid (1049-53). 8 
Only part of the Zain al-akhbar is extant - the work seems to 
have had little influence upon later historiography, and citations 
from it in later writers are infrequent -but we do possess, in add-
ition to the historical narrative, chapters on the festivals and eras 
of various peoples, on classical scientists and philosophers, and 
on the sciences, customs and beliefs of the Turks, Greeks and Indians. 
The sources used by G. for pre-Ghaznavid history and for his accounts 
of non-Muslim practices and cultures have attracted the attention of 
scholars, in particular of Barthold (cf. Turkestan, 20-1; "Zur Gesch-
8. 
ichte der ~affariden", Ntsldeke-Festschrift, Giessen 1906, I, 171-6; 
EI
1 
Art. "Gard.Izi") and of Minorsky (cf. Marvazi on China, the Turks 
and India, London 1942, introd.; "Gardizi on India", BSOAS, XII, 1948, 
625-7). Most important is his use of the lost Ta'r!kh wulat Khurasan 
of AbU CAli al-~usain b. A~mad as-Sallam!, a historian and poet of 
Baihaq who flourished in the middle years of the lOth century and 
whose fortunes were connected with those of the governors of Khurasan 
Abu Bakr Mu~ammad b. Mu~taj Chaghani and his son Abu CAli. 9 G. also 
refers to the work of the Samanid Vizier AbU CAbdallah M~ammad 
Jaihani (flourished early lOth century), whose lost Kitab al-masalik 
wa'l-mamalik has been extensively quoted by later writers. According 
to Minorsky, G.'s chapter on the sciences and customs of the Indians 
has Jaihani as its source; G. refers to his work as the Kitab-i 
tawarikh of Jaihani. Furthermore, G. knew Biruni personally, and 
his chapter on the festivals of . the Indians is demonstrably based 
on Birilni's India ("Gardizi on India", 626-7). 
G.'s account of the Gliaznavids goes down to Maudud's seizure of 
the throne from Mu~ammad (1042). His information on the origins of 
Ghaznavid rule in Ghazna is very sketchy; observations on the rise 
of Alptigin and Sebdktigin (the intervening governors are not ment-
ioned) occur in the narrative of the history of the later Samanids. 
His connected account of the Ghaznavids begins only with Maqmud's 
investiture in 999 with the governorship of Khurasan by the Caliph 
al-Qadir. (Nazim's text, 62). In his preface to the account of 
Ma~ud's reign, G. describes his qualifications for the task, in 
that he had been a first-hand observer of many of the events involved. 
"I propose", he says, "to begin now on the history of Yamin ad-Daula, 
may God have mercy on him, in a brief and concise manner. For, in 
comparison with all the other reports I have read about, a new factor 
comes into consideration when I treat of his reign. I have derived 
knowledge about the previous events either by hearsay or by reading 
books; and it may well be that the authors and relaters of these comp-
ositions and accounts have made ommissions or have inserted extra 
matter. They may have been out to secure an unusual effect by their 
words or to make the book sought after. But in regard to the greater 
Part of these events which I am about to relate, I can say that I 
witnessed them personally - what Amir Ma~ud did in India, how he 
conquered fortresses in Sistan, Khurasan and Iraq, what fearsome 
deserts, mountains and passes he traversed, what battles he fought, 
what mighty rulers he humbled. No-one has ever witnessed or heard about 
the like of these campaigns and stratagems, for indeed they were super-
human feats •••• Out of all the reports about the rule of this dyn-
asty, may God establish it for ever, I have selected the most attract-
ive and memorable parts and set them down here. So far as possible, 
I have condensed them; if I had explained them at length, the work 
would have grown too big". ( 61-2). 
We are not therefore surprised that the account of the Ghaznavids 
is a chronicle of bare events, without the analyses of motive and 
the critical comments on events which we find in Baihaqi; nowhere 
does the author's personality or attitude to events come through. 
However, the narrative is often quite detailed. It supplements 
10. 
cutbi, who does not deal with the last decade of Maqmud's reign. 
His accounts of the two short reigns of Muha~nad are the only contemp-
• 
orary ones we have, and the only other source with substantially new 
material here is Shabankara'I's Majmac al-ansab (see below, 19-22). 
G. is careful to give dates for the events he records (not always 
accurately, however; cf. 108, where the date 430 given for MasCud's 
winter stay in Nishapur should be 431). He writes dispassionately, 
without fulsome praise of the Sultans and without savage condemnation 
of the Seljuqs and the ravages. The Persian style is usually simple, 
though not without some difficulties, in part caused by the lacunae 
of the Mss. As an example of straightforward historical style of the 
10 
11th century, the Zain al-akhbar has an honoured place. 
The Ta'rikh-i MasCudi of Abu'l-Fa~l Mu~ammad b. ~usain Baihaqi 
(385-470/995-1077) gives us a unique insight into the working of the 
Persian bureaucracy which ran the Ghaznavid empire. None of the 
compilers of biographical dictionaries deal with Baihaqr, for he spent 
most of his·working life on the periphery of the Islamic world in 
Ghazna, but considerable biographical details can be gleaned from 
his~ writings. Moreover, since he came from the oasis of Baihaq 
(modern Sabzawar), Ibn Funduq in his Ta'rikh-i Baihaq devotes some 
11 
space to this illustrious son of his home town. 
After an education in Nishapur, B. entered the Ghaznavid admin-
istration during Maqmud's reign. He began in the Correspondence 
Department (Diwan-i Risalat) and rema.ined there, first as assistant 
12 
to the Chief Secretary, Abu Na~r-i Mishkan, and then after his 
death in 1039, to the new head of the department, Abn Sahl Zatisani. 
11. 
F'inally, in CAbd ar-Ra.shid 's reign ( 1049-53), he himself became 
head of the Diwan. Soon afterwards he fell from grace, and in the 
end retired after some forty years of active service. B. was thus 
one of the many Khurasanian civil servants whom the Ghaznavids attr-
acted to their capital and who gave the administration there such a 
strong Khurasanian and Samanid imprint. 
B~ put together his experiences and memories in a series of 
volumes called collectively the Mujalladat. According to Ibn l.i'unduq, 
there were originally over thirty volumes. During the course of his 
career, B. took copious notes and often made copies of olficial and 
diplomatic documents for his own purposes. These papers went back 
as far as 409/1018-19, and he began in his retirei.lent to put them in 
order and write them out properly. B.'s own, original work in the 
Mujalladat thus covers forty-two years, dovm to 451/1059. Events 
down to the year 409 had been dealt with by another historian in 
Ghazna contemporary with B., Malj.mud Viarraq, whom he calls "trustworthy 
and authoritative", but on Maltmud Warraq's death, his sons prevented 
B. from using their father's work more extensively, on the pretext 
that it had not yet been copied and made widely known enough. 13 
Whether this work of ~issemination was ever done seems dubious, for 
the history has been lost without trace. 
Nevertheless, B.'s intention was to produce a history of the 
whole Ghaznavid dynasty down to the accession in 1059 of Ibrahim b. 
MasCud, as the general title Ta'rikh-i al-i Sebffktigin implies; so 
he borrowed from Maltmud Warraq for the reign of Sebuktigin and for 
the earlier part of Maltmud's reign. The divisions dealing with the 
12. 
various reigns seem to have had separate names, e.g. Ta'rikh-i Na~iri, 
T.-i Yamini:(cf. Baih., 26), T.-i MasCudi. Only the section dealing 
with the reign of MasCud, i.e. part of vol. 6, vols. 7-9 and part of 
vol. 10 (so Morley in the title of his edn., Calcutta 1862, Barthold, 
Turkestan, 22, and Storey, 253; according to SaCid Nafisi, EI2 Art. 
"Bayhalfi", vols. 5-10 complete) are extant. rrhe last year of MasCud • s 
life is not treated in them, and there is a lacuna covering several 
14 
months in the years 424-5. At least twenty-five volumes of the 
Mujalladat have thus been lost. This probably happened fairly 
quickly. Ibn Funduq, loc. cit., saw various volumes in a library at 
Sarakhs, in the library of the Khatun Mahd-i crraq mad.rasa in Nish-
apur and in private libraries, but not a complete set. The lack of 
incentives for copying such a gigantic work, whose subject-matter was 
in any case of comparatively local interest, and the. :destruction of 
books in Khurasan and Afghanistan by such vandals as the Ghuzz of 
Sanjar's reign, the Ghurids and the Khwarizmshahs, amply explain 
15 
this regrettable loss. 
B. was also the author of a work on the secretary's craft, the 
Zinat al-kuttab. Ibn Funduq is the sole author who mentions it, and 
it is probably from this work that he quotes in his biographical 
notice of B. (TB, 176-7, cf. below, Part I, 141-3 ) • CA. A. 
Fayyaq mentions some leaves of a majmuca in a private library in 
Tehran, giving definitions of terms of kitaba, and attributed to 
Baihaqi; these leaves may have come from the Zinat al-kuttab. 
16 
B. 
seems also to have been the author of the Maqamat-i Abu Na~r-i 
Mishkan, a collection of reminiscences and episodes which he took 
13. 
down from his old master in the Diwan-i Risalat. These Maqamat are 
explicitly quoted by later writers such as CAufi and Saif ad-Din 
Faqli (see below, 37, 48 ). It is perhaps this work which B. refers 
to in his Ta'rikh-i MasCudi as the Maqamat-i Ma~mudi. 17 
The uniqueness of B.'s work has been rightly insisted on by 
earlier authorities like Elliot and Dowson (History of India, II, 
56-7) and Barthold ('11urkestan, 22-3); a comparison of its style and 
structure with that of the other contemporary sources, CUtbi's 
inflated periods and Gardizi's jejune chronicle, immediately displays 
this. B. wrote with an eye on posterity. He anticipates criticism 
of the work's excessive size by asserting the paramount claims of 
completeness and of justice to all concerned in the events: "I want 
to bring this history to a satisfactory conclusion and to bring out 
all the curious and obscure points, so that no aspect of events may 
remain hidden. If this book becomes long, and my readers grow weary, 
then I crave their indulgence not to consider me as a tiresome 
person11 ( 11). 'Phe freshness of his ideas on historiography is seen 
in the contempt which he expresses for the arid chronicles which are, 
in Collingwood's phrase, mere "scissors-and-paste history", where 
"so-and-so king sent so-and-so general to some war or other; on a 
certain day they gave battle or made peace; this one beat that one 
or that one this; they proceeded there" (354). 
B.'s work is a dynastic history because the Ghaznavid Sultans 
and their empire provided him with a satisfactory chronological and 
territorial framework; it is not a panegyric. When he wrote, he 
was a retired civil servant, enjoying his old age and without material 
14. 
reasons for writing exagerrated praises of his old masters. Hence 
in the Ta'rikh-i MasCudi he states that his aim is not to praise 
the greatness and courage of Amir MasCud, since these are well-known 
and contemporaries have been able to witness it for themselves; 
instead, ''my aim is to write a history which will be of permanent 
value, and to raise up a mighty monument, whose fame will endure till 
the end of time 11 (96). He does not fail to record MasCud's obstinacy 
a.nd errors of judgement in dealing with the Seljuqs in Khurasan. He 
knows that the story of the Sultan's avarice at Amul in 1035 is very 
unflattering: "It comes very hard for me to let my pen set down such 
words, but what can I do? One must not show partiality in writing 
history 11 (462). It was alien to B.'s nature to be unfair, even to 
his opponents. Although he had suffered personally at the hands of 
Abu Sahl Zauzani and his partisans, and says that "evil and malevolence 
were engrained in his nature", he wanted to be fair to him and avoid 
charges of prejudice and parti-pris (taca~~ub u tarabbud) from 
readers who might think him a vindictive and cantankerous old man 
(154, 178-9, cf. 109). 
In laying down his principles of historiography, B. shows an 
insight into historical method and Quellenkritik; his attitude test-
ifies to the high level of Khurasanian Persian culture at the time, 
in that it produced so judicious a scholar. B. enunciates these 
principles at the beginning of the tenth volume of the Mujalladat. 
The thirst for historical knowledge, knowledge about the past, is a 
universal one, he says. But this knowledge can only be acquired by 
personal effort, entailing much travel f! talab al-Cilm, or else ---·------------
15. 
by reading it in books. Man's wisdom and critical faculties are 
therefore rnost important: "Your informant must be a trustworthy and 
veracious person, but your own wisdom must also testify that the 
statement is true and must give sanction to that saying of God's 
which they speak about, 'Give no credence to any reports which offend 
against your judgement'. A book should be such that the reader's 
intelligence does not reject the reports set forth in it; that anyone 
who hears it.credits it; and that wise men, when they hear it, should 
accept it". Unfortunately, he continues, the majority of common 
people are stupid, and instead of the truth, prefer incredible non-
sense, stories about demons, fairies, evil spirits of the desert, 
hills and seas, fishes as big as islands and the turning of men into 
animals: "The namber of people who can distinguish the truth and 
reject the false is very small •••• In undertaking to write this 
history, I have laid down for myself as a guiding principle that 
whatever I write shall be based either on personal observation or on 
man 
reliable informants known to me personally (;la az mucayana-;lV y_a az 
samaC-i durust az mardi thig_a) 11 (666-7). 
:S. was a personal witness of many of the Sultan's campaigns, for 
the Diwans were peripatetic and accompanied the court. Where he had 
no first-hand knowledge, he could often find someone else in the 
bureaucracy with the requisite information; thus he got an eye-witness 
account of Prince MasCud's youthful bravery in Ghur from the dabir 
CAbd al-Ghaffar, fifty years after the event (109-10). In the course 
of his duties, B. had frequently to make copies of official documents 
16. 
and communications to outside powers, and was thus well-placed for 
giving the exact texts of these in his history. His work is, indeed, 
most valuable as a source for Ghaznavid external relations, in part-
icular, with the Qarakhanids, Ziyarids and the Baghdad Caliphs. 
Unfortunately, when B. fell from favour during the reign of CAbd ar-
Rashid, he was deprived of his official records, so that in some 
cases he was unable later to quote texts verbatim. If he had been 
able to keep his own exact copies of state papers, his history, so 
he says, would have had a different complexion. He had to spend 
years searching for the text of MasCud's baiCat-nama to the new 
Caliph al-Qa'im (422-67/1031-75) before he came across it in the 
hands of Abu Na~r-i Mishkan's children (287, 294). When he was deal-
ing with regions of which he had no direct knowledge, he was careful 
to go to the best sources; the account of Khwarizm in vol. 10 of the 
Mujalladat is taken from BirUni's history of his native province (667). 
The style of the Mujalladat is difficult. Syntax and word-
-order are rambling and complicated, with frequent ellipses and par-
entheses. Somet'imes the word-order and even the grammar is reminiscent 
of Arabic. It gives an impression of being the technical and erudite 
Persian of the diwan-personnel, a language which was becoming affected 
by the increasing Arabic influences in the Ghaznavid state. B. often 
adorns his narrative with verses or anecdotes from the pre-Islamic 
or Muslim Persian past, and these contribute to the prolixity of his 
style. But the Mujalladat are an interesting example of what Bahar 
calls the second great period of New Persian prose writing, in which 
16a. 
the works of B·. and his master Abu Nafir-i Mishkan, the Qabus-nama 
18 and the Siyasat-nama are outstanding. 
Barthold complained in 1900 that B.'s work had been insufficient-
ly appreciated and used by scholars working on the history of the 
powers adjoining the Ghaznavid empire, e.g. the Qarakhanids. 19 His 
criticism has still some force. For instance, neither of the two 
scholars who have written on the Ziyarids~in recent decades, Cl. 
Huart ("Les Ziyarides 11 , M~ms. de l'Acad. des Inscrs. et Belles-
-Lettres, XLII, 1922, 357-436, and EI1 Art. s.v.) and E. Denison 
Ross ("On three Muhammadan dynasties in northern Persia in the tenth 
and eleventh centuries", Asia Major, II, 1925, 205-25) have used B. 
at all; nor does H.L. Rabino include him in the bibliography to his 
M~zandaran and Astarab~d, GMS, London 1928. Yet B. has much valuable 
information on the Ghaznavids' relations with their kinsmen the 
Ziyarids and on the topography of the regions where MasCud campaigned 
in 1035; moreover, the section of B. relating to this last episode 
was printed as far back as 1858 by Dorn in Vol. IV of his Muhammedan-
ische Quellen zur Geschichte der sudlichen Kustenlander des Kaspischen 
Meeres. 
Abu Rai~an Mu~ammad b. A4mad al-Birtini (362-c.442/973-c.l050) 
was the most distinguished scholar of the early Ghaznavid period, in 
Barthold's opininn, perhaps the greatest Muslim scholar ever. He 
came from Khwarizm and was born in the environs (rabaq, biran) of 
its ancient capital Kath. Despite modern Turkish attempts to claim 
him as a Turk, he was almost certainly an Iranian. His early life 
17. 
was unsettled. He seems to have been first connected with the ancient 
Afrighid dynasty of Khwarizmshahs. When they were overthrown, he 
moved to Gurgan for a while, and there wrote his al-Athar al-baqiya 
for Qabus b. Washmgir. Returming to his homeland, he served the 
Ma'miTnids in several diplomatic missions. After Maqmud of Ghazna in 
1017 dispossessed this dynasty, Biruni was carried off by the acquis-
itive Sultan to his capital. According to Yaqut's biography of him, 
he was saved from death at Maqmud's hands as a suspected heretic by 
his great knowledge of astronomy, and it was probably as court astral-
oger that he spent the remaining thirty odd years of his life at 
20 
Ghazna. 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Biruni was no sycophant. 
His dedications to MasCud and Maudud are couched in what for the age 
are reasonable terms. Ma~ud's role as the great Ghazi does not seem 
to have impressed him; no doubt he had seen enough of the wastefulness 
of militarism. Of the Sultan in India, he says, "Ma~ud utterly 
ruined the prosperity of the country, and performed there wonderful 
exploits, by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in 
21 all directions and like a tale of old in the mouth of the people." 
The lthar al-baqiya can al-qurun al-khaliya, "Chronology of 
ancient nations" as Sachau called it, was written before BiriTni 
came into contact with the Ghaznavids; its information on the eastern 
Iranian world relates chiefly to his native Khwarizm. The Tacyqiq ma 
li'l-Hind was the outcome of his visits to India in the wake of 
Ma~mud's armies. Its section on the Hindushahi rulers of Kabul (tr. 
lB. 
II, 10-14) is a precious source on the history of this a.rea before 
it was annexed by the first Ghaznavids, and has been much used by 
historians to elucidate the history of this important Indian dynasty. 
,'le would very much like to have in our hands today two other works 
by Biruni listed by Yaqut, Irshad, VI, 311, the Ta'rikh ayyam as-
-Sul~an Ma~mud wa akhbar abihi, and the Kitab al-musamara fi akhbar 
Khwarizm. The latter is the history of Kb.warizm which Baihaqi used 
extensively for his account of Ma~mud's conquest of Khwarizm 
(Ta'rikh-i MasCudi, 665-80). 
Minhaj ad-Din Abu cumar cuthman b. Siraj Juzjani (b. c.589/1185, 
d. in the second half of the 13th century) came from a family which 
had been connected by marriage to the Ghaznavid royal house and which 
had later served the Ghurids. In 1226 he followed in the path of the 
Ghfirids and their successors, the Slave Kings of Delhi, by transferr-
ing to India. He attained high legal office there under the Sultans, 
and in 1259-60 dedicated his ~abaqat-i NaEiiri to Sultan Na~ir ad-Din 
Ma~mud b. Iltutmush. In form this is a general history, dealing 
with pre-Islamic and Islamic dynasties by "tables", but· a disprop-
ortionate part of the book is not unnaturally devoted to the Ghurids 
and their successors in India. The irruption of the Mongols, which 
J. witnessed personally, is graphically described. From J.'s close 
connections with the Shansabanis, his book may be considered as a 
special history of that house, all the more precious in that it is 
the only detailed work devoted to them. 
However, the section on the "Yamini" dynasty is also of value. 
As an historical narrative, it is here sketchy and unbalanced, even 
19. 
for the reigns of the key figures Ma~mud and MasCud; the author 
seems to have been more interested in the miracles and portents which 
accompanied the Sultans' campaigns than in anything else. What is 
valuable is the account of the early Turkish ghulam governors of 
Ghazna and of Sebuktigin's Turkish origins. J. quotes here from the 
part of Baihaqi which dealt with Sebuktigin, the Ta'rikh-i Na~iri, in 
which Baihaqi claimed to have been given information by Ma~mud him-
self on his father's steppe origins, and from the Ta'rikh-i mujadwal 
22 
of the Imam Abu'l-Qasim M~a~~ad b. CAli Cimadi both these 
works are now lost (tr. I, 67-9). When dealing with the succession 
to the Sultanate on Maqmud's death, J. quotes Abu Na~r-i Mishkan, 
23 
presumably via his Maqamat (tr. I, 92). 
M~ammad b. CAli b. M~ammad Shabankara'I (d. 759/1358) was a 
poet and litt~rateur of Kurdish origin. He wrote under the patronage 
of Ghiyath ad-Din Mu~ammad b. Rashid ad-Din, Vizier to the Il-Khanid 
Sultan Abu SaCid, and in 733/1332-3 dedicated to him the first version 
of his Majmac al-ansab fi't-tawarikh. This is a general history in 
Persian, beginning with the Creation; the author prefixes to it (ff. 
l5a-18b of Yeni Carni 909) a "description of the various human races", 
including the Chinese, Turks, Indians, ijabasha and Zanj. He gives 
especial prominence to the history of his native region, southern 
Persia, with sections on the rulers of Kirman, Hormuz and Yezd, the 
rulers of the Shabankara'i Kurds and the Atabegs of Fars (ff. 20a, 
212b-239a). It is thus to some extent a special history of this 
24 region. 
Morley considered the work of little value, except where the 
20. 
author dealt with events near his own time (Catalogue of the R.A.S. 
Arabic and Persian Mss.~ 29), but the section on the Ghaznavids is 
certainly of importance ( ~ ff. 164a-189a). It begins with Alptigin 
and ends with the deposition of Khusrau-Shah by CAla' ad-Din Ghuri, 
after which comes an appendix on the Slave Kings of Delhi. Sh. is 
especially important for giving the fullest account which we possess 
of the period between the governorships of Alptigin and Sebuktigin. 
in Ghazna. Juzjani has a certain amount on the Turkish governors in 
Ghazna in this period, but many sources jump directly from Alptigin 
to Sebuktigin without mentioning the three governors who came in 
between (see below, Part I, 203 n. 61). 
Sh. also gives the only text in extenso which we possess of 
Sebaktigin's Pand-nama. (ff. 167a-169a). This is a brief exa.mple of 
the"Mirrors for Princes"genre, in which Sebtlktigin tells of his 
steppe origin and early life and then passes on to giving advice for 
his son Maljmud on the business of kingship. It was allegedly written 
for Ma~ud when, at the age of seven, he was appointed governor of 
Ghazna whilst his father was away attacking Bust. That a Turkish 
barbarian could have put together this sophisticated little epistle, 
which contains so many of the aphorisms and counsels of the longer 
and more elaborate Persian "Mirrors for Princes", is most unlikely. 
Either the Pand-nama was composed for Sebttktigin by one of his Pers-
ian advisers, or, more probably, it was composed after his death, 
Perhaps during the course of the 11th century, and retrospectively 
attributed to him. This process has frequently happened where the 
counsels or opinions of a prominent figure are involved; the 
21. 
Siyasat-nama was, at the very least, "edited" after the great Vi:zier's 
death (see below, 44 ), and the so-called Wa~aya or Na§a'i~ of 
Ni~am al-Mulk are clearly not from his ·own mouth and were only 
compiled in the 9th/15th century, although the subject-matter seems 
to come from genuine family tradition and near-contemporary written 
materials. The elaboration of the Pand-nama may thus be part of 
the growth of the legend of Ma~ud as the great Ghazi and of his 
father as the Amir-i CAdil, showing that their comportment as rulers 
d d "th th "d 1 f P I 1 · k" h" 
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Sh. further describes such interesting episodes as Sebuktigin's 
regulation and reform of the ~~aC-system among the Turks in Zabul-
istan (see below, Part I, 98-9 ). He eives accounts of the 
campaigns of Sebuktigin and Ma~mud in Khurasan, Transoxania, Sistan 
and western Persia, but India is given little attention; the author 
is not interested in the Ghaznavids as an Indian power. Particularly 
noteworthy is the long section on Mu~ammad's short Sultanate of 
1030, the intrigues leading up to it and the vengeance later taken 
by MasCud on those involved in it. The motives of the generals 
and courtiers who manipulated events at this time are skilfully 
analysed (ff. 18lb-185a). Apart from a brief account of the Seljuq 
irruption into Khurasan, the reigns of MasCud and his successors 
are only cursorily treated. 
Sh. does not in this section name any sources, but the detail 
on the succession dispute after Ma~mud's death, the analyses of 
the rival sides' motives and the descriptions of correspondence 
which passed between them all show that Sh. was using a source well 
22. 
based on official records and on first-hand knowledge of bureaucratic 
circles. It could be from the lost part of the Mujalladat which 
dealt with the end of Maqmud's reign and that of Mu~ammad. The 
hostile attitude towards the MasCudiyan, those who gained ascendancy 
in the state after MasCud's accession, and the friendly one towards 
the old, trusted counsellors like the Khwarizmshah Altuntash, reflect 
very clearly the sympathies of the established bureaucracy as we 
know them through Baihaqi and his master Abu Na~r-i Mishkan. The 
account of Sebnktigin and his predecesso~s may be from Ma~mud Warraq's 
history or from the Ta'rikh-i mujadwal of crmadi which Juzjanr used 
26 
for his much briefer account of Ghaznavid origins. (see above, 19). 
As centres for scholarship of all kinds, the Khurasanian cities 
produced several local histories. These are frequently woven around 
the lives of the eminent scholars, ascetics or literary men produced 
by the city in question, and partake of the nature of biographical 
dictionaries. They aim at preserving the names and memories of these 
great men, and illustrate the strength of local pride in past achieve-
27 
ments and in the lineage of prominent families. Ibn Funduq, 
himself the eminent author of a local history of Baihaq (see below, 
27-9 ) devotes a section to the local historians of Khurasan 
and Transoxania (TB, 20-1), For Nishapur he mentions the history 
of Abu'l-Qasim al-KaCbi al-Balkhi, the original of which, he says, 
was destroyed when the CUqail mosque in Nishapur was burnt down; 
and the famous biographical dictionary of the ulema of Nishapur by 
al-~akim al-Bayyic. Since the originals of both of these works 
have been lost, we cannot but agree with Ritter that we are less 
23. 
well-provided for in regard to Nishapur than in regard to other 
Persian cities (Oriens, III, 1950, 71). 
Al-~akim Abu CAbdallah Mu~ammad b. CAbdallah b. ijamduya an-Nish-
-aburi, known as "al-BayyiC" or "Ibn al-BayyiC" (thus with "ibn" in 
Samcani and Subki) lived from 321/933 to 405/1014. He was a famous 
traditionist who travelled as far as Iraq and the Hijaz in search 
of knowledge. In 970, under the Vizierate of Abu JaCfar CUtbi, he 
was appointed 3!~! of Nasa and then of Gurgan. Later he returned 
to Nishapur and administered the Dar as-sunna madrasa of the Imam 
Abu Bakr A~mad aq-~abaCI. During his lifetime he was accused of 
ShiCI sympathies, but Subki is at pains to defend him from this 
charge, pointing out that ShiCism was rare among the mu~addithun and 
that his biographies of Sunni divines are invariably sympathetic. 
Al-BayyiC's work included a collection of ~adiths supplemental to 
those of Bukhari and Muslim, the Mustadrak Cala ·~~~~I~ain, and a 
book on the merits of ash-shafiCI. But his magnum opus was the 
Ta'rikh Nishablir, which ran to eight volumes (according to Samcani, 
s.v. "an-Naishaburi", f. 574a) or twelve (according to Ibn F'unduq, 
TB, 21). It gave the biographies of the local ulema down to 380/ 
990 and ended with a section on the history and topography of the 
city. Subki praises it as "the most oft-consulted and profitable 
work on the fuqaha'" which he had by him. The praises of Ijajji 
Khalifa, who apparently himself possessed a copy of the book, are 
well-known (given in Barthold, Turkestan, 16). But during the three 
28 
centuries since his death, the work has alas disappeared. 
24. 
F'ortuna.tely, it has not disappeared without trace. Later authors 
like Samcani, !aqut, Ibn al-Jauzi and Subki quote it incessantly 
when dealing with the scholars of Khurasan. li'urthermore, we have 
extant in mss. three continuations and/or abridgements. Ibn Funduq, 
loc. cit., mentions two continuations of the 'ra'rikh-i Nishabur: 
one, in Persian and in two volumes, by ~mad al-Ghazi (not otherwise 
known), and the other, in Arabic, by Abu'l-ijasan CAbd al-Ghafir al-
-li'arisi. Al-Farisi (d. 529/1135) continued his Siyaq li-ta'rikh 
Nishabur down to 518/1124. The second volwne of this work, covering 
the names from "al-I-Jasan" onwards, is extant in an Ankara Ms. An 
epitome of al-Farisi's work was made in Arabic by Ibrahim b. Muqammad 
b. al-Azhar a~-~arifini (581-641/1185-1243), and this Muntakhab is 
known in the unique Istanbul Ms., K~prulu 1152, which has been used 
29 
in this thesis. From al-BayyiC's original, an epitome was also 
made by one Mu.Jtammad b. ijusain, known as "al-Khalifat an-Nishabfui", 
who must have lived in the 7th/13th century or thereafter. He 
reduced the biographical part to a mere list of names, keeping 
Arabic for this section, but he translated the topographical section 
into Persian. The :_unique Ms. of this is in Bursa, HCiseyin ~elebi, 
Tarih 18; efforts to procure a microfilm of this for use in this 
thesis have failed, but it has been cited from Frye's analysis of 
Togan " 
the topof~aphical section in his article in/KopiQlQ armaganr (see 
note). 30 
An unknown author wrote the Ta'rikh-i Sistan, apparently in 
the reign of the Seljuq Tughrrl Beg (429-55/1038-63). It is 
uncertain whether it was first written in Arabic and then translated 
25. 
into Persian or whether the Persian version which we now possess 
was what the author originally wrote. The author's own work seems 
seven 
to end on p. 382, where a break ofi~teen years, 448-65/1056-73. 
occurs. A continuator then takes over who carries events down to 
the end of the 13th century, but the narrative here is very sketchy 
and little more than a series of chapter-headings. 31 
'I'he Ta' rikh-i Sistan is a most valuable local history, in which 
the personal viewpoint of the author, his pride in his homeland and 
its achievements, comes over plainly. He begins with an account of 
the merits and blessings of Sistan. Then comes an analysis of its 
( 30-3) 
revenues and the items of expenditure therefrom/ Since he speaks 
of the share of the "Sultan", this budget may relate to the author's 
own day, the Ghaznavid or early Seljuq period. The coming of Islam 
and the Arabs is described, and we learn that the local dihqans a,nd 
Zoroastrians led resistance to the invaders (93). There is a detailed 
account of the ~affarids' rise to power (192 ff.). As a patriotic 
Sagaz1, the author's attitude to YaCqub and CAmr is very favourable, 
and he praises their rule as just and firm. We discern clearly 
what the majority; of Muslim historians, viewing events through the 
eyes of the Baghdad Caliphate or from a Sunni or ShiCI standpoint, 
conceal: that the ~affarids were a popular dynasty in Sistan, and 
in later times expressed local feeling against attempts at control 
from outside. r..rhe author notes how YaCCJU.b, impatient of poets who 
eulogised him in Arabic, a language he could not understand, encour-
aged vernacular Persian poetry, and several examples of these verses 
32 
in New Persian are given (e.g. 211-12, 253, 260, 286-7). 
26. 
The author's local patriotism further emerges when he describes 
the beginnings of Ghaznavid influence in Sistan and the Sultans' 
attempts to reduce the local ~affarids to the position of governors 
for the Ghaznavids. He regards the Turks' coming as the beginning 
of all the province's misfortunes, whereas it had previously been 
as prosperous a part of Islam as any: 
"The day that they pronounced the khutba from the minbars of --·-
Islam in the name of the Turks was the beginning of Sistan's trib-
ulations. Until then, no calamity had come upon Sist an. li'rom 
the ti::1e of YaCqub and CArnr, there was no region in the whole 
world more prosperous than it. They used to consider Nimruz the 
centre of their rule (dar ad-daula). [This happy state lasted] 
till they carried Amir Khalaf away from Sistan as a result of the 
unrest which the people had stirred up against him; and then they 
experienced what they experienced, and are still experiencing now. 
God Most Hi.n.·h only knows what fortune will eventually bring 
round" ( 354). · 
In the succeeding pages he describes how the activities of the 
cayyars in Sistan formed the spearhead of local resistance first 
to the Ghaznavids and then to the Seljuqs. 
The prose style of the Ta'rikh-i Sistan has many archaisms in 
wording and in orthography; these peculiarities are noted by Bahar 
in his glossary of unusual wmrds and technical terms ( .!J - >!. of 
the introd. to his edn.). In his Sabk-shinasi, he compares the 
archaic style to that of the Samanid writers BalCami and Abu'l-
-Mu'ayyad Balkhi. The author's use in one place (375) of dating by 
the Persian numerals and months and the Yezdegirdi era seems to 
show that he took some of his source-material from dihqan and 
peasant circles where this system was still in day-to-day use. 
27. 
~ah1r ad-D1n Abu'l-ijasan CAli b. Zaid al-Baihaq1, called Ibn 
Funduq, was born at Baihaq in 490/1097 (so according to Qazwini, 
introd. to Bahmanyar's edn. of the Ta'rikh-i Baihag, ~- L , 
pace Yaqut's date of 499/1106, repeated by Storey, 353) and died in 
565/1169-70. He came from prominent local families, the Ijakimiyan 
or Funduqiyan on his father's side, and the BaihaqiyyiTn on his 
mother's, and traced his descent back to the Companion Khuzaima b. 
Thabit Dhu'sh-Shahadatain. His forebears had been traditionists, 
scholars and officials in the service of dynasties like the Samanids 
and Ghaznavids. He himself served as a qad.I in Khurasan and then -·-
as an official in Ray during Sanjar's captivity by the Ghuzz. In 
his time, I.F. was famed as a scholar, with interests embracing 
tradition, history, astronomy, mathematics and philosophy. This 
wide range is reflected in the long list of his books given by 
Y~qut; they include works on kitaba, Arabic proverbs, poisons, the 
special foods given to sick people, etc., and most of them were 
written in Arabic. Only four or five of his works are, however, 
now extant. 33 
One of I.F.'s historical works was a dhail to the Yamini called 
the Masharib at-tajarib wa ghawarib al-ghara'ib, which included 
histories of the Ghaznavids, Seljuqs and the early Khwarizmshahs of 
Ats!z's line. It is cited by Yaqut, Ibn al-Athir (s.v. 568 A.H. on 
the history of the Khwarizmshahs), Ibn Abi U~aibiCa, c.Tuwaini and 
Ijamdallah Mustaufi. 'Phe Ta'rikh-i Baihaq was completed in 1168 
under the rule in Khurasan of Sanjar's former ghulam Mu'ayyid ad-
-Dfn Ay Aba. It has been edited by A. Bahmanyar, Tehran 1317/1938, 
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from the three extant Mss. (cf. Storey, 353-4, 1295-6). I.F. uses 
a simple and straightforward style of Persian, but for clearness' 
sake, gives dates and genealogies in Arabic. 
He proclaims his interest in history at the outset: it is "the 
treasury of the secrets of events", and is not only a useful science 
but also brings pleasure to its students (7-8). The book has sect-
ions on the towns of Khurasan and Transoxania in general. The topo-
graphy, climate, demography and fac}.a'il of the Baihaq oasis are 
described. Then I.F. deals with its history, from its foundation 
by the Sassanids through the Arab conquest down to the author's own 
day. There are several interesting passages on local Khurasanian 
history during the Islamic period which are not eiven elsewhere by 
the general historians. The accounts of attacks on the oasis by 
cayyars, ruffians from nearby towns and IsmaCilis, help us to realise 
how disturbed social conditions in the Khurasanian countryside often 
were. The core of the book, however, is a series of biographical acc-
ounts of the prominent families of Ba.ihaq. Noteworthy are those on 
the family of Ni~am al-Mulk, whose grandfather was a dihqan of the 
Baihaq district (73-83), and on the Sayyids of Baihaq and their 
Naqibs (54-65, 253-5). The author describes the arrival from Nisha-
pur of the CAlids and repeats the genealogies of the Naqibs which 
he had already given in his genealogical work, the Lubab al-ansab. 
I.F. himself was a ijanafi, although there was in his day a strong 
ShiCI element in Baihaq, and in later times it acted as a diffusion-
-centre for ShiCism in K[lurasan. He was unable to pass over the 
social power and prestige of the CAlid families, with which he probab-
ly himself had marriage connections; and in the space he allots to 
them we have an illustration of the important role they were already 
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playing in Khurasanian society at this time. 
The historian of Islam is often confronted with a defect of 
his sources: their impersonalness. In part, determinist theological 
attitudes were to blame for this comparative lack of interest in 
human character and its development. Much of Islamic biographical 
material falls within two divisions. On the one hand we have the 
biographical dictionary, which often gives a curriculum vitae of 
the subject, quotes a few anecdotes or verses and then lists his 
literary or theological output. The technique is descriptive and 
not analytic. On the other hand we have eulogistic or hagiographical 
treatment, whether the subject be a religious figure or a warrior 
who can be depicted as a fighter for the faith. Here, the real man 
is frequently hidden by extravagant praise or by the incredible 
feats of valour or charismatic power attributed to him. 
CUtbi's Yamini springs to mind as an example of the second type 
of approach, and regarding it as a purely biographical work, we are 
left with a negative and unsatisfactory picture of Ma4llud. There 
is a much more satisfying account of an important personage of Ghaz-
navid Khurasan in the Asrar at-tau~Id fi maqamat ash-Shaikh Abi 
SaCid. The author of this work in Persian, Mu~ammad b. al-Munawwar, 
was a Khurasani whose life spanned much of the 6th/12th century. 
He composed a work on "the mystical states and sayings" of his great-
-great grandfather, the ~ufi Shaikh Abu SaCid b. Abi'l-Khair al-
30. 
-Maihani (357-440/967-1049), and then later incorporated most of this 
into the much longer Asrar at-tauqid. Khurasan early became a 
flourishing home of ~Ufism as well as of Sunni orthodoxy (cf. the 
glowing praises of the shaikhs of Khurasan by al-Hujwiri, below, 
Part III, 360-1 ), and in the early Ghaznavid period contained 
two outstanding ~ufi leaders in Shaikh Abu SaCid c.nd Shaikh AbU'l-
-Q.asim al-Qusha.iri ( 3 76-465/986-1073). The Asrar at-tauhid is in ------·-
effect a contemporary document, for it is based on family traditions 
and stories handed down by the participants in the events. For a 
work of family piety, designed to exhibit the Shaikh's sainthood 
and telepathic power (firasat), the tone is not too extravagant, 
although naturally, the Shaikh always comes out best in his many 
clashes with orthodoxy and usually converts his opponents to his 
own views. The Shaikh lived in N~shapur for a decade, and we derive 
much information on the social classes there, on the attractions 
for many of the common people which the Sha.ikh's teaching and example 
had and on the opposition to him from the established religious 
institution, both Sunni and ShiCI. 35 
The biographical dictionaries on Muslim scholars and literary 
men are vast repositories of erudition. The work of systematisation 
he~had a particular appeal to scholars who conceived of their work 
as the proper arrangement and elucidation of known materials rather 
than the production of original work. Sometimes the compiler limit-
ed himself to a particular geographical region or place, usually 
his home province or town; al-ijakim al-BayyiC's Ta'rikh Nishabur 
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(see above, 23-4 ) and ~.l_~Kh~ ti_b __ a}_~B.B:ghdadi 's Ta' rikh Baghdad 
are examples of this type. Sometimes the compiler treated of a 
particular group of scholars like the ShafiCis or ljanbalis, as did 
as-Subki and Ibn al-Jauzi. Only the most outstanding scholars, 
such as Yaqut, attempted to deal with scholars in general. 
Certain works whose scope is general in conception nevertheless 
have a particular interest for the area and age which we are study-
ing. One of these is the Yatimat ad-dahr fi ma~asin ahl al-Casr of 
Abu Man~ur Mu~ammad ath-ThaCalibi an-NtshabiTri (350-429/961-1038), a 
survey of the poets of his own and the preceeding generation arranged 
under geographical regions. The fourth section of this anthology is 
devoted to the poets of Khurasan and Transoxania. As in earlier 
times, poetry under the Sarnanids and Ghaznavids was a mirror of the 
age and poets would express themselves on social and political topics. 
Amongst the satires and complaints of the poets with whom ath-ThaCalibi 
deals are references to the iniquities of tax-collectors, the vices 
of ministers and the merits and demerits of various cities of the 
east. There is also much valuable biographical material. There is 
a section on the poet and historian as-Sallami, author of the "Hist-
ory of the governors of Khurasan" (see above, 8 ) , and many 
of the notables of Ghaznavid Khurasan and Nishapur, including several 
members of the influential Mikali family (see below, Partiii, 
are mentioned in the Yatima and in the continuation which ath-
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-ThaCalibi wrote of it, the Tatimmat al-yatima. 
One of the most impressive works of Muslim scholarship, and 
one which is especially significant for Khurasanian and Transoxanian 
- / 
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affairs, is the Kitab al-ansab of Taj ad-Din AbU SaCd. (or SaCid) as-
-Sarncani (506-62/1112-66). Sarncani was a ShafiCI <alirn whose family 
had long been settled at Merv. The titles of forty-nine of his works 
are known, including a local history of Merv; the originals of these 
probably perished with the Samcaniyya family library when the 
Mongols sacked Merv in 1221. His Ansab is a dictionary in Arabic of 
nisbas and in each article he carefully establishes the correct 
vocalisation of the name, explains its origin and mentions the famous 
ulema who bore it. Since the majority of the nisbas are geograph-
ical in origin, the work is of importance for topographical research, 
and was much used by Yaqut for his MuCjam al-buldan. Samcani's 
prime interest was in traditionists and theologians, but there are 
entries for names of political interest, such as that of SimjUri, 
and there is much information on leading families of the acyan of 
Nishapur, like the ~aCidis (s.v. "al-Ustuwa'I"), ~abUnis, MJ.kalis 
and Karamis; the main sources here used by Samcani are al-IJakim al-
-BayyiC and his continuator al-Farisi. Because of its great bulk, 
the Ansab does not seem to have been copied much or to have circul-
ated far beyond Merv; later Muslim scholars made much more use of 
Ibn al-Athir's abridgement, the Lubab al-ansab, and as-Suyu~I made 
an epitome of this last, the Lubb al-lubab fi ta~rir al-ansab. 37 
AbU CAbdallab YaCqub al-ijamawi, called Yaqut ar-Rumi (575-626/ 
1179-1229) was, as the latter names suggest, a Greek by birth who 
had been enslaved. After manumission, he continued his former work 
as a trader, and then as a scholar, travelling about th~ Islamic 
world. He fled from Khurasan and the east as the Mongols advanced, 
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and died in Aleppo. As a man who spent much of' the latter part of 
his life browsing in libraries and copying manuscripts, he had the 
mind of a cataloguer and bibliographer, and two encyclopaedic compil-
ations stand to his credit. His MuCjam al-buldan, 
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finished in 
1228, has been described by Kramers as "the most complete compilation 
of the descriptive, astronomical, philoloeical and travellers' geogr-
aphical material collected by the previous generation" (EI1 Supplement, 
Art. "!j_~rafiya"). It is a dictionary of place-names in the 
Islamic world, and the author took particular care to set down the 
correct forms of names, so far as was possible in the Arabic script. 
The entries on places in rpFB:NeeaeaRia, Khurasan and Khwarizm which 
Y. had himself visited are of particular value, and he was able to 
give a personal account of the siege of Nishapur and its capitulation 
in 1221 to Chinggiz Khan (IV, 858-9). Often he appends a list of 
the famous ulema produced by a town; for the Khurasanian ulema he 
depends frequently on al-f}akim al-Bayyic and his continuator. 
However, where he had no personal experience to draw on, he followed 
the traditional path of Muslim geographers and used the work of 
previous authorities without regard to the outdatedness of their 
information ; in his entry on Sistan (III, 42) he describes the 
Khawarij as still flourishing there. 
Y.'s other great work is a biographical dictionary of Muslim 
scholars, theologians, poets, literary men, etc., the Irshad al-arib 
ila maCrifat al-adib, which we now possess in its entirety. It 
contains valuable biographies of Khurasanians who were prominent 
during the Ghaznavid period, such as members of the Mikali and 
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~abllni families of Nishapur, and a long section on al-BirUni, with 
1 . t f h' . t. 
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a 1s o 1s compos1 1ons. 
AbU'l-CAbbas A~mad al-Irbili, called Ibn Khallikan (608-81/1211-
-82), came from the Jazira and was, like as-Samcani and Yaqut, a 
ShafiCI in madhhab. He acted as a ~~! in Cairo and Da~ascus and 
thentaught in various Cairo madrasas till his death. He wrote his 
biographical dictionary, the Wafayat al-aCyan, over a period of 
twenty years, 1256-74. He cast his net wider than earlier compilers 
and included rulers, statesmen and soldiers as well as scholars and 
literary men. The F'a1imid and Seljuq Sultans, the Atabegs and the 
Ayyijbids, are exhaustively treated. I.Kh. was most interested in 
events and people of the heartland of the Caliphate, stretching 
from Egypt through Syria and Iraq to western Persia, although he 
does not exclude outstanding figures from the extremities of the 
Islamic world. Of the Ghaznavids, only Ma~ud is dealt with (tr. de 
Slane, III, 337-44). In this article, SebQktigin's origins and the 
succession struggle on his death are touched on, and the text of 
Ma~mud's fat~-nama to the Caliph after the Somnath campaign is given; 
but especial place is given to Ma~mud's alleged change from the 
IJanafi to the ShafiCI rite (see below, Part III, n. 94). I.Kh. is 
one of the most sAtisfying of Muslim biographers to study, for the 
anecdotes he retails and the information from earlier sources which 
he brings in often give life to his subjects. He usually names his 
sources, and some of these are important ones which are now lost; 
in a long and valuable article on YaCqub and CAmr b. Laith (tr. IV, 
301-33) he quotes Abu CAbdallah ¥u~ammad al-Azhar, whom de Slane 
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identified with the Ibn Abi'l-Azhar al-Ptishanji (b. 283/896) of the 
F'ihrist, and also as-Sallami 's Ta' rikh wulat Khurasan. 
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Taj ad-Din AbU Na~r CAbd al-\'/ahhab as-Subki (727-71/1327-70) 
was Cairene by birth, but his father subsequently moved to Damascus, 
and he spent most of his life there teaching in madrasas and acting 
as a kha~Ib and as a qa(j..!_. Amongst his works is the ~abaqat ash-
-ShafiCiyyat al-kubra, a biographical dictionary of scholars and 
traditionists of his own madhhab arranged in "classes" according to 
the century of their deaths. The work is extant im three rescensions, 
the fullest of which was the basis for the not very satisfactory 
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Cairo edn. of 1323-4/1905-6. The work is valuable for the lives of 
the Khurasanian scholars of the late lOth and early 11th centuries, 
many of whom were ShafiCis and who by their intellectual eminence 
helped establish orthodox Sunni learning in the madrasas there. 
In the second 'rabaqa there is an important biography of the founder 
of the Karamiyya sect, Mu~ammad b. Karam, inserted in the entry 
nominally dealing with cuthman b. SaCid ad-Darimi (II, 53-4); and 
there is a long section on Ni~am al-Mulk, on the ground that "he was 
the most famous of those who built madrasas for them [se. the ulema] " 
(III, 135-45). There is also a section on the "Virtues of Sultan 
Maljmud", perhaps because of the Sultan's reputed change to the ShafiCI 
rite which Ibn Khallikan mentions. It gives prominence to the 
episode of the F~a~imid daCI at-Taharti, who· came to Ma}tmud' s domin-
ions in 1013, and the source here is named as the "History of Herat" 
42 of Qa~r AbU Na~r. 
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It is convenient to consider together two Persian biographical 
works on the lives of Viziers, the anonymous Nas~'im al-ash~r and ------------·---
the better-known Athar al-wuzara' of Saif ad-Din ij~jji b. Ni~~m al-
-Fac.}.li. '11he first of these bears the sub-title Ki tab fi algab al-
-vmzara 1 • It was written in 725/1325 and is known in the unique Ms. 
of Istanbul, Aya Sofya 3487, where it is bound together with a Kitab 
fi'l-mawaCi~ and forms ff. 54a-llla of the whole volume (20 x 14.5 
ems.; black ink with red headings; spidery naskhi with sparing 
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consonant points; 15 11. per page). After an introduction of 
generalities on the Vizierate, the biographies proper begin with 
those of the Viziers of the Orthodox Caliphs (sic). The Viziers of 
the Abbasids end on f. 7lb (where nearly three blank pages follow) 
with the Vizier Mu'ayyid ad-Din b. al-Qa~El~b, who held office in the 
period 590-2/1194-6 under an-N~~ir. Then come the Viziers of other 
dynasties, beginning with those of the Samanids (f. 73b ff.). The 
section on the Samanid Viziers deals with the last years of the 
dynasty, the Qarakhanid invasion and the rise of SebUktigin's power 
in Khurasan (ff. 73b-75a). That on the Ghaznavid Viziers treats at 
some length of Isfara'ini, Maimandi and ijasanak, with shorter 
notices on the Viziers after Ma~mud's death (ff. 75b-79b). No sources 
are mentioned in this section, but the account of the arguments set 
forth when ijasanak was chosen to succeed Maimandi is very similar, 
in parts word-for-word, to that in Baihaqi, 366-7, and must be 
taken from there or from a common source. 
We have more explicit information in the Athar al-wuzara'about 
a connection with first-hand Ghaznavid sources. Saif ad-Din al-
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-Faqli was an official of the TimUrids in Khurasan during the 
latter half of the 15th century; for one period he acted as Vizier 
to Sultan AbU'l-Ghazi ijusain Bayqara. His work is conceived on a 
larger scale than that of the Nasa'im al-a~har, with a long section 
on the Ghaznavid Viziers (ff. 87b-115a). He begins with Abu'l-Fat~ 
Busti and ends with the minister of Ibrahim b. MasCud I and his son 
MasCud III, CAbd al-Majid b. A~mad b. CAbd a~-~amad. The fullest 
treatments are those given to the great Maimandi (ff. 89b-llla) 
and to ijasanak (ff. llla-114a). In the section on Maimandi, the 
author quotes specifically from the Maqamat-i Abu Na~r-i Mishkan on 
the Vizier's disgrace and dismissal, and the language, style and 
treatment are similar to those of Baihaqi. As in the Nasa'im, the 
story of ijasanak's rise to office is related at length. Al-Fadli . 
gives it on Abu Na~r-i Mishkan's authority, but his version is fuller 
than that of the Nasa'im or Baihaqi (ff. 112a-113b). 
V.A. Hamdani has pointed out the close depemdence of the Athar 
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as a whole on the Nasa'im, extending at times to verbatim quotation. 
This may clearly be seen by comparing the respective sections on the 
Samanid Viziers (Athar, ff. 85b-87b) where al-Fa~li is the briefer 
of the two; but in his section on the Ghaznavid Viziers he has 
added much fresh material, apparently from contemporary sources which 
were still available to him at the time. It may also be noted that 
Khwandamir (d. ?942/1535-6) drew heavily on the Nasa'im for his own 
book on the lives of Viziers, the DastUr al-wuzara'; judging by the 
extracts on the Ghaznavid Viziers translated in Elliot and Dowson, 
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History of India, IV, 148-53, the borrowing was verbatim• 45 
The genre of adab-literature has still a didactic value for the 
modern orientalist, for it indicates to us the ethics and norms of 
behaviour then prevalent amongst educated Muslims. With the increas-
ing complexity under the Abbasids of social and governmental instit-
utions, an education in adab, which for the educated Muslim completed 
necessary 
Cilm, became especially/for the secretaries in the chancelries of 
Islamic rulers. From this time dates the quest for kafa'a, omni-
competence, the swn of qualities which the perfect secretary or 
minister needed, and in the lOth century appear laudatory design-
ations like "Kafi '1-kufat" (given to the ~a!J.ib IsrnaCil b. CAbb'ad) 
and "Shams al-ku!at" (given to Maimandi). The demand for polite 
education gave rise to numerous manuals. These often contained 
anecdotes, proverbs, maxims and curiosa of all kinds, and, in those 
works intended particularly for the kuttab, accounts of administrative 
procedures, forms of address, specimens of epistolary style, etc. 
The "Mirrors for Princes" are a special class of adab-literature, 
comprising manuals of guidance for rulers in which are set forth 
the personal and intellectual qualities necessary for wise govern-
ment. The 5th/11th century sees a flowering of this genre, produc-
ing such works as the Qabus-nama, the Siyasat-nama and the Qutadghu-
-bilig, and it noteworthy that this development was in the eastern 
regions of Islam, where Iranian influence was strongest. 11he 
reproach is often levelled at works of this type that they do not 
relate to actual conditions and are impossibly idealistic. Yet we 
must surely concede that they were intelligible to people of that 
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time and had a practical value. The gap which then existed between 
theory and practice seems impossibly wide to us, but to many lfuslim 
the approaching reign of justice and equity was always a real hope 
and one had to strive after it. Moreover, the texts of these 
"Mirrors for Princes" are often liberally interspersed with anecdotes, 
many of historical value. 
The Mafati~ al-CulUm of AbU CAbdallah Mu~ammad b. YUsuf al-
-Khwarizmi, who lived in the second half of the 4th/10th century, is 
justly famed as the first encyclopaedia in Arabic of the Muslim 
sciences. He was probably born in Balkh and worked as a civil 
servant for the Samanids; his book is dedicated to AbU '1-Ijasan:~CUbaid-
allah b. Alpnad al-CUtbi, who became Vizier to NTi~ b. Man~Ur in 977. 
It is a survey of the basic principles of the CulUm and ~inacat and 
of the technical terms used in them. In the section on kitaba 
(53-79 of van Vloten's edition, Liber Mafatih al-olum, Leiden 1895), 
al-Khwarizmi explains many of the practices of the diwans, includ-
ing those of finance, the Barid and the army. His model is the 
Samanid administration in which he worked, and many of the techniques 
46 
which he describes were later taken over by the Ghaznavids. 
A work typical of that branc~ of adab-literature which aimed at 
giving the reader a stock of interesting stories and snippets of in-
formation, nawadir and ghara'ib, is the La~a'if al-macarif of ath-
-ThaCalibi (see above, 31 ). It was dedicated to the great 
BUyid Vizier, the ~a~ib IsmaCil b. CAbbad, and has been edited by P. 
de Jong, Leiden 1867. Its tenth chapte~ is a survey of the lands of 
Islam, especially those of the eastern half, and has information on 
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the towns of Khurasan and the articles of trade and industry 
handled there. 
In 1082 the Ziyarid ruler of Gurgan and 'rabaristan Kai Ka'us 
wrote the Qabus-nama for his son Gila.n-Sliah. It was written in the 
author's mature old age, and in R.Levy's words, 11 cornbines the funct-
ions of popular educator, manual of political conduct and text-book 
of ethics, with expediency as its motto 11 • The book's name harks 
back to the a~thor's grandfather ~}ibus b. Washmgir, the greatest 
ruler which the dynasty produced; in Kai Ka'us' s day the Ziyarids' 
power had been much restricted by the Seljuqs and they were soon to 
disappear. They had close contacts with the Ghaznavids; until the 
Sultans lost Khurasan, their territories were contiguous and the 
Sultans treated them as dependents and tributaries. ManUchihr b. 
QabUs (d. 420/1029) married one of MaQffiud's daughters, and MasCud 
took as wife the daughter of a later ruler in Gurgan, Abu Kalijar 
(his exact relationship to the Ziyarid dynasty is not clear). Kai 
K~•us frequently mentions the Ghaznavids as his kinsmen and states 
that he had spent eight years in Gb.azna as a boon-companion of 
Sultan Maudud. 
Consequently, the early Ghaznavids are the subjects of some of 
the anecdotes in the Qabus-nama. Like the author of the Siyasat-
-nama, Kai Ka'us quotes the Sultans and their policies with approval. 
The fact that he had kept up close relations with Maudtid at a time 
when the domains of the two rulers were separated from each other 
by the territories conquered by the Seljuqs attests to the authority 
and respect which the Ghaznavids were still able to inspire. It is 
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also likely that the example of the Ghaznavid state syste~ was exer-
cising a powerful influence on the structures of smaller, neighbour-
ing states, whose rulers welcomed the access of power which the 
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Ghaznavid system gave to the hea.d. of state. 
The Siyasat-nama of' Ni~am al-Mulk has been called by Barthold 
(Turkestan, 25) 11 incontestably the chief source for the study of the 
political: structure of the Eastern Muslim stat es••. Abu CAli ijasan 
b. CAli 'rusi ( 408-85/1018-92) was a product of the keen intellectual 
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and orthodox religious atmosphere of Ghaznavid Khurasan. His 
forebears were dihq~ns and typical members of the acyan class; his 
father had been CAmil or tax-collector for MasCud of Ghazna's civil 
governor in Khurasan, Silri. rl'he young N. al-M. p;rew up fully con-
versant with the traditions and practices of the Ghaznavid govern-
mental system , and this background coloured much of his later 
behaviour and attitude. After the Seljuq conquest of Khurasan, he 
accompanied his father to Ghazna and worked for a time in the Diwans 
there; but the pull of his Khurasanian homeland drew him back, and 
he entered the service of the Seljuqs, first at Balkh and then dir-
ectly under Chaghrr Beg. Therafter he rose high in the counsels of 
Alp Arslan and his son Malikshah, achieving the Vizierate in 1064 
in succession to Kunduri. During the remainder of his life, until 
his assassination in 1092, he worked to bring peace and unity to 
the vast but disparate empire of the Great Seljuqs; he was a cons-
ervator rather than an innovator and aimed at stability through 
centralising the administration and through reforming the ~~ac 
49 
system, the territorial basis of the standing army. 
42. 
As its alternative title Siyar al~aulUk indicates, the Siyasat-
-nama is a treatise on government and kingship. It is concerned 
with the broad principles of government a.nd royal conduct rather than 
with the day-to-day conduct of affairs in the Diwans. N. al-M.'s 
aim was to impress upon his politically naive and inexperienced 
Turkish masters how complex royal policy had to be and how the qual-
ities of vigilance, suspicion and ruthlessness ought to be their 
watchword. The regimes he holds up as models are those of the BITyid 
CAc].ud ad-Daula and above all, of Mal].mild of Ghazna. He places himself 
in the line of succession of Persian Viziers like the ~al].ib IsmaCil 
b. CAbbad and AQ_mad b. IJasan Maimandi, who sought to turn their 
Dailarni or Turkish masters, previously tribal leaders or military 
slaves, into the subtler mould of Persian despots. Hence anecdotes 
of which CAqud ad-Daula and MaQffiud are the heroes abound in the 
Siyasat-nama; and the author often quotes approvingly the administr-
ative and military practices of "former kings" (se. dynasties like 
the Samanids, Buyids and Ghaznavids) which the Seljuq Sultans had 
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regrettably allowed to lapse. N. al-JlllL' s formative years had been 
spent under G~aznavid rule, and the type of state he advocates for 
the Seljuqs is simply the"power-state" of Maltmud and his Persian 
officials: a state where the monarch is absolute, and whilst theor-
etically responsible to God, in practice restrained only by self-
-interest; where the division of people into caskaris aDd racaya 
is upheld and a large, multi-national standing army maintained; 
where the ruler is kept informed of everything which happens in his 
realm by means of a network of spies and informers; where religious 
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orthodoxy is equated with loyalty to the dynasty and the orthodox 
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institution upheld as a conservative force. Harold Bowen has 
written that the Siyasat-narna is "in a sense, a survey of what he 
[se. N •. al-M.J failed to accomplish" (EI1 Art. s.v.), but the 
Vizier was nevertheless the greatest statesman of his age and he made 
the empire of Malikshah one of the most powerful ones in Islam since 
the Abbasid Caliphate in its heyday. The Great Seljuqs never 
became sophisticated enough fully to absorb the Persian i·nonarchical 
tradition, but not all his influence died with him; his descendants 
continued to act as Viziers and officials for the Seljuqs for several 
decades, a striking example of administrative continuity upheld by 
a single family (cf. Zambaur, Manuel de genealogie et de chronologie, 
223; Bowen, EI1). 
The Siyasat-nama is a valuable document for the student of 
Ghaznavid history, above all for one interested in administrative 
and military organisation. We learn, for instance, about the role 
within the Ghaznavid empire of the ~!~ib-Barids and Mushrifs, about 
the army's composition from many different nationalities and about 
the strict insistence on the auditing of provincial governors' 
accounts (chs. IX, X, XIII, XXIV, XLIX). It is true that N. al-M.'s 
text is full of historical errors and anachronisms, and scholars 
have wondered how so erudite and capable a figure as the Vizier 
clearly was could have set down such patently inaccurate historical 
information. Noldeke's sceptical outlook made him doubt the work's 
value as an historical source (review of Schefer's edition, ZDMG, 
XLVI, 1892, 766-7); but Barthold, whose critical faculties were of 
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the keenest, accepted as authentic such an episode in it as the 
account of Na~r b. AlJ.mad's conversion to IsmaCilism ('.Purkestan, 
242-5; against accepting this, Qazwini, edn. of SN, 220 n. ff.). 
Recently, doubts on Ni~am al-Mulk's authorship have been express-
ed. Spuler writes of it, "angesichts seiner Plattheiten und seiner 
geringen historischen Zuverl~ssigkeit doch Vlohl kaum van Ni~am al-
-Mulk?"; Qazwini, too, was sceptical about the attribution. 
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It is 
likely that N. al-M.'s rns. was edited after his death, probably in 
the reigns of Malikshah II b. Barkiyaruq (1104) and Ghiyath ad-Din 
MulJ.ammad b. Malikshah I (1104-17) by Malikshah's old copyist, 
M~ammad Maghribi, to whom N. al-M. had in any case entrusted the 
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final chapters of the work shortly before h1s death. Even so, 
the whole ethos of the book, with its advocacy of the Persian man-
archical system and its exaltation of Sunni orthodoxy against the 
heresies which might rend the fabric of the state, accords well 
with what we know of the Vizier's beliefs and aims, and may be 
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accepted as substantially his work. 
A~mad b. cumar b. CAli as-Samarqandi, known as Ni~ami-CAru4I, 
was born somewhere near the beginning of the 12th century, and spent 
his early years wandering about Khurasan and Transoxania in search 
of knowledge. His fortunes rose after his verses had attracted the 
approbation of Sanjar's court poet MuCizzi. The rest of his life 
seems largely to have been spent in the service of the Ghurids, or 
"Kings of the mountains", as he calls them; when, during the reign 
of CAla' ad-Din Jahan-Suz, he wrote his Chahar maqala, probably c. 
1156-8, he had been in their service forty-five years. The Four 
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discourses cover the arts of the secretary, poet, astrologer and 
physician, and each of them is largely composed of anecdotes. Here-
in lies the value of the book: the anecdotes treat of most of the 
important dynasties of eastern Islam, from the ~af:f'arids to the 
Qarakhanids, and give us historical information not found elsewhere. 
Sometimes he quotes lost works like that of as-Sallami. Much of 
what we know about the lives of the Ghaznavid poets Pirdausi and 
:b'arruk.hi derives from Ni~amJ:-CAruq.I, and in the second discourse he 
gives a list of the poets who extolled the Ghaznavid dynasty. 55 
Little is known about Abu'l-CAbbas Al}.mad b. CAll: b. Baba al-
-Qashani except that he wrote his book in Arabic, the Kitab ra's mal 
an-nadim, "the boon companion's stock-in-trade 11 , during the reign of 
the Caliph al-Muqtafi (530-55/1136-60). 
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Yaqut, Irshad, I, 230-2, 
has an entry on him, calling him a gra~narian (lughawi) and saying 
that he was known as Lawah or Ibn Lawah (? l.w.h.); but he knows 
nothing about him except a few of his verses and an anecdote of his 
quoted at third-hand. Ibn Baba seems to have been more a nadim 
himself than a grammarian pure and simple. V.A. Hamdani says: "It 
seems that the author belonged to the class of professional enter-
tainers in crraq, whence he travelled to Khurasan where he had 
cause to deplore the prostitution of his profession11 •
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As might be expected from its title, the Ra's mal an-nadim is 
a work containing material for nudama' and musamiriTn: the names 
of famous horses and swords, people who were buried alive but 
escaped, men who in the Jahiliyya had the name "Mu}tammad", the lives 
of famous grammarians, etc. 'l'he last part of the book, however, is 
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a history of the Caliphate and the provincial dynasties of Islam 
_ ( ff. l66a-210a) 
down to the ')th/llth century. He closes by saying that he has 
decided to devote a special work to his contemporaries, the Seljuqs, 
''which will describe how their power originated, how their followers 
(auliya') con(]uered Khurasan, Iraq, Rum, Syria, the land of J.i1irs and 
the Hijaz, and how their dominions expanded stage by stage and year 
by year. Bec2use of this intention, we have not mentioned it [se. 
the Seljuq dynasty] here" (f. 210a). 
The section on the Ghaznavids (ff. 203a-210a) goes up to the 
reign of MasCud III b. Ibrahim ( 492-508/1099-1114). 1l'he only auth-
ority for the Ghaznavids which he mentions here (specifically, for 
M.al}.mud's birth-date) is Baihaqi, ~!Jtib ta'rikhihirn (f. 204b). He 
gives a succinct account of Sebttktigin's origin and of the Turkish 
governors who preceeded him in Ghazna, with the dates of their 
death or deposition. He is the only authority who corroborates 
the Pand.-nama concerning Sebttktigin's origin from the Barskhan region 
of the Semirechye. This account of the Turkish governors is the 
earliest we possess. Ibn Baba seems to have been especially inter-
ested in political and. constitutional aspects: he deals especially 
with the relations of the early Sultans with the Abbasid. Caliphs; 
the succession disputes on the deaths of Sebttktigin and Ma~mud; 
and the murder of CAbd ar~ashid and the usurpation of power by 
the slave Tughrtl (444/1053). His mention of the legitimist feeling 
in Ghazna for the Gbaznavid dynasty which this last episode provoked 
is interesting (f. 209a). It seems unlikely that Ibn Baba, who 
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was probably an Iraqi, could have had access to the originals of 
Baihaq'i's Mujalladat. It is possible that he took his information 
from an intermediate work which had utilised Baihaqi and which 
could also provide some material on the Sultans of the latter half 
of the 11th century. The Ta'rikh-i mujadwal of Cimadi must be 
considered a likely source here, especially as the Mujmal at-tawarikh 
wa'l-qi~~~ quotes as an authority in its section on the Ghaznavids 
"the Arnir MaJ:tmud crmadi b. al-Imam as-8anjari al-Ghaznawi", and its 
anonymous author came from Jibal, the part of Persia adjoining 
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Iraq, Ibn Baba's homeland. 
Sad'id ad-Din .Mul}.ammad CAufi lived for some sixty years between 
approximately 1176 and 1232. He was born in Bukhara and spent his 
early life there, being also for a while in the service of the Qara-
khnaids of Samarqand. He wandered through Khwarizm, Khurasan and 
Sistan seeking a suitable patron, but the troubled political condit-
ions there, the wars of the Ghtirids and Khwarizmshahs and the impend-
ing shadow of the lviongol invasions, drove him to seek his fortunes 
in India, first with the Turkish slave ruler of Sind, Multan and Uchh, 
Na~ir ad-Din Qubacha, and then after the latter's overthrow in 625/ 
1228, with Shams ad-Din Iltutmush of Delhi. 
It was in India that he composed what is the first example which 
we have in Persian of the Tadhkirat ash-shuCara' genre, his Lubab 
al-albab. When he passed into Iltutmush's service, he dedicated 
to him the work he had been engaged on for five years, the JawamiC 
al-Jtikayat, a collection in Persian of over 2000 anecdotes drawn 
from ninety-three named sources and no doubt many more unnamed ones. 
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CAufi's Vlork is a vast repository of' extracts from earlier books 
on a wide range of subjects, including such topics as ~Ufism and 
tafsir as well as theexpected history and adab. There are eighty-one 
anecdotes concerning the Ghaznavids. Several of these are from the 
lost parts of Baihaqi's Mujalladat, and there is also a reference 
to a manual written for Viziers, the Dastur al-wuzara' of Sultan 
Ibr~him b. MasCfid; this work is not mentioned in any other contemp-
orary or near-contemporary source, but that ruler's known interest 
in administration and just rule make his authorship of it not 
unlikely. Several of CAufi's anecdotes are concerned with the estab-
lishment of Ghaznavid power in Zabulistan and with Sebuktigin's wars 
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in Sistan and against the Hindushahis of ICabul. 
],akhr ad-Din Mu}J.ammad b. Man~Ur al-Qurashi Mubarakshah, knovm 
as F'akhr-i Mudabbir, was the author of a treatise on the art of war 
and the conduct of kingship in general called the Adab al-mulUk wa 
kifayat al-mamluk (also called, in the B.M. and R.A.S. Bengal's 
copies, Adab al-ltarb wa' sh-shajaca). F,akhr-i Mudabbir claimed 
descent on his father's side from Abu Bakr and on his mother's, from 
Amir Bilg~tigin, one of Sebuktigin's predecessors in the governorship 
of Ghazna and father-in-law of MalJ.mUd. He could thus claim a person-
al connection with the Ghaznavid dynasty, and it is probable that 
his family's ancestral home was Ghazna, but that the family was 
driven to Lahore and Multan by the GhiTrid invasions. He nevertheless 
earned the commendation and patronage of MuCi:zz ad-Din Multammad b. 
Sam and of Qu~b ad-Din Aibak for his famous genealogical tables of 
the prophets and the Muslim dynasties. 
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'l'he Ad ab al-muluk was written when the author was alrea.dy an 
old man and was dedicated to Sultan Iltutrnush of Delhi (607-33/1211-
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36). 'rhe work contains forty chapters (thus in the I.O. Ms.; in 
the B.M. one, thirty-four) on the duties of kings, the appointment 
of officials, the organisation of armies, weapons and tactics. It 
is in part a "Mirror for Princes" with a strongly military emphasis. 
Illustrative anecdotes are very prominent, and amongst these, there 
are many relating to the Ghaznavids; there is, on the other hand, 
little reference to the Samanids or the Seljuqs. Episodes of interest 
in them include Bilg~tigin's siege of Gardiz during his governorship 
of Ghazna; Malfmud's campaigns against the Qarakhanids and against 
Q.anauj; the revel t. which took place shortly after the killing of 
MasCud and the accession of Maudud, of the IsmaCilis of Multan (not 
ptherwise known except from this mention); and Ibrahim b. MasCud's 
relations with Malikshah. 
Besides historical information, the work gives detailed descr-
iptions of the weapons and tactics used by the Ghaznavid Sultans. 
Bearing in mind the author's family background and the fact that he 
wrote only two generations after the end of the Ghaznavid dynasty, 
it seems reasonable to regard him as giving the common Islamic 
stock of precepts for the ideal military commander against a spec-
ifically Ghaznavid and Ghurid background, and to use his information 
Where it accords with the specifically historical sources. Accord-
ing to Nazim, Sul~an Maljmud, 9, the anecdotes relating to Malplud 
seem to have been taken from Baihaqi or a similar contemporary 
source; but the military nature of these seems to point to an origin 
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outside the civilian Baihaqi's work. 
In the History of India as told by its own historians, eight 
vols., London 1867-77, by !:)ir H.M. Elliot, edited from his posthumous 
papers by J. Dowson, the author gathered together Arabic and Persian 
material on the history of Muslim power in India. Vol. II, "The 
Muhammadan period" covers the Ghaznavids, the GhUrids and the Slave 
Kings of Delhi. Roughly half of this volume is devoted to the first 
of these dynasties; it deals essentially with the Gha.znavids' relat-
ionship to India, but also touches upon the dynasty in general terms. 
E. gives translations from the sources which deal originally ··.or 
significantly with the periodr and which were known in his day: 
Biruni's India, cutbi (from the Arabic original), Baihaqi, CAufi's 
Jawamic al-!J.ikayat, Ibn al-Athir and the 'rabaqat-i Nal:liri. In 
appendices he gives extracts from adab-works and collection of anec-
dotes relating to the G,P.aznavid Sultans, from the Wal:laya-yi Ni~am 
al-Mulk, the Nigaristan of Aeymad al-Ghaffa.ri and the Zinat al-majalis 
of Majdi. He also quotes from the Mir'at-i MasCudi, a 16th century 
historical romance built around the Indian campaigns of the hero 
and martyr Salar MasCud Ghazi, allegedly a nephew of Sultan Ma~rnUd. 
The author, CAbd ar-Ra~man Chishti, professes to base the work on 
the Tawarikh-i Ma~Udi of one Mulla Mu~ammad Ghaznawi, a contemp-
orary of Sultans Ma~ud and MasCUd, but it is in fact largely based 
on later compilations (see Storey, 1006-7). · 
All Elliot's translations were made from Mss. he had collected, 
and for some of the work he employed munshis. The translations vary 
in accuracy from the indifferent to the downright wretched. Those 
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from cutbi have been shorn in part of their rich verbal ornamentat-
ion. It is true that ~.'s death supervened before he could check 
all the munshis' translations. ~he work of translation in general 
and,in particular, the inability to make sense of many of the personal 
and place names, demonstrates the handicap under which British 
orientalism in India at that time laboured: its isolation from and, 
frequently, lack of awareness of the results of continental scholar-
ship. Turkish names suffer especially badly. Nevertheless, the 
undertaking was an ambitious one for the time. E. spent forty years 
on it and Dowson another twenty editing his papers. It has been an 
almost inexhaustible quarry in which later writers on Indian history 
have dug, either from inability to read the original texts or else 
from sheer laziness. Por the serious scholar today, the work's 
value is limited. }10r all the texts which E. used, we now know of 
an increased number of Mss. (for geographical reasons E. was cut off 
from the continental collections), and for such sources as the 
Arabic geographers, Biruni' s India, Baihaqr a.nd Ibn al-Athir, we 
now possess critical editions. S.H. Hodivala has endeavoured in 
his Studies in Indo-Muslim history: a critical commentary on Elliot 
and Dowson's 'History of India', I, Bombay 1939, II, 1957, to 
correct and annotate it, 11 to undertake a systematic and exhaustive 
review of its contents and rectify its errors of interpretation, as 
well as transliteration. 11 (I, v). He has brought to this task a 
vast store of information on Indian history and topography, and 
his work is most valuable; but as with many Indian scholars, his 
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ental scholarship in his field. 
~. introduces each of his sources with some comments on the 
author and his work, but his judgements are sometimes aberrant. He 
states that a knowled[~~e of the Yam1n1 was at one time considered a 
great desideratum in Europe, "but it is now found to contain but 
little which is not accessible through other channels". Later 
Muslim historians have extracted all the meat from it, although he 
concedes that 11 i t must continue a work of authority and an object of 
curiosity, as the original source. from which later v,rriters have 
drawn much of their information respecting Mahm~d's campaigns 11 (15). 
His judgement of Baihaqi is rather patronising : 11 although tedious, 
the work is eminently original, and it presents such a reflex of 
the doings and manners of the time that its minutiae and trifles 
frequently constitute its chief merit. The writer may not inaptly 
be described as an oriental :hlr. Pepysn (57). But E. did realise 
the gTeat value of the M.ujalladat and the judiciousness of Baihaqi 
as a historian. 
In addition to these comments, E. devotes a special appendix 
to the historians of the Ghaznavids, concentrating on the later, 
derivatory writers like Rashid ad-Din, Mirkhwand, Khwandarnir, the 
author of the Ta'rikh-i Alfi, Firishta, etc. (429-33). Then in a 
further appendix he liststhe Indian campaigns of Ma}tmud, numbering 
~eventeen, and cites earlier European writers on the Sultan from 
d'Herbelot to Reinaud (434-78). This appendix has been used as a 
basis by many later writers on Ma1tmud, and E.'s list is a useful 
piece of classification. Nowhere in his book does he try to describe 
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the internal working of the Ghaznavid empire, but this does not 
come within the scope of the book. Not does he venture any judge-
ment on the doings of the Sultans in India, beyond such occasional 
references to Maljmud as "that ferocious and insatiable conqueror 11 
(434), and his attitude is on the whole a dispassionate one. 
Secondary sources 
Every student of Central Asian history must acknowledge a debt 
to W. Barthold and his works, above all, to his Turkestan down to 
the Mongol invasion (original Russian edn., 1900, accompanied by a 
volume of texts, revised English edn., GMS, London, 1928; the reprint 
of 1958 has a very few additions and corrections). The book's value 
is increased by the fact that Barthold knew at first hand much of 
the terrain he was dealing with, its topography, vegetation and 
climate. From the end of the 19th century onwards he made regular 
journeys into what were then the Khanates of Bukhara and Khokand 
and are now the Uzbek, '.Pajik and Kazakh S.S.Rs., a.nd the information 
which he gained was used in a masterly fashion to elucidate the 
ancient texts in his geographical survey of Transoxania in Turkestan, 
64-179. 
B. does not in his book deal with the Ghaznavid empire as a 
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whole, nor, in any detail, with the origins of the Seljuqs and their 
conquest of Khurasan, but he does deal extensively with the relations 
between the early Sultans and the rulers of Transoxania and Khwarizm, 
the Samanids, Q.arakhanids and Ma'mtinid Khwarizmshahs. He stresses 
the importance of Ma]tmtid's reign in the development of the govern-
mental tradition in the eastern Islamic world, and how the central-
ised Ghaznavid administration became a. model for many subsequent 
rulers and statesmen. He further notes the division in the empire 
of the ruling institution, Sultan, army and bureaucracy on one side, 
and the masses of subjects on the other. B. was the first person 
to evaluate the achievements of Ma1tmtid in terms beyond those of 
pure military conquest, and his verdict was a severe one, that the 
Ghaznavid r~gime weighed on the subjects very severely (cf. 286-93). 
Eis lack of sympathy with its authoritarianism led him to regard 
its supplanters in Khurasan, the early Seljuq Sultans, much more 
favourably (305 ff.). In estimating the social and human aspects 
of Ghaznavid power, the sources are rarely explicit for us; yet 
the general conclusion set forth below in Part I of this thesis 
accords substantially with Barthold's view. 
As a vehicle for conveying historical information, Mohammad 
Habib's Sultan Ma~~ud of Ghaznin, Aligarh 1927 (2nd edn., Delhi 
1952) has little to recommend it, for he brings few new facts to 
light and relies heavily on Elliot and Dowson. Yet the book has 
some interest because the author reveals himself as a Muslim anti-
elerical and .rationalist. 
55. 
His interpretation of the age of Mapnud is that it was a tirne 
when Islamic religion preserved its outward forms apparently intact, 
but when the earlier, inner fire of the Arab conquests had burnt 
out (2-3, cf. 62-5). Hence H. combats the view, which must have 
been almost sacrosanct in Muslim India when he wrote, that Ma~ud 
was the model warrior for the faith: "F'ar from being a missionary, 
he was not even a fanatic •••• [and] fought with Hindus and Mussal-
mans alike", and "His outlook on life was essentially secular" (18-21). 
It follows that his Indian campaigns "were not crusades but secular 
exploits waged for the greed of glory and gold" (81), and the 
progress of Islam in India was retarded, not forwarded by his campaigns 
there: "The plundered people were not likely to think well of 
Islam when it came to them in the shape of the Ghaznavide conqueror 
•••• As a faith, Islam had been morally disgraced, not elevated, by 
the Ghaznavide's achievement" (44, cf. 85-6). H.'s attitude is thus 
in sharp contrast to that of Nazim (see below), and unlike Nazim, he 
indulges in reflections on the spirit of the age and the role of 
the Ghaznavid empire within it. 
In considering the Ghaznavid administrative system, H. attributes 
to Ma4mud a lack of interest in these affairs which led him to leave 
the~ to his officials, a competent body of men, but one devoid of 
idealism. H. is conscious of the debit side here of the Sultan's 
achievements: "An extensive empire had been established over the 
ruins of many governments. What for? We are not told that Ma~Ud's 
administration was better than what had existed before, while the 
collection of revenue was certainly more strict •••• No laws, good 
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or bad, stand to his name" (73-4). With his critical spirit, H.'s 
approach is in one way superior to that of Nazim, although he shows 
nothing like the latter's industry and grasp of the sources. His 
secularist attitude did not apparently cownend itself to Nazim, who 
quotes his book in his bibliography, but only mentions it in his 
text to correct its errors. 
M. Nazim' s book, .The life and times of Sul ~an MalJ.mud of Ghazna, 
Cambridge 1931, deals with the Sultan against the background of 
military conquest in which he spent his life. This is the author's 
main concern, but he has also endeavoured to do justice to Ma~Ud 
as an administrator, as a pious Muslim, as a patron of the arts and 
as the head of a family. 
N. has used a wide range of Arabic and Persian literary sources, 
and he surveys these in a bibliographical introduction(l-17). As 
well as contemporary and near-contemporary sources, he has used ex-
tensively the products of later Indian historiography. Much of 
this is derivative and repetitive, but a careful gleaning occasionally 
yields new facts. N.'s use of the diwans of cun~uri and Farrukhi, 
with their tedious floridities, is enterprising and to some extent 
rewarding, although the value of these diwans to the historian lies 
less in the facts which they reveal than in the picture of the court 
and cultured life and the insight into contemporary tastes and 
ways of thought which they open out for us. N. might, however, have 
used Manuchihri who first came to the Ghaznavid court during 
l.;a}?.mud's reign (seeR. Levy, Eil Art. 11 MinUcihri"), and whose diwan 
is available in both a Tehran lithograph and in the European edition 
of A. de Biberstein-Kazirnirsky. But H. takes little coe;"!lisance of 
work by earlier European orientalists, except that he uses Barthold's 
Turkestan for Central Asian events. He could have profited from the 
works of scholars who have worked on the periphery of his field: thus 
the v.Jorks of Tornaschek and i~:a.rquart would have a!ilplified his know-
ledge of the historical geography of Afghanistan and neighbouring 
lands (Bartholcl's text of the Ijudtid al-Calarn was not published in 
time for him to have used it). 
In common with other writers on the Ghaznavids like Elliot and 
Dowson, ii1. Longvvorth Dames and Sir Wolseley Haig, H. appears to 
have no knowledge of Turkish. As a result, N. repeats the familiar 
perversions of transliteration practised by Arabic and Persian 
authors when faced with Turkish names and terms (e.g. "Bilkatigin", 
rectius Bilgatigin; "Chaghartig1n", rectius Chaghri-, Chaghirtigin). 
His use of the terms "Turkistan" and "'rurkoman" (127, 131 n.3) is 
vague and imprecise; contemporary sources use the second term at 
least with a specific meaning. This criticism is not captious, for 
0. Pritsak's researches on the Qarakhanids have shovm the importance 
of a good acquaintanceship with Turkish onomastic in throwing light 
on the ramifications within Turkish dynasties and families. Moreover, 
anyone who deals with a Turkish dynasty and has no background know-
ledee of Turkish steppe life, culture and customs, is handicapped. 
Certainly, the Ghaznavid Sultans themselves were quickly Persianised, 
and the sources - all non-Turkish - do not allow us to see clearly 
how much the Turkish ethnic origins of Maqmud and MasCud counted 
for. But these cannot have been altogether negligible; only one 
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generation separatedM~~mTid from the Central Asian steppes; the 
Sultans remained Turkish speaking; and a considerable part of the 
army and most of the top commanders, who were always close to the 
Sultan, were Turks (see below, Part I, 109-10, Part II, 239 ff.). 
When we come to non-literary sources, N. is much weaker. As 
Minorsky has pointed out in his review (BSOS, VI, 1930-2, 1025), l·l. 
has given little a.ttention to Maljmud' s monlllilents and inscriptions, 
even though s. Flury did much careful work on these (see his a.rticles 
in Der Islam, VIII, 1918, and Syria, VI, 1925). Bqually lacking is 
the use by N. of numismatic evidence, although he gives it a cursory 
mention (16). In coins we have a physical link with the Sultans' 
power in the period under study. ~ot only were they in part propa-
gandist documents, proclaiming the extent of the Sultans' claims to 
obedience, but they still indicate to us today the Sultans' financial 
standing. The issue of a good-quality coinage was especially import-
ant within the Ghaznavid empire, spanning as it did the Muslim, 
Central Asian and Indian worlds. 11he Indian plunder enabled trust-
Vlorthy coina..ge to be minted, and the movements of treasure and 
slaves across the empire must have stimulated the circulation of 
money within it. 
l4early half of Sul~an Mal:J.mud is devoted to the Sultan's wars, 
and here N. has combed the sources and thrown much new light on the 
.campaigns ( 42-122). 1i.1 he military nature of the dynasty is thus rightly 
stressed. N.'s work on plotting routes and battle-campaigns is 
most useful, for the Muslim geographers fail us in dealing with 
northern India, and personal knowledge of its topography is a 
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desideratum. A guiding principle of N. in this section is"to exon-
erate hirn [se. Mar;.rnud] from the charge of fanaticism so often 
levelled against him, and to show that his wars in India were not 
the haphazard movements of a predatory warrior but were the results 
of a v;ell-considered programme of conquest and annexation" (xiii-
xiv). He is however, torn between the two views, firstly of buttress-
ing the orthodox Muslim view of Mal:mud as the propagator of the 
faith, and secondly, of showing that his hero was not, pace Barthold, 
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a bigot in religion (161 ff.). But it is irrefutable that the 
Ghaznavid armies in India left behind trails of destruction, and 
there is little trace here of a "well-considered programme". The 
Hindus inevitably recoiled from the Islamic faith, anu the real 
spread of Islam came later and was effected by more peaceful means 
combined with the Indians' own desires to escape from the rigidities 
of the caste system (cf. Arnold's classic study, The preaching of 
Islam). 
N. then surve~the administrative system of Ma~Ud, stressing 
the personal nature of his rule and the empire's dependence on his 
own energies (126-50). N.'s picture of the administration has been 
painstakingly built up from the fragmentary information of sources 
-like B_aiha_q,~, the Siyasat-nama, the Athar al-wuzara' and the Majmac 
al-ansab, but it could have been longer. Five pages on the Ghazna-
vid army are quite inadequate in view of the military nature of the 
empire, the role of the Sultan as war-leader and the importance of 
the slave institution within the state (137-42). An attempt has 
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been made in Part II of this thesis to fill the gap. 
A deeper criticism of this section is that it is superficial, 
in that the information cited has not been properly evaluated. It 
could have been related to the administrative systems of other dyn-
asties, whose practices might be expected to have been copied at 
Ghazna (e.g. those of Bukhara). Further, the system.'s points of 
contact with the subjects have not been brought out; to quote Min-
orsky, ''~e learn nothing on such important questions as revenues, 
essessment, situation of the civil population, especially the peasants, 
to say nothing of the conquered races" (op. cit., 1024). Apart from 
the military one, we do not know what the dynamics of the empire 
were. The military one was certainly very important, but there 
were also those of the administrative tradition, inherited from the 
Samanids and ultimately from Baghdad, and kept alive by the Persian 
secretary class, and of the Turkish strand coming from the Sultans' 
personal entourages. Difficult to evaluate, but undoubtedly of 
importance, was the dynamic of local life inside the empire, whose 
resilience in the face of repeated acts of oppression and natural 
disasters was indeed remarkable. Here, in particular, the sources 
have little direct information, but some picture can be built up 
by inference. 
'rhe book's text ends with an assessment of Ma4roUd's work and 
personal character (151-70). He ascribes to him a role as a 
Maecenas and encourager of learning (156-9), with a genuine interest 
in this. He absolves him from direct responsibilty for ]'irdausi's 
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shabby treatment. But Ma~mUd's patronage was not disinterested, 
for if it had been, scholars of all shades of belief would have been 
welcomed at Ghazna. As it was, Avicenna, with his family's Ism~Cili 
antecedents and personal reputation as a. failasuf, fled from Khwar-
izm to avoid capture by MalpnUd and preferred to end his days at the 
court of a kindred spirit (stigmatised by Ibn al-Athir, IX, 310, as 
fasid al-iCtiqad), the KakUyid CAla' ad-Daula. It is not difficult 
to make out a case that the local Dailami dynasties of central 
Persia and the Caspian coastlands, many of which exhibited heterodox 
and ShiCI tendencies, were more genuinely interested in encouraging 
the revival of Iranian culture than were the rigidly Sunni Sultans 
(see further on this topic, below, Part I, Chapter 5). 
B. Spuler~s Iran in fruh-islamischer Zeit, Politik, Kultur, 
Verwaltung und 6ffentliches Leben zwischen der arabischen und der 
Seldschukischen Eroberung 633 bis 1055, Wiesbaden 1952, represents 
the only large-scale conspectus of the history of Persia in this 
peri'od which we possess. Three-quarters of the book are devoted to 
a kulturgeschichtlich survey (133-518), to which is prefixed a survey 
of the sources (XV-XXXII) and a concise historical survey of the 
period (3-129). The concentration on social, economic and cultural 
history is thus most welcome. 
In the historical section, S.'s central thesis is Iran's "immer 
gleichbleibende BedQrfnissen zu konzentrieren "(VIII), and this 
hisDorical process is seen in the gradual assimilation in this 
period of Islam in its orthodox, Sunni form, and in the attempts of 
Iranian dynasties like the 'l'ahirids and Samanids or 11 kul turell 
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iranisiert'' dynasties like the Ghaznavids and Seljuqs to unite the 
iranian world and impose uniformity over it. S.'s attitude is ess-
entially that of the Sunni historians who extol these dynasties for 
their aristocratic nature and their orthodox piety. The limitations 
of this view for the modern scholar have been pointed out by 1fin-
orsky in his review of s. 's ·book ( JRAS, 1953, 161-3; cf. also, Hrbek 
and Rypka, OLZ, LI, 1956, 249): in particular, that it fails to 
appreciate the parts of the BUyids and lesser Dailami dynasties, many 
of which played significant parts in the encouragement of Iranian 
culture. In this period, ShiCism began to take firm root, but S. 
has little sympathy for the non-Sunni sects and describes the Dail-
arnis as ''a series of Iranian tribes v:ho had remained backwards till 
that time" ( 88). 
Thirteen pages (111-24) are devoted to Mal}.mUd and MasCUd of 
Ghazna, and these deal exclusively with warfare in Transoxania and 
Khurasan, latterly, that with the Seljuqs. Mal}.mud, hero of the 
Sunni historians, is also S.'s hero: "he must undoubtedly be consid-
ered as the most outstanding champion of the faith of his age". His 
supreme achievement lay in his Indian policy: "the permanent estab-
lishment of Islam in India, and with it the creation of a point 
d, appui for a further expansion of the nu-:1bers of the Muslims there, 
is the historical achievement of Ma~mud" (112). But the truth, as we 
have seen, is nearer to Habib's view, that Mal}.mud was rather the 
calculating, unfanatical exploiter of the riches of India, with no 
burning desire to win souls for Islam; and the .legacy his armies 
left behind was one of hatred. 
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The kulturgeschichtlich part of the book has been stigmatised 
by Minorsky, loc. cit., as little rnore than a vast, undigested 
card-index of information, but this is too sweeping a condemnation; 
it is very useful to have information on these topics conveniently 
gathered together, and with so many valuable references. The 
bibliography, listing over 600 works, is of outstanding value 
(532-94). s. has perhaps attempted too much, but his book makes a 
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useful starting point for more specific researches. 
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Part I 
The administrative system of the Ghaznavids 
Chapter One 
Introduc~~ 
It must be said at the outset that the term "state" is used 
here for convenience rather than as an exact description of the 
Ghaznavid dynasty and the territories and peoples over wb.ich it 
ruled, for the "state" of European 1)oli t:i.ca.l theory hHs little 
meaning in 11th century Islam. Most Islamic d.ynasties have in the 
last resort been founded on military force, whether exercised by a 
ruling dynasty wi-th a centralised administration and a professional 
army (e.ge Abbasid Caliphate, the Fa~imids, the Sama,nids, the 
Ghaznavids and the Ottomans) or by a chieftain controlling tribal 
or nomadic bands (e.g. the Dailami dynasties and the many Central 
Asian Turkish and Mongol peoples who irrupted into the Near East and 
eastern Europe). In both cases, the directing genius of the leader 
is most important; but in few Islamic dynasties was the personality 
of the ruler so crucial as amongst the Ghaznavids. Only the military 
skill and the untirir•g activity of Sebtlktigin (Sabuktigin) and 
Ma~ud enableo these Turkish adventurers to become rulers of an 
ertpire which at the latter's death was the most extensive known 
since the dismemberment of the Abbasid Caliphate. 
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In considering the Ghaznavid administrative system, two 
questions will be born in mind. Firstly, dicl the Sultans reg""drd 
their subjects as anything more than c.locile tax-payers, and did the 
subjects in their turn expect anything more tha.n internal pea.ce and 
defence from outside enemies? Secondly, was the administrative 
structure of the empire SllCh that the sovereign's will could speedily 
be enforced. in all parts of the empire, and how rnuch administrative 
continuity was there in such crises ae; the death of the sovereign 
and in succes;;::ion clisputes? It is hoped to elucida.te these points 
by particular reference to Ghaznavid rule in k'burasr;.n and to the 
struct'ltre of the Ghaznavid civil administration and military machine. 
Chapter Two 
The Samanid f~ndations 
An important strand in the theory of government in the Islamic 
world of the 11th century derived from the Persian governmental 
tradition. This stretched back to Achaernenid. times, and included 
an aristocratic and feudal element, in which the importance of 
agriculture and the land, and the duties of the ruling claRseB in 
keeping them prosperous, were stressed. It also included an element 
from the concept of the Divine Ruler, fa.,nilial· all over the Ancient 
Near East. Here, the emperor was regarded as descended from the 
gods and as being the Cosmic Ruler, haft kishyar khvatai or gehan 
khvatai. With his divine status reflected in court ceremonial and 
the insignia of royalty and his priestly education qualifying him as 
sacrificer and fire-priest, the emperor's rule took on a theocratic 
nature. 1 In purely Islamic thinking, disobedience to a ruler, even 
to one who had flagrantly disregarded the Sharrca, was not to be 
undertaken lightly. But in the theocratic Persian view, no right of 
resistance was possible at all, for there could he no motive in 
defying the Divine Ruler. (In practice, as Widengren has pointed 
out, the strength of aristocratic and feudal forces in Persia, 
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dominant in the Parthian period, meant that, whilst the Persian 
emperor's secular authority was very great, it was not unrestricted 
and despotic). 
When these Persian concepts were brought into an Islamic 
context, the divinity of the ruler could no longer be put forward as 
such; only extremists like the Dailami Mardaw~j b. Ziyar and other 
exponents of extravagant Iranian nationalism, whose own Islam was a 
very dubious quantity, openly claimed divine attributes.2 But by the 
11th century, the Persian governmental ethos had leavened most political 
thinking in the Islamic east. A Turkish dynasty like the Ghaznavids 
rapidly left their steppe origins behind and adopted the Perso-Islamic 
Political attitude. A theologian like al-Ghazzali, whom one might 
expect to uphold the older, more purely Islamic views on kingship, 
was strongly influenced by the prevalent Persian ideas; in his 
Na~I9.at al-mulUk his general conception of a ruler is not that of a 
patriarch, but of a despotic monarch. 3 From the later Umayyad period, 
when the Caliph Hisham began to show an interest in Persian history 
and Sassanid court procedure, the Persianisation of the Eastern 
Caliphate continued apace, showing itself especially in administrative 
and financial practice and in the manners and morals of polite society. 
The dominance of~ in education; the influence of the secretaries 
in the diwans, who used Sassanid techniques for coping with the 
growing complexity of the work of ruling; the reliance of the early 
Abbasid5on their Khurasanian guards; all these combined to fuse 
Persian monarchical ideas with the original Arab basis. The Abbasid 
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Caliph-Imams and many of the lesser rulers, from the Arab ijamdanids 
to the Dailami Buyids and the Turkish Ghaznavids, now became raised 
high above their peoples; the gap between ruler and ruled widened and 
the terms raCiyya or rac~y~, "herd, flock of beasts", became generally 
applied to the subjects. 
Yet in one region, that of Khurasan and Transoxania, the process 
had not in the lOth century gone so far. Here the Samanids, a dynasty 
which seems to have been of local, Soghdian origin, ruled from Bukhara. 
The historians are very favourable to the Samanids and to their 
Predecessors and patrons, the ~ahirids. Thus Ibn al-Athir, whilst 
he is eulogising the Samanid IsmaCil b. ~mad, also takes the opport-
unity to contrast the justice of the ~ahirids with the evil conduct 
of one of their predecessors in Nishapur, the governor MuCadh b. Muslim 
(160-3/777-80), and their successors, the ~affarids. Barthold pointed 
out that this favourable bias is attributable to the fact that the 
~ahirids and Samanids both stood for law and order, orthodoxy in 
religion and the preservation of the traditional, hierarchical society, 
whereas the ~affarids were regarded - on the whole, rightly - as base-
-born brigands.4 The same bias is visible in the accounts of the 
geographers; but as contemporary travellers within the Samanid empire, 
they did see things for themselves, and the general prosperity and 
feeling of euphoria which they record as prevailing there rings true. 
Ibn ijauqal visited Transoxania in the reign of Man~fir b. ~u4 (350-66/ 
961-76) and wrote: 
''The. rulers ·over: this-, r~gie>n and· over:··the rest· of_ Kh:urasan are 
of the Samanid dynasty. They are descended from B~am ChOben, 5 
'(1. 
whose bravery and nobility are well-known among the Persians. In 
all the eastern lands there is no kingdom whose borders are better-
-defended, whose population is more numerous, whose material 
possessions are more extensive, whose internal affairs are better-
-regulated, whose resources are more plentiful, where foodstuffs 
are more easily obtainable and where official salaries are more 
regularly paid. All this despite the mildness of taxation there, 
the lightness of their imposts and the small reserves they maintain 
in their treasuries". 
Maqdis! wrote a few years later: 
"They come from a village in the environs of Samarqand called 
Saman, and trace their descent back to Bahram Gfir. God has given 
them success and dominion. They are amongst the most praiseworthy 
and exemplary of monarchs in their conduct and outlook and in the 
respect they give to learning and scholars. If a tree were to 
rise up against the Samanid dynasty, it would surely wither! Have 
you not considered the case of CA~ud ad-Daula, with his despotic 
power, his firm grip on affairs, the perfection of his power and 
his noble personal qualities? He was hailed as ruler in the whole 
of the Yemen, and he achieved this authority without warfare and 
intrigue, but merely by writing an ultimatum and sending an envoy. 
He was hailed in Sind, too, and he conquered cuman and gained 
possession of many other territories. But when he launched himself 
against the Samanids and tried to take Khurasan, God caused him to 
Perish, shattered his assembled might and gave his enemies dominion 
over his own lands. So perdition to whoever tries to attack the 
Samanids! 
Amongst their [laudable] practices is that they do not compel 
men of learning to kiss the ground before them. Also, in the weeks 
of Ramaqan they hold evening meetings for disputation, and these 
are held in the ruler's presence. He himself introduces a topic 
and then they all discuss it. They belong to the law-school of 
Abu ijanifa. Severity towards their subjects is never part of their 
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policy. The Vizier merely puts their ideas into execution [i.e. 
does not act in his own arbitrary way]. Indeed, when they want 
to honour a man, they sit him down at the table with themselves. 
They did exactly this with Shaikh Abu'l-CAbbas al-Yazdadi. When 
important affairs crop up, they frequently interview envoys person-
-ally, just as they spoke directly with Shaikh Abu ~ali~ when they 
despatched him to the commander of the army, Abu'l-~asan [Mu4ammad 
Simjuri]. They always select the most learned and pious of the 
Bukharan scholars, treat him with great respect, act upon his 
counsel, supply his material needs and no~·ninate people to offices 
on his advice, as was the case with the exalted Shaikh and Imam 
Mu4ammad b. al-Faql, until people began to talk amongst themselves 
about this. So now they resort for advice to his successor. 
Have you not observed how they now consult al-~akim al-Imam 
11u4ammad b. YUsuf because he is the most learned and most ascetic 
6 of men?" 
It seems from this passage that the gap between ruler and ruled 
had not yet become so wide as it did under the Ghaznavids. The Amirs 
cultivated the ulema and showed them great respect, exempting them 
from the humiliation of the taqbil and constantly associating them 
with their executive decisions. Indeed, the royal ghulams who in 
301/914 murdered A4road b. IsmaCilrre said to have become alienated 
from him by his excessive frequenting of scholars and theologians. 
~u4 b. Na~r (331-43/943-54) employed the Imam of the ijanafis Abu'l-
-Faql Ml!4ammad as-sulami, "the most learned faq1h of his age", as his 
Vizier. 7 Both the Am1rs and the ulema had a common interest in 
checking the progress in Khurasan and Transoxania of IsmaC11I Sh1Cism, 
8 
which was attracted many converts there in the lOth century. When 
the S!manid empire was being established, the moral support of the 
Abbasid Caliphate was valuable against enemies like the ~affarids 
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and the various Dailami adventurers who coveted Khurasan; so when 
Narshakhi praises IsmaCil b. A~mad, the vanquisher of CAmr b. Laith, 
for his faithfulness to the Caliph's commands, the element of self-
-interest must be remembered. 9 Later, the Abbasid Caliphate fell 
under the tutelage of the Samanids' enemies, the Buyids, and towards 
the end of the lOth century the Amirs found themselves at odds with 
Baghdad when they refused to recognise the succession in 381/991 of 
al-Qadir, but continued to recognise his deposed predecessor, a~-~a'iC. 
After his great victory in 389/999 over the combined forces of the 
Amir CAbd al~alik b. N~ and his generals Abu'l-Qasim Simjuri, Fa'iq 
and Begtuzun (Begtuzrrn), Maqmud b. Sebaktigin became master of 
Khurasan, and in his fat~-nama to the Caliph claimed that it had been 
only the Samanids' refusal to recognise al-Qadir that had caused the 
10 
war in the first place. Nevertheless, the Samanids contented them-
selves with the modest designation of "Amir", and did not arrogate 
to themselves Caliphal titles, as some dynasties in the western 
11 Islamic world had done by the end of the lOth century. 
Na~r b. !4mad (301-31/913-43) built himself a fine palace in 
Bukhara, together with an adjacent building to house the various 
government departments. He could thereby keep in touch with day-to-
-day affairs. Ten diwans were located there: those of the Vizier, 
of the Treasurer (Mustaufi), of the chief of the Correspondence 
Department (CAmid al-Mulk), of the Captain of Police (~~ib-Shura~), 
of the Postmaster (~a~ib-Barid), of the internal espionage system 
(Sharaf, probably to be read as Ishraf), of the Amirs' personal 
domains (mamlaka-yi kha~~), of the M~tasib and of the Qa4r. This 
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proliferation of offices, and their nomenclature, is clearly based 
12 
on the system at Baghdad, with the Vizier as chief executive officer. 
Already under the S~m~nids there were local families, like those of 
BalCami and CUtbi, who were professional bureaucrats and who held 
the Vizierate for long periods, just as the Abbasids had their 
Barmakis, Naubakhtis and Furatis. Al-Khwarizmi's encyclopaedia, the 
Matati9. al-CulUm, was written in the Samanid dominions and dedicated 
to NU~ b. Man~ur's Vizier Abu'l-ijasan CUbaidallah cutbi {see above, 
Bibliographical introduction, 39 ). In his section on kitaba, it 
is Samanid practice upon which he draws for his explanations of 
administrative organisation and techniques. We can deduce from this 
section the complexity and advanced state of their bureaucracy, in 
particular, of the Diwan al-kharaj (taxation) and the Diwan al-jaish 
(military affairs); al-Khwarizmi states that the Samanids had twenty-
-six different types of daftar, official registers, for recording 
financial and military transactions. 13 
The Samanid administration's sphere of operation was essentially 
Transoxania itself, the valleys of the Zarafshan and the middle Oxus, 
with Khurasan in close dependence. However, Khurasan tended latterly 
to fall under the control of powerful military leaders, whether of 
Turkish slave origin, like Tash (Tash), Begtuzun and the eunuch Fa'iq, 
or drawn from local landowning families, like Abu CAli Chaghani and 
the SimjUris, who had extensive estates in QUhistan.14 Their ascend-
ancy in the second half of the lOth century was symptomatic of the 
enfeeblement of the Samanids. The Samanids also regarded as their 
tributaries adjacent rulers like the ~affarids in Sisfan, the 
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Farighfinids in Guzgan, the Khwarizmshahs and the rulers of Iranian 
or Arab origin in the upper Oxus principalities of Chaghaniyan and 
15 Khuttal. On none of these was the Samanid hand a heavy one. 
As a centre for controlling Soghd and for speedy access to the 
Oxus crossing at Amul-i Sha~~ the Samanid capital Bukhara was well 
sited. I~~akhri stresses this strategic aspect: "The Samanid 
governors of Khurasan established themselves at Bukhara because it 
was the nearest of the Transoxanian cities to Khurasan. When someone 
fixes himself there, he has Khurasan in front of him and Transoxania 
behind him. Their [se. the people of Bukhara's] good behaviour 
towards their governors and the infrequency of their rebelling 
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brought about the Samanids' decision to settle among them". The 
Arab governors of Ma wara' an-Nahr had established themselves further 
up the Zarafshan valley at Samarqand, but Bukhara also had ancient 
traditions as a capital; Na~r b. A~mad's new palace and government 
building in the Rigistan of Bukhara were on the site of the pre-
17 
-Islamic Bukhar-Khudahs' palace. Before the Samanids, Transoxania 
had always been a politically fragmented region. Its broken topo-
~phy of mountain ranges, fertile valleys and irrigated oases had 
encouraged the growth there, from at least Hellenistic times onwards, 
18 
of city-states; these had often been involved in internecine warfare. 
Into this region, the Samanids - whose early fortmnes had owed 
something to the patronage of the Caliph al~a'mUn - placed an admin-
istration modelled on that of Baghdad and thereby introduced a new 
element of centralisation there.
19 
On the other hand, the social system of Transoxania and Khurasan 
82. 
was in many respects different from that prevailing in the heart 
of the Caliphate. This region formed the north-eastern bastion of 
the Iranian world against the barbarians of Central Asia, and the 
historic role of defending it was taken over by the Samanids. It 
was also the transition area connecting the Islamic Near East with 
the Eurasian steppes and the routes to the Far East, and played an 
important part in conveying trans-Asiatic commerce. The landed and 
trading interests of the region demanded a well-protected frontier 
against the Turks and a political and military authority which could 
command respect inside the steppes and so secure the safe passage of 
caravans. In their heyday, the Samanids provided this authority, 
but when eventually they weakened, the local landed and commercial 
interests were obliged to come to terms with the Qarakhanid (Qarakhanid) 
invaders. 
In general, Samanid policy in Central Asia was not an aggressive 
one; in the lOth century, especially, the possession of Khurasan and 
Ray, rather than of bare steppeland, was a more lucrative prize. 
Normally, activity along the northern frontiers of Transoxania was 
the minimum consonant with defence needs and the maintenance of the 
dynasty's prestige within the steppes. Slaves were the chief reward 
which warfare there could bring, and without this compensation -
admittedly a considerable one in the economy of Transoxania (see 
below, Part IV, 405-6 ) -all raids would have been unremunerative; 
the nomad has no towns or valuables to pillage and can quickly send 
his herds back into the deep steppe. Only in their earlier, expans-
ionist stage did the Amirs adopt a forward policy. Farghana was 
B3. 
definitely conquered for Islam in the middle of the 9th century, 
Possibly by NU~ b. Asad; more certainly, he conquered Isfijab in 
840 and in the next century it was ruled by a tributary Turkish 
dynasty. In 893 IsmaCil b. ~mad dethroned the local dynasty of 
Afshins in UshrUsana, brought the area under direct rule and then 
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pushed on to capture Talas. Besides military campaigns like these, 
there was continuous activity on the frontiers by the ghazis of the 
In the Isfijab province, towns like Binkath and Sauran 
bristled with riba~s against the Oghuz and Kim~k (Kimak); the 1700 
or so riba~s of Isfijab were manned in part by volunteers from 
Nakhshab, Bukhara and Samarqand. In I~~akhri's time, Isfijab paid 
kh -· b fit f t •t• 
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described as having many riba~s; those at Dizak were manned by ghazis 
from Samarqand, and the famous riba~ of Khudaisir had been built by 
the Afshin ijaidar and endowed by him with auqaf. The defence of 
Baikand, a vital point on the Bukhara-Amul road, which guarded the 
communications with Khurasan against the Oghuz of the Qara Qum, was 
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the special responsibility of the Bukharans. Life in these frontier 
regions bred tough, self-reliant communities lacking the graces of 
more settled existence; Maqd_isi describes the inhabitants of the 
23 
town of Isfijab as wild beasts, churlish, violent and self-satisfied. 
This fundamental fact of the frontier meant that in Transoxania 
the landed, military class was notable in the social hierarchy, 
whilst in Khurasan the dihqan class of small landowners was numerous 
and influential to an extent unknown in parts of the Islamic world 
further west, where rulers had often succeeded in curbing the power 
of local, feudal elements and reducing them to the general level of 
subjects below the throne. In the north-eastern part of the Persian 
world, the survival of the agrarian, feudal society of earlier Iran 
was combined with the keen, mercantile spirit of the urban traders 
and manufacturers, both of these elements enjoying equal importance 
there. This situation may be in part ascribed to geographical and 
economic reasons, as was suggested above; but also to the fact that 
Transoxania and Khwarizm escaped the Sassanid social reaction in 
which an attempt was made to model the state on the pre-Parthian 
past. Sassanid political, and above all cultural and religious, 
influence was certainly strong beyond the Oxus. Local rulers in 
Soghd and Chach (but not in Khwarizm , which had its own independent 
cultural tradition) minted coins on the Sassanid pattern. However, 
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direct political control by the Sassanids ended not far beyond Merv. 
The landowning and dihqan classes were longer-lived and socially more 
powerful here than in Persia proper; large personal retinues were 
kept up and the heroic virtues of hospitality and entertaining 
practised on a scale which drew enthusiastic praise from travellers. 
Maqdisi calls the people of Khwarizm ahl qiyafa wa nahma fi'l-akl. 
I~~~khri expatiates on the intense hospitality of the people of 
Transoxania, and mentions the house of a landowner of Soghd whose 
door had not been closed for a century or more and who fed and lodged 
a hundred or two hundred travellers each night. Four hundred years 
later Ibn Ba~~u~a declared in similar vein that he had never met a 
people who had nobler and more praiseworthy characters or who were 
more pleased to receive strangers than the people of Khwarizm.25 At 
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the very end of the Samanid period, the common people in the towns 
retained their personal arms, and were ready to defend th~ir homes or 
to sally forth as ghaz!s. The S~l~r of the Bukh~ran ghazis was an 
important military figure at this time; and Ma~mud of Ghazna was able 
to attract thousands of the Transoxanian ghazis for his Indian 
. 26 campa1gns. 
Such were the social and military conditions within which the 
S~anids had to work. Their administrative model was essentially 
that of the Caliphate in Baghdad, and it can hardly be doubted that 
they aimed at increasing the element of centralisation in their 
dominions and at raising their own status as rulers. In the event, 
the counter-balancing elements of the landowners and merchants 
frustrated these trends~ it must be remembered that any increase in 
the central power meant fresh taxation. Moreover, from the reign of 
Nfi4 b. Na~r onwards, the cost of dealing with rebellious governors in 
Khurasan began to cause periodic deficits. Attempts to tap new 
sources of revenue, such as the inheritance tax introduced in the 
Baihaq district in the last years of the Samanids by the local 
governor, the Amir Abu'l-Fa~l Ziyad, were felt to be tyrannical; 
27 
even the Ghaznavids did not retain this particular tax. The landed 
class was also that of the military leaders and cavalrymen. Many 
Transoxanian dihqans found their way to Baghdad as soldiers of fortune 
28 
and were made officers in the Turkish slave armies of the Caliphs. 
The Saminid Amirs had to rely heavily on this class for their own 
armies, but tried to break away from over-dependence on them by 
recruiting Turkish slave ghulams; here again, the Abbasid Caliphate 
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was the model. Moreover, Turks already settled within the borders 
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of Transoxania had already been employed by local Soghdian rulers. 
From the Samanid ghulams arose great commanders like Alptigin and 
SebUktigin, and in this way, the idea of the slave army passed from 
Baghdad via the Samanids to the Ghaznavids on the easternmost borders 
of Islam. Unfortunately for the Samanid Amirs, their hope that the 
Turks would be a counterbalance to the military power of the Iranian 
landed classes proved false; the royal ghulams were often turbulent 
and acted as king~akers in succession disputes. 
Following the Abbasids, the Samanids aimed to make their court 
a centre of culture and graceful living, and the Amirs' part in 
encouraging the renaissance of New Persian literature was appreciable. 
There is a fine description of the splendour of Na~r b. A4road's court 
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in one of Rudaki's poems. Nevertheless, because of the social and 
military factors outlined above, the Samanids' absorption of Abbasid 
ideas on administration and court ceremonial could not proceed beyond 
a certain point, and the Amirs could never make themselves into 
absolute rulers. In the first half of the lOth century at least the 
Amir was not permanently resident in the administrative capital of 
of Bukhara; Na~r b. Aqmad used to take his army and spend the summer 
in Samarqand, Herat or some other of the cities of Khurasan. 31 The 
passage quoted from Maqdisi ( above, 77-8 ) shows that the Amirs 
were by no means withdrawn from immediate contact with their subjects 
and that they could receive them without undue ceremony. 
Finally, the failure of the Samanids' attempts to conciliate the 
religious classes and to draw them to their own side may be noted. 
Indeed, in the increasingly frequent succession troubles the religious 
elements often aligned themselves with the anti-dynastic forces of 
the landowners and military leaders. Hilal a~~abi' gives the 
account of a merchant, one Abu'l-ijasan b. Ilyasac al-Farisi, who 
witnessed the entry of the Ilig Na~r into Bukhara in 389/999· The 
kha~ibs of Bukhara, who were of course salaried servants of the 
Samanids, tried to raise the population on behalf of the Amirs, saying: 
"You are aware how well we have conducted ourselves and how cordial 
have been the relations between us. The enemy now menaces us, and it 
is your manifest duty to help us and fight on our behalf. So ask 
God's grace in succouring our cause". But the people consulted the 
representatives of popular religious feeling, the faqihs, who dissuad-
-ed the people from taking up their arms and risking their lives 
against other good Muslims, as were the Qarakhanids (Qarakhanids): 
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iCtizal al-fitna aula. 
Chapter Three 
The establishment of Sebttktigin in Ghazna 
The town of Ghazna, which became the centre of SebUktigin's 
empire, had been in theory a possession of the Samanids, but in 
practice, control from Bukhara had been tenuous. Although the 
Arabic geographers of the lOth century describe Ghazna as one of the 
entrepots (fura~) of the transit trade connecting Khurasan and Trans-
oxania, its economic role was never as important in this respect as 
that of Kabul. It was really the Ghaznavid Sultans who erected 
Ghazna, previously a small town on the margin of the Indian political 
and cultural world, into the centre of an empire, and Babur, visiting 
it when it was again insignificant, wondered at this: "Ghazna is a 
very humble place; strange indeed it is that rulers in whose hands 
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were Hindustan and Khurasan should have chosen it for their capital! 11 
The Ghaznavids used the town as a spring-board for their winter 
campaigns into India, and their empire inevitably acquired a bias 
towards India; in Sultan MasCud's time this was to prove a source of 
strategic weakness in dealing with the Turkmen and other threats in 
the west (see below, Part V). On the other hand, despite territor-
ial losses in the west to the Seljuqs, the Ghaznavids were able to 
survive as a considerable power in eastern Afghanistan and northern 
India for another 130 years. 
The most important of the former Sam~id provinces to pass into 
Ghaznavid hands was Khurasan, with its rich economic resources, its 
fertile agricultural oases and its populous towns. It was the 
taxative potentialities of the province which appealed to the Ghazna-
vids, with their insatiable demands for treasure, the sinews of war. 
Solidarity of race and culture and comparatively restrained exercise 
of power by the Am!rs had knit the two main province of the Samanids' 
empire, Transoxania and Khurasan, into a fairly organic whole; 
whereas under the Ghaznavids, when the prosperity of Khurasan was 
threatened by the Turkmens, the people of Khurasan became conscious 
of the remoteness of the capital Ghazna and of the pull of India for 
the Sultans. 
The outlying dynasties in loose tributary status to the Samanids, 
such as those in Khwarizm, Sistan, Guzgan, Gharchistan, Chaghaniyan 
and Khuttal, also passed under Ghaznavid suzerainty, and a systematic 
policy of bringing them under closer control was pursued by Ma~mud. 
By a combination of ruthless diplomacy and military force, the local 
Ma'mUnid dynasty of Khwarizm was in 408/1017 overthrown and the 
province brought under direct control; for the next twenty-four years 
or so it was ruled by the ghulam general Altuntash {AltiTntash) and 
his sons. 34 The upper Oxus principalities were strategically import-
ant as outposts against the Turks who lived to the north, and these 
were left in the hands of their old rulers; but where considerations 
such as this were absent, the Sultan did not hesitate to intervene. 
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The Sher of Gharchistan, Muqammad b. Abi Na~r Muqammad, may have 
encouraged the Ilig Na~r's ambitions in Khurasan; be that as it may, 
in 403/1012 Maqmud invaded the province, deposed its dynasty and 
annexed their lands. When in 401/1010-11 the Far!ghunids of Guzgan 
failed to provide an heir of suitable age, Ma4roud stepped in and 
installed his son Mu4ammad as governor. 35 In Sistan, the ~affarid 
Amlr Khalaf b. Ahmad was deposed in 393/1002, and the Sultan's brother, 
AbU'l-Mu~affar Na~r, eventually installed as governor; but scions of 
the ~affarid family continued to head cayyar bands and lead them 
against the Ghaznavids, and up to the time when the Seljuqs reached 
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S!stan, the land was rarely quiet. 
Before SebUktigin achieved power in Ghazna and zabulistan, a 
series of Turkish governors, ghulams of the Samanids, had ruled there. 
The commander-in-chief of the Samanid forces in Khurasan, Alptigin, 
together with the Vizier Abu CAli Muqammad BalCami, had staged a putsch 
on the death in 961 of the Am!r CAbd al-Malik b. ~u4. They failed to 
place their candidate on the throne, and the triumph of the rival 
party made Alptigin's position uneasy. So he decided to withdraw to 
the eastern fringes of the empire. The sources state that he made 
for India to avoid his enemies at court and to earn divine merit by 
raiding the Hindus; he had no intention of capturing Ghazna, and was 
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only forced to ~ake it when the local ruler denied him transit. In 
reality, Alptigin was probably influenced by the example of a group 
of Turkish ghulams of the Samanids who had already become largely 
independent on the southern borders of the empire. The general 
Qaratigin (Qaratigin) of Isfijab had established himself at Bust and 
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ar-Rukhkhaj before his death in 929; and a line of his own ghulams 
succeeded him at Bust as governors. They were frequently involved 
in the affairs of their ~affarid neighbours. It was a dispute between 
two of these ghulams, Toghan (~ughan) and Baytuz (Baytuz), which in 
367/977-8 gave SebUktigin a pretext to intervene and add Bust to his 
existing territories. 38 
Alptigin proceeded with a small force of his own ghulams and of 
ghaz!s, subduing en route the Iranian Sher of Bamiyan and the Hindu-
-shah! king of Kabul. 
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After besieging the citadel of Ghazna for 
four months, Alptigin wrested the town from its ruler, Abu CAli or 
Abu Bakr Law!k or AnUk. Despite the Islamic kunyas, and pace Marquart, 
Eransahr, 298, who considered him to be certainly a Muslim and perhaps 
a descendant of the Zunb!l whom YaCqub b. Laith took prisoner (see 
below),.this Lawik was not necessarily a Muslim; the whole form of 
his name is[very dubious, and he is described as the brother-in-law of 
the ruler of Kabul's son. It was from Kabul that Lawik sought aid 
in an attempt to regain Ghazna during the governorship of one of 
Alptigin's successors. 
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The regions of Bust, ar-Rukhkhaj, Zabulistan, Ghazna and Kabul 
had been invaded at the end of the 9th century by YaCqub and CAmr b. 
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Laith. On his first expedition, YaCqub captured the Zunbil of 
zabulistan, identified by Marquart with the ruler of an extensive 
kingdom in the Helmand basin, the Firuz b. Kabk mentioned by MasCud! 
and Ibn Khallikan, who was probably subordinate to the Kabulshahs. 
On a second expedition, this time in 870, the two brothers reached 
Bamiyan and Kabul and again captured the Zunbil, who had fled to 
Kabul. 
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In 900 Khurasan, S!st~n and these regions of eastern Afghan-
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istan passed to IsmaCil b. A4mad and henceforth became part of the 
Samanid empire. In practice, these last regions were too distant to 
be controlled from Bukhara. Probably they reverted to their original, 
local rulers, who may have received some form of investiture from the 
Samanids and who may have paid some tribute, although even this is 
doubtful. The Shers of Bamiyan were Iranian rulers, but Kabul was 
ruled first by the Hinduised Turk-Shahis and then after c.850 by the 
purely Indian Hindu-Shahis. The racial origins of the Zunb!ls and 
the mysterious Lawik are unknown, but their close links with Kabul 
43 point, at the least, to strong Indian influences. 
The Turkish ghulams of the Samanids came to a land where some 
Turkish ethnic elements had been known in earlier centuries. 
Marquart visualised the whole of eastern Afghanistan as once held by 
first the Kushans and then by the Ephthalites or White Huns, the Sveta 
~a of the Hindus and the Hai]al (rectius, ~ Hab~al, cf. A. Herrmann, 
"Die Hephthaliten und ihre Beziehungen zu China", Asia Major, II, 1925, 
571-2) or Haya~ila of the Arab historians, and as retaining in the 
early Islamic period a strong ethnic flavour of the Ephthalites. He 
connects the very name "zabulistan" with an Ephthalite tribe, Jativla, 
Jabula, Jabuvlah, known from northern Indian inscriptions. The 
Oghuz and Khalaj Turks, who in the early Isla;nic period roamed from 
!ukharistan and Badakhshan down to Bust, would thus be the remnants 
of Turkish peoples brought from north of the Oxus as part of the 
Ephthalite confederation and left behind there. Marquart's theory 
is by no means certain, although Frye and Sayrlr have recently foll6w-
ed him.
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Yet there is no doubt about their existence there in pre-
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Ghaznavid times. At the opening of the 9th century, the Kabulshah 
had to send an annual tribute of 2000 Oghuz slaves to the governor 
of Khurasan, CAbdallah b. Tahir. In the Caliphate of al-Man~fir, 
Macn b. Za~ida as-5ulami was governor of Sistan, and he received from 
the Zunbil at his winter capital of ar-Rukhkhaj the customa~y 
tribute of camels and Turkish felt tents and slaves (qibab Turkiyya 
wa raqiq). 
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The Zunbil is said to have had a bodyguard from the 
local Turks, at-Turk ad-Dawari. 46 I~~akhri says that up to his own 
time, the Khalaj of Zamindawar had kept their Turkish customs, 
external appearance and (?) language. 47 The Khalaj survived as an 
ethnic unity for several more centuries; they were subdued and 
recruited into his army by SebUktigin; they formed an important 
element in the armies of the Ghaznavids, Ghurids and Khwarizmshahs; 
they were the progenitors of the Lodi king,s of Delhi (1451-1526); 
and their name probably survive.s today in that of the modern Ghilza'I 
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Afghans. Some form of authority was exercised over these nomads in 
the lOth century by the Samanid central government; the youthful 
SebUktigin was once sent by his master Alptigin in a military force 
to collect the customary taxes from the "Khalaj and Turkmens". 49 
Alptigin had his position in Ghazna regularised by a patent of 
investiture (manshur) from the Amir Man~Ur b. NU4. 50 On his death in 
352/963, he designated in his wa~aya his son Abu Is4aq Ibrahim (or 
perhaps, Ist~q b. Ibrahim) as his successor; for the next three years 
Abu Is9aq held the governorship of Ghazna, travelling to Bukhara, 
apologising for his father's errors and securing investiture from the 
Amir. It was to Bukhara that he fled for the year 964-5 when Lawik 
temporarily re-occupied Ghazna, bringing back military aid from the 
Samanid capital. On his death in 355/966, the Turkish troops in 
Ghazna chose one of their commanders, Bilgetigin (Bilkatigin), a 
former ghulam of Alptigin's, as their leader; like his predecessor 
he sent to Bukhara offering his allegiance and explaining that he 
had been elected by the Turks' popular acclamation. Shabankara•r 
records that in Bukh~ra the ~jib Fa'iq was bitterly opposed to the 
"Turkish rabble" {mushti Atrak) being left in Ghazna in virtual indep-
-endence and that he sent an army to assert direct authority over 
them. Bilgetigin defeated it, and no army was ever sent out from 
Bukhara again. After governing Ghazna for ten years, Bilgetigin 
died in 364/975, and another of Alptigin's ghulams, Piri or Piritigin 
(1 B~ri, BBritigin), held power for two years. He too regarded 
himself as governor for the Samanids, for as insignia of office he 
had the pointed hat (kulah), cloak (qaba) and girdle (kamar) which 
were to be the standard outfit of a governor under the Ghaznavids 
(cf. Baihaqi, 50, 430, 492 and passim)and which are clearly Persian 
in origin.51 Indeed, after Alptigin's son Abu Is~aq had had to 
apply to Bukhara for help to recover Ghazna, the money coined at 
Ghazna began to include the name of the Samanid Amir as well as that 
of the local governor. 52 It may be assumed that the name of the Amirs 
was also in the khu~ba. 
B~ritigin's misrule caused the people of Ghazna to invite Lawik 
back again, and it was by Sebaktigin's skill that he was repulsed. 
In 366/977 the Turkish soldiery in Ghazna deposed B6ritigin, and 
SebUktigin took his place and began a twenty years' reign. Already 
95. 
during B6ritigin's governorship he had had the substance of power, 
and was thus able to impose his own terms upon the soldiery. During 
his reign, the main lines of Ghaznavid expansion, which Maqmud was 
later to follow, were laid down: south-westwards to Bust and Qu~dar; 
eastwards into India, against the Hindu-shahi Rajas of Waihand; and 
latterly, SebUktigin intervened decisively in Khurasanian affairs. 
Sebttktigin was again one of Alptigin's ghulams. His Turkish origins 
and early life are known from three main sources. Firstly, there is 
the preface to SebUktigin's own Pand-nama (see above, Bibliographical 
introduction, 20-1 ) • Secondly, there is Juzjani, who in his 
~abaqat-i Na~iri, 6-8, tr. 67-75, quotes a lost part of Baihaqi's 
history which dealt with SebUktigin's reign under the title Ta'rikh-i 
Na~iri, and also a general history, now lost, the Ta'rikh-i mujadwal 
of Abu'l-Qasim Mll4ammad b. CAli Cimadi (see above, Bibliographical 
introduction, 19 ). Thirdly, there is the not very reliable 
account of SebUktigin's rise as Alptigin's ghulam in the Samanid 
service, given in the Siyasat-nama of Ni~am al-Mulk, eh. XXVII, 111-26, 
written at least a century after most of the events described there. 
According to the Pand-nama, Sebaktigin (Sabuktigin) came from 
the Barskhan, or as Kashghari spells it, Barsghan tribe of Turks.53 
The main settlement! of the Barskhan people, which bore the same name, 
was on the southern shore of the Issiq-G61; the father of Kashghari, 
author of the Diwan lughat at-Turk, came from there. Since the 
Barskhan were part of the Qarluq confederation, it is a curious point 
that both the Ghaznavids and their great rivals the Qarakhanids may 
have sprung from the same tribal grouping. 54 Obsequious genealogists 
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of the Ghaznavids were unable to get round this fact of SebUktigin's 
pagan Turkish birth, but did later succeed in connecting his tribe 
with Yezdegird III, the last Sassanid emperor. It is noteworthy 
that the Persian culture which the Sultans acquired eventually led 
their court genealogists to attach them to the Iranian past, as had 
the ._ .. genealogists of the Samanids, Buyids and Ziyarids, and not to 
some ancient princely family of the Turks, which would have been just 
as easy and more plausible. This alleged Persian connection of the 
Barskhan tribe is inserted in the Pand-nama's preface, and may have 
been elaborated during the 11th century. A complete genealogy 
connecting SebUktigin with Yezdegird appeared in the Ta'rikh-i 
mujadwal, whose date is, however, unknown; Barthold found an indication 
that its author might have flourished in the early 12th century. 55 
On the other hand, we know definitely that Ma4mud was praised for 
his Turkish lineage. cutbi quotes verses in which the poet BadiC 
az-Zaman Abu'l-FaQ.l al-Hamadhani says that "The house of Bahram [se. 
the Samanids] has become subject to the son of the Khaqan". 56 This 
emphasis on the Sultan's Turkishness comes, of course, from the early 
years of the Ghaznavid dynasty. 
Sebnktigin's enslavement was typical of what often happened in 
the internecine warfare of Turkish peoples in Central Asia. He was 
captured by a neighbouring tribe, the Bakhtiyan (read "Tukhsiyan".::. 
Tukhs). The Tukhs are described by Marvazi as one of the divisions 
of the Qarluq confederation; they lived in the Chu valley to the north-
57 
-west of the Issiq ~1. SebUktigin was sold to a slave-dealer of 
Chach, who took him with other captives to a slave-depot at Nakhshab. 
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After a period of training in the military and equestrian arts, he 
was bought at Nishapur by the ijajib Alptigin for service in his 
58 
guard. Thereafter, according to Ni~~ al-Mulk's narrative, he 
climbed rapidly under Alptigin's patronage and at a ~ate much quicker 
than the normal cursus bonorum for Samanid ghulams allowed, for 
Alptigin had early discerned in him the marks of future greatness. 
At the age of eighteen, he already commanded 200 ghulams. On 
Alptigin's withdrawal to Ghazna, he accompanied his master and played 
a prominent part in defeating in Tukharistan the pursuing Samanid 
On Alptigin's death, he passed to Abu Isqaq Ibrahim as 
partr~of his father's bequest to him. CUtbi, and following him Ibn 
al-Athir, begin SebUktigin's career only as a ghulam of Abu Is~aq, 
whom Ibn al-Athir calls "Commander of the army of Ghazna for the 
Samanids"; he accompanied Abu Is~aq to Bukhara when he was temporarily 
expelled by Lawik, and became known at court for his intelligence, 
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judgement and piety. The Pand-nama, ed. Nazim, 613-14, tr. 623, 
merely records briefly SebUktigin's passing into Alptigin's hands 
and sube~uent rise to favour. It is likely that Ni~am al-Mulk's 
elaborate story of his gradual rise in his master's esteem is largely 
invention, and that SebUktigin, although originally bought by Alptigin, 
did not achieve prominence until Alptigin and his son settled at 
Ghazna. 
During the governorships in Ghazna of Bilgetigin and B5ritigin, 
Sebnktigin's prestige grew among the Turkish troops, and on BBritigin's 
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deposition,/was chosen by the army as their head. Whilst in Ghazna, 
SebUktigin had for some time been winning over other army chiefs to 
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his side by lavish twice-weekly feasts for them, and this work of 
ta'lif qulUbihim now bore fruit. He also acquired local connections 
outside the ranks of his Turkish fellow-soldiers; the future Sultan 
Ma~ud was born in 971 of the daughter of a chief (ra'Is) of zabul-
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istan, whom SebUktigin had married. Like his immediate predecess-
ors in Ghazna, SebUktigin continued to regard himself as governor( 
there for the Samanids. The names of the Amtrs appear on his coins 
before his own one, and the title on his tomb at Ghazna, al-~jib 
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al-Ajall, shows that he clung to this status till his death. Hence 
in 993 the Amir Nu~ b. Na~r, faced with the generals Fa'iq and Abu 
CAli SimjiTri united against him in rebellion, summoned Sebuktigin 
to Transoxania. His oath of allegiance to the Amir was renewed, and 
for the next few years, the attentions of SebUktigin and his son 
Ma~ud were focussed on Khurasan. As Samanid power weakened, they 
·found themselves well-placed to share in the spmils and, in the end, 
to partition the Samanid dominions with the Qarakhanids. 64 
When Sebfiktigin became governor of Ghazna and Zabulistan, the 
Turkish soldiery who had originally accompanied Alptigin thither 
had been established there some fifteen years. They had implanted 
a system of fiefs, and later in the Ghaznavid period four agricultural 
areas around Ghazna, (?) NUgh, (?) Khimar, Lamghan and Shah-Bahar, 
are mentioned as fiefs of the Turks and their descendants. 65 The 
system of military fiefs was already well-known in the Samanid empire. 
Alptigin himself had accumulated an immense number of estates and 
properties all over Khurasan and Transoxania: 500 villages in out-
right ownership (dih-i milk); palaces, gardens, caravanserais and 
baths in every town of note; revenues assigned to him from estates 
99. 
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(mustaghall); a million sheep and 100,000 horses, mules and camels. 
By the time SebUktigin came to power, the system in Zabulistan had 
got into disorder. Apparently mustaghall-type fiefs were being 
converted into outright ownership (tamlik) and the warriors were 
settling down as cultivators, with a consequent disinclination from 
taking up their arms. On the other hand, the central administration 
in Ghazna was tending to appropriate lands allotted to the soldiers 
and turn them into state lands (d1hha-yi diwan1). At some point 
early in his reign SebUktigin reformed the system, insisting that 
all fiefs should be of the mustaghall-type, that the revenues from 
these should be paid out to the army by the central Diwan, and that 
thsoe soldiers whose incomes had declined through appropriation of 
fiefs should have them made up to the amount originally allotted.
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At an early date, if this had not been already done by his pre-
decessors, SebUktigin must have had to set up government offices. 
Basically, three diwans were necessary: one to administer and tax 
the territories which gradually became added to the nucleus around 
Ghazna; a second to deal with correspondence and diplomatic relations 
with Bukhara; and a third to see to the mustering, payment and prov-
-isioning of the army, which was already assuming a dominant role. 
Thus emerged the three administrative branches, later to be formally 
organised as the D1wan-i Wazir, the Diwan-i Rasa'il and the Diwan-i 
CAr4, under the Vizier, the Chief Secretary and the CAri4 respective-
ly. The personnel of these offices would be wholly Persian. The 
contacts which Alptigin and his successors had kept up with the 
Bukharan court must have entailed some coming-and-going of financial 
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and administrative personnel, with the resultant transfer of Samanid 
practices to Ghazna. There may have been a few representatives of 
Samanid authori:t-y in Zabulistan before Alptigin's arrival. We 
cannot trace a definite series of Viziers of SebUktigin, as can be 
done for later Sultans, but there seems to have been a nucleus of 
Persian secretaries in Ghazna whom SebUktigin could call upon for 
duty. When in 367/977-8 he left for his Bust expedition (see above, 
91 ), he appointed the boy Ma4IDud as his lieutenant in Ghazna, 
and left as his Vizier the official Abu CAli Kirmanr, whose nisba 
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suggests the possibility that he had once been in the Buyid service. 
Through the Bust expedition SebUktigin acquired the services of the 
noted scholar and rhetorician, Abu'l-Fat~ Busti, a fact which cutbi 
accounts one of the chief results of the campaign. Abu' 1-Fath had . 
been secretary to the Turkish ghulam ruler of Bust, Baytuz. Now 
he became chief of SebQktigin's Diwan-i Rasa'il, with the duty, among 
other things, of composing his master's fat9,-namas, and remained in 
this post until early in Ma~ud's reign. 69 
The last paragraph has suggested that SebUktigin must have drawn 
on the relatively advanced Samanid model in setting up his administr-
ation in Ghazna. It must be remembered, however, that institutions 
and practices can rarely be tranplanted en bloc from their homeland 
to a strange environment, and Ghazna and Zabulistan were on the far 
periphery of the Samanid empire. The Ghazna region itself had no 
strong local traditions of governmental procedure, but it is likely 
that there were influences from the adjacent Indian world, especially 
from the Kabul valley, where a Hindu dynasty ruled until Alptigin 
began his campaigns there (see above, 91-2 ) • The chief innovation 
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which the Turkish ghulam commanders introduced into the village 
organisation of the Ghazna region lay in the system of military fiefs 
for their followers; but beyond this, there cannot have been any 
question of imposing from outside a completely new system in local 
affairs. 
In one direction, the early Ghaznavids did in part adapt themsel-
ves to local conditions: their system of minting coins. No attempt 
was made to set up a uniform, centralised system here. Their coins 
show the distinctive traits of various local mints. SebUktigin's 
main minting-place was at Parwan; these coins from the Bamiyan-Kabul 
area vary considerably from those of his Samanid suzerains, but 
approximate in size and weight to those of the Hindu-Shahi kings of 
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Kabul. (Comparatively speaking, the silver coinage of the Ghazna-
vids was considered by E. Thomas to be heavier than that of the 
Samanids (average of 50-55 grains compared with 45 grains) and 
nearer to that of the Indian Kabul kings (average 50 grains). On 
the other hand, Ghaznavid gold coinage seems to be modelled on that 
minted by Ma4IDud at Nishapur when he was governor there). 71 The 
silver coins minted by Ma~ud at Ghazna differ perceptibly from those 
he minted at Nishapur. The products of mints in Balkh and Sistan 
can likewise be distinguished from those of elsewhere. Thus the 
policy was to retain existing provincial patterns and to change them 
as little as possible. 72 This Applied especially to the conquered 
territories of India, which had their own patterns of economic and 
social life entirely different from those of the Islamic world. 
Sebaktigin struck coins for Indian circulation, and in Ma~ud's 
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reign are first attested the well-known bilingual coins with legends 
in both Arabic and Devanagari characters; Thomas mentions one from 
412/1023 and Lane Poole catalogues two minted at Ma~udpur in 418/ 
1027. On these coins, the Ghaznavids combined Islamic titles and 
professions of faith with Hindu motifs, the recumbent Bull of Siva, 
73 Nand!, and the Sanskrit superscription "Sri Samanta Deva". 
side the sphere of numismatics, it is difficult to estimate what 
Out-
the fabric of the Ghaznavid empire in its full florescence owed to 
local foundations; but if the highly-developed superstructure was 
Persian and Samanid in inspiration, there must nevertheless have 
been a certain substratum of local practices to build upon. 
Chapter Four 
The succession of Ma~mud 
By 998 Maqmud had successfully set aside the succession claims 
of his brother Ism~Cil and had made himself ruler of all the lands 
his father had held. By 1001 he had expelled from Khurasan all 
his rivals from amongst the Turkish generals of the Samanids, and 
had secured that province against the last, fugitive Amir, Isma~Il 
al-Munta~ir. All Ma~mud's earlier life had been spent aiding his 
father, and Sebaktigin had always acted as a faithful vassal of the 
Samanids. Maqmud felt this connection less strongly, but the idea 
of making himself completely independent did not occur to him immed-
iately on his father's death. In accordance with Sebuktigin's 
wishes, his son IsmaCil received the provinces of Ghazna and Balkh in 
387/997. Straightway, he came to Balkh, the nearest point in his 
newly-acquired dominions to Bukhara, anddidhomage to the Amir Abu'l-
-~arith Man~Ur b. NU4. Likewise, when in the next year Maqmud had 
deposed his brother, he came from Ghazna to Balkh anddid homage to 
the Amir, who confirmed him in the provinces of Ghazna, Balkh, Bust, 
Herat and Tirmidh. 
As has been seen, the Samanid Amir had invited SebUktigin to 
intervene in Khurasan against Abu CAli and Fa'iq. After his victory 
in 994, Sebaktigin had been ·rewarded with the governorship of Balkh, 
~ukharistan, Bamiyan, GhiTr and Gharchistan, and Ma~ud with Abu CAli's 
old job as commander of the army in Khurasan. Ma4mud had made 
Nishapur his headquarters, the first taste Khurasan had of Ghaznavid 
rule. Because of the pressure on the Samanids from the Qarakhanids, 
then in possession of the whole upper and middle Syr Darya basin, 
Maqmud had been able to strengthen his hold in Khurasan. But the 
death of Sebllktigin and the succession struggle in Ghazna had forced 
him to leave Khurasan, and in the interim, the Samanid government 
had sent out the ghulam general Begtuzun as commander there. Ma~ud 
felt that he had prior claim on the province, and when he was able 
to attend to the west once more, asserted his claim by force. 
After 999, a weakening of Ma~mud's respect for the Amirs is 
discernible. His stay in Nishapur had given him knowledge of the 
richness and desirability of Khurasan, and theoretical loyalty 
towards an increasingly impotent overlord now yielded to personal 
ambition. In the event, circumstances saved him from unambiguous 
hostility to Bukhara. In 999 Fa'iq and Begtuzun deposed the Amir 
Abu'l-ijarith and set up his brother Abu'l-Fawaris CAbd al-Malik b. 
~~. Ma~ud was able to pose as avenger of the blinded Amir, even 
though he had previously taken up arms to seize Khurasan whilst Abu'l-
ijarith had been still on the throne, and clear all his rivals from 
74 Khurasan. 
Judging by Sebnktigin's last wishes, he did not envisage that 
his family should set up as an independent dynasty, despite the 
evident decay of the Samanids. He did not leave his territories as 
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an undivided inheritance, but as governorships to be held by various 
members of his family, continuing the practice prevalent during the 
last years of his life. His brother Bughrachuq (Bughrajuq) was to 
remain as governor of Herat and PUshang. Of his sons, Maqmud was to 
command the army in Khurasan; SebUktigin did not claim any right to 
nominate the governor there. Another son, Abu'lJ~u~affar Na~r, was 
to remain at Bust; and the younger son IsmaCil was to have G~azna and 
Balkh. In allotting Ghazna to IsmaCil, he was probably influenced 
by the fact that IsmaCfl was his son by a daughter of Alptigin's, 
and so felt it more fitting that a descendant of Alptigin should rule 
there; the apparent preference of IsmaCil over Maqmud, who was much 
the more experienced. in statecraft and war, puzzled Muslim historians 
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of the Ghaznavids. In fact, no specific overlordship was given to 
Ismacrl. The possession of the ancestral lands in eastern Afghan-
istan perhaps implied this, but it.is arguable that Maqmud's hold 
over the rich province of Khurasan was a more desirable inheritance 
than Ghazna, whose chief value was as a springboard for Indian conquests. 
Just as SebUktigin divided up his territories and gave an apparent 
Preference to the young IsmaCil, so did Maqmud in his last days 
nominate as his successor in Ghazna his son Muqammad, governor of 
GUzgan, excluding the other brother, MasCud, who had much greater 
fame as a military commander and was the obvious choice. 76 Although 
Maqmud's declining powers of judgement should be taken into account, 
there is a certain parallel here with SebUktigin's testatory wishes. 
If any consistent principle is to be sought here, it might be found 
in the early Ghaznavids' Turkish background rather than in their 
,; 
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acquired Perso-Islamic culture. In the system of inheritance of 
ancient Mongolian customary law, ultimogeniture prevailed: the major 
part of the paternal inheritance went to the youngest son, who was 
guardian of the domestic hearth, the otchigin, 11 prince of the fire", 
and the elder sons were entitled to indemnities during their father's 
lifetime.
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This institution seems to have been carried over into 
Turkish life; Kotwicz suggested that the Turkish name "Ktlltigin", 
familiar from the Orkhon inscriptions and from later usage, is not 
a personal name but a title, and he connects it with k:Ul "ashes", 
giving the complete meaning "prince of the ashes" .-.. "guardian of 
the 
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hearth in the Qaghan's family, the younger son". Certainly, 
the transmission of an inheritance undivided to the eldest son was 
little familiar to Central Asian peoples; chiefs often took the 
view that leadership should come through personal merit and not 
birthright, and that all children should have a chance to achieve 
success. It is just possible that some memory of steppe custom 
may have remained in the minds of Sebnktigin and Ma~ud. The 
sources provide no direct evidence for this surmise, but the reasons 
they give for Ma4IDud's designation of Mll4ammad as his heir are 
unconvincing. 
Chapter Five 
The cultural background of the early Sultans, and the 
Ghaznavid court and bureaucracy's continuity with their 
predecessors in structure and personnel 
Ma~mud's education and training was a two-fold one. The 
practical, military side came from accompanying his father into battle, 
and boyish exploits of his are recorded against the pagans of Ghfir 
and the Hindu Shahi Raja Jaipal at Lamghan. Later, his favourite 
waepons were the spear and long sword (qalachuri), the weapons of 
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the champion who goes out for single combat. Doubtless SebUktigin 
passed on to him all his distilled experience and expertise. The 
academic side of his education came from a leading ijanafi scholar, 
the father of the Qa4Y Abu Na~r ~Ini, who also acted as prayer-
-leader for Sebnktigin; from him Ma~mud learnt the Qur'an and later 
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derived much benefit from his counsel. Because of Ma4mud's early 
involvement at his father's side in the business of warfare and 
ruling, his academic education in the Muslim sciences and literatures 
may have been somewhat broken. He is said to have known Arabic well, 
lth h h d . l"k d th 1 
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Persian was adequate for him to work with his Persian secretaries 
and ministers; exactly how much he appreciated the florid panegyrics, 
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both Arabic and Persian, which his poets dedicated to him, is more 
82 
dubious. CAufi quotes in his Lubab al-albab some fragments of 
verse said to be by Ma~mud. The verdict of Ethe, Browne and Rypka 
has been against the authenticity of this attribution, even though 
it is true that most persons literate in Persian could at that time 
have turned out tolerably competent verses. 83 
From Baihaqi, we have a few details about the Islamic education 
which Ma~ud gave to his own children. Mahmud had his two sons . 
MasCud and Mul).ammad and his young brother YUsuf, only three years 
older than the two princes, educated together. Already by the age 
of fourteen, MasCud had a good knowledge of adab and was able to 
teach a few of al-Mutanabbi's odes and the MuCallaqa of Imru'ul-
-Qais to another boy. Their tutor at this time was a eunuch, Rail).an 
Khadim. Afterwards, when Ma4IDud nominated MasCud to the governor-
ship of Herat, Rai~an Khadim accompanied him there as a tutor, with 
a strict commission to watch over MasCud's moral welfare} in Seljuq 
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times, Rai~an Khadim would have been described as an Atabeg. As 
Sultan, MasCud was a competent Persian stylist. As well as affi~ing 
his tauqiC to the documents prepared for him by the D1wan-i Risalat, 
he sometimes added sections in his own hand. The draft of a treaty 
which MasCud was making secretly just before his father's death with 
the Ziyarid Manuchihr b. Qabus was written in his own excellent hand 
11 such as the masters among secretaries would have been impotent to 
indite11 • Baihaqi retained in his possession many documents, drafts 
and notes by MasCud which he utilised in putting together his 
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Mujalladat. From his knowledge of adab, MasCud was certainly able 
to read Arabic and apparently able to understand it when spoken. 
The Caliph al-Qadir's envoy brought a diploma of recognition to the 
Sultan on his accession, and addressed him and his court in Arabic. 
MasCud acknowledged the greetings, and then a Persian abridgement of 
the manshur was read out for the benefit of those present who could 
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not understand Arabic. The expressions MasCud used occasionally 
reveal his intellectual processes as thoroughly Islamic. Writing 
to the Qarakhanid Arslan Khan Sulaiman b. Qadtr Khan after his defeat 
at Dandanqan by the Seljuqs, the Sultan minimised the disaster and 
compared it with the Prophet's setback at U4ud against Quraish; on 
one occasion the Chief Secretary, Abu Na~r-i Mishkan, described the 
Turkmen pillagers in Khurasan to his master as "Khawarij". The 
knowledge of classical Islamic learning which the Ghaznavid Sultans 
early acquired is in striking contrast ta the untutoredness which 
seems to have characterised the Great Seljuq Sultans down to a late 
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date in that dynasty's history. It was nevertheless necessary for 
the Ghaznavid Sultans to stay attuned to the needs and aspirations 
of their Turkish ghulams, upon whose military prowess much of the 
dynasty's success depended. Some of the ghulams who had been in the 
Sultans' service for a long period no doubt acquired some knowledge 
of Persian, especially those in positions of high command and thus 
in contact with the civilian administration; but the ranks of the 
ghul~s were frequently replenished by recruits from Central Asia 
(see below, Part II, 228 ) and Turkish was their normal language. 
Certainly MasCud, and a fortiori Ma4roud, retained their ancestral 
Turkish tongue and always used it when speaking informally to their 
110. 
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ghulams and to other Turks. 
The sincerity of the Ghaznavid Sultans as patrons of learning 
has provoked speculation. To consider the topic in detail would 
not be in place here, but it cannot be altogether neglected, for it 
helps us to assess the barbarian, Turkish elements in the early 
Sultans versus the cultured, Persian ones. Undoubtedly, Maqmud's 
and MasCUd's courts at Ghazna became brilliant cultural centres; 
according to Daulatshah, 400 poets were regularly in attendance on 
ma~ud, presided over by the laureate, amir ash-shuCara', cun~urr, 
who was continuously busy commemorating in verse his master's exploits 
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and campa1gns. The polymath of his age, al-Birfini, finished his 
days at Ghazna, and dedicated his great astronomical treatise, al-
-Qanfin al-MasCudi, to Ma~ud's son, and his book on mineralogy, the 
Kitab al-jamahir fi maCrifat al-jawahir, to MasCud's son Maudud in 
turn. Inasmuch as it was Maqmud.who brought him to Ghazna, the 
gateway to India, it was he who made possible al-Birfini's Ta9,qiq ma 
li'l-Hind, although Sachau has pointed out that al-Birfini's mentions 
of the Sultan's name are curt and unen.thusiastic, and has added that 
during the thirteen years spent under his Sultanate, al-Biruni "had 
no official inducement or encouragement for this study [se. his 
India], nor any hope of royal reward". 90 
In the evaluation of the culture of the early Ghaznavids, two 
opposing views have been adopted. Many of Ma~ud's admirers, espec-
ially those among Indian i'liuslim scholars, have stressed his role as 
a munificent patron of the arts and as the creator of a Muslim 
culture on the eastern fringe of the Islamic world, by whose influence 
111. 
Mah-• hluslim religion and civilisation passed to the Indian plain. 
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mud has thus become the first hero of Indian Islam. At the other 
extreme, some European scholars have condemned this culture as 
insincere and derivative. The Samanid court at Bukhara, which had 
nurtured authors like Rudak1, the Vizier Abu CAli BalCami and Daqiqi, 
presented Ma~mud with a striking model, and scholars like August 
Muller, Barthold, Browne and recently Rypka have asserted with 
justice that Ma~mud's encouragement of culture did not spring from a 
disinterested love of learning. In the course of his conquests, the 
Sultan brought back whole libraries to Ghazna (e.g. from Isfahan and 
Ray~, and he seems to have had an acquisitive love of collecting 
around himself poets and scholars, if need were, by force. In 
Browne's words, "Sul~an Mal:pnud has often been described as a great 
patron of letters, but he was in fact rather a great kidnapper of 
literary men, whom •••• he often treated in the end scurvily enough~: 
In telling how the Tabani family of ijanafi faq1hs passed in Maqmud's 
time from Nishapur to Ghazna (see below, Part III, 339-41 ), Baihaqi 
remarks that "whenever he came across a man or woman who was an 
expert in any skill, he deported them thither [se. to Ghazna]".93 
The Sultan's intentions were perfectly blunt when he sent an ultimatum 
to the Khwarizmshah Abu'l-CAbbas Ma'miin b. Ma'mun: "I have heard that 
there are at the Khw~rizmshah's court several men of learning, each 
peerless in his science, such as so-and-so and so-and-so. You must 
send them to our court, so that they may have the honour of being 
presented. there and that we may derive prestige (musta~hir shavim) 
from their knowledge and capabilities. We request this favour of 
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the Kh.warizmshah". 94 Barthold' s strictures are also based on the 
political and social background of this culture: the narrowness of 
the circle involved, and the ruthless fiscal exploitation and war 
misery which alone enabled MasCud, for instance, to dispense at 
Mihrgan celebrations 1000 dinars to cun~urr, an elephant's load of 
50,000 dirhams to Zainabi CAlawi and 20,000 dirhams to poets not 
regularly of the court circle (bigana-tar). These points are valid 
ones, and our verdict must on the whole lie with Barthold's strictures 
rather than with Nazim's defence. 95 
But three qualifications must be made. Firstly, all: highly-
developed Islamic cultures were at this period elite ones, resting 
not on popular but on royal or aristocratic bases. Although 
patronage inevitably brought the attendant vices of hyperbole, effus-
iveness and insincerity, it was the sole foundation upon which such 
a culture could then rest. Al~Biruni pointed out the necessity of 
the system when he said that "to do this [se. to honour learning 
and its representatives] is •••• the duty of those who rule over them, 
of kings and princes. For they alone can free the minds of scholars 
from the daily anxieties for the necessities of life, and stimulate 
their energies to earn more fame and favour, the yearning for which 
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is the pith and marrow of human nature". ·.Moreover, the financial 
basis of patronage was that upon which the whole dynasty and state 
rested; the one cannot be condemned without the other, but such a 
judgement would not be in order here. 
Secondly, poets and writers were the publicity men of their age. 
Rulers bathed in the echoed splendour of their eulogists and retained 
113. 
them with a practical purpose in mind. Both sides benefited: "For 
just as a patron becomes famous by the verse of a good poet, so do 
poets likewise achieve renown by receiving a great reward from the 
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king, these two things being interdependent". 
Thirdly, the culture of the early Ghaznavids did begin to show 
individual traits of its own. Originally, there was no significant 
literary tradition in Ghazna and Zabulistan upon which to build. It 
is noteworthy that the great poets of the Ghazna court all came from 
outside: cun~ur1 from Balkh; CAsjad1 from Merv or Herat; Farrukh1 
from Sistan; and Manuchihr1 from Damghan. The latter two were attract-
ed to Ghazna from the service of the Muqtaj1 Amirs of Chaghaniyan and 
the Ziyarids respectively. Arberry has drawn attention to the 
greater receptiveness of the cultures of Ma~ud and MasCfid, with their 
strongly Sunni policy and cultivation of links with the Abbasid 
Caliphate (see below, 132-4 ), to Arabic influences in learning 
and literature. These brought an increased elaboration and euphuism 
in literary style, and set the pattern for the ornate poetry and prose 
which became increasingly popular in later Ghaznavid and Seljuq times, 
and Arberry concludes that "Ghazna developed into a greater centre of 
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Arabic learning than Bukhara had ever been". According to Bahar, 
the penetration of Arabic influences into Persian literature marks 
the opening of the second great period of New Persian prose, whose 
style differs clearly from that of the Samanid period; and in the 
sphere of poetry Rypka notes the appearance of the "romantic epic", 
whereas the Shah-nama had been the climax of the "feudal epic" 
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inspired by the Samanid milieu. It is also notable that during 
114. 
Ma~ud's reign, Turkish poetry seems to have been known and recited 
in literary circles, although this poetry was probably popular in 
origin and not the product of cultured circles. 100 A certain growth 
of individuality is also visible in architecture and the plastic 
arts. Under Ma4IDud, a great influx of treasure flowed into Ghazna, 
and there can be little doubt but that the Sultan imported artisans 
and craftsmen from the conquered lands to beautify his capital, just 
as he imported scholars and literary men. When Ma~ud began his 
work, there was no strong local tradition to guide him. But during 
his reign and that of his successor, a certain tradition did grow up, 
with the sumptuous, Indian use of marble for building, and with 
carved decoration grafted on to the more sober, Persian technique of 
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fired brick construction and moulded brick decoration. 
The literacy of the Sultans, their Muslim educations, their 
encouragement of scholars, all these have been sketched out; it 
remains to adduce further evidence from the court surroundings in 
which they lived to demonstrate that the Ghaznavids were, in Spuler's 
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Phrase, "kulturell iranisiert". The Sultans were lovers of splend-
our and luxury, to which their zeal in building palaces and laying 
out gardens attests (see below, 189-90 ). The lavish furnishings 
and decorations of these palaces show that the way of life there 
fell within the Iranian tradition. MasCud acquired luxurious tastes 
at an early age. When he was the youthful governor of Herat, he 
built a house for his afternoon siesta in the garden of the CAdnan1 
palace. This house was cooled by water dripping down the hangings 
within it, and its walls were adorned with lascivious paintings of 
115. 
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nude men and women in various convivial scenes ( ~rrrat-ha-yi ulfiyya). 
The splendour of court life in Ghazna itself shows how far the 
Sultans now were from the frugal ways of Turkish steppe life. The 
description of a celebration there in 1038 is worth quoting at 
length: 
"The golden throne and the hall for audiences and merry-making, 
which the Amir had ordered to be constructed, and on which they had 
been busy for over three years, was now ready. They informed the 
Amir, and he ordered that they should install and set it down [se. 
the throne] on the great dais of the new palace, and put the build-
ing in order. Everyone who on that day saw that adornment never 
saw anything after that which could compare with it. I was one of 
them at that time, and I have never known anything like it. The 
throne was constructed entirely of red gold, overlaid with shapes 
and patterns of branches and plant-fronds •. It was set with a large 
number of precious jewels, and over it was stretched lattice-work, 
again all encrusted with jewels. The throne itself was overlaid 
with covers of R~I brocade. It had four well-filled cushions, 
made of silk and sewn with gold thread, laid down for the feet; a 
cushion for the back; and four other cushions, two for each side. 
A golden-plated chain hung from the ceiling of the chamber contain-
ing the dais, and came down over the dais where the crown and throne 
were. The crown was attached to this chain, and there were four 
bronze figures fashioned in the shape of human beings and mounted 
on columns which were secured to the throne itself, so that their 
hands were outstretched and thus held the crovm safely. In this 
way, the crown did not hurt the head since the chains and the 
columns supported it, and the Sultan's cap could go underneath it. 
They draped this dais with rugs, gold-woven Rrrmi brocade and gold-
-woven parti-coloured carpets. Three hundred and eighty golden 
dishes were set out in the hall, each a gaz long and a khushktar 
(?) ~ wide. On these were placed cakes of camphor, vesicles of 
musk, fragments of sandal-wood and amber. Before the high throne 
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were fixed fifteen settings of pomegranate-coloured and Badakhshani 
rubies, emeralds, pearls and turquoises. Within that opulently-
-appointed hall they had set out a table, and in the middle of it, 
stretching towards the ceiling, was a pavilion made out of ~alva, 
and there was ample other food. 
On Tuesday, the 21st of ShaCban, the Arnir came back from the 
Iaa~mudi ~arden to this new palace and seated himself in his new 
golden throne on the dais. The crown was suspended above his cap 
and he wore a cloak of crimson brocade so heavily ornamented with 
gold that only a little of the material underneath could be seen. 
All around the hall, standing against the panels, were the house-
hold ghulams (ghulaman-i kha~~agi), with robes of Saqla~un, 
Baghdad! and Isfahani cloth, two-pointed caps, gold-mounted waist 
sashes, weapon belts and golden maces in their hands. On the dais 
itself, to both left and right of the throne, were ten ghulams, 
with four-sectioned caps on their heads, heavy, bejewelled waist 
sashes and bejewelled sword belts. In the middle of the hall were 
two lines of ghulams; one line was standing against the wall, with 
four-sectioned caps. In their hands they held arrows and swords 
and they had quivers and bow-cases. There was another line posit-
ioned down the centre of the hall, with two-pointed caps, heavy, 
silver-mounted waist sashes, weapon belts and silver maces in their 
hands. The ghulams of both these lines all wore cloaks of Shush-
tar! brocade. As for the horses, ten had bejewelled accoutre-
ments and twenty had plain, golden ones. There were fifty 
Dailamis with golden shields, ten of which were ornamented with 
jewels. The high-ranking servants of the state stood by, and outside 
the portico of the palace there were many palace attendants and a 
crowd of infantrymen (~ashar), all armed. 
The court celebrations then took place. The great men of 
state and the holders of high rank came forward. Enormous quantit-
ies of largesse were distributed. The prominent people, governors 
and great men were invited to sit on that dais, and the Amir held 
court, seated on his throne, till morning, when the nadims came in, 
117. 
greeted the Arnir and distributed largesses. Then the Amir rose, 
mounted and made off to the garden. He changed his robes, rode 
back and sat down to feast in the splendidly-adorned hall. The 
nobles and great men of state came forward to the table too. Other 
tablecloths were spread outside the hall, to one side of the palace, 
and the sarhangan, khailtashan and other groups of the army sat 
down there and began to eat. The musicians struck up and wine 
flowed like water, so that gradually, those who had become drunk 
left the tables. The Amir rose up from the table in a mood of great 
joy, mounted and rode off to the garden. They organised a splendid 
majlis there, similar to the first. Tpe nadims came along and they 
all settled down to drink wine till the evening prayer. Then they 
went back". 104 
For supplying the opulent clothes, .carpets and hangings mentioned 
here, the Sultan depended in part on the customary presents brought 
by governors and tributary rulers at NaurUz and Mihrgan and in part 
on taxation levied in kind, for most cities of the empire produced 
textiles and rugs in some form or other. But we know that in 
Bahramshah's time {512-47/1118-52), and doubtless before then, there 
were also royal workshops, kar-khanaha, supervised by a Mihtar and a 
Mushrif, where the rich embroidery of the 1araz was sewn on to the 
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robes. 
The running of the palace and its ancillary departments was 
organised on lines reminiscent of earlier Islamic courts and, ultim-
ately, of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. At court, the Sultan 
was withdrawn from contact with the masses;, except when he held 
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~~alim sessions. Normally, his entourage consisted of his nadims, 
the bureaucracy officials and the leading military commanders. 
Access to the royal presence came only through the intermediacy of 
118. 
the Court Chamberlain, a eunuch (the Aghachi-kha~~a khadim), who 
also performed such personal services as waking up the Sultan, and 
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was in charge of the inner living quarters of the palace. At 
court, strict protocol was observed; Maqmud once hit a well-known 
traditionist on the head for speaking without permission and made 
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him deaf for life. For the Sultans' majalis-i nasha~ u sharab, 
Poets, musicians and clowns were brought in, and to wait on the 
topers there were the saqis, of whom Ayaz was chief in Maqmud's 
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time. The smooth functioning of the palace service and its needs. 
(in particular, provisioning and financial expenditure} was the resp-
onsibility of the Wakil-i kha~~ {see below, 159 ) and of the 
Aghachi (domestic affairs and staffing). An office of Katkhuda, 
overseer of the chambers of the harem and of the royal princes, is 
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mentioned in Ibrahim b. MasCud's reign (451-92/1059-99). The 
Aghachi had a staff of eunuchs and pages. The pages were often 
younger members of the royal family, sons of tributary princes or 
hostages taken from the families of the Sultan's commanders. Most 
of the eunuchs were probably castrated in the slave-markets of Trans-
oxania or India, but ghulams were also castrated at the Ghaznavid 
court itself. It is not known whether black eunuchs were used; 
they were certainly used as harem attendants by Maqmud's neighbour 
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in Sistan,Khalaf b. A4road. The eunuchs had special charge of the 
Sultan's harem. The harem and its attendants usually accompanied 
the Sultan, the army and the Diwans on their peregrinations, and 
they were then housed in special tents. On the death of a Sultan, 
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it is likely that the new ruler took over those of the wives and 
concubines whom he desired. Vfuen Maqmud died, the Sultan's women 
were looked after by h±s sister, ijurra-yi KhuttalY, and those who 
were no longer wanted were assigned estates on whose revenues they 
could live. When Mu4ammad was deposed after his brief reign, he 
had to make over his harem, together with other possessions, to 
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MasCud. Hence, far from the comparative freedom of women in 
Turkish steppe life, the Ghaznavids immured their women in the confines 
of a harem system, with all the traditional concomitants such as 
eunuchs; and this system became so tightly knit that Bahramshah is 
said to have been reluctant to allow even a physician to treat a 
113 slave girl in the harem. 
Because the Ghaznavids inherited much of the former Samanid 
empire, they acquired a considerable proportion of the Samanid 
bureaucracy personnel. Some of these merely remained at their posts 
in the Diwan of Khurasan when Ma~ud took over there,others were 
attracted to Ghazna when the Qarakhanids took over Transoxania. 
Such trained men as these were welcomed in the Ghaznavid bureaucracy, 
for the expansion of the empire under Maqmud enlarged its sphere of 
operation and the volume of work which it had to cope with. These 
former Samanid officials strengthened the continuity in traditions 
and techniques between the Sa~anid and Ghaznavid administrations. 
Ma4mud's first Vizier, Abu'l-CAbbas Fa41 b. A4mad Isfara'ini, 
was a Khurasani. Shabankara'I errs in describing him as a former 
Vizier of the Samanids, but he had been a secretary in Fa'iq's 
employ. On the defeat of Fa'iq and Abu CAli SimjUri, he went over 
l?O. 
to Sebllktigin, and when Ma~mud gained the throne, became the new 
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Sultan's Vizier. From the evidence of his nisba, the family of 
MasCud's Vizier A4road b. CAbd a~~amad Shirazi came originally from 
~rs, but according to CUtbi, his father Abu ~ahir had served the 
Samanids' ghulam general ijusam ad-Daula Abu'l-CAbbas Tash as his 
confidential secretary (cala diwan asrarihi). !4mad himself began 
his career as katkhuda of the Khwarizmshah Altuntash, and ended up 
as MasCud's Vizier (see below, 138 ).
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The Ghaznavid official 
Abu'l-Qasim-i Kathir, whose name appears frequently in Baihaqi and 
who had been head of the Diwan of Khurasan, came from a family which 
had long served successive masters of Khurasan; his grandfather 
Kathir had been such a talented katkhuda of Abu'l-ijasan Simjuri that 
the S~anid Amirs had frequently tried to get him directly into their 
own service. An experienced treasury official (dabir-i khizana) of 
the Ghaznavids, Abu'l-~asan Quraish, had been formerly a secretary 
in the Samanid treasury at Bukhara, but had been brought back to 
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Ghazna by the Vizier Isfara'ini. The Amir Abu'l-Fa41 Ziyad b. 
A~mad, who came from the prominent Baihaq family of the Ziyadis, 
had been governor of Baihaq under the SimjTiris, and although he 
suffered temporary imprisonment when they fell, he soon found favour 
with Ma~mud and was appointed his deputy in Khurasan when Ma~ud 
had to hurry eastwards and deal with his brother IsmaCil. The 
Sultan was less successful with another civil servant from Baihaq, 
Abu'l-CAbbas IsmaCil CAnbari; Abu'l-CAbbas had acted as Vizier for 
the Ilig Na~r, but refused to accept the same office from the Ghazna-
vids, and was imprisoned for his recalcitrance and died. 
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121. 
Shortly before his death, Ma~mud annexed Ray and Jibal and so 
became the possessor of lands formerly ruled by branches of the 
Buyid dynasty. Hence there is, perhaps, a subordinate strand in 
the formative factors shaping the Ghaznavid administrative system, 
the influence of Buyid practice, but this contribution can only 
have been small compared with that from the Samanids, for Ghaznavid 
control over central Persia lasted less than a decade. We learn 
from Miskawaih that the administration of the Buyid territories was 
based on the procedures of the Abbasid Caliphate, although the Dail-
ami origins of the BUyids and their dependence to a considerable 
extent on a tribal foalowing brought about changes in the sys~ems 
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of land tenure and taxation in western and central Persia. Any 
borrowings from Buyid practice would supplement the more important 
ones from the Samanids, for the ultimate parent of both these admin-
istrative systems was Baghdad. rn·an anecdote of the Siyasat-nama, 
eh. XLII, a gro~p of unemployed Buyid. dabirs and muta~arrifs in Ray 
contemplate emigration to Khurasan, where they believe that Maqmud's 
well-known munificence to scholars and appreciation of talent will 
surely bring them recognition and employment. As Qazwini notes, 
the anachronisms in this tale make its authenticity doubtful, but 
we do hear of instances where men passed from Buyid to Ghaznavid 
employment. Baihaq1 mentions a Ghaznavid commander who had previous-
ly been a sipahsalar-i Snahanshahan, and the Dailam1 element in the 
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Ghaznavid army was an important one (see below, Part II, 243-4 ). 
The Qaq1 Sh1raz1, to whom Maqmud gave an important post in India 
(see below, 168-9 ), came into the Sultan's service from that of 
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the BUyids. When Ma~mud dethroned Majd ad-Daula of Ray, the BUyid 
administration there continued to function as a provincial diwan 
of the Ghaznavids, with a sphere of operation embracing Ray and 
Jibal. As with the take-over in Khurasan, much of the old personnel 
must have stayed on. This was the case with Abu'l-CAla' Muhammad . . 
b. ijassul, who later became known as the author of a propaganda 
tract for the Seljuqs, the Taf4Il al-Atrak Cala sa'ir al-ajnad. 
He had previously been Vizier to Majd ad-Daula, and then after the 
capture of Ray, was given a secretarial job by Maqmud; by the time 
of the Seljuq invasions he was heading the Diwan-i Rasa'il at Ray, 
and finally he passed into the service of yet another master, 
Tughrrl Beg. 120 
Chapter Six 
The attitude to power 
In Part III of his book Sul~an Ma~ud, 126-50, Nazim surveys 
the administrative system of Ma~ud of Ghazna. From a patient 
winnowing of Baihaq1's history and of the excerpts from the Maqamat 
of his master Abu Na~r-i Mishkan incorporated in the Athar al-wuzara' 
(see above, Bibliographical introduction, 12-13, 37 ), together with 
details from the later source of the Siyasat-nama, he has built up 
a straightforward account of the Sultan presiding over his administr-
ation, with its diwans and its officials. It is not the intention 
here substantially to add to what llinorsky has called "a valuable 
reconstruction of the administrative machinery·~ under Mahmud" (BSOS, 
VI, 1930-2, 1024). Unfortunately, Nazim's reconstruction only takes 
us to a certain point; we know what the bare bones are, but we are 
still ignorant about what made the system really work. What ethos 
guided the Sultan and his chief officials and what was their attitude 
towards the subjects? In what ways did the subjects, townsmen and 
peasants alike, feel the hand of the state? How did the state 
exact the taxes and services due to it, and what limits, if any, were 
recognised to these demands? Nazim is silent here, and the imperfect 
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state of the sources does not allow us to fill out the whole of 
the picture; but there is enough information for us to assess in 
broad outline what principles and assumptions guided the men who 
ran the empire and, to a much less extent, how the subjects themselves 
reacted. Such questions are relevant in considering why the Seljuqs 
were able to conquer Khurasan, for the purely military and strategic 
factors (described below in Part V, "The ascendancy of the Turkmens 
in Khurasan") are insufficient to explain the total failure of Ghaz-
navid power there. We must look further back into the forty years 
or so of Ghaznavid rule in Khurasan; and if our specific material 
on that province under the Ghaznavid.s is not so abundant as could 
be desired, we can tentatively apply the more general deductions 
Which can be made from conditions in the Ghaznavid empire as a whole. 
Some of the formative factors which moulded Sultan Magmud have 
been mentioned: his education in the Perso-Islamic tradition, and 
his inheritance of a large part of the former Samanid empire, together 
with much of its personnel and many of its techniques. The Perso-
-Islamic bias to his upbringing was undoubtedly the predominant infl-
uence in his attitude towards the exercise of power. The Turkish 
steppe background, into which his father had been born, was over-
shadowed by the inluence of the Islamic milieu in which he had to 
rule and the Persian officials with whom he had to work. Such men 
as Alptigin and SebUktigin are classic examples of the transformation 
of the Turkish military slave, brought into the Islamic world at a 
young and impressionable age, plunged into the sophisticated environ-
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ment of Muslim civilisation, rising to high command within it and 
having to deal with the complexities of political and administrative 
life there. Very soon, religion as well as culture became a barrier 
between such men and the steppe past. Although Islam was spreading 
through the steppes in the lOth century, there was still much pagan-
ism there, and in any case, it is not to be supposed that there was 
much in common between the subtle ijanafY mutakallimiTn, whose company 
Ma~ud affected to enjoy, such as the Tabanis, the ~aCidis and the 
Na~i4Is, and the ~ufis and itinerant preachers who carried the faith 
from Transoxania and Khwarizm into the steppes. Men like Alptigin 
~ . ~ and Sebfiktigin were initially derac~nes in the Samanid empire, but 
speedily integrated themselves into the Persian world around them. 
The great stronghold of Turkish nationality and feeling in the 
Ghaznavid empire was of course the army, a considerable proportion 
of which was Turkish. Those who had passed into the Ghaznavid empire 
via the Samanid service had had some opportunity to adapt themselves 
to the Perso-Islamic world; but there were always fresh elements 
arriving from the steppes with only a brief transit through the 
Islamic lands along the Oxus. The inability of two Turks, Astghtigin 
(spelt in Baihaqi "Asaftigin") Ghazi and Eryaruq (Aryaruq), whose 
fighting qualities had raised them to high military rank, to find 
their way about in the complexities of life in the capital Ghazna, is 
remarked upon by Baihaqii 
11 
•••• these two prominent men, Eryaruq and Ghazi, had no reliable 
person to advise them. These two generals lacked a pair of katkhudas 
who were efficient, competent in official procedure and with wide 
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experience of the world. Obviously, what could one expect from 
SaCid the Money-changer and other lackeys like him, of obscure 
position and little worth? The Turks just acted according to the 
guidance of men like these, without regard to what the final 
outcome and disastrous effect might be. They had no experience, 
and although they were perfectly ready to expend their efforts and 
their lives, and possessed extensive wealth and belongings, they 
lacked judgement and had no familiarity with official routine 
(dabiri). They lacked any foresight [lit. "could not distinguish 
between today and tomorrow"], so were inevitably powerless against 
misfortunes". 121 
It must be noted, however, that until the annexation of Khwarizm, 
the Ghaznavids did not have direct access to the Central Asian steppes 
for recruiting Turkish troops; often they acquired them through the 
Transoxanian slave markets, and after the fall of the Samanids, 
Ghaznavid access to the north had been partially blocked by their 
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rivals the Qarakhanids. 
It was mentioned at the outset (above, 74-5 ) how in the 
eastern Islamic world, the Persian administrative tradition had 
become prominent by the 11th century, and as a result of this, we 
have the rise of what E.I.J. Rosenthal has called the "power state". 
It was noted, too, that the spread of this form of political organ-
isation was connected with the orientalisation of the Arab Caliphate. 
Especially noticeable in this process was the dependence of the 
Abbasids first of all on their Khurasanian guards, the abna' ad-daula, 
and then, from the 9th century onwards, on a mercenary and slave 
army recruited from all parts of the Caliphate and beyond. Whilever 
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a ruler had to depend on the lev'e en masse of his free subjects, 
as the early Caliphs depended on the Arab muqatila, or on a tribal 
following, as many Central A~ian dynasties of Turkish or Mongol 
origin did at a later period, he could not hope to free himself from 
dependence on his subjects and to demand unfettered obedience. When 
he acquired a slave or mercenary army which had no ethnic or territor-
ial links with the rest of his subjects, he might find it turbulent 
at times, but he could be sure that there would be ho bond of sym-
pathy between it and his subjects. Hence he could be sure of its 
ruthlessness in dealing with unruly subjects (see further, below, 
Part II, 224 ff. ). 
This may be considered as the military aspect of the process. 
The social aspect was the rigid division of society within the state. 
This differed from the hierarchisation of social groups in earlier 
Middle Eastern cultures. In the early Caliphate, the community of 
freemen (we must always remember the substratum of slaves and mawali) 
had its aristocracy of noble Arab blood, but there was also at the 
side of this a feeling that moral and intellectual factors in part 
determined whether one belonged to the cawamm or khawa~~· In ancient 
Iran, as in ancient India, class divisions were rigid and were c .: -... 
determined by birth; the Avesta divided society into three classes, 
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to which a fourth was added in the Sassanid period. But in the 
Islamic power state, there was only one dividing line, that between 
rulers and ruled (in the later terminology of the Ottomans, that 
between CAskeris, comprising both military and civil ruling elements, 
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and Recaya). In the lOth and 11th centuries there was nothing 
Predestined about which of the two divisions a man might belong to. 
The Mirrors for Princes might expatiate on how God designates certain 
outstanding men to be kings (cf. the opening words of the Siyasat-
nama), but in practice kingly power was often gained through military 
force, political shrewdness or merely through favourable circumstances, 
as the maxim ad-daula ittifaqat ~asana implies. Whatever exalted 
genealogies might be later supplied, most Islamic dynasties of this 
period arose from lowly or even slave status (~affarids, G~aznavids, 
Khwarizmshahs of Atsrz•s line); from invading tribal groups (Seljuqs, 
Qarakhanids); or from local chieftains or dihqans of middling status 
(Samanids, BUyids, Ziyarids, Ma'munid Khwarizmshahs). Dynasties 
that could genuinely trace their ancestry back to a long line of 
kings, like the Afr!ghid Khwarizmshahs, were very much the exception. 
The political theorists of the power state were always concerned 
with laying down moral bases for kingship, for Ibn Khaldun's wazic, 
the institution which curbs the individualist and anarchic instincts 
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of mankind and which guarantees an ordered form of society. Our 
concern here, however, is with the practical effect of this concept 
in the Ghaznavid dominions, i.e. the gratitude and obedience which 
the subjects must always show towards the Sultan who stands between 
them and chaos. Three passages are quoted here from authors of the 
11th century, each of them touching on the relationship of kings 
and subjects. 
Ni~am al~ulk says: 
"Concerning subjects, God Most High has created kings to be 
over all mankind; all mankind are beneath their sway and derive 
their means of life and their degree in society from them. Hence 
they [se. the kings] must always keep them [se. the subjects] in 
such a position that they know their stations and never remove 
the ring of servitude from their ears". 125 
Baihaqi's views on this topic, representing as he does the katib 
class who put the commands of the Ghaznavid Sultans into action, are 
of special interest. He employs the analogy, familiar from the 
political theory of so many cultures, of the human body. In the 
body he distinguishes three forces: (1) that of the guiding intellect 
and the faculties which serve it (khirad u sukhan, nafs-i guyanda); 
(2) that of anger, revenge and self-defence (nafs-i khashm-i grranda); 
and (3) that of passion and desire (nafs-i arzu). These he compares 
with the ruler, his army and his subjects: 
"You must realise very clearly that the nafs-i gilyanda is the 
king - commanding, masterfJil:~. and overbearing. He must administer 
justice and punishment as whole-heartedly and firmly as possible, 
and not in an ineffective manner; and when he shows kindness, it 
must not be so as leave an impression of weakness. Furthermore, 
khashm is the army of this king, by means of which he uncovers 
[the enemy's] weak points, makes secure [his own] vital points, 
frustrates the enemy and protects the people (raCiyyat). The 
army must be fully-prepared; when it is thus ready, it is able to 
carry out the ruler's command. The nafs-i arzu is the subject 
population of this king; it is vital that they should be in complete 
fear and trembling of the king and the army, and give [him] 
obedience". 126 
Thirdly, we return to the Siyasat-nama for the credo attributed there 
to Bahram Gur's Vizier Rast Ravish. Here, the relationship of ruler 
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and ruled is conceived of as being always in tension; any latitude 
given to subjects diminishes the majesty of the ruler and will lead 
inevitably to rebelliousness, for if they are given an inch, they 
will always take a mile. The Vizier is made to say: 
"The subjects have grown insolent because of our extremely 
equitable rule and have become impudent. If they are not punished, 
I fear ruin will appear [in the state] .... Be severe on them, 
before ruin becomes visible. For know that severity is of two 
kinds: destroying evil-doers and confiscating the wealth of the 
good" .12 7 
In the Ghaznavid empire under Malpnud and MasCud we see these 
attitudes of mind on the part of the ruler made the mainspring of 
political action. The darker side to the rule of these Sultans 
was well brought out by Barthold, Turkestan, 291-3, and must constant-
ly be born in mind as the background to Nazim's biography of Maqmud. 
Especially noticeable is the discouragement of what we might call 
local solidarity and self-help. The words in use.today in the 
Middle East for "patriotism" (!.~~aniyya, ~~anparasti, vatanperverlik) 
are neologisms, and the concepts of both "patriotism" and "national 
feeling' are very recent ones in the Islamic world. Certainly, 
these terms could not be used with reference to the 11th century 
without serious qualification. What we can speak of are regional 
and local solidarities of feeling and interest, and the ca~abiyyat 
of one province or town against another. 128 For most people at this 
time, the rural district in which the peasant worked or the town in 
which the artisan or shopkeeper lived was the limit of their world. 
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Protection of their homes and freedom to pursue their avocations in 
peace were what these people essentially expected from the government 
to which they paid taxes. 
It would have been an abdication of this responsibility if the 
ruler:had left the subjects to defend themselves. Yet the Ghaznavid 
Sultans denied their subjects a limited right of self-defence, even 
when the Sultan was unable to bring help in time against external 
attackers; arms which were used to repel attackers might be turned 
against the Sultan himself. As the Sultans saw it, the great cleav-
age was between all rulers on one side and all subjects on the other, 
not between the ruler and the ruled of one kingdom as against the 
ruler and ruled of another. This is especially clear in Maqmud's 
reprimand to the people of Balkh when in 1006 they resisted the 
Qarakhanid general JaCfartigin. In a determined resistance against 
the attacker, royal property was damaged, and this attracted the 
Sultan's wrath. He told the townspeople that they had no right to 
resist the enemy and so place his own property in jeopardy; subjects 
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must resign themselves to whichever ruler shows himself the strongest. 
There was some logic in the Sultan's words. The army alone did the 
fighting, and subjects should not arrogate this function to themselves; 
on the other hand, if the ruler was impotent to protect them, they 
should not let any feelings of loyalty prevent them from getting the 
best possible terms from the incoming power. This explains MasCud's 
attitude when, towards the end of his reign, the Seljuqs were thought 
to be aiming at Ghazna itself. He resolved to leave for India, but 
132. 
gave his officials full permission to stay behind in Ghazna and 
make terms with the Seljuqs, in whose service they could expect to 
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find employment. 
Lastly, we turn to what might be termed an ideological aspect 
of the Sultans' power, the buttressing of secular authority by the 
cachet of Sunni orthodoxy, achieved by the establishment of cordial 
relations with the Abbasid Caliphs. 
In 389/999 Ma4mud received the titles Yamin ad-Daula wa Amin al-
~~illa for his recognition of the Caliph al-Qadir in the khu~ba in 
Khurasan (the Samanids had continued to recognise the deposed Caliph 
). 131 During his reign, Ma~mud felt the 
need for legal and moral confirmation by the Caliph of the accomplish-
ed fact of his empire; and Caliphal approval was also valuable against 
enemies like the IsmaCilis of Multan and the ShiCI Bliyids. He was 
always careful to include the Caliph's name on his coins; to send 
presents to Baghdad from captured spoils; and to depict himself in 
his fat4.-namas as a warrior for the faith, justifying the title of 
Ghazi Amir al-Mu'rninin which appears on the "Tower of Malpnud" near 
his tomb. 
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The role of defender of orthodoxy against the Buyids 
was especially useful to him in justifying what was an act of pure 
aggression, the deposition of Majd ad-Daula of Ray in 1029. Whereas 
the Sultan had latterly grown dilatory in sending fat4-namas to the 
Caliph after his Indian campaigns, one now came straight from the 
army camp outside Ray. In it, Ma4IDud boasted that through him, 
"God has swept away from this region the hands of the tyrants, and 
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has cleansed it from the daCwa of the infidel Ba~iniyya and the evil-
-doing innovatorsn, and went on to justify his action by detailing 
Majd ad-Daula's uhcanonical practices and the ascendancy of heretics 
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within his territories. 
In his turn, the Caliph found the support of the greatest milit-
ary power of the age useful against both the tutelage of the Buyids 
and the pressure of the rival Fa~imid Caliphate, whose wealth and 
splendour completely overshadowed the impotent and poverty-stricken 
Abbasids. In support of the Caliph, Ma~mud harried the IsmaCilis 
within the boundaries of his empire; ostentatiously had daCis who 
strayed into his territories, such as the luckless at-Taharti (see 
below, Part III, 356 ),executed; and satisfied the Caliph over 
his Vizier ijasanak's dealings with the Fa~imids (see below, Part III, 
348 ) . Actions like these all contributed to the picture 
which grew up in later ages of Ma4mUd as the fanatic for religious 
orthodoxy, so that Shabankara'I can say in the Sultan's praise that 
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he was said to have executed over 50,000 heretics and dissidents. 
Under MasCUd, loyalty to the dynasty continued to be identified 
with religious orthodoxy. Early in his reign, he proclaimed his 
imperialist ambitions in the west, embracing the freeing of the 
Caliph from BITyid constraint in Iraq and the opening-up of the 
Pilgrimage route; attacks on the BITyids of Kirman; an invasion of 
CUman from Makran and dislodgement of the Qarami~a from there; ghazw 
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against Rtim; and attacks on the Fa~imid Caliphate. On gaining 
the throne from his brother and rival Mu4ammad, MasCud was careful 
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to secure a Caliphal patent of investiture for his territories, and 
this was renewed when in 422/1031 al-Qadir died and al-Q.a'irn succeed-
ed in Baghdad. Rich presents of indigo, cloth, jewels and aromatics 
were sent for the Caliph and his retinue. \.Yhen the new Caliph 1 s 
envoy came to Nishapur in 424/1033, bringing a fresh string of 
laqabs for the Sultan, MasCud again~swore to act as the hammer of 
heretics: 
"They brought forward the turban and sword, and the Sultan 
declared, :Th~s t~rb~n which I am ~~ou~ "P? pu~ on wi"Ph my han~, 
~~~t be ~ound on by the hand of the Supporter of Rel~~io~~. 136 ·::He 
put it on his head after the crown. He drew the sword and said, 
'The Zanadiqa and Qarami~a must be uprooted, and the sunnat of my 
father Yamin ad-Daula wa'd-Din thereby observed; moreover, other 
regions which are in the hands of enemies must be seized by the 
might of this sword'"• 137 
There emerges from all this that the Ghaznavids were very 
conscious of the moral benefits to be derived from Caliphal support 
and that religious orthodoxy was regarded as a cement for the fabric 
of the empire. 
Chapter Seven 
The Sultan and his servants 
The Ghaznavid Sultans were despots who held their empire 
together by fear. Nazim mentions as an institution of the admin-
istrative system the so-called Council of civil and military leaders 
which the Sultan convened for opinions and advice on important 
issues. But as he admits, " •••• the council was nothing more 
than a deliberative and consultative body at best, and the Sul~an was 
not bound either to ask or accept its advice". 138 A body so hebul-
ous and gelded of real power hardly deserves to be accorded an 
independent existence. 
In current monarchical theory, to acknowledge the circumscribing 
influence of ministers could only be viewed as an encroachment on 
kingly power. Maqmud could only be made to accept advice indirectly. 
The quotation from Baihaqi given below, Part V, 458 , shows how 
he was enraged by any contradiction; but on mat·ure reflection, he 
might well quietly heed the advice. By this means, the appearance 
of total personal control of decisions was kept. MasCud was amenable 
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to the suggestions of certain of his ministers, but this was usually 
when the ministers in question were his own creatures and personal 
favourites. i.e. those who gave the advice which the Sultan wanted to 
hear anyway. 
This explains the ascendancy in the early part of MasCud's 
reign of the CAri~ Abu Sahl Zauzani, whom Baihaqi (admittedly Abu· 
Sahl's enemy) regards as the evil genius of much of the Sultan's 
139 
reign. It was he who instigated MasCud to bring to trial and 
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execute the former Vizier ijasanak on pretext of his being an IsmaCil1. 
This course of action accorded with the Sultan's desire to uproot the 
men of the old regime, the ~~udiyan, who had either offended him 
in the past or who had supported his brother Mul:jammad's bid for the 
throne (see below, Part V, chapter 4); but Abu Sahl was actuated by 
the motive of revenge for a slight he had once received from one of 
ijasanak's servants. He so ill-treated the captive ijasanak that 
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the people began to murmur against him for his cruelty. Similarly, 
it was Abu~Sahl's stimulation of the Sultan's avarice which led the 
l-atter to attempt in 1031 to recover the mal-i baiCat, the seventy 
to !eighty million dirhams which Mu~ammad had paid out to the military 
leaders, officials and courtiers on his accession in an effort to 
secure their loyalty. MasCud even hoped to recover the presents 
given to the court poets, musicians and buffoons. The Vizier 
hlaimandi and the Chief Secretary considered the scheme unprecedented 
in the annals of the kings of CAjam and Islam; the attempt to collect 
the money failed in the end and served only to show up the Sultan's 
137. 
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avarice and arbitrary behaviour. 
At last Abu Sahl overreached himself. In 1031 he tried to 
procure the assassination of the Khwarizmshah Altuntash, but the 
plot was revealed by one of Abu Sahl's enemies at court and so mis-
fired. Unfortunately, the Sultan himself had been privy to the 
scheme, although his ministers Maimandl: and Abu Nafir-i Mishkan had 
known nothing about it. The revelation of the plot meant that all 
the officials' tact and diplomacy had to be employed to cover up 
their master's blunder; Altuntash's strategic position as a shield 
against the Qarakhanids and the Turkmens made him too important a 
personage to be alienated. rl'he Vizier feared that the Khwarizm-
shah might ally with the Qarakhanid CAlitigin against the Sultan. 
Hence he insisted that Abu Sahl should be sacrificed, and he was 
dismissed from the CAr4, imprisoned in the citadel of Ghazna and 
stripped of his estates and properties in Merv, Zauzan, Nishapur, 
Ghur, Herat, Badghis and Ghazna. MasCud avowed that henceforth he 
would do nothing behind the Vizier's back or without his advice: 
"Let the Khwaja know that after this, whatever is done in regard to 
matters of kingly power, finance or statesmanship, it shall always 
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be done on the advice of and after consultation with him". Abu 
Sahl was restored to favour in 1034, and after Abu Na~r-i Mishkan's 
death, was appointed in 1039 to head the Diwan-i Risalat; but his 
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influence was never again allowed to become preponderant in the state. 
Whether, if Maimandi had lived, the Sultan would have followed 
his judgement more closely, we cannot know. The probability is 
138. 
that MasCud's high opinion of his kingly office, his arbitrariness 
and obstinacy, would not long have allowed him to work in complete 
harmony with the wise old Vizier. Certainly, he was soon on bad 
145 terms with his new Vizier, A4mad b. CAbd a~~amad. The latter 
had been katkhuda of the Khwarizmshah Altuntash. The Sultan had 
been so impressed at his skill in extricating the Ghaznavid forces 
after the Battle of Dabusiyya, in which Altuntash had been fatally 
wounded fighting against CAlitigin, that he made him ruaimandi's 
successor. He thus exchanged a quasi-military post for a civilian 
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one. Despite the new Vizier's excellent conduct and reliable 
advice, MasCud soon grew suspicious, to such a point that he auto-
matically opposed whatever good counsels the Vizier put forward. 
Thus when in 1037 a council was swnmoned·,to discuss where the Sultan 
should campaign next, the Vizier and the Chief Secretary were the 
only ones to oppose the projected Indian expedition; they both held 
that the threatening situation'· in ··Khurasan demanded the concentration 
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of effort there, but their opinion was unheeded. After this, the 
Sultan and his Vizier remained on cold terms. Like the rest of the 
civilian officials, the Vizier complained of his master's capricious-
ness, his growing immersion in drinking and his neglect of personal 
attention to the menace of the Tur~nens. 
The Sultan was well aware that he could ill afford to dispense 
with an experienced man like the Vizier, and ~mad b. CAbd a~-9amad 
survived MasCud and after his murder served the new Sultan Maudud for 
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two years. The uneasy relationship between the Sultan and his 
Vizier is seen in the care with which the latter secured specific 
139. 
conditions of duty when in the autumn of 1040 MasCud appointed him 
to accompany the Prince MaudUd to Balkh and ~ukharistan. It was 
usual for an official to have a contract or muwadaCa explaining the ----·---
conditions under which he was taking office. A~mad b. CAbd a~-
-~amad had doubtless secured a muwa4aca when he had accepted the 
Vizierate, but this was a new, additional one. It shows that the 
Vizier was especially anxious to maintain his rights vis-a-vis the 
Department of the CArd. ---· Clauses of this contract deal with his 
relationship to the palace ghulams and their commander and to~the 
Commander-in-chief of the army and other generals. He also claimed 
some control over the army's pay arrangements and the right to app-
oint and dismiss the CAri4's deputy. The text of Maimand1's 
muw~4aca, made when in 1031 the Sultan brought him out from imprison-
ment in India and restored him to the Vizierate, is known from the 
Athar al-wuzara', ff. 107a-110a (summarised in Nazim, Sul]an Ma~ud, 
130-1; for the Athar al-wuzara' see above, Bibliographical introduct-
ion, 36-7 ) . It was clearly advisable for officials to have a 
statement of their duties in black-and-white, in order to avert 
criticism for omissions and shortcomings and to avoid encroachments 
by other departments. The importance attached to this muwadaCa of ----·---
1040 between the Sultan and A4mad b. CAbd a~~amad is shown by 
MasCUd's order that the copies for each party should be engrossed in 
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code, a procedure reserved only for doc~~ents of prime importance. 
The atmosphere generally prevailing between the Sultan and his 
ministers may be inferred from what has been said above. We have 
140. 
the explicit words of Abu Nasr-i Mishkan that "Kings often harbour 
fancies (khiyalha), and no-one can be sure, as he ought to be able, 
of what is in their minds or their hearts, nor can he discern what 
they really intend". Elsewhere he warns against the immediate execut-
ion of an order for someone's being put to death, for kings often 
150 
change their minds and repent of their decisions. The institution 
of the muwaqaca shows that something with greater legal sanction than 
the undefined, paternal relationship of master and servant was felt 
as necessary by the bureaucracy. 
As a typical representative of the Persian secretarial class 
and the author of a work on the secretary's craft, the Zinat al-
-kuttab,151it is unlikely that Baihaqi's views on kingship and the 
divine ordering of events were much different from the accepted 
Perso-Islamic tradition. In his own words, 
"Know that the Lord Most High has given one power to the prophets 
and another power to kings; and He has made it incumbent upon the 
people of the earth that they should submit themselves to the two 
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powers and should acknowledge the true way laid down by God". 
However, there are some indications that the education in the Muslim 
religious sciences undergone by all literate persons at this time 
had made Baihaqi and his fellow-officials conscious of the claims of 
justice and morality in official life and had disinclined them from 
wholly accepting the most ruthless aspects of the theory of the power 
state. The all-presence within the Ghaznavid empire of spies and 
informers will be discussed below. Baihaqi is very disapproving 
of the fact that the mushrif whom Sultan MasCud secretly set over 
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his uncle CA4ud ad-Daula YUsuf b. Sebaktigin was one of YUsuf's 
own ghulams, a ghulam whom YUsuf had cared for and treated as his 
own son; to Baihaqi, this was the ultimate in cynicism and ingratitude. 
Likewise, when Abu Na~r-i Mishkan was eventually told by the Sultan 
that during Maqmud's lifetime, when his son MasCud had been governor 
of Herat, the latter had employed one of the officials in Abu Na~r's 
own Diwan-i Risalat as a spy for his own interests, he was deeply 
shocked at this deceit. He expostulated that, had he known, he 
would have thrown the official in question out of the Diwan, for "a 
treacherous dabir is no use". 153 
These attitudes seem to be evidence of a feeling amongst the 
Dtwan officials that there were moral limits to the application of 
the internal spy system and that the atmosphere of mistrust which it 
engendered would, if unchecked, make honest administration impossible. 
As might be expected from a man who served several Sultans in turn, 
who recorded events carefully and who had much occasion to observe 
the harsh effects of government on the Sultan's subjects, Baihaqi 
seems to have made some reflections on the position of his class, that 
of the secretaries, and their position as intermediaries between the 
ruler and the ruled. These philosophisings have a rather more 
practical cast than much of the material in the "Mirrors for Princes". 
Ibn Funduq gives them in his biography of Abu'l-Faql Baihaqi, without 
stating from which of his works they are taken. It is possible that 
they came not from the Mujallad~t, the complete thirty volumes of 
which were not apparently extant in Khurasan even by Ibn Funduq's 
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time, but from the Zinat al-kuttab; if this surmise is true, it 
142. 
is unfortunate that a work of this interest has not survived. 
Baihaqi says: 
"The Sultan's officials should not accumulate treasure hoards, 
since this would mean attempting to share in the Sultan's power; 
for the accumulation of wealth and treasures is one of the prerog-
atives and procedures of kings. Nor should they pile up estates 
and mansions, for that is what subjects (racaya) do. The Sultan'~ 
officials have a rank and position midway between that of the 
subjects and the Sultan, superior to the one but inferior to the 
other; they must not try to emulate the Sultan in accurnulating 
treasure hoards, nor the subjects in acquiring estates and incomes 
from landed property. They should be content with their official 
salaries. From this income, they can enjoy affluence, esteem and 
influence. They should not desire greedily a higher salary than 
this moderate one which they derive from the service of rulers. 
Purely temporal benefits should not be sought through the exercise 
of this rank in the state; for if they seek after rank, and work 
for purely temporal ends, both rank and wealth will slip through 
their fingers and they will lay themselves open to bringing down 
Perdition on their souls". 
Then he passes on to consider some of the moral obligations which 
the Sultan's servants ought to observe towards the subjects. Baih-
aqi himself had noted the trail of deprivation which the Sultan's 
court and accompanying forces not infrequently left behind. When 
the commissariat, which was organised by the CAriq, was inadequate 
to feed and house all the Sultan's train, living off the land or 
the imposition of irregular levies on the population was often 
resorted to. Baihaqi goes on to say: 
"Wherever the royal court (dar al-mulk) may be, it is necessary 
that this person [se. the official] should have properly equipped 
143. 
quarters (saray-i maCmUr) so that it is unnecessary for him to 
be billeted on the subjects. It is preferable for the ruler to 
take with him herds of sheep, wherever he establishes himself, 
because otherwise it means that someone without herds, who comes 
to greet the ruler, is unable to show the virtues of hospitality 
and liberality. If the official is able, he arranges it so that 
his [se. the host's~j expenditure comes out of supplementary 
official funds ( az marsiirn-i ziyada t ayad; or perhaps, ''so that his 
expenditure is made up out of official funds", az ma.rsiim ziyadat 
ayad); this is only just and it avoids a [financial] catastrophe 
[for the host]. Also, it gives him [se. the official] security 
from punishment or dismissal in whatever he says or writes. And 
if he uses his high position to succour the distressed and needy, 
he will have built for himself one of the pillars of felicity in 
the next world. In this way, he will avoid calamity in this world, 
and will secure for himself an abundant entitlement to God Most 
High's mercy in the next world". l55 
Chapter Eight 
The intelligence system 
The day-to-day running of the empire was the work of the 
Diwans, which, together with the royal treasury, wardrobe and harem, 
normally accompanied the Sultan on his progresses round the realm. 
The official papers and registers were loaded on pack animals, and 
when the court halted for a period, tents were set up to accommodate 
the government departments and their clerks. (Nazim's survey of 
Ma~ud's administrative system does not clearly bring out the peri-
patetic nature of the central administration, but it emerges clearly 
enough from Baihaqi's pages, cf. 93,256, 287, 452 and passim). 
The Diwans were continuously fed by reports and despatches from 
all_)parts of the empire and brought in by couriers, askudaran, munhiyan. 
These reports covered such matters as the conduct of local officials; 
famines, gluts and the prices of provisions; natural catastrophes; 
incursions by external enemies; and activities by bandits and questions 
of law and order in general. The gathering of all this information 
was done by a network of local intelligence officers and spies, and 
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their reports were conveyed to the centre by the couriers of the 
Barid or postal-relay service. The service was, it goes without 
saying, organised for the benefit of the state and not for the use 
of private individuals. It was also used for the conveyance of 
important people, such as diplomatic and Caliphal envoys, to the 
capital. Occasionally, rare or perishable goods and foodstuffs 
were conveyed by it to the court. The etymology of the term barid 
has been traced back (in the first place, it seems, by Quatrem~re) 
to the Late Latin veredus "post-horse" and veredarius "courier", 
156 
words used in Byzantine administrative terminology. The use of 
a communications network and of envoys to carry messages, however, 
dates back in the Near East far beyond Byzantine times. Herodotus 
and Xenophon admired the Achaemenid postal system, and this system 
was perpetuated by the Sassanids. The Arab Caliphs inherited the 
institution and found it equally useful, although they relied more on 
swift mounts than on well-constructed roads for speedy movement. 
We may therefore view the Ghaznavid use of a Barid and Ishraf 
system as deriving from the practice of the Sassanids and early 
Caliphs, spread eastwards by the successor states in Persia of the 
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Caliphate, such as those of the ~ahirids, the Samanids and the BUyids. 
Such a system was a governmental necessity for dynasties which had 
territories disparate from each other in nature and geographically 
distant from the capital, as had the Caliphs and many of their succ-
essors. The Ghaznavids had the problems of great distances and 
mountainous terrain to cope with, so it was not surprising that 
military commanders on the periphery of the empire should be tempted 
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to rebel or that tax-collectors should divert more to their own 
pockets of the local revenues than convention of the time allowed. 
It was taken as axiomatic that the pride and arrogance of local 
governors made them insubordinate and that Camils were dishonest as 
a class. The Mushrifs and ~a~ib-Barids were the sole means by which 
misdeeds could be reported and the vengeance of the Sultan made to 
fall on the miscreants. Thus to a certain extent, they acted as 
checks on oppression and arbitrary behaviour. 
Karl Wittfogel has drawn attention to the care with which rulers 
in his 11 hydraulic" and "agro-managerial" societies devoted to the 
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question of rapid communication and the conveyance of information. 
However dubious the value of his thesis to Middle Eastern conditions 
at the time we are considering, it is true that an effective spy 
system and a network of communications buttressed a ruler's power 
and enabled him to exert more pressure on the periphery of his terr-
itories. In the Islamic power state, the division of ruler and 
ruled was maintained largely by fear, and the ruler's life was often 
dominated by fear of plots against him from within his own court 
circle and family, ~·of 1 rebellious generals in the provinces, of 
peasant jacqueries, in short, fear of almost anything. The resultant 
atmosphere was, in Wittfogel's terse summary, "total terror, total 
submission, total loneliness". 
The value of an efficient espionage system is stressed in the 
"Mirrors for Princes" literature. The Pand-nama of SebUktigin 
recommends: 
"You should always keep spies to bring you news of foreign 
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kingdoms and armies and of distant cities. In your own kingdoms 
and cities, you should keep honest ~!~ib-Barids so that they may 
keep you acquainted with the condition of the people and of the 
justice and righteousness of your camils". l59 
Ni~am al-Mulk devotes four chapters to the topic maintaining internal 
and external security by means of spies and secret observers (chs. 
VII, IX, X, XIII). The aim of the system of post-masters, he says, 
is to keep subjects in a state of obedience and fear of punishment 
and so discourage revolts. Spies must travel continually up and down 
the roads of the kingdom, disguised as merchants, travellers, ~ufrs, 
quacks and dervishes, reporting everything of note, for governors, 
fief-holders, officials and military commanders have a propensity 
160 towards rebelling. 
The Pand-nama cautions the ruler about his officials: 
"Do not be unmindful of those who have been camils for several 
years. They will spend the money which they have been saving for 
years to influence the governors and your servants, so that you 
may renew their appointment. Hence it is necessary that you should 
keep yourself acquainted with the condition of every revenue coll-
ector who has been in a village, town or city for two or three 
years, and get his accounts checked". 
Ni~am al-Mulk advises similar caution on the ruler's part: 
"It is necessary continually to enquire about the affairs of 
Camils; if the Camil acts in the way we have just mentioned [se. 
with compassion and justice towards the people], he may keep his 
office; but if not, he [se. the king] must give it to someone more 
worthy •••• It is likewise necessary to enquire about the affairs 
of Viziers and whether they are carrying out their duties properly 
or not, since the good or evil state of the king and the kingdom 
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is bound up with this official. When the honest Vizier is of 
good conduct and sound judgement, the kingdom is prosperous, both 
army and subjects are happy, contented and well-supplied, and the 
king is relieved of worry. But when the Vizier is of evil conduct, 
indescribable injury is generated within the kingdom; the king's 
head is always spinning round, his heart is distressed and the land 
is disturbed". 161 
Nizam al-Mulk also deals with the two men who were the mainstay of 
the system of internal control, the l-1iushrif and the ~!!J.ib-Khabar or 
S!thib-Barrd. ·-·---- The use of salaried officials such as these is clearly 
a more practical procedure than the other suggestion he makes, that 
the ruler should seek out the most virtuous citizen in each town and 
over 
make him his private eye/the local officials and the subjects. But 
the great Vizier stresses throughout the Siyasat-nama that all offic-
ials, and not merely spies and post-masters, should be paid adequate 
and regular salaries which will put them above being bought or corr-
upted. Any economies in this direction are false ones; the advant-
age of having trusty Mushrifs compensates ten or a hundred-fold for 
the expenditure on their salaries. The pay of hlushrifs and ~al:J.ib-
-Barids should, moreover, come from the central treasury, and not 
from provincial funds or from levies on the people; in this way 
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their direct dependence on the ruler will be maintained. The 
Ghaznavids made extensive use of these two officials for policing 
their empire, but the Seljuqs let the internal espionage systems 
lapse in the lands which they took over. Hence it is probable that 
Ni~am al-iviulk is here drawing upon Ghaznavid practice in his advocacy 
of the system. 
149. 
The Adab al-muluk (see above, Bibliographical introduction, 
48-50 ) devotes chapters to the Mushrif dar umur-i mamlakat and to 
the ~al}.ib-Barid. respectively. From this first chapter, the ~ushrif 
emerges as an official with a very varied number of inspectoral 
duties, :nainly in connection with the smooth running of the Sultan's 
household and the administration of his private property. Fakhr-i 
M.udabbir echoes Ni~am al-1.iulk in advising that the Iiiushrif should be 
of good birth as well as cautious and discreet. His duties included 
the inspection of all royal workshops (karkhanas),where the ~araz and 
other items like cordials, herbs and aromatics were manufactured or 
processed for the Sultan's consumption or bestowal, and the planting 
of agents in the royal kitchens to watch that the food was properly 
prepared and that none of it was stolen. lie looked after the supply 
of fodder for the royal stables and saw that the falcons and hounds 
were being cared for. Especially important was his oversight of 
the Sultan's herds of camels, cattle, sheep and buffaloes; he had to 
check that new births were recorded, that the beasts were branded 
with the Sultan's tamgha and that the herdsmen were fulfilling their 
tasks properly. Finally, the Mushrif had to be present in battle 
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with the army to take the Sultan's fifth of the spoil. Fakhr-i 
Mudabbir's emphasis on the Mushrif's inspectoral and regulating 
duties reflects perhaps the development of the office in the later 
Ghaznavid. period rather than the position in the first half of the 
11th century. 
However, there is some evidence that in the earlier period too 
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the Ghaznavid Mushrifs did have certain inspectoral and executive 
functions. Possibly this secondary aspect of the Mushrif's duties 
grew to primary importance after the Ghaznavid territories in the 
west were lost to the Seljuqs and the empire shrank in size, making 
an extensive internal spy system less necessary. In Baihaq1, the 
lvlushrif is essentially a member of the internal espionage system, 
but Mushrifs also had some duties concerning enforcement of the 
Sultan's decisions and other legal processes. ~~en an official fell 
from grace, Mushrifs carried out his arrest and the sequestration of 
his property. On one occasion, Baihaq1 himself, though at that time 
a secretary in the D1wan-i Risalat, was temporarily appointed a 
Mushrif. He accompanied an envoy conveying messages to two generals 
who had incurred lviasCud 1 s displeasure and saw that the message was 
properly delivered. 
164 An office of Mushrif-i khizana existed in 
MasCud's reign; he was probably charged with keeping an eye on the 
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activities of the officials and guards of the treasury. 
The essential function of the Mushrifs, that of police and esp-
ionage work, was organised from a special government department, the 
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Diwan-i Shughl-i Ishraf-i Mamlakat. Its importance to the ruler 
of an authoritarian state in preserving his power is attested by the 
words of Sultan MasCud himself, who regarded it as more important 
than the Diwan-i CAr4; and at the outset of his reign, he appointed 
as Chief Myshrif the man who had held the supreme office of Vizier 
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in Mu~ammad's reign. It was the ideal of the Sultans that the 
tentacles of the Ishraf system should stretch out and connect him 
with every important official and commander within the empire. 
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Because of their turbulence, the palace ghulams (see below, Part II, 
chapter 1 ) were a source of potential danger. During MasCud's 
reign we learn that the Sultan had a special ~ushrif planted among 
them. This man hung about the ghulams' living quarters and gathered 
gossip and intelligence from their victuallers and suppliers 
(~awa'ij-kashan-i with~qha); then he made a personal report to the 
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Sultan. It was felt as espec1ally necessary to have someone to 
report on the great military commanders. Usually, someone close to 
their hearts and particularly cognisant of their ambitions and intent-
ions was chosen. Thus the katkhudas of the two Turkish generals 
Eryaruq and As!ghtigin Ghazi were suborned to act as spies over their 
masters; these two men were Persian secretaries who acted as the 
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advisers of the slower-witted Turks. The Sultan often had spies 
over the higher civilian officials too. Being sharper and wiser 
than the Turkish soldiery usually was and being in the heart of the 
bureaucracy, of which the Department of the Ishraf was itself a part, 
these officials were less likely to be taken in. Towards the end of 
his reign, Sultan MasCud was on bad terms with his Vizier, A4road b. 
CAbd a~-~amad, and when the latter went out with an army to Balkh, 
~ukharistan and Khuttal, the Sultan secretly appointed one of the 
officers to be a muwakkal over the Vizier. ~mad was quite aware of 
this, but did not let it interfere with his work for his master. l70 
The royal family itself was not exempt from the working of 
spies within it. MasCud was intensely jealous and suspicious of 
his uncle Yusuf b. Sebfiktigin, who was an experienced soldier and 
a former governor of Khurasan. Fortunately for the Sultan's designs, 
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YUsuf had a weakness for boys. He therefore commissioned Ynsuf's 
favourite slave to act as a spy over him, despite the fact that this 
ghulam owed his career and fortune entirely to YUsuf. In this way, 
rAasCild was soon able to catch his uncle out in a doubtful move and 
lead him openly to confess his disloyalty. 171 Spies were even planted 
in the heart of the bureaucracy and at court by rival members of the 
royal family. When illa'.Q.mild appointed his son MasCud to be governor 
in Herat, he did not rely only on his tutor Rai!J.an Khadim's reports, 
but further employed ghulams, valets, old women and musicians as 
spies there. Conversely, l•'iasCild received news of events at court 
through the intermediacy of a Turkish ghulam commander, Anushtigin 
Kha~~a, and of his own aunt, ijurra-yi Khuttali, who was a fervent 
partisan in ~asCild's interests. ~ore daringly, ~asCild succeeded in 
planting two spies in the Diwan-i Risalat itself, unknown to the 
Chief Secretary; their presence was only revealed to Abil Na~r-i 
Mishkan when MasCild became Sultan and decided to reward these two 
men with the offices of the Barid of Sarakhs and the Ishraf of Balkh 
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and ~ukharistan respectively. 
It need hardly he added that the spy system also covered 
external enemies. In the early Ghaznavid period, the Sultans were 
anxious to know what was going on amongst the Qarakhanids and Turk-
mens in Transoxania, and spies were employed in the courts and milit-
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ary encampments there. Something approaching modern psychological 
warfare was practised at times. Sultan Ibrahim b. MasCild used his 
official Mihtar Rashid to create an atmosphere of mistrust and 
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treachery in the camp of the Seljuq Sultan Malikshah. Mihtar Rash'id 
promised substantial payments to the Seljuq Amirs and other officers 
if they would betray their master. Incriminating docmnents from 
this correspondence were then left in a sack ostentatiously dropped 
near Malikshah's own tent in the encampment, with the aim of under-
174 mining his confidence in his troops. 
It was noted above that the postal system depended on mounted 
couriers conveying reports from the ~a~ib-Barids in the provinces. 
For extra safety, messages were often concealed on the courier's 
person or on his mount, especially when the envoy had to pass along 
the edge of hostile territory, as did an envoy coming from Khwarizm; 
we hear of messages being concealed in hollow staffs, in hollowed-
-out shoemakers' tools, in the lining of boots, in the lining of 
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water-bottle holders and in saddle-cloths. Furthermore, messages 
were often written in code (mucamma); at court, the secretaries of 
the Correspondence Department deciphered them, whilst when messages 
were sent out to military commanders in the provinces, the commanders' 
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katkhudas did the decoding. 
The Sultan appointed the chief ~a~ib-Bar'ids and Mushrifs himself. 
They had to be thoroughly trustworthy, for the central government 
depended on them exclusively for news of happenings in the extremities 
of the empire such as Ray and Khwarizm, and had to form its policy 
177 on the basis of their reports. The office of ~a4ib-Barid was not 
infrequently a stepping-stone to offices as high as that of the 
Vizierate; and according to Fakhr-i Mudabbir, ~a4ib-Barids were as a 
1)4. 
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profession always scholars and learned men, writing many books. 
We hear of a .9!4.!., Abu'l-Faql Al:J.mad al-Abiwardi, being appointed 
~al}i b-Barid of Nishapur by l•lal).mud. 179 The line between ~alJ.i b-Barid 
and Mushrif was not always a hard and fast one; the man who in 1033 
was appointed by the Sultan as ~alJ.ib-Barid of Nishapur was also 
secretly charged by the Vizier to act as his personal spy over the 
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CAmYd (Civil governor)of Khurasan, srrrr. To complete the police 
and communications network, the Sultan had watchmen, ~ala!ic, along 
all important roads within the kingdom, and he had at his disposal 
pursuivants and bailiffs, muwakkalan, who made arrests and carried 
out distraints on goods and property. Finally, the local officials 
and notables, acyan, who acted as wakils of crown property in the 
181 
provinces, could. be alerted to apprehend fugitives. 
Chapter Nine 
The financing of the empire 
The Ghaznavid rulers required immense amounts of treasure to 
run their administration and to keep the momentum of expansion 
going. With regard to this requirement, there are three points to 
note. 
Firstly, the Ghaznavid state had a strongly military and imper-
ialist bias. As will be described later,,(15elow;·:1.PaTt II), the 
military machine of the Ghaznavids combined features from earlier 
military practice. In particular, it had a nucleus of slave soldiers, 
ghulams, who gave personal loyalty to the Sultans and who came from 
several nationalities. The purchase or hire of soldiers for profess-
ional armies such as this entailed great expenditure. Previously, 
armies of free citizens or tribesmen had usually had the obligation 
to equip and feed themselves, and when the campaign for which they 
had been summoned out was over, they had returned to their peace-
-time callings. The evolution in human society of armies from a 
feudal or tribal basis to a paid, professional basis has generally 
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meant an increase in state expenditure. Fresh taxation and a larger 
administration to collect it have then been required, so that the 
power of the ruler and the state vis-a-vis the subjects has grown. 
This process can be seen at work amongst the Ghaznavids, but they 
were fortunate in the financial resources which they could tap, i.e. 
the rich provinces over which they ruled in the west and the plunder 
obtained from the Indian campaigns. A corollary of this was that 
the Sultans could pay their armies mainly in cash and did not, like 
the Buyids and. Seljuqs, have to resort generally to a system of 
military feudalism and land.grants (see below, Part II, 
Secondly, the immediate needs of cash for the Sultans' campaigns 
were great. Ma~ud's campaigns have been carefully elucidated and 
classified by Nazim, Suli(an lEa:Q.rnud, 42-122; see also, Elliot and 
Dowson, History of India, II, 434-78, Sir Wolseley Haig in Cambridge 
History of India, III, eh. II, and M. Habib, Sultan Mahmud of Ghaznin2 , 
23-59· Those of MasCud were equally far-ranging, even though the 
peak of expansion had passed when he assumed power, and he made no 
significant territorial additions to the empire left by his father. 
In the latter part of his reign, the fabric of the empire began to 
crack under the Turkmens' attacks, but even then, the liquidation 
of the Ghaznavid assets in the west was an expensive business. The 
warfare between the less mobile Ghaznavid professional I~r~es and 
the Turkmen skirmishers, often indecisive, swallowed up whole armies. 
There was no compensatory booty to be taken from these miserably-
-equipped nomads; moreover, their depredations were ruining the 
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economy of the rich province of Khurasan. 
Thirdly, there was the lUxurious court life and the heavy super-
structure of the bureaucracy, which was not flexible enough to be 
cut back as the momentum of the empire ground to a standstill and 
then began to go back. The Sultans lived opulently; and habits of 
extravagance contracted in times of affluence cannot easily be curbed 
in times of ill fortune, when there is always the hope that prosper-
ity is once more around the corner if only one can hold on long 
enough. The administrative network had grown in complexity as the 
empire expanded; the members of the bureaucracy had acquired a corp-
orate feeling of interest, and the machinery of state now went 
forward under its own momentum. 182 
The sources of the revenue which fed the Ghaznavid state, and 
the methods by which it was collected, will now be examined. In 
particular, we would like to know how oppressive was the burden of 
taxation, for there are many indications that taxes were often coll-
ected brutally. These sources of revenue will be considered under 
five headings: 
(1) crown lands and private possessions of the Sultans; 
(2) escheats to the Sultans and confiscations by them; 
(3) tribute and presents from dependent rulers, governors, etc.; 
(4) war plunder; 
(5) normal taxation, the kharaj, and extraordinary levies. 
Firstly, crown lands and private possessions of the Sultans. 
In the Islamic world at this time, there was little distinction in 
practice with regard to the ultimate disposal of the monies a ruler 
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had, i.e. there was no water-tight division between his Privy Purse 
and the Public Treasury. Certainly, within the Abbasid Caliphate 
there were two separate financial organs, the Bait al-mal and the 
Bait mal al-kha~~' and in his survey of finant±al practice as it 
was in the last days of the Baghdad Caliphate, Na~ir ad-Din ~us! 
distinguishes very carefully between the mal-i ma~aliq-i padishahi 
and the kha~~~; but as Mez pointed out, the Caliph could draw on 
either of the two without having to account to anybody. Often, when 
the Public Treasury was exhausted, the Private one was used. This 
Procedure resembles that which Ni~am al-filulk recommends: that the 
ruler should have a khazrna-yi kharj for everyday expenses and pay-
ments and a khazina-yi a~l for capital deposits. The latter should 
only be tapped in emergencies, and money taken from it regarded as 
183 a loan therefrom. 
In the Ghaznavid state, there was some duality of organisation 
in that there was a Diwan-i Wikalat which administered the crown 
lands and supervised the financial side of the running of the Royal 
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Household. However, its operations did not extend outside this 
limited sphere, and in this respect, the Ghaznavid system was not so 
developed as that of the Abbasids. Under the Sultans, the Diwan-i 
Wazir was the premier financial department. It received and dis-
bursed the monies, whilst its ancillary, the accounts office (Diwan-i 
Istifa'), registered the transactions in its ledgers and accounted 
for them. Income from the Sultans' private possessions, apart from 
that specifically expended on the Household, seems to have been 
utilised through the departments of the Vizier and Mustaufi. 
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It was the Wakil-i kha~~ who normally administered the personal 
estates of the Ghaznavid family, the ~iyaC-i kha~~' but at times, 
some of the lands seem to have been given to other officials. One 
Bu sacrd-i Sahl, an old retainer of Ma~ud's brother Na~r b. Sebllk-
tigin, held the overseership of the crown lands at Ghazna until he 
further acquired the Diwan-i Ghazni, when he combined the two posts. 
(The Drwan-i Ghazni was the local administrative office there, per-
manently located in the capital, whereas the chief diwans of state 
were peregrinatory. The supervision of the Ghazna estates required 
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their overseer to be permanently resident there.) The royal 
family's lands were especially concentrated in the Ghazna area, where 
the 1s~acs originally granted to Sebllktigin formed their nucleus 
(see above, 98-9 ). But they had other, lucrative properties, 
estates and markets scattered all over the empire, such as the Bazar-i 
CAshiqan in Balkh (see below, 190 ) . It is likely that the 
Ghaznavids succeeded to ownership of the former Samanid crown lands 
in Khurasan, which, towards the end of the latter dynasty's rule, 
h db . t db th s- ·- - 186 F th Gh .d f ·1 a een appropr1a e y e 1mJur1s. or e aznav1 am1 y 
auqaf there was a special katkhuda. As well as lands and properties, 
the Sultans' private possessions also included herds of horses, sheep, 
camels, cattle and buffaloes, whose tending required:~numerous 
herdsmen and attendants. It was the practice in the spring of each 
year to put the royal horses to graze in lush meadows, whilst the 
camels were sent to the rich pastures at Riba~-i Karwan, on the 
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borders of Guzgan and GhiTr. During his father's lifetime, MasCud 
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had his own flocks of sheep at Herat, where he was governor. Their 
numbers may be gauged from the fact that soon after his accession, 
MasCud was able to bestow 16,000 sheep from his personal flocks on 
someone whose faithful service had pleased him. There were apprec-
iable opportunities for personal profit for the custodians of these 
flocks. When after fifteen years' oversight of the Ghazna flocks, 
the accounts of the Bu SaCid-i Sahl mentioned above were investig-
ated, it was found that in this period he had made seventeen 
million dirhams pure profit (~a~il-i ma~4), even though his personal 
income (tankhwah) was only one million per annum.
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Lastly, the 
Sultans' private possessions included their own treasure hoard, and 
this normally accompanied them in their journeyings. It came from 
such sources as paternal inheritance, personal savings and confisc-
ations among the royal family; MasCud was very careful to see that 
the treasure of his deposed brother M~ammad came safely into his 
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own hands. 
Secondly, escheats to the crown and confiscations. The Sultan 
was ultimus haeres to those whose heirs could not be found, to those 
who were his personal slaves and to his eunuchs. 
190 From the prop-
-erty and possessions thus gained, the Sultan often distributed 
movables and personal slaves among the royal family and granted out 
estates and military slaves to other commanders. Wb.en the Sultan 
freed any of his slaves, these freedmen still remained tied to their 
manumitter, according to the latter's right of wala', and the Sultan 
was heir to their property. It was normal oh-· tlie ·death of a high 
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official that his accounts and personal affairs should be invest-
igated by one of the Sultan's officials. When Baihaqi's master in 
the Correspondence Department, Abu Na~r-i Mishkan, died in 1039, 
the Sultan took over the only possessions he left, his personal 
slaves and herds of beasts; these must have been originally granted 
out as emoluments of his office, reverting to the grantor on Abu 
Na~r•s death, for he certainly left children of his ovm. l9l 
The office of Vizier was traditionally a precarious one. The 
Vizier's far-reaching control over affairs and the sources of profit 
open to him, often aroused the ruler's jealousy over encroachments 
on his own sovereign power and his cupidity at the Vizier's personal 
gains. Similar temptations and dangers beset other high officials, 
and many aphorisms were current in the Islamic world which contrasted 
the perils of office with the joys of a life free from responsibility. 
Hence men who thought the joys of power a poor exchange for the 
dangers inherent in high rank, refused offices like the Vizierate. 192 
The Abbasids had brought to a fine art the practice of mu~adara, 
the process by which officials retiring from their posts were made 
to disgorge their ill-gotten gains, and had set up a special depart-
ment for this, the Diwan al~~adara. l93 In their greed for money, 
the Ghaznavids in no way fell behind the Caliphs, although they 
lacked the refinements of torture which the mu~adirun of Baghdad 
had developed over the years. 194 Even so, the Ghaznavid "extractor 
of information" (mustakhrij .; often called, in Abbasid parlance, the 
mutalib) had at his disposal the rods, the lash and the rack, and -·--
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behind him stood the executioner as ultimate compeller. When 
Mal].mtid 1 s Vizier Maimandi was being divested of his wealth, one of his 
bitterest enemies was specially brought from Sarakhs to Ghazna and 
Gardiz to act as mustakhrij. 195 
Of the six men who acted as chief minister during the reigns of 
Mal].mud, hluljammad and MasCud., three were dismissed and died violently 
and another of them suffered disgrace and prolonged imprisonment. 
Isfara'ini acted as Maljmud 1 s Vizier for ten years, extorting large 
sums for his master from the luckless subjects. Yet the Sultan's 
avarice was insatiable, and when the Vizier could squeeze the people 
of Herat no further and he refused to make up the deficiency in the 
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revenue from his own pocket, h1aljmud tortured him to death. The 
next Vizier, Maimandi, eventually fell from favour, suffered various 
torments and confiscations, escaped death very narrowly and was 
imprisoned in India. He nevertheless survived the Sultan and died a 
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peaceful and honoured death as his son lviasCud 1 s Vizier. l'1aJtmud 1 s 
last Vizier, ijasanak, was executed by MasCud shortly after his access-
ion after he had "voluntarily" sold all his possessions to the Sultan; 
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in this way, an illusion of legality was preserved. Surprisingly, 
M~ammad's Vizier, Abu Sahl ijamdawi, escaped MasCud 1 s vengeance and 
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was honoured with further important offices. MasCud's first chief 
minister (it is not clear whether he was ever formally invested with 
the Vizierate) was Abu Sahl Zauzani; he was moved to another office 
and was later dismissed under a cloud (see above, 136-7 ). The 
new Vizier, Alpnad b. CAbd afi~amad, remained Vizier till the follow-
ing reign, but after two years of service to Maudud, his enemies at 
163. 
200 
court~rocured his downfall, and he was jailed, dying of ill-treatment. 
Other high officials were liable to suffer ~~adara on leaving any 
office which could have given opportunities for private gain, and 
they frequently suffered rough handling in the process. 201 
It was the Vizier who was finally responsible for safe collect-
ion of the taxes. Consequently, he kept a continuous watch by means 
of the Barid system over the collectors, cummal, and the forwarding 
of the sum assessed for each collector's district was strictly 
required. If the sum fell short, either the eamil had to make up 
the sum from his own pocket or else the money which he was withholding 
was wrung from him by force. It was Isfara'ini's reluctance or 
inability to make up the sum demanded by the Sultan which led to his 
downfall. In one of his ~~Idas, Farrukhi describes what must have 
been a common occurence: "Tomorrow when he [se. the Vizier] demands 
an account from the Sultan's camils, their extortions will become 
manifest. The money which they have embezzled, he will recover from 
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them to the last dang, and will send them to prison". It was 
because of considerations like these that Maimandi, when he became 
Vizier once more, insisted in his muwaqaca with MasCud that the trad-
itional practice in the appointment of the deputies of the ~~~ib-
-Barids and the Mushrifs should continue to be observed. Whereas 
the Sultan personally appointed the chief officers in these police 
and espionage services, the Vizier had the right to appoint their 
deputies. The relevant clause of the contract explains that the 
Vizier must be assured of the subordinate officials' probity and 
must be able to prevent any collusion between them and the camils; 
otherwise, there will arise irregularities in the collection of 
taxes and officials will take from the taxes a greater share than 
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their salary (mushahara) allows. The recalcitrant camil could 
expect at the least the bastinado, and if he still held out, the 
rack or mutilation of the hands and feet. At the end was death; 
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trampling by elephants was one of the methods of execution used. 
Maimandi's father had been na'ib and camil of Bust, but because of 
his defalcations and confiscations of property, he had been denounced 
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to SebUktigin and crucified on a tree. A further method of control 
over Camils was to take hostages from their families. In Ma~mud's 
reign, the CAmil of Sistan, M~ammad-i Ba ijaf~, had to send one of 
his four sons in turn to Ghazna each year, where they were kept as 
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sureties for his honest behaviour. 
Finally, in this section on escheats and confiscations, we may 
note income from extraordinary acts of expropriation, such as MasCud's 
attempt to recover the mal-i baiCat which his brother Mu~ammad had 
paid out (see above, 136-7 , and below, Part II, 267 ), and 
a lesser but more constant stream of payments of pecuniary mulcts 
and fines for ordinary criminal offences. 207 
Thirdly, tribute and presents from dependent rulers, governors, 
etc. Many lands were annexed outright; ~ in other cases rulers 
had to recognise the suzerainty of Ghazna, but it was not possible to 
bring their territories under direct rule. To have held down the 
Indian native rulers would have required enormous forces in closely-
-spaced garrisons. The Caspian provinces were too unhealthy for 
troops accustomed to the bracing plateaux of Khurasan and Afghanistan 
to endure for long. Sometimes it was politically expedient to leave 
local rulers in possession; those of the trans-Oxus principalities 
of Khuttal and Chaghaniyan were left to hold their provinces as buffers 
against the Qarakhanids, Kumijis and other marauders from Central Asia .. 
(see below, Part V, 464, 468 ). Above all, there was the question 
of distance: it was administratively impossible for the bureaucracy 
in Ghazna to keep a regular control over such distant regions as 
western Persia or Khwarizm. In the outlying areas ruled by tribut-
ary rulers, the Sultan had to be content with the precedence of his 
own name after that of the Abbasid Caliph in the local minbars, the 
occasional requiring of contingents for his armies and the exaction 
of an annual tribute. This is called in contemporary sources mal-i 
qaman or mal-i muwaq.aca, "tribute stipulated according to a covenant, 
Maqmud's conquests in western Persia in the last year of his 
life brought him into contact with the B~yids and with several minor 
Dailami and Kurdish dynasties. He forced the Musafirid and Rawwadid 
rulers at this time to pay tribute, but the region of Tarom, Sawa 
and Aba did not remain subject to the Ghaznavids for long. A Dailami 
rebellion at Qazwl:n and Qum was suppressed in 1033, but Ghaznavid 
influence here was hampered by the great distance from Ghazna invol-
ved and by Turkmen pressure on the line of communication through 
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northern Persia. The Kakllyids of Isfahan were also overawed as 
a result of Maqmud's Ray expedition. The ~akUyids were another 
166. 
Dailami dynasty who, although they falsely claimed descent from 
the Bawandid Ispahbads of ~abaristan, really rose to power under 
BUyid patronage. However, the son of the founder of the dynasty, 
CAla' ad-Daula Muqammad b. Dushmanziyar, known as Ibn KakUya (reigned 
398-433/1008-42), cannot be classed as just another barbarian from 
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the backwards Caspian highlands. The possession of such rich 
towns as Isfahan, Hamadan, DYnawar and ShapUr-Khwast enabled him to 
buy Turkish mercenaries and to make himself a power in central Persia. 
His court was a flourishing centre for the arts and sciences, and 
Avicenna eventually found refuge there from Ghaznavid pursuit, acting 
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as CAla' ad-Daula's Vizier until his death in 1037. M as Cud 
always regarded "Pisar-i Kaku" as a powerful and dangerous opponent. 
At the outset of his reign, he had to content himself with exacting 
tribute; on the Caliph's intercession, CAla' ad-Daula promised to 
pay each year 20,000 dinars and 10,000 pieces of cloth from the local 
workshops, besides sending the usual NaurUz and Mihrgan presents. 
But in the succeeding years, Ghaznavid armies had frequently to 
march against him, and the tribute remained generally in arrears 
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(see further, below, Part V, 460). 
The Ghaznavids had especially close relations with the Ziyarids 
of Gurgan and Tabaristan. In the last decades of Samanid rule: 
Q~bUs b. Washumgir had intervened in Khurasanian affairs and taken 
part in the warfare between the rival Samanid governors and commanders. 
His son Manuchihr became Maqmud's son-in-law, but derived no special 
privileges from this. The Sultan's financial demands on him were 
exorbitant and continuous. He had to buy off Ma4IDud's support of a 
rival to the succession, his own brother Dara, by an annual tribute 
of 50,000 dinars. When MaQmud marched against Nardrn in India 
shortly afterwards in 1013-14, Manuchihr had to send a contingent 
of Dailami troops. When the Sultan marched westwards to Ray, he 
was compelled to give a subvention of 400,000 dinars and supply 
provisions to the army. Manuchihr then feared that the Sultan might 
direct this army against his own kingdom, and assumed a hostile 
attitude; for this, he had to pay a further 500,000 dinars. When 
he died a few months later, his son Anushirwan had to pay another 
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levy of 500,000 dinars in order to secure recognition from Ghazna. 
For much of MasCud's reign, the effective ruler in Gurgan and Tabar-
istan was one Abu Kalijar (on him, see below, Part II, 246 ). 
The Sultan tried to attach him to himself by a marriage alliance, 
but was nevertheless most careful that the mal-i daman should still ------·----
be forwarded to the provincial diwan at Nishapur. Even so, Abu 
Kalijar was by 1035 two years behind with his tribute, and this was 
one of the reasons behind the Sultan's decision then to take a 
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punitive expedition to the Caspian shores. 
In dealing with India, it is not easy to distinguish regular 
tribute payments by the Indian princes from plunder brought back by 
expeditions. Since for most of the early Ghaznavid period there 
was no special diwan: or permanent civil administration in northern 
India, income came in irregularly. wilitary force was often the 
only means of collecting tribute. The payment of tribute was usually 
stipulated in the peace treaties between the Sultan and the princes; 
168. 
sometimes part of it was payable in elephants. Thus at sorne time 
after 1009, the Raja· of Narayanpur (in modern Alwar state) made 
peace on the basis of an annual tribute, which included fifty ele-
phants, and promised to send a contingent of 200 men for the Ghazna-
vid army. After the winter campaign of 1022-3, Ganda, the Raja of 
Kalinjar (near the modern Allahabad), promised a spot payment of 
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300 elephants and an annual tribute. The city of Mu1tan had 
been since the early Arab invasions of Sind an outpost of Islam in 
India, but during the course of the lOth century had been won over 
by IsmaCili d~Cis~ 15 aa~mUd, the hammer of heretics, captured Multan 
in 1006, and the inhabitants are said to have been forced to pay a 
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fine of twenty million dirhams to keep the city from being sacked. 
Multan remained quiet for over thirty years, and it is probable that 
the Sultans were able to collect regular tribute from it, since it 
lay closer to Ghazna than did much of northern India. One valuable 
commodity taken from India as tribute was the dyestuff indigo (nil). 
The Sultans reserved part of this for their own usage, and often 
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sent it as presents for the Caliph or for other rulers. 
Towards the end of his reign, Ma~Ud tried to establish a more 
permanent form of control over the Punjab, with a division of resp-
onsibility there. The military command remained in the hands of 
'rurkish ghulam generals, based on Lahore, centre of the Muslim ghazis 
in India; but at their side was set up a civil administration under 
a Persian official, the Qa4I Bu'l-ijasan CAli Shirazi, of whom the 
Sultan though so highly that he had considered him for the Vizierate. 
A ~!ltib-Barid was deputed to watch over both the military and civil 
heads. The intended division of functions is clearly laid down in 
the instructions sent out early in MasCud's reign from Ghazna to the 
Qaqi: "Your job is management of the finances there (katkhuda'I mali) 
and you have nothing to do with the military command or the army. 
[The new Commander-in-chief] AQ.rnad [Inaltigin] will himself carry 
out the duties required of him; he will exact the stipulated taxation 
and tribute from the native princes (malha-yi takkuran basitanad az 
kharaj u muwaq.acat) and then go·: out on plunder raids and bring back 
large sums to the treasury". It seems that this was an attempt to 
set up a civil administration in the Punjab with a regular system of 
taxation, as was the normal arrangement in the heartlands of the 
Ghaznavid empire. In the event, northern India was not pacified 
enough for this to work, nor wer-e there adequate means of controlling 
officials there. Personal animosity poisoned the relations of the 
Qaqi Shirazi and A4road Inaltigin, for they were unable to agree about 
the demarcation of their respective spheres. In the time of the 
previous Commander-in-chief, the Qaqi had gone round in military 
dress and had claimed to give orders to him; but ~ad Inaltigin 
had the backing of the Vizier Maimandi in Ghazna and, above all, of 
the troops and ghazis of Lahore. He used these forces and the money 
which he had kept back from the princes' tribute and from the plunder 
of his raid on Benares to rebel against the Sultan in 1033. The 
rebellion was suppressed, but northern India remained in a turbulent 




Provincial governors and tributary rulers brought presents to 
the Sultan's court on the traditional Iranian festivals of Nauruz 
in the spring and Mihrgan in the autmnn, and in return, the Sultan 
dispensed hospitality on a munificent scale. At the Mihrgan celebr-
ations of 422/1031, presents were received from the civil governor 
of Khurasan, Sur1, from the Khwarizmshah Altuntash, from the Am1rs 
of Chaghaniyan and Gurgan; from the governors (wulat) of Qu~dar and 
Makran, etc. On another occasion, the ruler of Chaghaniyan brought 
to J.~asCud specialities of his country - powerfully-built horses, 
Turkish slaves, hawks, panthers for hunting, etc.219 Diplomatic 
relations with outside powers like the Caliphate or the Qarakhanids, 
with whom the Sultans had to treat on an equal footing, normally 
entailed an exchange of presents. Those exchanged in 1025 between 
Ma~ud and Qadrr Khan YUsuf were especially luxurious; they are 
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described in detail by Gard1z1. Many of the fresh Turkish slaves 
for the Ghaznavid armies came in the form of tribute or presents 
from the Turkish lands to the north (see below, Part II, 228). 
At the local level, the Sultans benefited from presents given by their 
subjects; it was the annual custom of one rich landowner of Ghazna 
to present the Sultan with pickles, savouries, dried meats and fine 
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clothes. 
Fourthly, war plunder. The rich spoils of regions like the 
northern Indian plain and western Persia were an important factor 
in making the Ghaznavid empire the most dynamic power known in east-
ern Islam since the Arab conquests. The Gkaznavids' professional 
171. 
army was a salaried one that had to be kept permanently in existence 
and could not be stood down. In paying it, the regular income from 
taxation was most important, but the spoils of war supplemented this. 
Moreover, specific article~ like weapons, valuables or slaves could 
be divided up amongst the soldiers in addition to their regular pay. 
Hopes of booty and religious zeal made ghazis flock to the Sultans' 
standards from all parts of eastern Islam; these irregulars did not 
qualify for regular pay, but could rely on rich pickings from the 
Indian campaigns. The ghazis also performed much of the work of 
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garrisoning Lahore and other Ghaznavid strong points in India. 
It is unnecessary to cite more than two or three sets of figures 
to show the extent of booty falling to the Ghaznavid armies; despite 
llluslim historians' penchants for round numbers and tendencies to 
exaggerate, its great size is apparent. ~~om the temple in the fort 
of Nagarkot in the upper Indus valley, Ma~mud is alleged to have taken 
in 1008-9 seventy million dirhams in coined money, 10,000 mans of 
gold and silver ingots and rich clothing, a folding house made of 
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silver and a richly-decorated throne. From the temple of Somnath, 
he is said to have got over twenty million dinars' worth of spoil. 224 
When Ray was captured in 1029, the army carried off about 500,000 
dinars' worth of jewels, 260,000 dinars in coined money, over 30,000 
dinars' worth of gold and silver vessels, 5,300 garments, suits of 
woven and Khusrawani (?) clothes valued at 20,000 dinars and fifty 
loads of books, excluding those of the MuCtazila, philosophers and 
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ShiCa, which were burnt forthwith. 
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Part of the bullion and precious stones taken from the temple 
treasures of India was converted into negotiable form by skilled 
valuers and assayers (nuqqad) at Ghazna. Another part of it was 
used for ornamenting and enriching the Sultan's palaces and their 
furnishings, in which precious metals and jewels were lavishly used 
{see above, 115-16 ). A further part of it was given away as 
~ilat for the Sultan's favourites, courtiers, poets, etc. To the 
pious, wealth brought back from pagan India was mal-i ~alal, lawfully 
gained from the idolaters; it was very likely that money from tax-
ation on the Muslim subjects had on it the taint of violence and 
oppression. 
Perhaps the most important use: of all for the bullion was for 
minting purposes. The Ghaznavids' gold coinage maintained a high 
standard. Their early dinars, modelled on those minted at Nishapur 
by Maqmud when he was governor there, were probably of an average of 
65-66 grains, but a considerable number of specimens are known which 
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reach 76 or 77 grains. It has been noted (above, 101 ) that 
the silver coinage of the early Ghaznavids seems to be of a higher 
standard than that of the Samanids. There are extant dirhams of 
Mu4ammad and MasCud (in both cases with mint and date illegible) 
with weights as high as 60 and 66 grains respectively, and one large 
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silver coin from Ma~ud (? Nishapur, 399/1008-9) of 76 grains. 
With the strong treasury backing such as they had, the Ghaznavids 
could have issued a trustworthy copper currency; in practice, there 
seems to have been so much silver available for minting that copper 
173. 
currency was little necessary. The exception was that in the Punjab 
a mixed silver-copper currency continued to be minted on the old 
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Hindu models. There are some signs of a decline in quality of 
the silver coinage in the second half of the 11th century in the 
reign of Ibrahim b. Mascua; on the other hand, there are some heavy 
silver coins known from the reigns of Bahramshah and Khusrau Malik 
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in the next century. The high standard of the coinage in the 
reigns of MaQmud and wasCud facilitated trade between the Islamic 
east and India and across the Ghaznavid empire. Whereas for cent-
uries India had swallowed up precious metals, from the mineral 
resources of Tibet and Central Asia and from trade with the Islamic 
world and the Turkish steppes, this process was now for a time 
halted and the terms of trade for the first time favoured the lands 
to the west and north-west of India. The flow of bullion stimulated 
trade and industry within eastern Islam; and it was partly because 
of this that provinces like Khurasan and Transoxania, though racked 
by warfare and other disturbances, were highly prosperous in the 11th 
century. Finally, the Indian campaigns yielded large numbers of 
slaves and the influx of slave labour into Ghazna and its economic 
hinterland drew slave traders and further stimulated trade. (see 
below, Part II, 229). 
Fifthly, regular taxation and extraordinary levies. Here one 
realises how heavily the Ghaznavid state machinery bore at times on 
the population. Some general remarks have been made (above, 146 ff.) 
about the tyranny of camils and the measures taken by rulers to 
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control their activities, but there are two further points to con-
sider. The first concerns the harshness of the camils towards the 
subjects. Vfuilst many of them regarded their tenure of office as 
an opportunity for lining their own pockets, it is clear that others 
were forced into oppressive measures by the relentless pressure of 
the Sultan, for he showed no mercy towards camils whose quotas fell 
short of the stipulated amounts. The second point concerns the 
attitude of the subjects themselves towards their masters and 
towards authority in general. Gibb and Bowen have commented on this 
in regard to the Arab world in the 18th century, but their judge-
ment has validity for other places and periods in Islam: 
"The conception of authority implied in the minds of the subjects 
themselves an assertion of power accompanied by a certain measure 
of harshness and violence •••• The prevalence of such a conception 
of authority may, at first sight, be put to the account of long 
centuries of misrule and oppression, supplemented by the tradition 
of quietism which was inculcated by the religious authorities and 
by an acquired habit of stoicism, passing into fatalism. But this 
explanation by no means covers all the facts. It seems rather to 
be a development of the basic idea that authority confers privil-
ege •••• Yet public opinion recognized certain limits to tyranny 
and exploitation. One may even speak of 'permissible extortions' 
or 'recognized abuses' as we shall see later, in the sense that 
they had become traditional usages". 23° 
Nevertheless, the exhortations of the "Mirrors for Princes" 
show that theorists of the 11th century often felt that exploitation 
went too far. Ni~am al-Mulk warns against pressing the peasants too 
far and against demanding taxes before the harvest is ready, so that 
175. 
peasants are driven into debt or have to sell their possessions to 
find the money. Such a policy, he says, drives peasants away from 
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the land and into foreign parts. In practice, the timing of tax 
collecting must have presented considerable problems, for the differ-
ent crops on which taxation in cash or kind was to be levied ripened 
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at different times of the year. Flight to the city or to another 
province gave the peasant an ultimate weapon if conditions grew intol-
erable. Before the Great Seljuq period, Khurasan:and the east were 
as yet little familiar with the 1s~ac system as developed in western 
Persia, ~esopotamia, the Jaztra and Syria by the ijamdanids and BUyids, 
and the peasants there were not yet adscripti glebae. 233 In the 
1030's the people of Khurasan were being heavily taxed by the Ghazna-
vids, but were not being properly defended against the Turkmen raiders. 
Hence peasants fled to the comparative safety of the towns, rural 
depopulation took place and there was a catastrophic fall in land 
values (see below, Part V, 504-5 ). Another frequent reaction 
of exasperated peasants was to break out in jacqueries against the 
authorities; in the course of these, Camils might be murdered and 
and tax registers destroyed. 234 
The land-tax, kharaj, was collected by the camils, who brought 
in their yields to the provincial Diwans, where their accounts were 
audited. The collected revenues, whether in cash or in kind, were 
often temporarily stored in local strongholds and castles. When in 
1038 the Turkmens were threatening Nishapur, the cash part of the 
revenues of Nishapur and other light and transportable items were 
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removed for safety to a castle belonging to the Mikali family on the 
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Nishapur-Sistan road. It appears from the anecdote about the 
Khwarizmshah Altuntash's allowance in eh. XLIX of the Siyasat-nama 
that the Vizier Maimandi always insisted that the revenues of the 
more outlying provinces, where central control was weakest, should go 
through the central Diwan at Ghazna. Only after they had been accoun-
ted for there was a part of the revenue to be sent back to the province 
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for local salaries and expenses. Otherwise, the central administr-
ation had no idea of what a distant province was actually yielding, 
nor could it determine how much how much a local governor might be 
diverting to his own pocket. However, in the provinces which were 
not too distant from the centre, the regional Diwan normally deducted 
the expenses and salaries of the local administration before forward-
ing the surplus to Ghazna (see above, 164). 
Collection of the revenues by local Camils under the direction 
of the CAmid or civil governor applied to those provinces under 
regular, civil government, such as Zabulistan, Sistan, ~ukharistan, 
Khurasan and, for a brief period, Ray and Jibal. In a less pacified 
area like northern India, where a civil administration did not norm-
ally function (see above, 167 ff. ), the military collected taxes. 
Simce the collecting methods of the army were more violent than those 
of the civilian Camils, the Sultan occasionally resorted to the 
issue of berats, assignments of revenue to be collected personally 
by the troops in lieu of salaries paid by the Diwan, as a punitive 
measure in the lands .of settled government. MasCud did this at 
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~nul in Gurgan in 1035 {see below, 186 ) and four years later 
against the people of Herat and the surrounding regions of Ganj 
Rustaq and Badghis, on the pretext that they had been helping the 
Turkmen invaders {see below, Part V, 512 ).237 Where the 
revenues of one region were insufficient to maintain the administrat-
ion or army required there, supplementary assignments might be made 
on the revenues of another province geographically quite distant 
from the first one. In the above-mentioned anecdote of the Siyasat-
-nama, Altuntash comes to the D!wan in Ghazna a year after he has been 
appointed ruler of Khwarizm (se. in 1018) and demands his allowance 
(jamagr) of 120,000 dinars. The revenues of Khw~rizm only cover 
half of this, so the Vizier .Maimand! assigns him the rest from the 
yield of Sistan and Bust. On receiving authorisations (berats) from 
the D!wan, Altuntash's representatives proceed to Sistan and Bust, 
collect the amount allowed and take it back to Khwarizm. The story 
also says that these taxes were levied in kind, comprising cotton, 
pomegranate husks, oak-galls, etc. Another source mentions that 
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eggs and straw were taken in taxation during Ma~mud's reign. In 
cases like these, either the camil converted them into cash locally, 
or else the professional valuers in the Diwan at Ghazna appraised 
them and produced a cash equivalent. The crops and other products 
collected as taxes in kind were then placed in granaries and store-
houses, whilst beasts were kept in special enclosures or added to 
the Sultans' personal flocks. 
The Persian provinces of Khurasan, and after 1029, of Ray and 
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Jibal, were distant from Ghazna and were governed by local Diwans 
at Nishapur and Ray respectively. Each was presided over by a 
civilian CAmid, a Persian secretary, and at his side was the command-
er of the army of the province, usually a Turkish ghulam general. 
The civilian and military heads were equal in status and independent 
of each other, although they had naturally to work in co-operation. 
Liaison had to be particularly close in Khurasan during MasCud's 
reign when military forces were operating there continuously against 
the Turkmens. Along the projected routes of the Sultan's armies, 
the CAmid of Khurasan, Suri, and the local ru~ asa 1' &nd1 Cumrnal were 
required to prepare provisions and fodder. 239 Taxation collected in 
kind was also used for eventualities like this; not all of it was 
forwarded to Ghazna, but part of it was laid up in local warehouses, 
riba~s and. castles for the army to use. The Siyasat-nama recommends 
the general adoption of this system: since requisitions on the 
peasantry by passing armies are both unlawful and impolitic, the 
ruler should have storehouses, filled up by local officials, in each 
village or riba~. Dumps of provisions and stores such as these were 
further used in times of natural disaster such as famine, when seeds 
240 and foods were dispensed from them. 
Maqmud had handed over the governorship of Ray, Jibal and the 
west to his son MasCud. On his father's death, MasCud had to rush 
eastwards and claim the throne, so it was necessary to leave there a 
strong army and administration for fear of a revanche by the Biiyids 
or an attack by Ibn Kakiiya of Isfahan. The city of Ray was a great 
179. 
prize; its industrial position and commercial position along the 
highway connecting Iraq with Khurasan and Transoxania made it the 
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richest city of northern Persia. In 422/1031 the Sultan sent a 
ghulam general, Tash (Tash)-F'arrash, to Ray. His force of ghulams a 
and Turkmen auxiliaries were to accompany him, and these were to be 
provisioned and paid in the first place by the Diwan in Nishapur. 
Eight months later a secretary, Abu ~ayyib Tahir, was sent to take 
charge of civil affairs, but with the designation of katkhuda to Tash-
-Farrash, i.e. in a subordinate status to the military. A treasurer 
and a ~!lJ.ib-Barid were also sent out. ~_Phis arrangement lasted till 
the beginning of 424/1033, but was not satisfactory, so Mu~ammad's 
old Vizier, Abu Sahl ijamdawi, was sent out with full powers as civil 
governor and with the title ash-Shaikh al-CAmid, and a completely-
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But Ghaznavid rule in Ray was now approaching its term. During 
their few years there, the Ghaznavids failed to keep local support. 
At the outset, their entry into Ray in 1029 had been welcomed by some 
sections of the population, exasperated by the turbulence and excesses 
of the undisciplined Dailami troops of Sayyida and Majd ad-Daula. 
MasCud made an initial effort to win over the notables by giving 
robes of honour to prominent personages like the Qa~I, the Ra'Is, 
the Kha~Ib, the Naqib of the CAlids and the Salar of the Ghazis, and 
they in their turn expressed gratitude at deliverance from "the 
oppression and tyranny of the Qarami~a [se. the ShiCI Dailamis]". 
This fund of goodwill was based on the hope of firm, just government 
from the Ghaznavids, and shortly afterwards, when an attempt to 
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regain Ray was made by Abu Kali jar F,ana Khusrau b. Majd ad-Daula, 
the local people turned out in force with their own arms to help 
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the Ghaznavids defend the city. Unfortunately for the Razis, 
their new masters turned out to be as intolerable as the old. 
Financial demands were at the bottom of this revulsion. On arriving 
in Ray, Abu Sahl ijamdawi had to abolish the illegal levies and exact-
ions (al-aqsa~ wa'l-mu~adarat) which Tash-Farrash and Tahir had 
practised and which had reached such a pitch that many Razis had 
fled the city: "Tash-Farrash had filled the land with injustice and 
tyranny, until the people prayed for deliverance from them and their 
rule [se. of the Ghaznavids] • The land became ruined and the pop-
ulation dispersed".
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Likewise, financial exploitation was the root of the Ghaznavids' 
inability to secure for their rule in Khurasan the loyalty of the 
people during the forty years which they had there. Although officials 
and governors were to some extent active there in the public works 
and charities conventionally expected of them, the Sultans regarded 
Khurasan, with its rich resources, as a milch-cow, and their interests 
in it extended little beyond this. It was distant from Ghazna and 
India was always a counterattractive influence. In their lack of 
any disinterested concern for Khurasan's well-being and. defence, the 
Ghaznavids differed from the earlier Iranian rulers of the province, 
such as the ~ahirids and Samanids, who had more fully identified 
themselves with its interests. 
In the first part of Maqmud's Sultanate, Khurasan suffered much 
from the financial policies of the Vizier Isfara'ini, who, it must 
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be admitted, was driven on by the insistent demands of his master 
(see above, 162 ). Of the Vizier's Raubwirtschaft policy 
cutbi records that he extracted continuously and put nothing back: 
"[Affairs in Khurasan] were characterised by nothing but tax-levies, 
sucking dry (is t idrar) and. the 1 us t for increased revenue, without 
any constructive measures (istiCmar)tt. After some years of this, 
there was nothing to be got, "since in Khurasan, after water had been 
thrown on her udders, not a trickle of milk could be extracted, nor 
any traces of fat". Land went out of cultivation, peasants fled 
and the camils were unable to collect the required amount of taxation. 
During the Ilig Na~r's invasion of Khurasan in 1006, Nishapur remain-
ed quite passive, and a)large group among the acyan of the province 
. 245 actively supported the Qarakhan~ds. Natural disaster added to 
the ravages of armies and tax collectors. Earthquakes occurred 
periodically. Khura.san was badly hit by the famine of 1011, when 
the corn failed to ripen because of early frosts and people were 
reduced to cannibalism. Pestilence followed, and spread all over 
Persia, so that at ijulwan in the west the Kurdish ruler Abu'l-Fat~ 
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Muhammad b. CAnnaz died 9f it • . 
~~en Isfara'ini was arrested and jailed, Ma4mud appointed 
Maimandi, then heading the Department of the CAr~, to act temporarily 
as civil governor and collector of revenue in Khurasan. It is record-
ed that he paid such attention to affairs that nothing was ever in 
disorder there, and when the Sultan returned·'· from his Indian campaign, 
Ivl.aimandi brought him "extensive quantities of cash and numerous 
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presents", "whilst the racaya of K.hurasan were universally enthusiastic 
for him and attached to him, and their tongues were united in thanks 
and praise towards him". 247 If hlaimand'i really could please both 
Sultan and subjects at one and the same time, his short spell in 
Khurasan must have stood out from a generally unhappy picture. 
During MasCud's reign, the CAmid of Khurasan was Abu'l-Faql srrrr 
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b. al~~uCizz. Just as ~a~ud had allowed Isfara'ini a free hand in 
Khurasan provided the money came in, so did MasCud leave Sur'i to drain 
the province dry. In 1031 Suri' s Mihrgan presents were "limitless'.'; 
two years later he sent a magnificent array of presents valued at 
four million dirhams, comprising cloth, gold and silver vessels, 
slave boys and girls, musk, camphor, rare fruits, pearls, striped 
carpets and fine linen. Baihaq'i records that the Sultan exclaimed 
in delight, "What an excellent servant is this Suri! If I had a few 
more like him, it would be extremely profitable!", but the Chief 
Secretary, Abu Na~r-i Mishkan, denounced Sur'i as a tyrant, who only 
sent the Sultan half of what he took from the people. The acyan in 
Khurasan, he said, were being destroyed and were sending envoys and 
letters to 11 the leaders of the Turks" (se. the Qarakhanids) in Trans-
oxania inviting them to direct the Turkmens into Khurasan. Baihaqi 
himself voices the opinion of the high officials in Ghazna when he 
insists that sarr•s policies were a direct cause of Khurasan•s loss. 
The Vizier IUJ.mad. b. CAbd a~~-~amad distrusted Suri intensely and 
employed the ~a~ib-Bar'id of N~shapur as his personal Mushrif over 
Suri. 
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This official, Abu'l-Mu~affar CAbd al-Jabbar Juma4I, came 
from a prominent Baihaq family, and his class of notables and landown-
ers was suffering particularly from Suri's exactions. Abu'l-Mu~aff-
ar was a fine poet and wrote many savage satires in both Arabic and 
Persian against Suri, which the Vizier passed on to the Sultan in 
an attempt to rouse him against Suri. Scraps of these verses are 
extant, including the following: 
"i'llasCud' s power collapsed through Silri' s tyranny and misdeeds; 
He alighted on the people for hospitality, and left not one 
timber on another in their houses" 
and 
"Amir! Pay heed to Khurasan, for SITri is denuding it of wealth 
and possessions; 
If his tyrannical hand is allowed to stay extended, your interests 
there will be badly affected; 
For that flock which you have entrusted to Suri, he will bring 
back to you like a shepherd who is clumsy at branding". 250 
Ni~am al~~ulk's father had Suri as his taskmaster and suffered 
under him. This man, Abu'l-ijasan, was camil and bundar (se. tax-
-collector) at ~us for many years, but as Seljuq depredations grew, 
the land suffered, the processes of agriculture were interrupted, 
beasts were carried off and the carnal of ~us decreased. Finally, 
Abu'l-~asan was unable to find the 50,000 dirhams demanded of him, 
so SITri confiscated his property and valuables to the amount of 
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30,000 dirhams, and took out a bond for the rest. When the 
first Seljuq occupation of Nishapur in August 1038 was imminent, 
Suri fled with the local garrison, the movable part of the state 
treasury and his own money to a nearby stronghold and then to Gurgan, 
Thus to the people of Nishapur, the appearance of the Seljuqs was in 
one sense a liberation. By now, MasCUd :nust have realised how Sliri's 
unpopularity had contributed to his difficulties in Khurasan; when 
in January 1040 Nishapur was re-occupied, he decided not to re-
-appoint Suri, but to appoint his brother instead.. After the battle 
of Dandanqan, SUri retired to Ghazna; later, he became Maudud's 
~!!J.ib-Diwan, but returned to his old ways of extortion, fell from 
favour and died in the fortress of Ghazna.
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He had tried to salve 
his conscience by public works and charities in Khurasan. He added 
to the improvements made by Fa'iq's old master, Abu Bakr Shahmard, 
at the shrine of CAli ar-Ri4a in Mashhad, building a minaret and 
giving a village in waqf for its upkeep; he built a fine ~~alla at 
Nishapur and embanked a stream which flowed through the Nishapur 
oasis with a stone and brick barrage against the floods caused by 
melting snows, again endowing them with auqaf; and did other things 
at Farawa and Nasa. But it was the humane Baihaqi's opinion that 
these benefactions in no way compensated for the misery he had 
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caused. 
The province of Sistan passed into Ghaznavid hands after Ma~ud 
had invaded it in 393/1002 and dethroned the ~affarid ruling there, 
Khalaf b. A~mad. After the suppression of a revolt in the next year, 
during which Maqmud's pagan Hindu troops behaved extremely savagely, 
sacking the Friday mosque of Zarang and killing the Muslims in it 
and killing the Christians in their church, an administration was 
set up in Sistan with the Amir Na~r b. Sebfiktigin as governor and 
a civilian camil to collect the taxes. 254 The first of these Camils, 
Muqammad-i Ba ijaf~, made the province ruinous by his exactions, and 
as in Khurasan, the distress caused by financial exploitation was 
consummated by the famine and plague of 1010-11. Because the 
Sagazis hated the Ghaznavid yoke so much, the province was never at 
peace whilever they ruled there. Khwaja Bu Manfillr-i Khwafi became 
c~mil in 1010, and "during his term of office there were always a 
thousand men in Sistan engaged in revolt". In MasCud's reign, the 
camil had to take draconian measures against the cayyars (see below, 
Part III, 325 ) and to levy heavy fines (mu~adaraha) on the 
urban leaders and rural gentry (sarhangan-i qa~aba u mihtaran-i 
rusta). When the Turkmens began to appear in Sistan, local leaders 
gladly used them to throw off Ghaznavid control. 255 
It is clear from what has been said about Ghaznavid financial 
methods in the provinces of Ray, Khurasan and Sistan that they were 
often very harsh. Hence it is not surprising that the rulers and 
peoples of neighbouring lands, although they might have to pay :. 
tribute to the Sultans, were anxious to keep their financial agents 
from direct interference in internal administration. 'Ne have seen 
how the people of Ray speedily became disillusioned with Ghaznavid 
rule. The experience of another province of the Buyids, Kirman, 
was similar. Early in his reign, MasCud sent an army there and 
conquered it from Abu Kalijar Cimad ad-Din of Fars's representatives. 
The Ghaznavids set up a civil administration there and began to 
collect taxes, but the exactions of the governor Abu'l-Faraj Farisi 
were so intolerable that the acyan of Kirman s~nt secretly to 
crmad ad-Din's Vizier Ibn 1da.finna and in 1034 a Bfiyid force ignom-
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iniously ejected the Ghaznavids. 
186. 
The Ziyarid kingdom of Gurgan and ~abaristan was tributary to 
the Ghaznavide (above, 166-7 ). By the winter of 1034-5 its ruler 
Abu Kalijar was two years behind with his tribute. MasCud decided 
on a punitive expedition to the Caspian shores, hoping to give his 
army a break from the climatic rigours of the Khurasanian plateau, 
where provisions and fodder were in short supply. Moreover, the 
cost of the warfare against the Turkmens was causing serious financ-
ial difficulties, and the Sultan aimed at getting the two years' 
arrears of tribute from Abu Kalijar and at levying a dinar per head 
on the population of Amul, whose numbers, he believed, amounted to 
a million. 
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Abu Kalijar and his retinue withdrew westwards into 
the unhealthy and impenetrable jangal of ~abaristan and Ruyan. The 
Sultan vented his disappointment on the unfortunate people of Amul. 
Whereas on arrival in Gurgan he had forgiven them a year's taxes, he 
now decided to mulct them to the tune of a million NYshapuri dinars, 
1000 sets of RITmi and other clothes, 1000 carpets and rugs and 5000 
pieces of linen. He threatened that if this were not paid promptly, 
it would be extracted forcibly by a mustakhrij and by the army, to 
whom berats would be assigned for collecting the taxes. The Vizier 
exclaimed that the whole of Khurasan would not yield such a sum, 
but nevertheless he had to pass on the Sultan's commands to the 
acyan of Amul and their head, an CAlid. "Know", he began, "that 
your master the Sultan has incurred great expense in sending and 
army here and in clearing out these oppressors. These provinces 
must give him a fitting subsidy (natbar)". The acyan pointed out 
that the traditional rate, the "permissible extortion" from Gurgan 
187. 
and ~abaristan had always been 100,000 dirhams and some carpets and 
cloth. 
Faced with the Sultan's demands, a large number of the citizens 
fled. These fugitives were rounded up from the surrounding country-
side by the military. A Diwan for extracting the money was set up 
and the soldiers got to work. After four days' sacking, when 
160,000 dinars had been collected, Amul was set on fire. Baihaqi 
expresses his shame at having to record the affair; the Ghaznavids 
had made the paradise of Amul into a hell. They brought much dis-
credit down on themselves; from Amul, a stream of people went to 
Baghdad to complain of the Sultan's tyranny, and the news travelled 
as far as Mecca. MasCUd now realised that, by a process of revulsion 
from the Ghaznavids, AbU Kalijar's position among his people would 
be stronger than ever. 26° 
Chapter Ten 
Building construction and labour services 
Something has been said on the splendour of court life under 
the early Ghaznavids, their many palaces and gardens and the assimil-
ation of their way of life to the typical luxury and conspicuous 
consumption of Persian monarchy (above, 114 ff. ). The heavy 
expenditure which the upkeep of these buildings and gardens and the 
maintenance of this opulent standard of living entailed has also 
been noted (above, 157 ). Because of drains on resources 
similar to this, one can often discern at various places and times 
in Islamic history much popular feeling against the constructional 
extravagances of rulers; it was a clear factor in the unpopularity 
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of the later Umayyads. 
Ma~ud and MasCud were both great builders, although little of 
their work has survived today. The effects of an extreme climate; 
natural catastrophes like earthquakes and floods; the ravages of war; 
the use of comparatively perishable materials like sun-dried brick, 
_; 
since stone and even fired brick were infrequently used; the theft 
of building materials by local people: all these combined to make 
much building work, however splendid and imposing at the time it 
was put up, impermanent and transient. How often in the sources 
does an author note that an edifice was put up only a few decades 
before the time of writing, but is now ruinous or totally disappeared! 
Nazim mentions some of Ma~ud's public works, which included bridges, 
aqueducts and irrigation channels; of these, the Band-i Ma~mudr, 
just north of Ghazna, has survived and has been still used in recent 
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times. Ghazna itself was sometimes exposed to inundations 
caused by sudden rainstorms or melting snows rushing down the bed 
of the river which ran through Ghazna. Baihaqi records a particul-
arly disastrous flood in 1031 which wrecked most of the markets and 
caravanserais of the town and necessitated Sultan MasCud's building 
a new bridge across the river. Irrigation works by the "Kings of 
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Zabul" are mentioned in the Herat and Badghis area. 
Of architectural works, the tombs of SebUktigin and Ma~ud are 
still in existence (the contemporaneousness of the latter one - at 
least in its extant form -with the Sultan's death is, however, 
dubious). The well-known brick minaret or tower of Ma~ud stands 
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today on the old site of Ghazna. The work of the French Arch-
aeological Delegation in Afghanistan brought to light in 1949-51 
the shell of the great Ghaznavid palace of Lashkar-i Bazar at Bust, 
265 the modern QalCat-i Bist. Since Maqdisi mentions the caskar there, 
it seems probable that it was SebUktigin who first began this. 
190. 
Baihaqi connects this lashkar-gah "at the Polo-Field at Bust" with 
Maqmud, and states that MasCud made additions to it which were still 
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in part intact when he wrote thirty years later. Although only 
Lashkar-i Bazar seems to have survived at all, we learn from Baihaqi 
that the Sultans possessed palaces and gardens in every important 
city of the realm. In Herat there was the CAdnani palace, which was 
( ). 267 In reconstructed and added to by MasCud see above, 114-15 
Balkh, Ma~mud possessed a lucrative market, the Bazar-i CAshiqan, and 
a splendid garden, the upkeep of which was a distressing burden on 
268 
the local people. It was probably in this garden that there was 
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constructed the CAbd al-ACla palace. In the Nishapur suburb of 
Shadyakh, MasCud built to his own design a palace with pavilions and 
courtyards, since there had not previously been an official residence 
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there for the Ghaznavids. In Ghazna itself, liia!pnud had a palace 
at Afghan-Shal, and there was a ~ad-Hazara garden with the White and 
Z~ulr pavilions in it and a Firuzr garden where the Sultan was 
eventually buried; but MasCud decided to design and build a new 
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palace for himself at Ghazna (see below). 
Such buildings were erected by the time-honoured oriental way, 
described by Wittfogel as especially characteristic of his "hydraulic" 
societies, of corvees. We have evidence for the organisation of 
these labour services in the Islamic East both before and after the 
coming of Islam. Like so many others of the cities of Persia, the 
foundation of Nishapur was attributed to the Sassanid Emperor Shaprrr, 
/ 
who imposed corvees on the local people. Such was his frenzy to get 
191. 
the construction finished, so the story goes, that the masons had 
to be there before dawn each day, and those of the subjects not there 
by sunrise were thrown alive into the mortar and plaster of the 
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walls. wThen Abu'l-CAbbas al-Faql b. Sulaiman a~-~usi was 
governor of Khurasan (166-71/783-8), he ordered the Arab Amir of 
Bukhara to construct a fortified enceinte around the city to protect 
it from the Turks. The wall was completed by 830, but later Am!rs 
~ added to it and large sums of money and corvees on the local popul-
ation were required to maintain it, until the Samanid IsmaCil b. 
273 
A~ad relieved the people of this burden. The first story may 
not be historical, but the two instances do demonstrate how normal 
was the use of corvee labour for large-scale constructional works. 
Although the Sassanids had used bodies of peasant infantrymen 
in their armies as cannon-fodder, this usage was not followed to any 
appreciable extent by the Islamic rulers who relied on professional, 
often slave, armies (see below, Part II, chs. 1, 2). The Ghazna-
vids relied on their professional soldiers and. ghulams, although 
we hear that their opponent CAl!tigin supplemented his forces with 
Turkmens, including the Seljuqs, and peasant levies (~ashar) at the 
battle of Dabusiyya in 1032. 274 But the Gpaznavids did make use of 
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peasant levies (qashar, mard-bigari) for their building operations. 
Baihaqi more than once stresses MasCud's passion for building and 
his skill as the architect and planner of his own works. The new 
palace which he built at Ghazna took four years to complete, cost 
seven million dirhams and was erected by corv~e labour. In this 
19~. 
case, the workers may have been paid. But Baihaqi says that the 
building was already dilapidated when he wrote. 276 He also mentions 
I' corvees for other purposes. '.'v'hen the Sultan wanted to hunt, a 
peasant ~ashar was assembled by officers of the army after consult-
ation of the registers kept for this purpose; it seems that there 
was some kind of a rota. Another ~ashar was organised to clear snow 
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from the roads into Ghazna when the Sultan's army was due to return. 
This use of forced labour was undoubtedly a burden on the shoulders 
of the population, who not only paid taxes on the products of their 
own hands, but had also to provide labour service. However, the 
practice has lasted in Persia and Afghanistan down to the present 
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day. 
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Part II 
The Ghaznavid army 
Chapter One 
The ghulams 
In general, the Ghaznavid army developed within the eastern 
Islamic military tradition, exemplified before the Ghaznavids in 
the armies of dynasties like the Samanids and Buyids. Certain feat-
ures of this tradition were, however, modified by the unique nature 
of the Ghaznavid empire -its strong militarist bias and its ethnic 
diversity, providing a wide range of races from which soldiers 
could be drawn. 
The core of the Ghaznavid army was the slave force (ghilman, 
mamalik), and more than anything else, this institution marks off 
the armies of the Islamic Persian dynasties from those of pre-
-Islamic Persia. It is true that in both Achaemenid and Sassanid 
times there was an imperial bodyguard, the pushtighban, and a corps 
of cavalry, probably of 10,000, the "corps of immortals"; such 
, 
elite bodies grow up naturally around a ruler. But the Sassanid 
court service was largely hereditary in a few great families; and 
all the cavalry, the only part of the army which counted, was drawn 
from the nobles, vuzurgan, and gentry, azadan. 1 Apart from this 
fact, there are certain parallels between the Sassanid and Ghaznavid 
?24. 
armies, e.g., military reviews resembling the Islamic Card, the --· 
tactical use of elephants and a contmnuity in the personal arms 
used, which will be noted later. 
The value of slave troops lay in their lack of roots and local 
connections. Brought in at an early age from the lands outside the 
D~r al-Islam, their minds could be moulded by their masters and 
their bodies trained for warfare. Attached to the ruler by a pers-
onal bond of fealty, they could give single-minded loyalty; owing 
everything to their master, they were untrammelled by the material 
and personal interests which locally-raised troops inevitably had. 
Well might a poet say, "An obedient slave is better than a hundred 
children; the latter desire their father's death, the former his 
long life". It was the ideal that all parts of the army should be 
bound to the ruler by a personal bond -in Kai Ka'tis' words, "It 
is a matter of necessity that your troops should at all times be 
under an oath, sworn by your life and head, of loyalty to you" -
2 
but the relationship could be closest where a slave was concerned. 
The development of a slave institution within the Caliphate 
dates back to the time when the early Abbasids first reduced the 
pay of the free Arab muqatila and then let their summonse lapse, 
using the money saved on their pensions for buying Turkish slaves. 
Al-Mucta~im on his accession in 833 struck off the Arabs from the 
Diwan in Egypt and bought ghulams instead. 3 Provincial dynasties, 
some of which, like the ~tiltinids and Ikhshidids, were themselves of 
servile origin, followed suit. YaCqub b. Laith had a corps of 
225. 
over 2000 ghulams as his pages and bodyguard, fitted out with weapons 
captured from MuJtammad b. 1'ahir's treasury at Nishapur, and he also 
employed a contingent of Indian soldiers in his army. His brother 
CAmr used to buy slaves at an early age, rear them, and give them to 
his commanders, where they acted as spies on the Amir's behalf, an 
anticipation of what became regular practice under the Ghaznavids. 4 
The Dailami leaders, from Mardawij b. Ziyar onwards, all stiffened 
their Dailami followings with Turkish ghulams. This was in part a 
necessity of military organisation, for the Dailami mountaineers 
were primarily infantrymen, and for their thrusts across the plains 
and steppes of central Iran, thes~ Dailami condottieri needed caval-
ry. 5 This need was filled by Turkish horsemen, with the handling 
of whom those Dailami leaders who had served in the Samanid armies· 
were already familiar, and soon the Turkish element became as import-
ant as that of the Dailamis themselves. The majority of the ghulams 
of the Buyid 1'IuCizz ad-Daula (d. 356/967) were Turks, and in pay and 
6 
the granting of ~~acs were preferred above the Dailamis. The 
Samanids could draw directly on the steppes beyond the Syr Darya for 
Turkish slaves. Already in the reign of IsmaCil b. Aqmad (279-95/ 
892-907) the Commander-in-chief of the army was a slave. It was 
the hope of the Amirs that their palace ghulams would form a counter-
balance to the indigenous military element of the Iranian dihqans, 
who opposed their centralising policy. As early incidents like the 
murder by his ghulams in 914 of A4mad b. IsmaCil and the growing 
inability of the later Amirs to depend on them showed, this hope 
226. 
was not realised. But whilst the Amirs were strong and able to 
control ·.their troops properly, an observer like I~~akhri could 
praise the Samanid slave army for its discipline and boldness in 
battle. Na~r b. AJtmad (301-31/914-43) is said at one time to have 
had 10,000 ghulams, his own together with his father's, as well as 
7 the rest of the army. The Fa~imid army included a force of what 
N'S.~ir-i Khusrau calls Saraijran, "palace guards", 10,000 infantrymen 
. 8 
drawn from all countr~es. Even Turkish rulers like the Qarakhan-
ids, who ruled over a loose, semi-nomadic confederation rather than 
a unified state, early acquired military slaves. For his war against 
Iua~mud of Ghazna in 1007-8, the Ilig Na~r had a force of some 1000 
personal ghulams which he placed on one occasion in the centre of 
his battle-line. 9 
Thus by the 11th century most Islamic armies Vlere built round 
a nucleus of slaves. 'l'urkish ghulams were preferred for their 
loyalty and martial virtues, but even when a ruler disliked Turks, 
as did the Caliph al-Muqtafi (530-55/1136-60), the necessity for a 
slave guard was not questioned; the Caliph merely recruited Greeks 
10 
and Armenians instead. That any of the nations customarily supply-
ing slaves were conspicueusly superior to the rest is problematical; 
the criterion was that they should come from some region remote from 
the ruler's own seat of power. When ghulams proved treacherous, it 
was usually either because they had acquired local, vested interests 
or else had been treated unduly harshly by their masters. 11 
227. 
The career of the Samanid general Alptigin, SebUktigin's master, 
illustrates the potential dangers of an uncontrolled slave institut-
ion. Although legally a slave, he had amassed great possessions 
within the Samanid dominions (see above, Part I, 98-9 ); as 
governor of Khurasan he had 2700 Turkish slaves of his own. Since 
under the Samanids the mount, equipment and property of a dead 
ghulam reverted to his military superior and not necessarily to the 
Amir, a man like Alptigin had ample resources and opportunity to 
12 
attach men to himself. Private armies such as this easily became 
abstracted from the ruler's control, and a nexus of intermediate 
loyalties arose which might on occasion be turned against the ruler 
himself. The growth of private empires within the state was symptom-
atic of the later Samanids' enfeeblement; earlier, one of their 
generals, Qaratigin (d. 317/929), had deliberately avoided acquiring 
estates lest they tie him down and interfere with his mobility. l3 
Profiting from the history of the last Samanids, the early Ghaznavids 
kept strict watch on the followings of their generals. 
The slave element of the early Ghaznavid army was commanded by 
the Salar-i Ghulaman, whose office ranked next in importance only to 
that of the Commander-in-chief, the ~jib-i Buzurg. Baihaqi also 
mentions a Salar-i Ghulaman-i Saray, but in MasCud's reign at least, 
this officer was the same as the Salar-i Ghulaman, and the two 
names seem to be different titles for the one office. 14 The slaves 
comprised Turks, Indians and some Tajiks, probably Khurasanis. 15 
The former predominated, and normally held the highest commands in 
the army as a whole. Nevertheless, when in 1033 the Turkish comm-
ander of the army in India rebelled, liiasCud gave AJ:pnad Inaltigin's 
post to a Hindu ghulam, one Tilak, who had formerly been an official 
translator in the administration; the appointment aroused consider-
16 
able resentment at court. Within the general body of ghulams 
there was a special group, the Sultan's personal bodyguard, the 
ghulrunan-i saray, ghulaman-i kha~~ or ghulaman-i sul ~ani. rl'he pro-
portion of these to the whole is uncertain, but their numbers were 
appreciable (see below, 
Turkish slaves came mainly from the traditional Central Asian 
sources, either by purchase or by gift. In Ma~mud's reign it was 
the custom of the wife of the Qarakhanid Arslan Khan hian~ur b. CAli 
(406-15/1015-24) to send the Sultan each year a male and female slave 
as a present. During his Transoxanian campaign against CAlitigin im 
1025, the Sultan reached Samarqand and exacted from it a tribute of 
1000 ghulams; at the same time he received from his ally Qadrr Khan 
Yusuf of Kashghar and Khotan presents of Turkish horses and slaves.17 
Some slaves were taken over by 1\iaJ.tmud from his father. When he 
first established himself in Ghazna, SebUktigin spent the greater 
part of his official income in building up a following and attaching 
18 them to himself through twice-weekly feasts. On the other hand, 
the accession of a new ruler often rneant a clean sweep of officers 
in the higher positions. ~he feud between the Ma~udiyan or Pidar-
iyan on the one hand, and the parvenu MasCudiyan or Nau-khwastagan 
on the other, runs through Baihaqi's pages very clearly (see below, 
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Part V, chapter 4 ). It was even considered wise before one camp-
a.ign of 1<1asCud 's against the 'l1urkmens to appoint both i>laJ:trnudiyan 
and Bar-kashidagan-i khudavand to the top commands lest jealousy 
19 
and dissension arise. Sometimes ghulams who had become masterless 
or who had deserted a previous, less successful leader, would enter 
the Sultan's service. The Indian ghulams were continually replen-
ished from the campaigns there; on one occasion, the return from 
the Qanauj expedition in 1018, 53,000 captives were carried off, 
merchants converged on Ghazna from all parts of eastern Islam and 
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slaves could be bought for two to ten dirhams. 
A well-knovrn passage in the Siyasat-nama on the education and 
training of the Samanid palace ghulams has been accepted at its 
face value by such an authority as Barthold. According to this, 
there was a definite training programme spread over seven years and 
a cursus honorum, so that a youngster began as a foot-groom and at 
th f th . t f. b 1· ·b1 r th k f - 21 e age o 1r y- 1ve ecame e 1g1 e or e ran o am1r. If 
we could accept this account, we would expect to find at least traces 
of such a system amongst the Ghaznavids, themselves arisen from it. 
In reality, Ni~am al-Mulk is probably describing an ideal rather 
than an actuality and is influenced here by the favourable attitude 
towards the S~manids adopted by so many of the historians. The 
Samanids cannot have possessed the administrative experience and 
skill to organise. a training curriculum like this. r_rhe Ottoman 
Palace School, of which we are reminded, came into being through the 
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peculiar position of the Sultans as rulers of a large Christian 
subject population in the Balkans, and more doubtfully, by earlier 
Byzantine traditions of palace service. The account of SebUktigin's 
early training given in his Pand-nama is of a general one in weapons 
and the equestrian art, not of a specific course. The most we can 
be sure of is that there was some hierarchy of offices among the 
Samanids, although the grades may not have been clear-cut; Alptigin 
reacted vigorously when in 960 the Amir Abu'l-Fawaris CAbd al-Malik 
b. NU~ tried to appoint him camil of Balkh, for he had previously 
held the supreme military dignity of ijajib al-ijujjab. 22 
knongst the Ghaznavids, the ghulams' training came mainly from 
actual experience in the field, and we have no information about a 
specific training programme. Its existence would imply an army with 
fixed grades and ranks for the trainees to pass out into, and here 
again, the evidence is doubtful. Nazim, Sul~an Ma~ud, 141-2, has 
tentatively sketched the chain of command in the Ghaznavid army by 
inference from the sources. Ymilst the relative positions he ascribes 
to the various officers ring true enough, there are difficulties. 
For instance, the term khailtash; Nazim suggests that this was an 
officer who commanded ten cavalrymen, but it seems to be a function 
as much as a rank. A naqib-i khailtashan is mentioned. Vfuen in 
1039 the army of Khurasan left Merv for its last effort against the 
Seljuqs, 500 khailtashan formed the vanguard, and at Dandanqan they 
fought as a group on one of the wings. In one passage, Baihaqi 
23 
calls them one of the constituent groups, a~naf, of the army. 
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But if there was no specific training programme, promising 
lads might be taken into the Sultan's entourage for education, often 
with the Sultan's own children. In i·ilasCud' s reign, the ruler of 
Gurgan, Abu Kalijar, had a son at the court of Ghazna. In this case, 
as often happened, there was a political motive; the child served as 
a pledge for his father's good behaviour. 24 On appointing A4mad 
Inal tigin as commander of the Indian army, lilasCud required that his 
son should be left at court as a hostage, where he would be brought 
up in the saray-i ghulaman-i kha~~; India's rich resources and the 
nwnbers of turbulent troops there gave especial temptations to reb-
ellion. 
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For the sons of great commanders and courtiers thus to 
be admitted to the Sultan's household for education gave an excellent 
start in life, but in considering the general question of how ghulams 
achieved favour and promotion, the personal element should also be 
taken into account. In the strongly-masculine world which Islam 
brings about, the beauty of "moon-faced ones" was no small asset. 
Turkish youths were prized for their good physique and light colour-
ing, and it was no accident that 11 Ibn Khaqan" became a synonym for 
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"catamite". Later Muslim writers have often played down the 
physical aspect of Ma~mud's relationship to his favourite, the 
Yim~k slave kyaz, but the ethical climate of the time hardly 
frowned on such connections. Kai Ka'us soberly recommends lying 
with boys in summer and women in winter, and Ni~am a1~1ulk exhorts 
alert rulers to discover which of the two sexes neighbouring princes 
prefer; neither condemns unnatural tastes. Baihaqi relates an 
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episode where a palace ghulam' s beauty saved him from execution for 
murder and set him on the road to becoming the Sultan's dawat-dar. 
Even after his master's death, Ayaz was still able to play a polit-
ical role:in the setting up and then the deposition of J;iahrnud 's son . 
Multammad. 
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'I'he palace ghulams usually fought as a body, although groups 
of them might be detached for service on expeditions with the ordin-
ary troops. In battle they usually had the key position of the 
centre. As a crack force, they could be despatched to retrieve a 
campaign where the regular troops had failed. ~ben they were part 
of a larger military force, orders were not given directly to them 
by the commander of the army, but only through a liaison officer, 
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one of their own ~ajibs,, specially appointed to the force• They 
had their own set of officers, such as the sarhangan-i saray. 
Domestically, their corporate organisation was directed by a major-
-domo, the mihtar-i saray, and for their needs there·was a special 
secretary, the dabir-i saray or dabir-i ghulaman, who kept a nomin-
al roll of the ghulams (it is not clear whether this roll was merely 
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of the palace ghulams or of the ghulams as a whole). They had their 
own standards with a lion device, and when they were dismounted for 
ceremonial occasions, the special weapons of the short spear (~irad, 
mi~rad), bow and mace (~, camud). The ceremonial occasions when 
they lined the Sultan's audience chamber and surrounded the monarch 
enthroned on his dais, were an integral part of their duties. At 
these times, they wore splendid robes of the finest brocades of 
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Isfahan, Baghdad and Shushtar, and their weapons were heavily 
bejewelled and had gold and silver mountinb~· It is easy to gauge 
, 
from the descriptions we have of these levees, how important was 
the department of the Sultan's wardrobe and the office of its 
keeper, the jama-dar, who was normally a slave, and how serious the 
loss of the wardrobe in battle was regarded. 30 Besides this last 
office, there were certain other highly-regarded offices to which 
ghulams high in the Sultan's favour might attain, such as that of 
armour-bearer (sila~-dar) to the Sultan, bearer of the Sultan's 
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ceremonial parasol (chatr-dar) and standard-bearer (calam-dar). 
Each palace ghulam had his own personal servant, khadim, and two 
were only allowed as a special concession. 32 As regards numbers, 
Baihaqi records that in 1037 at the annual military review, the 
palace ghulams amounted to 4000 odd, and this tallies with the number 
he gives for them five years previously. But two years later, in 1039, 
6000 are mentioned as employed in northern Khurasan against the Oghuz, 
and it is possible that this increase represents a fuller awareness 
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then of the Turkmen menace and a supreme attempt to master them. 
The process whereby great commanders imitated the ruler in 
assembling a slave retinue round themselves does not seem to have 
gone so far under the Ghaznavids as under the later Samanids. The 
Sultans' keen supervision and their extensive spy system, organised 
from the central Diwan-i Shughl-i Ishraf (see above, Part I, eh. 8) 
helped to curb such a development. Only in the peripheral prov-
ince of Khwarizm was MasCud powerless to prevent his governor there, 
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the Khwarizmshah Altuntash's son Harun, from collecting a force of 
34 2000 ghulams and asserting his independence. Normally, the 
Sultans felt strong enough to give out ghulams to their commanders 
when these were detailed for governorships or for campaigns where 
strong support was necessary. On A~mad Ipaltigin's appointment in 
1031 to India, the Sultan gave him 130 of his own palace ghulams. 
The general Tash Farrash was sent off to Ray two months later, and 
the Sultan added 100 to Tash's own 150. When in 1033 Abu Sahl 
lfamdaw! was sent as governor of Ray and (.Ttbal with troops to rein-
force the army already there, MasCud gave him 200 ghulams and their 
officers. (For the backgrounds to these appointments to India and 
Persia, see above, Part I, 168-9, 178-80 .) In all these cases the 
ghularas ·:.rere released from their personal bond to the Sultan, and 
this was transferred to their new master. Notwithstanding this, 
ghulams thus transferred would often be expected to act as mushrifs 
over their superiors (see above, Part I, 151-2 ) • In fact, 
Al}rnad Inal t igin endeavoured to circumvent ro~ral control and to 
gather a really trustworthy personal guard. He sent agents to buy 
ghulams for hi1:1 in Turkestan, and over seventy of these were secretly 
transported to India via the upper Oxus and Panjhir before his pre-
parations for revolt were delated to the Sultan. 35 
Sultan Ibrahim b. MasCiid bestowed 400 Turkish ghulams on his 
trusted chief minister, the Sharif Abu'l-Faraj ~iddiqi, including a 
special group of seventy with golden belts like those of the palace 
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ghulams; but he continued himself to pay allowances to them all in 
cash and kind, and so kept up his personal bond with them. The 
ghulams and livestock left by BaihaqYs master in the Drwan-i Risalat, 
Abil Nafir-i Mishkan, were on his death all taken over by MasCud. It 
is likely in this case that the use them had been granted to the 
Chief Secretary for life, who was of course a free Persian and not a 
slave, for use within his lifetime, and on his death they reverted 
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to the Sultan. \'!here a ghulam commander was involved, the 
Sultan was the ultimate beneficiary as maula al-aCla. When such a 
man died, his personal following of ghulams was broken up. Anush-
tigin Khafi~a, an old and trusted eunuch commander and military 
governor of Merv when he died in 1037, left an extensive household 
with its own intendant and secretary, property and estates, and a 
body of personal ghulams. Anilshtigin requested and got his freedom 
just before he died, and expressed a desire that his ghulams should 
not be split up. IviasCUd agreed to this, and ordered that the civil 
governor of hlerv should meanwhile pay their salaries and allowances 
from government funds; later, the ghulams were taken into the royal 
household, the Sultan keeping the thirty best ones and distributing 
the remainder among his four sons. Thus the act of manumission does 
not seem to have affected the Sultan's position as beneficiary, for 
he still retained a right of wala' over his freedman. 37 The same 
process whereby retinues were broken up is observable when in 1031 
the generals Eryaruq and Asrghtigin Ghazi were removed from their 
posts of commander of the Indian army and Commander-in-chief 
respectively. Their personal ghulams were confiscated and divided 
up; the Sultan took the best and gave the rest to his courtiers. 38 
Aging and superannuated ghulams were probably found jobs around the 
palace or in the lower ranks of the administration; some may have 
retired to riba~s for less exacting defence duties. 39 
Chapter Two 
The racial contingents within the army and their fighting roles 
In his article in EI1 on the Ghaznavids, i·•I. Longworth Dames 
considered it a weakness that the Sultans had no strong nucleus 
of native troops for their armies. Such a view has little validity 
in the context of the age. Rulers who rose to power with the back-
ing of troops from their own people or tribe had frequently to kick 
this ladder away. The Buyids soon found Turkish troops more 
reliable than their DailamY fellow-tribesmen, and indeed, discrimin-
ated against the latter (see above, 225 ); latterly, the Buyids 
depended almost wholly on Turkish troops. 40 That the Turkmen 
nomads would be an unstable element in the Seljuq state was shown 
to Tughrrl Beg as early as Ibrahim Inal's rebellion in 1059. Most 
Muslim rulers would have recoiled from arming their own subjects, 
and in contemporary eyes, the racial diversity of armies like those 
of the Ghaznavids and Fa~imids was a source of strength. Moreover, 
the absence of a strong native backing meant that the Ghaznavids 
were not faced with the Seljuqs' problem, that of keeping occupied 
or absorbing a large nomadic following. 
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The two great 11th century Farstenspiegel both quote with 
approval Ma~mud's policy of diversity within the army; they ascribe 
it to his great percipience rather than to the mere fact that troops 
from so many races could conveniently be obtained. Kai Ka'Us praises 
his kinsman's use of Turks and Indians as palace guards whereby "he 
constantly overawed the Hindus by means of the Turks and the Turks 
by means of the Hindus, with the result that both nations submitted 
to him through the fear of each for the other". lllhereas, "if a 
prince's bodyguard is all frorn one race, he is ever the prisoner of 
his bodyguard and tamely submissive, for the reason that the members 
of one race will be in alliance together, making it impossible to 
use them in holding each other in check". The variety of national-
ities within the Ghaznavid army is praised in eh. XXIV of the 
Siyasat-nama, "The army should be composed of troops of all races". 
Ma~Ud's army was always organised by nationalities, and these 
encamped separately ttnder their own guards. A spirit of emulation 
in battle was thereby engendered. Consequently, Ni~am al-Mulk con-
eludes, a mono-national army should be avoided as leading only to 
/ plots and emeutes; there should always be 2000 Dailamis and Khurasanis 
at the ruler's court together with an admixture of Shabankara'I Kurds 
and Georgians, both of which races were famed for their valour.' 41 
The great Vizier's historical fact is here correct, although 
the Ghaznavid. army was by no means the only multi-national one of 
its age. The BUyids had Dailamis, Turks and Arabs in their service; 
the soldiers of the F'a~ imid Caliph al-Mustan~ir ( 427-87 /1036-94) 
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ranged from Berbers and Nee,Toes to Bedouins and 'l1urks; and conting-
ents from tributary states, syrnmachoi, and regiments of foreign 
mercenaries had long been a feature of Byzantine military policy.42 
Whilever there was a strong ruler on the throne, national divers-
ities were indeed a source of strength, especially as different 
races often had their own particular skills to bring to the common 
military pool; and from the organisational point of view, it was 
easier to deal with the separate national contingents when they 
each retained their unity under one commander from amongst them-
selves. We do not know whether the Ghaznavids themselves had any 
consciously-formulated views on the virtues or otherwise of the 
multi-racial structure of their army, apart from odd pointers in 
two anecdotes of Fakhr-i Mudabbir. In the first one, the homogeneity 
of the Q.arakhanids' 11urkish army when they invaded Khurasan, seems 
to be favourably contrasted to Ma~rnud's mixed army of Turks, Indians 
and irregulars. But in the second, Sultan Ibrahim b. MasCud's envoy 
boasts to Malikshah that the Ghaznavid army is of ten sorts compared 
with the Seljuqs' one only (tara yak nauC-i lashkar ast, mara dah 
nauc) - in fact, an inaccurate assertion, for the Seljuq forces also 
included troops of several races - and so advises M.alikshah to give 
up his design of attacking Ghazna. 43 
The Sultans' own Turkish eo-nationals inevitably formed a sub-
stantial element of the army, and from them most of the top commanders 
were drawn. Contemporary Islamic opinion characterised the Turks as 
a hardy race from the steppes divinely endowed with the qualities of 
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bravery and loyalty, if not of intelligence (see below, Part IV, 
406-7 ). 44 h The G aznavids gave the Turks this prominence because 
of these virtues, because of personal ties forged by comradeship in 
arms and because war was the only field in which the Turks in their 
retinue could be employed. The administration was a Persian pre-
serve, and instances where a Turk held high office in it were except-
ional; they tended to be in functions connected with the Sultan's 
household and person rather than in the bureaucracy proper. Awnad 
Inaltigin had been Ma~mud's treasurer, and it was personal ties -
A~ad claimed to be a son of Ma4mud's and was physically very like 
him - and not military experience which prompted MasCud to give him 
the Indian command. The fact that MasCud also appointed a Persian 
dabir, Abu'l-ijasan crraqi, over the Arab and Kurdish troops in Khur-
asan shows that the military and civil institutions were not always 
rigidly separated and that administrative capability might be used 
in the military field too. On one occasion, the links of racial 
fellow-feeling were appealed to on a question of policy; in 1040, 
to dissuade the Sultan from what the Vizier considered a disastrous 
decision, he brought forward a simple, loyal Turkish general to 
reason with his master, hoping that he would succeed where the more 
sophisticated Persian advisers had failed. 45 
There was probably a steady stream of mercenaries from the 
north coming to swell the Ghaznavid armies. The lOth and 11th 
centuries were troubled ones within the steppes, and the migrations 
of peoples like the Oghuz and Qrpchaq caused pressure on the northern 
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frontiers of the Ghaznavid empire. A section of the Oghuz, called 
by contemporaries the "Ciraqi" Turkrnens to distinguish them from 
the bands who irrupted into Islam under the leadership of the Seljuq 
family, were admitted in 1025 to Khurasan by IJialjrnud, and enrolled 
under their own leaders as auxiliaries (see below, Part IV, 434-6). 
At the outset of his reign, ll!asCud used them as part of an expedition 
to Makran, but under one of' his own Turkish generals, and again in 
1032-3 under the same general against a local rebel in Qazwin. 
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Provincial governors on their own initiative recruited tribesmen 
for local defence. 'J.lhe governor of Khwarizm, Al tuntash, employed 
Kujat and Chaghirat Turks, probably of Qfpchaq stock, to help 
defend the frontiers of his province against other nomads; these 
auxiliaries were later used by his rebellious son HarUn to throw 
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off Ghaznavid control. It is likely, however, that many of the Turks 
in the Ghaznavid armies were recruited from within the empire's 
borders, in particular, from nomads who had filtered into the upper 
Oxus region and across the Hindu Kush into eastern Afghanistan in 
earlier centuries (see above, Part I, 92-3 
hurried back from Multan to repulse the Ilig Na~r's invasion of Khur-
asan, he recruited Khalaj Turks, so that in 1008 he faced the Qara-
khanids with a mixed army of Indians, Afghans, Oghuz, Kbalaj and 
local troops from Ghazna. Although at this date Oghuz tribesmen 
from the lower Syr Darya were entering the service of the Qarakhanids, 
these Oghuz in Maqmud's service may well have been much earlier 
. 48 settlers from eastern Afghan1stan. 
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The Indians in the army resembled the Turks in their lack of 
home ties and of distracting interests which might affect their 
loyalty. Below the ijajib-i Buzurg, the Indians had, like the Arabs 
and Kurds, their own commander, the Sipahsa.lar-i Hinduyan, and. they 
had their own quarter in Ghazna. 49 Often they were more reliable 
than the Turks, to whom they formed a counterweight. When the brief 
regime of Muljammad b. Malpnud (421/1030) was collapsing through the 
defection of many of his troops, including the palace ghulams, to 
his brother MasCud, it was Muljammad's Indian troops under their 
commander Suvendhray who remained loyal. The rrurkish Ijajib-i Buzurg, 
CAli Qarib, went over to the new Sultan, but was doubtful of his 
reception. So he set out from Tiginabad to Herat, sending on the 
main body of troops to hlasCud, but preferring himself to travel the 
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next day with the more reliable Indians. As part of the vendetta 
against the Ma~udiyan, representatives of the old r~gime, the two 
Turkish generals Eryaruq and Asrghtigin Ghazi were in 1031 overthrown 
(see above, Part I, 125-6 , and Part II, 235-6 ). After an 
unsuccessful attempt to flee to Khwarizm, the second of these was to 
be sent back to Ghazna. The Sultan stipulated that he was to have 
three Indian ghulams as personal servants and that his escort to 
the capital was to comprise 300 Indian cavalry and 200 Indian infant-
rymen. Obviously, Indians were preferred here where the fallen 
general's plight might have aroused the active sympathies of his 
fellow-Turks. Likewise, MasCud never forgave his uncle YUsuf b. 
SebUktigin for supporting his brother MWJ.ammad, and in 1031 arrested 
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him on his return from an expedition against Quf}dar. Yilsuf was 
sent away to a fortress with an Indian escort of three muqaddams, 
three naqibs and 500 cavalry, together with a body of infantry of 
. f. d t. 1· t 51 I d. t f d 1· t unspec1 1e na 1ona 1 y. n 1an roops were o goo qua 1 y; 
the Ghaznavids always found the Rajput princes tenacious opponents, 
and the poor showing of an Indian contingent sent in 1034 against 
the Buyids of Kirman seems to have been an isolated occurence. 
Furthermore, religion was no bar to their employment, and the anon-
y~ous historian of Sistan complains bitterly of the slaughter and , 
violence done to the Muslims and Christians of Zarang in 1003 by 
Ma}pnud's pagan Indian troops. 
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The Dailamis, sturdy mountaineers from the backwards and inacc-
essible Caspian provinces, were familiar over many parts of the 
Islamic world after their upsurge in the lOth century. It is poss-
~ble that the poverty of their homeland forced them to seek military 
employment outside, much as it forced another mountain people, the 
Swiss, to do so in mediaeval and Reformation Europe. Thus in the 
11th century there was a corps of Dailami infantry in F~~imid 
service; Naf}ir-i Khusrau saw them escorting the Caliph as he made 
his ceremonial progress to the Nile, and the Dailamis had a special 
quarter in Cairo. 
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In the previous century, the BITyids had found 
their tough and frugal Dailami troops superior in the field to the 
Samanids' Khurasanis .• and the Musafirids' Bedouins. Abu CAli 
SimjiTri had used Dailamis in Khurasan against Maqmud; it was probably 
here that the victorious Ma~ud became aware of their calibre and 
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enrolled them in his forces. 54 The Siyasat-nama recommends that 
Dailarnis should form half of the ruler's crack guard of Mufradl!n, 
together with Khurasanis. 'l1he original fame of the Dailamis was as 
infantrymen, and their characteristic weapon the short, two-pronged 
spear (zhupin) which could be thrown at the enemy, and it was as 
infantrymen that the Seljuqs of Kirman were still using them in the 
12th century. 55 It is uncertain whether the Ghaznavids' Dailamis 
fought mounted or on foot; but we know that amongst them was an 
, . 
el1te group of some fifty or sixty who acted as foot guards, carry-
ing golden or bejewelled shields, when the Sultan held full ceremonial 
court. The Dailamis were undoubtedly an important element and their 
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amirs were highly favoured. 
The Kurds and Arabs were often, though not always, grouped 
under a single commander, and as such were given prominent military 
roles; when in 1040 MasCud's army left Merv for Dandanqan, they 
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formed the bulk of the key vanguard force. Successive Persian 
rulers, from the Sassanids to the Qajars, have taken the pastoralist, 
mountain-dwelling Kurds from their homes in Kurdistan and Luristan 
and planted them in Khurasan to defend the north-eastern frontier. 
Because of dispersions like these they came to be found as mercenar-
ies in the armies of many Islamic dynasties. The Sam~nids used them, 
although their experience with them was not always happy; moreover, 
a battle fought outside Ray in 1036 between the Ghaznavids and the 
"Ciraqi" Turkrnens was lost by the former because of the treachery 
of the commander of the Kurds in their army. 
58 
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The Arabs formed some of the finest cavalry in the army, the 
so-called divsuvaran, 11 dare-devil riders". 
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In Mal}.mild • s reign, 
the cornmander of the Arabs was CAbdallah Mui:ammad b. Ibrahim a~-
-'l'a 'I al-ACrabi. 1l'ogether with the Sultan • s brother Na~r, his 
troops held the centre position in the great battle of 1008 with 
the Qarakhanids. Again under Muqammad a~-r:ta'I, the Arabs were 
chosen as advance guard when Khwarizm was invaded in 1017. It seems 
that the swiftness and dashing qualities of the Arab cavalry made 
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them especially favoured for advance and raiding parties. In 
Khurasan and the east, the Arab tribal colonisations in the first 
century or so of Islam had left many groups of them. Some, like 
the Arabs w~o made Wadhar in the Samarqand oasis famous for textiles, 
fitted themselves into the settled economy of the land; but others 
remained semi-nomads, for whom the strategic position of Khurasan 
as a cockpit gave frequent employment in war. The author of the 
~udud al-Calam mentions as many as 20,000 Arabs in his home province 
of Guzgan who lived off their extensive herds of sheep and camels 
and were richer than all the other Arabs scattered about Khurasan. 
IsmaCil al-Munta~ir, the last of the Samanids, was killed by a group 
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of Arab nomads who lived in the Qara Qum steppe. Some of these 
communities may have retained their tribal organisation and dist-
inctive Arab dress. Just before Ma~ud's death, the Ziyarid Manu-
chihr b. Qabus sent envoys to MasCud; these were disguised as Arabs, 
so it seems that Arab dress cannot at that time have been an unusual 
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sight in Gurgan and Khurasan. The later Ziyarids themselves 
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relied substantially on Kurds and Arabs for defence. 'I'he obscur-
ity surrounding the antecedents of the man who ruled Gurgan and 
1abaristan for much of NlasCud's reign, Abu K'alijar, has--been remarked 
upon (above, Part I, 167 ), but Ibn al-Athir makes him Commander-
-in-chief of the forces and a Kurd of the QUhiyya tribe. During 
MasCud's expedition of 1035 against this rebellious vassal, the 
entire defence force of Gurgan, 4000 Arab cavalrymen, came over to 
the Sultan, then at the peak of his fame, and enrolled in his army 
as musta'mina; the remnants of them were still living at Ghazna 
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when Baihaqi was putting together his memoirs (1058-9). 
An extensive supply of mounts was necessary for the cavalry, 
especially as a considerable proportion of it was of two-horse 
troopers, the second horse providing a fresh mount or carrying equip-
ment and food. In the campaign which ended at Dandanqan, however, 
lack of fodder reduced many of these troopers to a single mount. 
The officer in charge of the royal stables, the Akhur-Salar or Amir-i 
Akhur, was a high-ranking commander; in an important battle against 
the Qarakhanids, Mal:J.mud chose this officer to lead the palace ghulams 
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branded with the in the main charge. The army's mounts were all 
royal mark, as were the camels and other beasts of burden. It was 
a duty of the Department of the Ishraf periodically to send out 
inspectors to the royal horse and elephant stables and ensure that 
the animals were being properly fed and cared for. They also visited 
the royal herds left out to pasture to see that they had been branded 
as a precaution against fraud (see above, Part I, 149 ). 65 The 
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form of the tamgha is not known. 
Many of the most famous breeding grounds for horses in eastern 
Islam fell within the Ghaznavid sphere of influence. The Sulaiman 
Mts. to the west of the Indus have a very long history as a h6rse-
-breeding area, and the name "Afghan" has been linked with the 
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Asvaka, "horse people", of Gandhara in the Mahabharata. On the 
upper Oxus, the lush valleys and upland pastures of Guzgan, Gharch-
istan, 'rukharistan, Khuttal and Chaghaniyan were famous for their 
horses; these were coveted in the Arab Caliphate as far back as 
Hisham's reign and exported as far east as China in the Mongol and 
Timurid periods. In the Samanid and Ghaznavid empires, the men of 
Khuttal were known for their skill in veterinary science, and their 
province produced high-quality bridles, straps and other pieces of 
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equipment for horses. All these regions were either for most of 
the time under direct Ghaznavid rule, or in the case of the provinces 
beyond the Oxus, held by tributary princes. In times of peace the 
Oghuz of the Gara Qum and beyond supplied Khurasan with livestock 
such as sheep and goats, and doubtless some of their horses in this 
way were acquired by the Ghaznavids. The 3000 horses sent in 1017 
by the Khwarizmshah Abu'l-CAbbas Ma'miTn to his brother-in-law 
wa~ud, and the further 4000 promised by Abu'l-CAbbas's killers as 
an indemnity, must have been obtained from Oghuz and 0rpchaq nomads 
around the borders of Khwarizm. On one occasion, the incoming 
Seljuqs offered the Ghaznavid CAmid of Khurasan Khuttali horses, 
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Bactrian camels and sheep as presents. Camels were reared in 
most parts of northern Khurasan and in the Baluchistan and h1akran 
deserts by Baluchi and Brahui nomads, but in the Ghaznavid army 
they were used mainly as beasts of burden. Only at the time of 
Dandanq~n, when the army's endurance had been sapped by famine and 
exhaustion, were the palace ghulams reduced to camels for mounts, 
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whilst, however, protesting their inability to fight on such beasts. 
In the Sassanid armies, the infantry was a.n ill-organised 
rabble of conscripted peasants who served without pay and were of 
dubious fighting value. In the Ghaznavid army, the cavalry was 
tactically the more important arm from its mobility, ability to 
charge the enemy and usefulness in skirmishing, but the infantry 
was valuable in pitched battles and at sieges. The Sultans had a 
permanent force of infantry, the piyadagan-i dargahi, who were est-
eemed enough to be mounted on swift camels for distant campaigns, 
dismounting to fight. 70 Indians were a prominent element in this 
infantry, but probably Dailamis and other races were to be found in 
it. As well as this permanent core, it was often convenient to 
recruit infantry locally for specific expeditions, as near to the 
theatre of war as possible. Here, the indigenous populations of 
Afghanistan and Khurasan were drawn upon. The army sent from Balkh 
in 1031 against the Buyid crmad ad-Din Abu Kalijar's outlying 
province of Kirman was to travel via Sistan and there pick up 2000 
Sagazi infantry provided by the local, tributary ~affarid ruler. In 
the same year, the infantry mustered at Ghazna comprised Marvazi 
heavy infantry with shields and 3000 others from Sistan, Ghazna, 
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Herat, Balkh and Sarakhs; and in 1039 a force of 2000 infantry was 
again raised in Afghanistan, from Sistan, Ghazna, GhUr and Balkh, 
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to reinforce the army of Khurasan against the Oghuz. 
Finally, there was the volunteer element of the army, the 
ghazis or muta~awwica. As with all successful commanders, the armies 
of the early Ghaznavids attracted plunder-seeking adventurers, above 
all for the Indian campaigns. Their predecessor Alptigin had come 
to Ghazna with only 200 personal ghulams and 800 ghazis, but his 
successes in India attracted so many warriors from Khurasan, both 
Turk and Tajik, that he ended up with 15,000 cavalry and 5000 inf-
antry. Ten thousand ghazis accompanied Ma~mud in 1001 to Peshawar 
and Waihind against Jaipal, and 20,000 from Transoxania for the 
Qanauj campaign of 1018. The concentration of Turkish ghazis in 
places like Lahore was a potent factor in the turbulence of the 
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Indian garrisons. The ghazis were not registered in the Diwan-i 
CArq as regular soldiers entitled to a salary, bistaga.ni, but some 
attempt was made to control their exuberance and to make better 
tactical use of them. For the Somnath expedition of 1025-6 Ma~ud 
took with him 30,000 regular cavalry plus the volunteers, and these 
latter were allotted 50,000 dinars from the state treasury for 
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weapons and equipment. There was in MasCud's reign a special 
Salar-i Ghaziyan, normally stationed at Lahore, but he was also 
present in Khurasan at Dandanqan; this office was held by a Turkish 
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ghulam, CAbdall"ah Q.aratigin. 
Chapter Three 
The elephants and other elements comprising the army's train 
Amongst the Indian princes, possession of elephants gave 
great prestige and a visible proof of power; in Hodivala's words, 
"the number of elephants which an Indian Raja could command in 
those days provides a fairly reliable criterion, if not absolutely 
crucial test, of the extent and magnitude of his power". It was 
from India that the Ghaznavids learnt the use of elephants, not 
merely for ceremonial purposes, but also as an important part of 
the army's mat6riel. They used them in conditions very different 
from humid, tropical India. They used them in the steppes and 
plateaux of Afghanistan and Khurasan and even in Central Asia. 
During the Dandanqan campaign, when the army suffered terribly from 
lack of water, provisions and fodder, MasCud was still able to field 
twelve elephants for the actual battle. They could even survive in 
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the hot, dry deserts of south-eastern Persia; some "unbelievers", 
Qufichis or Baluchis, used them against Ma~mud in 1010-11. 75 
The numbers of the Ghaznavids' elephants were kept up by 
presents from tributary Hindu princes and by plunder from campaigns, 
and the sources usually list the number of beasts a victorious 
army brought back. These might amount to hundreds at a time, e.g. 
350 from Qanauj and 185 from Mahaban in 1018-19, and 580 from the 
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ruler Ganda in 1019-20. CUtbi records that the Thanesar exped-
ition of 1014-15 was provoked by Ma~ud's desire to get some of the 
special breed of ~ailamani elephants, excellent in war. On another 
occasion, the Sultan so coveted an elephant belonging to Chandar 
Ray, ruler of Sharma, a beast whose excellence had become proverbial 
in India, that he offered fifty ordinary ones in exchange. When in 
MasCud's reign the appointment of a new governor was being discussed, 
the duty of procuring elephants was specifically linked with those 
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of carrying on ghazw and collecting taxes. 
The numbers of elephants in the Ghaznavid army must therefore 
have been great. At the army review of Shabahar in 1023-4 Ma~ud 
reviewed 1300 of them, each with equipment and armour; MasCud in 
1031 reviewed 1670 at Kabul, "all plump and ready for action". A 
pilkhana to accommodate 1000 elephants was built at Ghazna, but one 
would imagine that Kabul was more suitable to be the main depot for 
them. The expenses of upkeep and the amount of fodder required by 
these beasts must have ·been prodigious, and the fertile, irrigated 
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Kabul River valley, part of which Babur distinguishes as a garmsir, 
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would seem to be more suitable than the colder uplands of Ghazna. 
The elephants were tended by a staff of Hindus under a Muqaddam-i 
P!lbanan, who had the high rank of ~ajib; from the name of one 
holder of it in MasCud's reign, he was not necessarily an Indian 
himself. The price of an elephant appears from Baihaqi as 100,000 
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dirhams. 
Having so many elephants, the Sultans could afford to dispense 
them as gifts to other princes. In 1001 Ma~ud sent the Ilig Na~r 
female elephants; in 1023 the fat~-nama to the Caliph al-Qadir 
announcing successes in India was accompanied by presents of eleph-
ants; and ten female ones were given to Qadrr Khan YUsuf in an 
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exchange of gifts in 1025. Elephants were indeed essentially 
royal beasts at this time and for many centuries later, among both 
Hindu and eastern Muslim rulers, and possession of them jealously 
guarded. The unpermitted assumption of this privilege by a private 
individual was tantamount to rebellion. Rulers bestowed elephants 
on their amirs and nobles only as a great favour or when they were 
being fitted out for particularly responsible posts. Thus A~ad 
b. CAli Anushtigin was given five elephants together with the usual 
oufit of a governor - girdle, two-pointed hat, drum and standard -
when he assumed command of the Kirman expedition of 1034. When 
plunder from the Indian campaigns was being divided out, the eleph-
81 
ants automatically fell within the Sultan's fifth. 
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One of the reasons why the Caliph al-Manf.}U.r had. collected 
elephants was that they were "the most comfortable and smooth-moving 
beasts for transporting monarchs'! Similarly, the Ghaznavid Sultans 
rode them on state occasions such as reviews of the army; and in 
1011-12, when Ma~mud specially wished to impress the envoys from 
the Ilig Nafir and his brother and rival Toghan Khan, he had forty 
richly-caparisoned elephants drawn up facing the assembly, with a 
row of 100 war elephants behind. 
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The elephant became MasCud's 
favourite mount for hunting; iron plating was placed over the beast's 
head and face to protect it. MasCud also had an elephant held ready 
for his use at any time, and it was a daring stroke of Chaghrr Beg's 
Turkmens to steal this "big elephant kept at the door of the Sultan's 
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palace". 
Among Islamic dynasties, it was the Ghaznavids who first used 
elephants for battle in large numbers and who assigned them a defin-
ite place in their tactical theory; they had of course been much 
used in Persia and Iraq by the Sassanids, including at the battle 
of Qadisiyya. Tactically, they provided excellent vantage-points 
for commanders in confused fighting, and when in 1035 an army was 
sent to Nasa against the Oghuz, the commanders were all given 
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elephants specifically for this purpose. The Turkish peoples 
of Central Asia were by no means unfamiliar with elephants, as the 
totemistic title (onghun) Ytghantigin "elephant-prince", found 
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among the Qarakhanids, shows. But their use in battle against 
nomad horsemen could be demoralising, especially as they were norm-
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ally placed in front of the battle line, enraged, and then used 
to lead a charge. As Christensen says of their use in an earlier 
age, "leur mugissements, leur odeur et leur aspect terrible faisaient 
peur aux chevaux des ennemis". Sebttktigin had used 200 elephants 
captured in India against the rebel Samanid generals Fa'iq and Abu 
CAli Simjuri, and Ma4IDud took a force of them with him when he went 
off to repel the Ilig Na~r's invasion; the Qarakhanid troops prot-
ested that "it was impossible for anyone to withstand these elephants, 
weapons, equipment and arms". In 1025, 400 elephants were used 
against CAlitigin; before battle, drums and other instruments were 
beaten in the Sultan's camp, and the elephants' dangling ornaments 
and accoutrements shaken and jangled to excite them and to shatter 
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the enemy's nerve. An ,anecdote of Fakhr-i Mudabbir's mentions 
Malikshah's alarm when he saw his first elephant, a present from 
the Ghaznavid Sultan; and as late as 1116-17, during the battle 
outside Ghazna between Sanjar and Arslanshah b. MasCud b. Ibrahim 
(509-12/1115-18), the Seljuq horses were initially thrown into a 
panic by the fifty Ghaznavid elephants, each having four mailed 
spearmen and archers mounted and fastened down on the tops of them, 
Which were facing their front line. However, the Seljuq troops were 
able to stampede them into retreat by attacking the leading beast in 
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the only part not covered by armour, the vulnerable under-belly. 
The Ghaznavid Sultans applied the administrative talents of 
their Persian bureaucracy to problems of logistics, the mobilisation, 
orderly movement and supplying of their armies. Like other profess-
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ional Islamic armies, the Ghaznavid army carried in its wake 
auxiliary equipment such as armouries (zarradkhanas) and, where 
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necessary, siege machinery. The elephants were useful both for 
hauling this equipment and also in the sieges themselves. In 1033 
reinforcements were sent to defend Ray and to mount an offensive 
against the Kakfiyids; among these were five elephants fitted with 
rams and battering equipment for use against walls and buildings 
(divar afgan u darvaza shikan). For the Gurgan and ~abaristan exped-
ition of 1035, MasCUd took several elephants to the Caspian shore 
jangal, where they would find the hot, humid conditions there very 
congenial and where they could be used for breaking through the dense 
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vegetation. In India and the mountainous regions of Afghanistan, 
where stone for building was plentiful, the reduction of a fortified 
town or strong-point, rather than a pitched battle, was often the 
crux of a campaign. Here, specialists like engineers, sappers and 
pioneers were dafted in to work ballistas and catapults and to mine 
beneath walls. In 1020 Ma~ud attacked the pagan Afghans of the 
Nur and Qirat valleys to the east of Kabul (the later Kafiristan), 
t'aking wi t·h him blacksmiths, carpenters and stone breakers for 
making roads, felling trees and clearing away other obstructions 
in this difficult terrain. 90 The campaigns of MaqmUd and MasCud 
in GhUr were merely strings of sieges, for this backwards region 
had no large towns but was essentially a land of local strongholds 
and derebeys. 
Other impedimenta taken along when the Sultans went to war 
included the royal treasury and wardrobe, the kitchens and their 
provisions and the harem with its ladies. There were other hangers-
-on such as nadims, physicians, astrologers, etc. The Diwans of the 
administration were peripatetic and their personnel and official 
records and documents had to be housed. Thus the amount of tented 
accommodation required was considerable, and Gardizi records that 
when 1,{aljmud met Qadrr Khan YUsuf near Samarqand, he had one tent 
big enough to hold 10,000 riders and another tent for his personal 
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use of crimson Shushtari brocade. Vfuen it was a question of 
moving an army to reduce a rebellious town or to engage another 
army in pitched battle, the whole of this train had to accompany the 
army; nevertheless, Ma~ud had a reputation for being a dashing 
commander. Food and supplies could be taken in en route. Ni~am 
al-Mulk recommends the establishment of granaries and storehouses 
all over the provinces so that unjust levies on the people are 
avoided; furthermore, the ruler should be able to draw on the res-
ources of the !s~acs in the provinces. The camp-followings of 
Islamic armies normally included traders who supplied the troops, 
the bazar-i lashkar. Then when the campaign was over, the army 
returned to base or to garrisons in the provinces to rest and refit 
before it was next requiEed. 92 
Chapter Four 
The troops' personal arms 
The personal weapons of the Ghaznavid soldiers were basically 
those which had always been used in the Persian world. The regular 
infantry carried bows, but for close fighting had maces, short swords 
and spears. They wore mailed coats and carried leather-covered or 
-
metal shields, so that, in the Adab al-muluk's phrase, they could 
form a solid line in battle "like a fortress". The cavalry carried 
bows, battleaxes, maces, lances, sabres and long, curved swords 
(qalachurs). As the Shahnama shows, these weapons used by the 
Ghaznavid troopers were the traditional ones used by Iranian cavalry-
men. In particulat, the mace is the special weapon in the Shahnama 
of heroes and princes; Bahra~ GUr is said to have excelled in its 
use. The murals of Lashkar-i Bazar seem to depict the palace 
guards with maces on their shoulders, although the heads of the 
weapons are unfortunately not discernible. 
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The Ghaznavids do 
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not seem to have used horse-armour, but their elephants were 
certainly armoured, as the Sassanid ones had been (see above, 253-5). 
Fakhr-i Mudabbir has an interesting section on the favoured 
Personal weapons of the Ghaznavid Sultans. Sebttktigin fought with 
the spear, bow and qalachur; Ma~ud excelled in the use of the spear 
and. bow ; Muljammad used the spear; iYiasCud favoured the mace, and 
fought with this and with a sword and poison-tipped short spear at 
Dand~nqan; Maudud was a fine archer and is said to have invented a 
new kind of arrow-head; Farrukh-zad used a battle-axe; Ibrahim a 
spear and bow; etc. According to Shabankara•r, Ma~mud had a mace 
of 60 ~ weight which he could whirl round his head and throw 20 
~' whilst MasCud also excelled in fighting with the mace (chumaq, 
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~). Fakhr-i Mudabbir makes the qalachiTr the weapon par excell-
~ of the Turks, but it is perhaps the bow which is most typical 
of nomads. The bow probably came to the ancient Iranians from the 
north, and in their use of it, the Turkish soldiers of the Ghaznavids 
were drawing on both Iranian and Turkish traditional practice. 
Similarly, the lasso, characteristically used by pastoral herdsmen, 
had been used in Persian armies as far back as Xerxes' time; Maq-
mud's troops used it against the Indians, and MasCud's troops against 
the Turkmens in Khurasan. 95 It has been noted that some groups in 
the Ghaznavid army specialised in the use of certain weapons, e.g. 
the Dailamis' two-pronged spear (above, 243). 
We have little direct information on where the weapons and 
armaments of the Ghaznavid troops were made. The Indian booty 
often yielded weapons; like elephants, they fell within the Sultan's 
fifth (see below, 268 ), and India had long been famous for its 
steel cuirasses and sword blades, the sharpest and finest-damascened 
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of all blades, according to Fakhr-i llludabbir. But local centres 
within the Ghaznavid borders must have provided many of these weap-
ons and protective coats. Some areas had their own specialities, 
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e.g. Khwarizm produced swords and a very strong type of bow. The 
The mountain massif of the Hindu Kush and the adjacent ranges are 
geologically new and. are all metalliferous; Kabul was known for its 
iron mines, and Ghiir had both iron and timber to supply the forges. 
Hence Ghur was noted for its arms production, supplying the nearby 
provinces; the IJ.udud al-Calam records that "from this province 
come slaves [it was still a pagan enclave in early Ghaznavid times
98 ], 
armour, coats of mail and good arms". The name of one of its chief 
settlements or strong points on the upper Heri Rud was Ahangaran, 
also called Pul-i Ahangaran, "blacksmiths' boundary". MasCud, at 
the time governor of Khurasan, campaigned in Ghur in 1020-1; one 
of the local chiefs came to join him and brought a tribute of arms, 
shields and cuirasses, and when the main stronghold was captured, 
a tribute of arms was levied there. 99 MasCud was later able to 
utilise Ghuri officers in his service as specialists in siege war-
fare. Two of them directed the defence of Tirmidh in 1035 against 
the troops of CAlitigin's sons, for which the defenders had a 
ballista (carrada) operated by a Ghilri soldier and firing stones 
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weighing five or six mans. In the 12th century, the local ruler 
of Ghur, Cizz ad-Din ijusain (493-540/1100-46) used to send to 
Sanjar as annual tribute armour, coats of mail, steel caps and 




The CAriq's department 
The army's internal organisation, mustering, commissariat 
and pay arrangements were directed from the Diwan-i CAr4, and the 
office of CArid was accounted second only to the Vizier's. As well --· 
as the chief CAriq at the centre, there were subordinate cariq! and 
katkhudas, quartermasters, appointed for armies in the provinces 
and for the forces of great men like Maqmud's brother the Amir Na~r. 
Since administrative rather than military experience was the desid-
eratum here, it was usually Persians of the bureaucracy, and not 
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Turkish soldiers, who held these offices. 
The functions of the CArid have been concisely described by -· 
Nazim, Sul~an Ma~mud, 137-8. To this survey may be added something 
on the annual review of the army (carq) and on the army's pay 
arrangements. When the Sultan was at Ghazna, his forces (excluding, 
of course, those in provincial garrisons) were paraded on the plain 
of Shabahar, described as "a green place", carpeted with anemones, 
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half-a-farsakh outside the capital; the fertile region around it 
produced a famous variety of pears. This convenient site was 
probably utilised at an early date; MasCud built a new palace there 
to replace an old one of his father's. 
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The Mujmal at-tawarikh 
considers the Car4 to be a Sassanid institution, in which the 
m~bedh acted as CArid and inspected everyone from the Emperor down-----· 
wards, passing them as fit for service. It is true that amongst 
the Sassanids, it was customary to hold a review of the army before 
battles, when the troops filed past the Emperor, and in the inst-
itution of the card we see one of the elements of continuity ---· 
between the Ghaznavid army and the Iranian past. The inclusion 
of the Amir himself as the first person to be inspected and approved 
before payment at the Nauruz card is a detail recorded of CAmr b. ---· 
Laith's procedure. 
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As among the Samanids, with the Ghaznavids 
it was frequently the Sultan himself who performed the inspection. 
The troops filed past him and were counted by his whip-end. They 
had their names checked against the general nominal roll, jarida-yi 
Car4, of which the CAri~ had one copy and the other was kept in the 
Diwan-i R!salat; there was a separate roll for the ghulams. The 
immediate origin of this general nominal roll was probably the 
special register of the Samanids, al-jaridat as-sauda', wherein 
the names and duties of all their soldiers had been recorded. 104 
The evidence from the historical sources gives a ring of 
truth to the extended section in the Adab al-mulUk on the correct 
procedure for the Cari, where it claims to reflect the practice of 
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the "kings of Islam". According to this, the CAriq stood on an 
eminence. The order of inspection was first the army's left 
(maisara), then the centre (qalb) and then the right (maimana). 
Cavalry and infantry filed past to have their weapons and kit in-
spected and their names and descriptions recorded in a document, a 
copy of which was given to the Naqib of the army so that on the 
day of battle he could set out the forces in the same order. Then, 
beginning with the most senior, the commanders and officers were 
inspected and their names recorded. It was thus possible to bring 
detachments up to their required strength of officers before setting 
out for battle. At the end of the Carq., commanders returned to 
their detachments, got the men and horses in order, and made speeches 
of encouragement to the men. Then the CArid discreetly reported to --· 
the Sultan or Commander-in-chief, taking care that no hostile spies 
were lurking nearby to overhear information on the state of the 
-
army. Indeed, it is recommended that the CAriq should arrange 
previously with cavalry commanders that after being inspected, their 
troops should slip back and quietly mingle with the uninspected 
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ones, so as to confuse enemy spies about the army's numbers. 
The annual Carq was also the occasion for general festivities 
at the Sultan's expense. The card at Shabahar in 1037 took place --· 
at the end of Ramaqan, coinciding with the Cid al-Fi~r, and it ended 
with a feast in which large tables were laid out, the Sultan, his 
family, the commanders and the courtiers being at the top one, and 
poets and musicians entertained the concourse. Such munificence 
was in the tradition of Turkish nomadic life, where patriarchal 
hospitality was an important factor in a tribal chief's holding 
together his following. We have seen (above, 228 ) that Seb-
ttktigin gave feasts as part of his policy to build up his forces, 
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and they were expected too of the Seljuq Sultans. 
Lastly, the Carq was one of the occasions for the payment of 
the bistagani (Arabic, al-Cishriniyya), cash allowances to the 
troops. These were normally paid out in advance so that soldiers 
could equip themselves and their mounts for a forthcoming campaign 
(Fakhr-i Mudabbir nevertheless advises that a special issue of two 
days' rations should be made to all combattants on the morning of 
battle). Among the Samanids, official salaries, both military 
and civil, had been paid quarterly, and according to Ni~am al-Mulk, 
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the Ghaznavids continued this practice. However, it is clear 
from several citations in Baihaqi (e.g. 146, 611) that allowances 
to civilians in the bureaucracy and pensions awarded to people 
who had attracted the Sultan's favour were paid monthly (mushaharat). 
But it was no doubt preferable to pay the army at longer intervals 
than this, if only from the point of view of convenience; ~unlike 
the officials and courtiers, the troops were not often long in 
one place. Often it was necessary for the CAriq' or his deputies 
to pay armies in the field with cash drawn from provincial treasur-
ies; the armies campaigning against the Turkmens had often to be 
paid from Nishapur by the CAmid of Khurasan. It was an exception 
to the usual practice of advance payment, that the forces for the 
I 185, Part II, 243 
Kirman expedition (see above, Part f ) were to be paid from the 
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revenues of Kirman after they had occupied it. 
Where distant provinces were concerned, the duty of paying 
and equipping local troops was often left to the governor or cornm-
ander there. It was, for instance, difficult for the central 
Diwan at Ghazna to pay the army of Khwarizm, especially as the 
tenuous line of communication along the Oxus was vulnerable to Qara-
khanid attack; nevertheless, it appears from the anecdote in eh. 
XLIX of the Siyasat-nama that the Vizier Maimandi insisted that 
the monies for paying the Khwarizmshah Al~untash and his army 
should go through the Diwan at Ghazna~09 There was, indeed, a 
danger in letting a local governor, have full control over his 
's 
.army's salaries, for the army/loyalties to him and not to the Sultan 
at the centre were by this means strengthened. Whilst Altuntash 
lived, the Sultans could count on his loyalty, but the close links 
of the army in Khwarizm with its leaders facilitated his sons' 
assertions of independence. 
Ni~am al-Mulk also asserts that "previous kings", i.e. the 
Samanids and Ghaznavids, did not pay their officials and soldiers 
in land p,Tants, iqtacs, but gave allowances of cash, food and cloth-
ing. Barthold has already pointed out (Turkestan, 238-9) that the 
hereditary lands of the SimjiTris in QUhistan were in fact something 
like feudal franchises; moreover, great men like Alptigin had 
amassed large estates and properties all over the Samanid empire 
266. 
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(see above, Part I, 98-9 ) • Moreover, the Turkish ghulam 
governors in Ghazna and Zabulistan seem to have introduced a system 
of fiefs there for their soldiers. By Sebnktigin's time, these 
fiefs had been in existence some time, so that he had to reform 
abuses which had crept in (see above, Part I, loc. cit~. Shaban-
k~ra'I describes his action thus: 
"The second affair which he attended to was that he regulated 
the army's organisation and their fiefs (1s~aC-Ishan). One day 
he gathered together the army and said: 'I perceive that the 
disordered state of the country has arisen from the army's fiefs 
being converted into state lands (d!hha-yi diwanr). Consequently, 
the countryside has suffered and the army has lost its source of 
sustenance. The proper task of the army is warfare and wielding 
its weapons; when:~ it turns to cul ti vat ion and agriculture, things 
come to no good'. Then he issued his decision. He resumed all 
those agricultural lands which were in the hands of the army, 
and said, 'I will pay the fiefs out as a cash payment from the 
treasury at the beginning of each year. Each soldier must have his 
fighting equipment in battle order then'. Next, he made some 
calculations; each person who had acquired something in excess of 
his allotted fief had to give it back, and those who had less than 
the allotted fief had the amount made up. In this way he set the 
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army's affairs in order'. 
It is clear from this passage that SebUktigin's rule ended the 
period of weak government by Alptigin's successors, and that the 
central power in Ghazna was now strong en,ough to resume the fiefs 
and substitute cash payments. In general, his successors for the 
ne•t two or three generations at least maintained the system of 
paying the troops in cash, but it is possible that a type of fief 
?67. 
more closely supervised than the hereditary 1:SJ.~ac continued to 
exist under the early Ghaznavids in the form of the ~ucma or prop-
112 
erty assigned for life to an office-holder. 
The early Ghaznavids had an advantage over their rivals, the 
Buyids, in having the wealth of Khurasan and I~dia to tap. They 
could therefore pay their troops regularly, whereas Miskawaih's 
narrative shows that the pay of the Buyid troops was ·frequently in 
arrears, making them tumultuous and unreliable. rrhe practice of 
issuing authorisations, berats, to troops for them to collect their 
salaries - and anything else they could get - from hapless civilian 
populations was often the last resort of bankrupt rulers, but 
MasCud resorted to this practice with political as well as financial 
reasons in mind (see above, Part I, 176-7 ). Normally, the 
Sultans were in firm control of their forces; it was only after 
MasCud's demoralising defeat at Dandanqan and the loss of Khurasan, 
followed by the decision to abandon the west for India, that he 
lost control of the army and was deposed by it. At the opening 
of his reign he had been strong enough to dispense with the accession 
largesses and pay increases with which weak rulers like the Abbasid 
Caliphs and the Buyids had to win their armies' homage, the so-
-called mal-i baiCat, corresponding to the julus aqchesi of the 
Ottoman troops; indeed, he had been strong enough to try and get 
back the money which his weaker brother hl~ammad had paid out to 
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soldiers and courtiers (see above, Part I, 136-7 ) • 
On top of the allowances which a soldier received there was 
26B. 
his share in the plunder. Immediately after a victory, the 
CAriq or his representative supervised the valuing of the spoils. 
If the Sultan was not personally present, his rights would be watch-
ed over by an agent from the Department of the Ishraf. The Sultan 
took a fifth from the slaves, animals and general booty, reserving 
to himself within this fifth all precious metals, arms and eleph-
ants; and he had a right of first pick, ~afiyya, from other choice 
articles. The rem~ing four-fifths went to the troops in proport-
ion to their ranks and with cavalrymen getting two shares to the 
infantrymen's one. When the Sultan had had his pick from the arms 
and precious metals, he would often turn the rest over to be 
divided amongst the army. ll4 There were also special bonuses, 
~ilat, awarded in the field for outstanding valour or for a partic-
ularly striking achievement; Fakhr-i Mudabbir advises a definite 
scale of rewards proportionate to such feats as capturing horses 
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or elephants or carrying off the enemy's standard or chatr. 
Chapter Six 
The numbers of the army 
There remains to see whether we can make any estimate of the 
total numbers of the Ghaznavid army. Nazim, Sul~an Ma~ud, 140, 
estimated that in peace-time Ma~mud.'s army probably amounted to 
100,000 cavalry and infantry, a figure which would be swollen in 
war-time by volunteers, tributary contingents, etc. This is 
perhaps a generous estimate. An examination of the numbers of men 
used in certain campaigns suggests that in MasCud's day the total 
was less than this. 
The sections in the Akhbar ad-daulat as-Saljugiyya, Ibn al-
~Athir, Barhebraeus and 1ffrkhwand ;oh· the Ghaznavid-seljuq warfare 
in Khurasan all draw to a considerable extent on the Malik-nama, 
which was probably written for Alp Arslan, i.e. it dates from 
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within a generation or so of the events which it describes. The 
Akhbar is the oldest of the later sources, and the figures it gives 
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for armies and combattants are generally reasonable • On the other 
hand, many of Ibn al-Athir's figures need drastic pruning. r.rhe 
figure of 30,000 for an army sent in 1038 against Tughrtl Beg is 
on the large side; that of 100,000 cavalr~nen plus a train of follow-
ers taken from Balkh against ChagTt Beg shortly afterwards is cert-
ainly to be rejected. More acceptable are the figures given for a 
battle outside Ray between the local Ghaznavid a.rmy of 3000 and 
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5000 of the "Ciraqi" Turkrnens. cutbi is normally vague about 
figures, but certainly Baihaqi, and no doubt Gardizi, accompanied 
armies in the field, and their estimates of numbers seem to be on 
the whole sensible ones. 
According to Gardizi, there were 54,000 cavalry and 1300 eleph-
ants at the Shabahar carq of 1023, excluding those in the provinces 
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and. on garrison duty. This may represent a peak for Ma}tmud's reign. 
Baihaqi's figures for individual expeditions in MasCud's reign are 
often quite modest. To place his protege Abu'l-MuCaskar on the 
throne of Makran, the Sultan sent 4000 cavalry, 3000 infantry and a 
force of ucrraqi" Turkmens, Also at the beginning of his reign, 
his uncle Yusuf b. SebUktigin was sent to Qu~dar in Baluchistan 
with 500 cavalry and his own ghulams. The 4000 cavalry, 2500 inf-
antry and five elephants sent in 1034 to Kirman were beaten by a 
Bijyid relieving force of 10,000. For the Gurgan and ~abaristan 
expedition of the following year, MasCud took 3000 cavalry, but 
this figure was raised to 8000 when he reached Amul and saw the 
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difficulties of the terrain. These were all expeditions to peri-
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pheral regions, but the forces sent were deemed adequate, and the 
Sultan's prestige was in the early part of his reign at its height. 
Moreover, Ma~mud just before his death had considered 8000 cavalry-
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men sufficient for the task of dethroning Majd ad-Daula at Ray. 
After 1035, however, the problem of Khurasan and the Oghuz 
incursions became central. The army of 15,000 cavalry and 2000 
palace ghulams sent in 1035 to Nasa was defeated by the Turkmens. 
At the end of 426/1035, the Hindu general Tilak returned from 
suppressing Alpnad Inal tigin' s rebellion, and at l.ilerv ar-Rudh 
handed over to the Sultan his force of Indian cavalry and infantry 
together with fifty-five elephants taken in tribute from the Indian 
princes. MasCud was at this time able to leave an army at Sarakhs, 
to send 1000 cavalry (Akhbar ad-daulat as-Saljuqiyya, 5: 3000) to 
supplement the governor of Khurasan's force at Nishapur, and to 
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leave garrisons in Herat and Qa'in. There must have been some-
thing over 20,000 Ghaznavid troops in Khurasan at this time, and the 
events of the next year, 1036, strengthen this impression. The 
Sultan's advisers then estimated that a strong army of 10,000 
cavalry and 5000 infantry should be sent forward against the Oghuz, 
whilst the whole of the Arab and Kurdish element should stand at 
Herat as a second line of defence. There was also at this time an 
army of 3000 at Ray. At the end of 1038, Baihaqi, following the 
estimate of "trustworthy people", says that there were some 40,000 
infantry and cavalry reviewed at Shabahar; clearly, nobody was very 
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certain how many there were, and the figure seems quite a high one. 
272. 
What is certain is that MasCud was never able to take to Khurasan 
the army of 50,000 men and 300 elephants which at this time he 
promised to the notables of Nishapur; and eighteen months later 
he was only able to scrape together at the most 100 elephants for 
the final effort at Dandanqan in 1040. For this battle, the Turk-
mens fielded 16,000 riders, having sent 2000 of the youths and those 
with poor mounts back to guard baggage and families. Baihaqi does 
not mention how many troops MasCud had to oppose them, but his 
troops were starved and demoralised and the news of the Turkmens' 
numbers depressed him intensely. Hence it is unlikely that his 
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forces equalled his opponents' ones, and probably they were less. 
During this period there were garrisons and an army in India, 
but with the exception of the Hansi campaign in the winter of 
1037-8, major offensive operations were not undertaken; the cream 
of the Sultan's troops were in Khurasan. Even allowing for the 
troops in India, it seems unlikely that the strength of the regular 
army in MasCud's reign approached that of his father's; a total of 
30,000 - 40,000 might be a fair estimate. 
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Part III 
Nishapur and its Khurasanian setting 
Chapter One 
Introductory: the position of Khurasan in early Islamic history 
The role of north-eastern Persia in the development of 
Iranian civilisation has been a long-standing one; in as much as 
Zoroastrianism may have arisen in this corner of the Iranian world, 
this role is almost coeval with the appearance of the Iranian race 
in western and central Asia. During the Achaemenid and Sassanid 
periods the centre of Persia's gravity lay in the west, and for 
much of this time the capital of the empire lay in Semitic Mesopot-
amia and not in Persia at all. Even so, Khurasan and the east 
retained its own vitality, fertilised by contacts with the Buddhist 
worlds of India and Chinese Turkestan and by successive waves of 
incoming Indo-European, Turkish and perhaps Mongolian peoples from 
1 the steppes. 
Hence in the 9th century, when the Abbasid Caliphs were integr-
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ating Persia with the Arab world, Khurasan was ready to assume a 
creative part in the Islamic co~nunity. It was in the east that 
the first Persian dynasties grew up in the 9th and lOth centuries 
independent of Baghdad. Merv and Nishapur began to rival the cities 
of central Persia like Ray and Isfahan as centres of industry and 
trade. The New Persian language and the Persian national epic 
arose in the east, as did a Perso-Islamic style of architecture and 
painting. Although Khurasan and Transoxania were in this period 
predominant·ly Sunn! in outlook - the real home of revolutionary, 
political Sh!Cism lies in the Caspian provinces - one district of 
Khurasan, that of Baihaq or Sabzawar, later played a decisive part 
in the dissemination of ShiCism in eastern Persia, and IsmaC!lism 
had strong Khurasanian connections (see below, eh. 8 ). These 
factors, combined with Khurasan's position adjoining the Dar al-kufr, 
gave the province a remarkable intellectual vitality. It was the 
starting point for the orthodox reaction of the 11th century onwards, 
and its theologians like al-Juwain! and al-Ghazzali and its statesmen 
like Ni~am al-Mulk gave the movement intellectual leadership. 
Missionaries and faq!hs streamed from Khurasan and Transoxania to 
the lands beyond the Syr Darya. The interest in evangelism and the 
at~osphere of polemic in this north-eastern corner of the Islamic 
world explain in part the persistence there beyond the Mongol invas-
ions of the MuCtazila, a sect which had originally arisen to combat 
2 
dualist and other threats to orthodox Islamic teaching. 
290. 
Geographically, Khurasan is part of the mountain and plateau 
zone which stretches from Anatolia through the Elburz to Afghanistan 
and the Pamirs. In the west, Khurasan began to the east of Gurgan 
and QUmis; in the east, the ijudud al-Calam considers that Quhistan, 
Guzgan, Badghis and ~ukharistan are part of it, but that Ghur, 
S!stan and beyond are only the marches of Khurasan. 3 In the south, 
the uninhabitable Dasht-i Kavir and Dasht-i Lut salt deserts provide 
one of the strongest of natural frontiers; in the north, Khurasan 
spills over the Iranian plateau towards the Oxus. The mass of 
brown shading or hatching which a relief map displays to us, the 
lifeless salt deserts, the land-locked river basins, the indeterm-
inate rivers which peter out in lakes and swamps and permit no navig-
ation or access to the sea: all these betray an erratic water-supply, 
a harsh climate, an arid terrain and introspective and closed 
human communities. Life in Khurasan did present a challenge to the 
inhabitants. Localism was always a feature of life there, but it 
expressed zeal and industriousness rather than retardation. 
The strategic position of Khurasan shows us one reason why 
the niggardliness of nature did not inhibit progress there. The 
historic trade route from the Near East to Central Asia and beyond 
passed along the southern edge of the Elburz through Ray and Damghan 
and then through the heart of Khurasan to the Oxus crossings at 
Amul-i Sha~~ or Tirmidh, or else through Balkh and the upper Qunduz 
valley and the Ghorband to Kabul and India. Khurasan was the 
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springboard for the Arab conquests of Central Asia, and its import-
ance in the first two centuries of Islam was essentially military, 
as a colonial frontier area for the Arab tribesmen, Similarly, 
Nadir Shah made his Afghan and Indian conquests from here and 
stored up his armaments and plunder in the natural stronghold of the 
QalCat-i Nadiri in the mountains of Khurasan. 
But equally often, military movements have been in the reverse 
direction. Khurasan was the bastion first of Toynbee's Irano-
-Semitic "Syriac" society, and then of Islam,against Central Asiatic 
Turkish and Mongol peoples. Here, the mountains rise steeply from 
the steppes to over 10,000 feet, and the nomad has to leave the 
Eurasian plain and ascend the Iranian plateau. Here the armies of 
the civilised Near East have often chosen to stand against incoming 
barbarians, and here took place the fighting between the Ghaznavids 
and the Turkmens. The failure of the Ghaznavids to stem the inv-
aders should warn us that the abrupt change of terrain and. habitat 
only checked the nomads temporarily; the Central Asian peoples were 
only in part composed of horse-rearing plainsmen, and in any case, 
the balance of a pastoral economy requires herds to be driven up 
each summer to yailaqs in the hills. In the event, the Turkmens 
found excellent pasture for their beasts in the oases of Khurasan 
and in the valleys of Azerbaijan and Armenia further west. Because 
of such movements of peoples, Khurasan inevitably became a cockpit. 
YaCqubi contrasted its open position to Baghdad's sheltered one, 
and said that it "stretches out like a salient into the east, surr-
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ounded on all sides by fierce enemies and warlike aggressors"; and 
Curzon was probably right when he said that "more people have 
died a violent death in Khurasan than in any other territory of 
4 
equal size in Asia". 
However, the penalty of being a frontier area may be cultural 
impoverishment or lack of material progress, because the constant 
insecurity inhibits urban life and agricultural and commercial 
prosperity. There was always a danger for Khurasan here. It 
flourished during the Greco-Bactrian period, when urban life was 
stimulated by Alexander the Great's activities in the east; his 
foundation of !v1erv and Herat is historically attested in Pliny. 
This prosperity continued under the Arsacids, as the etymology of 
~ the older name for Nishapur, Abar-shahr (older form, Aparnak-
-shahr), "country of the Aparnak", one of the three tribes of the 
Dahae who founded the Parthian empire, shows.
5 
But Khurasan became 
comparatively poor and backwards under the Sassanids, who never 
held the more easterly part of Khurasan; many of the province's 
connections at this time were with the Buddhist east rather than 
with Zoroastrian Persia. The list of Persian towns mentioned in 
sources on the Sassanids and listed by Herzfeld is instructive: 
out of a hundred listed, eighty-two are in western Persia. Khurasan 
in its widest sense has only eleven, and of these, only Damghan, 
Nishapur, Merv ar-Rudh and PUshang are really certain. 6 In the 
period of the early Caliphate, Khurasan was racked by Arab tribal 
and Persian sectarian strife, whilst western Persia and Iraq were 
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enjoying great prosperity under the Caliphs. It was the appearance 
of vigorous local dynasties in the 9th century which gave Khurasan 
a greater measure of protection and stability; in the 11th century 
it was probably the most flourishing region of Islam after Fa~imid 
Egypt, even though violence and insecurity were never far away. 
rphe rise of native Persian dynasties like the Tahirids and 
Samanids coincided. with a revival of interest in the nation's past, 
stimulated in the first place by the Persian secretarial class in the 
early Abbasid Caliphate. These native dynasties attempted to create 
a community of interest with the dihqans and urban merchant classes. 
The ~affarid occupation of Khurasan was only an interlude. The 
Saffarids were essentially military adventurers, who gloried in 
7 
their plebeian origins; some of the earliest recorded building in 
Nishapur, of mosques and of the Dar al-Imara, is attributed to CAmr 
b. Laith, but his brother YaCqub had plundered houses and. burnt 
8 
down palaces when he had captured the city. Under the Samanids, 
Khurasan became a centre of the Persian cultural renaissance. The 
ambitions of the emergent Dailami adventurers, such as Laila b. 
Nucman, who temporarily occupied Nishapur in 921, were deflected by 
S~manid firmness towards western and southern Persia. Ghaznavid 
rule in Khurasan was short-lived, and though it gave political stab-
ility initially, failed to protect the province ultimately from the 
Turkmens. 
The Seljuq Sultans rapidly assimilated their rule to the Persian 
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administrative tradition. The fact that a direct line of the 
Seljuq family, running from Chaghrr Beg through Alp Arslan to 
Sanjar, ruled Khurasan proper for over a century (the eastern fringes 
like Herat and Balkh were often granted out to other members of the 
family) gave the province some continuity of administration. More-
over, from the time when Tughrtl took with him westwards from Nisha-
pur the Imam Muwaffaq (see below, Part V, 510-11 ), Khurasan 
provided the Seljuqs with a corps of efficient administrators, dist-
inguished in the eyes of contemporary historians from the oppressive 
and heretical dab1rs of Iraq and western Persia by their orthodoxy 
9 and just conduct. Unfortunately, the capture of Sanjar by the 
Ghuzz showed that the Seljuqs had failed to master the anarchically-
-inclined Turkmen bands who roamed the Khurasanian countryside with 
their flocks and who were to be henceforth a permanent element there. 
The Mongol ravages in Khurasan were grievous, but were repaired, and 
the province probably benefited commercially from the international-
ist attitude of the Mongols and the continuous traffic between 
Persia and Central Asia in the Ilkh~nid period. The real end of 
Khurasan's vitality comes only after the disappearance of the 
Timurids, for the ~afavids, a Kurdish dynasty from Azerbaijan, had 
little interest in the east and were unable properly to protect it 
from the Ozbegs. 
Chapter Two 
The agricultural and commercial bases of Nishapur's prosperity 
The modicum of political stability which Khurasan•s strategic 
position allowed favoured the province's economic pro~perity in 
the period from the 9th to the 13th centuries. Lying as they 
did on the caravan route connecting Iraq and Baghdad, the supreme 
centres of consumption in the Near East, with Central Asia and 
beyond, the Khurasanian towns were transit points for this traffic. 
To the north of Khurasan lay Khwarizm, which tapped the resources 
of the steppes and forests of Siberia and the middle Volga, some 
pf which were luxuries like furs or musk, but others materials of 
everyday use or consumption like leather and hides, wax and tallow, 
and honey. These products came to Khurasan and were distributed 
from there to other regions of Islam. 10 Above all, there was the 
slave trade from acress the Oxus (see below, Part IV, 405-7 ). 
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The products of China and the Far East had to be either small 
in bulk or luxurious in nature to make the journey across Asia 
worthwhile, but even fine porcelain from China could survive the 
trip: among the presents which CAli b. crsa b. Mahan, the tyrannical 
governor of Khurasan (796-807), sent to Harfin ar-Rashid were twenty 
pieces of chini faghfuri, dishes, cups, etc., and 2000 other pieces 
11 
of china. The historic caravan route through Central Asia has 
often been known as the "Silk route", and imports of Far Eastern 
silks supplemented the locally produced ones of knurasan and the 
Caspian provinces. The growing ease of life in Baghdad and other 
urban centres during the Abbasid Caliphate stimulated the demand 
for luxury merchandise and raised up a class of entrepreneurs who 
organised the required long-distance caravans and created a mechanism 
of distribution. In the early 11th century a Nishapur merchant 
could have a business partner as far away as Bulghar; doubtless it 
was commercial contacts such as this which in 1024 stimulated the 
King of Bulghar, Abu Is}J.aq Ibrahim b. Mu}tammad b. Iltabir, to send 
a substantial sum for the repair of the Friday mosques of Sabzawar 
d Kh - . . d . th B . h . 12 an usrUJ1r 1n e a1 aq oas1s. Hence the economic and 
cultural renaissance of Khurasan from the 9th century onwards was in 
part a reflection of the prosperity of the Caliphate in general at 
this time. 
As well as this east-west axis of trade, a secondary commercial 
route ran southwards trom Khurasan to Kirman, Fare and the Persian 
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Gulf. The Kirmanis had a bazaar of their own in Nishapur, and 
the town of Kirman or Jiruft was a prosperous entrep~t, especially 
under its local Seljuq dynasty of the late 11th and the 12th centuries, 
13 
when the settlements of foreigners there included Greeks and Indians. 
By this route, the commercial and financial influence of Khurasan 
spread across the Persian Gulf to cuman and Arabia. Na~ir-i Khusrau 
came home from the Pilgrimage in 1051 via F'alaj in Yemama, and 
found that commercial transactions there were done in NTshapuri 
dinars. Maqdisi noted the trade connections of Khurasan and Arabia, 
and of Qa'in in QUhistan said that ismuha bi-CUman kabir. 14 In this 
age when a money economy was becoming dominant in trading, the 
prestige of Nishapur currency was high. Thus when in 1036 the 
Caliph al-Qa'im tried to strike against the superior economic power 
of the Fa~imids, he ordered that commercial transactions should no 
longer be made in MaghribY (i.e. Fa~imid) dinars, but in Qadiri 
(i.e. those of the previous Caliph al-Qadir), Qashani or NYshapuri 
ones, and notaries and legal attesters were not to entertain any 
legal or commercial documents relating to the former currency. The 
geographers describe Nishapur at the end of the lOth century as an 
international trade centre, the resort of merchants from Iraq and 
Egypt, the depot (ma~~~) for Khwarizm, Ray and Gurgan, and the 
entrepot ( fur<ia) for F'ars, Sind and Kirman, and with inhabitants 
h th . h t . K.h 
15 
w o were e r1c es 1n urasan. 
Khurasan was also a manufacturing centre. This industry was 
organised on a local, small-scale basis, the work of craftsmen and 
artisans in their own houses and shops. Nishapur's artisans prod-
uced, among other things, ironware, needles, knives and other art-
icles of metalware. The mountains of northern Khurasan yielded 
copper, lead, antimony, iron and silver (and, it seems, gold, but 
not in economic quantities); but on the whole, mineral exploitation 
was more highly developed in regions further east, such as Kabul 
and Badakhshan, where there were better supplies of timber for 
smelting purposes. The mountains of Khurasan were generally bare, 
and there was only deciduous woodland in any quantity in the valleys 
which ran down to the Caspian, like the Dinar-Sari defile which 
d h h f - t. - d 16 carrie t e Nis apur-Is ara 1n-Gurgan roa • Coal, of an indiff-
erent quality, has been noted on the hills around Nishapur in recent 
17 
times, but has never been in general use there as a fuel. The 
mountains of Khurasan were most valuable for the luxury building 
material of marble and for the famous Nishapur turquoises. The 
turquoise mines, still worked today, lie to the north-east of the 
city on the Mashhad road; Curzon estimated that the workings covered 
forty square miles. The fame of these turquoises reached China; a 
14th century glossary of the jewels of the Muslims mentions 
18 
ni-she-bu-di turquoises. 
Above all, Nishapur produced textiles. The cloth industry was 
always an important one in the Islamic world. As the number of terms 
like "muslin", "tabby", "damask", "fustian", etc. which have passed 
into European languages shows, there were few ~iddle Eastern towns 
which did not produce cloth in some shape or other. Cloth and 
clothing played a far greater part in the lives of mediaeval Muslims 
than in our own today. Then, clothes were a mark of social class 
19 
or religion or the uniform for an office or profession. House 
furniture comprised essentially carpets and hangings. Investing 
money in a store of clothing or bales of cloth was one way of keeping 
wealth in a fairly liquid form. Often cloth was taken for taxation 
(see above, Part I, 186 ) . It is not therefore surprising that 
the New Testament makes moths and rust the great enemies of the 
hoarder. The workshops of Nishapur produced cloth of all grades. 
At the lower end were the utilitarian cottons and felts, produced 
for the masses of the people. At the upper end were the brocades 
and silks, for the demands of court ceremonial, official uniforms 
and robes of honour and the needs of harem women, always kept prod-
20 
uction here at a brisk level. The materials for these cloths 
were readily available. Raw silk came especially from the mulberry 
groves of the Caspian coastlands (Merv, rather than Nishapur, was 
foremost among the Khurasanian towns in the production of silks); 
wool and hair came from local herds or from the Turkish steppes 
(see below, 304 ); and cotton, whose use had spread from India, 
was either grown locally in irrigated oases or else imported from 
21 
the garmsirs of southern Persia and Makran. Because of the imp-
ortance of the textile industry, the cloth merchants of Khurasan 
were foremost a111ong the bourgeoisie, and it seems to be they who 
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amassed the biggest fortunes in trade. 
A mixture of both urban and rural life was characteristic of 
Khurasan. 'rhe fundamental unit in Khurasanian demography was the 
rusta or rustaq (Arabic pl. rasatiq), and the geographers enumerate 
four "territories" (~assuj, khan) and thirteen districts (rasatiq) 
in the old province of Abarshahr. The rustaq comprised a central 
market town, not necessarily very big, with a hinterland of villages 
around it. Often it was coincident with an oasis. Bach rustaq 
was an entity of its own, and frequently had its own distinctive 
dialect. Even the weights and measures used in Khurasan varied 
23 
from one rustaq to another. The agricultural rustaqs and their 
market towns, and the bigger cities like Nishapur and Merv, were 
interdependent from both the human and the economic points of view 
(see below, 302-3 ) . But the dominantly urban nature of 
Islam as an institution caused the townspeople frequently to regard 
the rustaqs as places where the good Muslim life could not easily 
be lived and their inhabitants as hayseeds. The description 
rusta-yi ~abC was a contemptuous one. Towards the end of his life 
the famous ~ufi Shaikh Abu SaCid b. Abi'l-Khair decided to leave 
Nishapur for his home town of Maihana, a small town in the rustaq 
of Khawaran between Sarakhs and Merv, but two of the most eminent 
religious leaders of Nishapur, Abu IWiuJiammad Juwaini and IsmaCil 
~~blini, tried to dissuade him from burying himself in this obscure 
place: sukhan-ishan ba shaikh-i ma In bud ki ay shaikh az har gUna 
ki hast Maihana rusta-yist mara darigh miayad ki tu dar Maihana 
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rnibashi. After Abii SaCid was established at 1vl.aihana, the news of 
his saintliness reached the community of fJiifis at Sarakhs, but they 
were sceptical that anyone of note could be living out in a rustaq. 
Similarly, the Seljuq Vizier Kunduri lamented that Ibn Funduq's 
grandfather, the Ra'Is Abii'l-Qasim Baihaqi, a fine scholar and poet, 
24 
should chose to bury his talents in a rustaq. Nevertheless, city, 
village and countrysiae in Khurasan formed an integrated social 
and economic whole; each required the others for its own prosperity. 
Nishapur and its villages lie in a plain bounded on the north-
-west by the fairly low KUh-i Chaghatai and on the north-east by a 
rather higher mountain chain, the modern Binalud-Knh, which separates 
Nishapur from ~us and Mashhad. This is comparatively steep on the 
Nishapur side, rising to over 11,000 feet, but to the east it rolls 
downwards as a wide plateau at four to five thousand feet, dotted 
with villages and orchards. This was a very attractive region 
for townspeople to visit. The village of Bushtaqan or Biishangan 
was a favoured pleasure-resort (tamashagah) of the N~shapurians; 
it was here that Shaikh Abu SaCid once gave a sumptuous feast for 
2000 of the people of Nishapur. Mustaufi mentions a delightful 
spring on the Tiis side popular for holiday excursions. From the 
mountain ridges many streams run down through the Nishapur oasis 
and lose themselves in the salt desert to the west. One of them, 
the Saghawar river, was espe~ially important for irrigating the 
city itself. 25 
The soil of the oasis was very fertile. Its "black earth", 
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turba Calika, indicates a loamy nature, and nearly a century and a 
half ago, J.B. Fraser found a good proportion of loam to sand in 
it. He also mentions a thick carpeting of grass over much of the 
oasis; this has resulted from the conversion of the mixed ·arable-
-pastoral farming of pre-Seljuq times into the predominance of 
pastoralism under the Turkmen and Kurdish nomads. On his mission 
to Timur, Clavijo saw the herds of sheep, cattle and camels of the 
Kurds who wandered here as tributaries of Timur. Yet the district 
still supported a dense agricultural population; the decisive event 
in its transformation was the ascendancy of the Ozbegs on the 
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borders of Khurasan. 
Thus Nishapur in the 11th century was the market centre for 
a rich agricultural region. It was also, as we have seem, a centre 
for industry and commerce, but the artisan and trading population 
of the city could not have been maintained without the imports of 
food and the human replacements of healthy peasants from the 
rustaqs, for the cities were insalubrious and mortality there high. 
The bulk of agricultural produce in the Nishapur oasis was consumed 
locally, although certain luxury foodstuffs like truffles and that 
curious sp~cialite du pays of eastern Persia and of the district 
of Zauzan in particular, edible earth, were exported as far as 
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Egypt and the Turkish lands. In the lOth century, Nishapur 
had to import a considerable proportion of its foodstuffs from the 
rustaq of Ustuwa, which lay a fair distance away, towards Nasa and 
on the head-waters of the Atrek; Khabushan, the modern Kuchan, was 
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its urban centre. As the name Ustuwa implies, it was an elevated 
plateau, and had corn fields watered by rain (maba:lchis) as well as 
artificially irrigated ones. Sarakhs was less well-favoured for 
water, but it too was a cereal-growing area and supplier (maghutha) 
of Nishapur; l:Jiaqdisi compares the amount of grain exported each 
week from Sarakhs to that sent from Old Cairo to Qulztim and the 
H
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1Jaz. It is clear that the resources of the Nishapur oasis 
alone did not suffice for the city's alimentary needs, and that the 
agricultural production of more distant regions was to some extent 
geared to the city's needs, just as the provisioning of another 
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great city of Khurasan, Herat, depended on the province of Badghis. 
Concerning agricultural techniques, it is unfortunate that a 
"precious" book on agriculture (dihqani)by a scholar of Baihaq, Abu 
Dujana, has not survived, for its information on agriculture in 
Khurasan seems to have been valuable. Ibn Funduq quotes from it 
a passage on the cultivation of almond trees, and another on the 
fact that the niluphar would not grow in the Nishapur region; its 
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fruit had to be imported from Balkh. 
The villages and hamlets of the oases of Khurasan were thickly 
sprinkled in the fertile valleys and on the stretches of plain. 
l~~aqd is I counted 6000 villages and 120 Friday mosques with minbars 
in the twelve rasatiq of northern Khurasan, and this survey excluded 
the regions of ~us, Nasa and Abiward. I~~akhri contrasts this 
density with the more scattered distribution of nucleated villages 
in upland Quhistan, each separated from the other by stretches of 
304. 
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steppe ranged over by Kurdish nomads. Lluch of the land in the 
Nishapur oasis was laid out as orchard and garden, as well as in 
tillage, and there were extensive estates (diyac) to be found. ·--
Stock-rearing was also important in Khurasan, providing food, 
means of transport and raw materials for local industry. Camels, 
used as beasts of burden, were reared mainly on the northern fringes 
adjoining the steppes. Sarakhs in particular was the "depot for 
pack animals, supplying both Transoxania and the Khurasanian towns"; 
in the early 19th century it was still a great mart for horses and 
camels, and animals from the steppes were sold there. Sheep came 
mainly from outside Khurasan, although there were within the prov-
ince stretches of excellent pa.sture, some of which, like the Ulang-i 
Radkan between Mashhad and Khabushan, have played significant parts 
in history as the camping and grazing grounds of armies. Sheep were 
imported from GhUr and from the Khalaj Turk nomads of eastern Afghan-
istan, and above all, from the Oghuz of the Qara Qum and beyond. 32 
Indeed, we see here an illustration of the interdependence of agri-
cultural and pastoral economies in this part of Asia. 
Aze~baijan is the only province of Persia where dry-farming 
can be practised at all extensively. In Khurasan, artificial irrig-
ation was the norm, and where fields were watered by rain alone, 
the geographers mention the fact. As in much of Persia, the qanat 
or kariz was a feature of the Nishapur oasis, and their shafts and 
mounds dotted the landscape, forming hazards for night travellers. 
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The qanat was often a small masterpiece of hydraulic construction, 
and the profession of qanat-digger (muqanni, qanna') highly-skilled 
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and often hereditary. 
In Nishapur itself, use was made of the streams which ran 
swiftly down from the mountains to the north-east and which provided 
cold water in the hottest weather. The Saghawar one ran towards 
the city across the oasis for two farsakhs. It passed through the 
village of Bushtaqan, and turned seventy water mills and filled 
many tanks and cisterns en route. In Mustaufi's time (se. the 14th 
century), many qanats had become ruinous, but there were still forty 
water mills where the rapid current ground down the grain with amaz-
ing speed. When it neared the city, the water was canalised into 
qanats. Some of the shafts down to the water level in these qanats 
were a hundred steps deep. They gave individual water supplies to 
the houses and gardens within the city and cooled the sardabs 
beneath the houses. Amongst the ganats of Nishapur are mentioned 
those supplying the quarters of al-ijrra, (?) Balfawa and Bab MaCmar 
and the Street of the Perfumers, the qanats of Abu CAmr al-Khaffaf, 
Shadyakh, Suwar, Sahl-tashin, ijamra-yi ulya and of Jahm from the 
village of Dastjird and the upper qanat from the village of JITri. 
The water came up again at the other side of the city and was led 
34 off to irrigate fields and agricultural estates. 
We do not have such detailed information on the irrigation 
system of Nishapur as we do, for instance, on the systems of Qum 




at Qum resembled what is known of the Nishapur one; water was 
channelled to cultivated fields and estates outside the town, and 
was run off inside the town (largely in surface channels, though in 
places through underground pipes) for domestic uses and for gardens 
and orchards. Consequently, there was ample water for the land, 
for the ~ammams and for the private houses. The shares in the water 
at Qum were registered and minutely regulated; a Diwan-i Ab super-
vised affairs, at least, before the incoming Ziyarids and Buyids 
introduced changes in administration and property-rights. The 
water at Merv was regulated by a department called the Diwan al-
-Kastabzud, a name derived from the Persian kast-afzud "decrease-
-increase"; the reference is to the repartition of the kharaj of 
the proprietors of the channels, where assessment was according to 
the waters over which rights were held. At Nishapur, we know of a 
group of officials concerned with the irrigation system, called 
quwwam wa qafa~~' whose functions corresponded to those of the 
Muqassim al-Ma' and his staff at Merv, i.e. they repartitioned the 
water and kept the qanats and channels in good repair. Doubtless 
too, as at Qum, fish from the qanats formed a useful addition to 
the Nishapurians' diet; Fraser noticed how full of fish'the qanats 
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of Nishapur were. 
Both surface irrigation works and underground qanats are expens-
ive to lay out and to maintain. Sudden spates of water after storms 
and after the melting of snows stretched and burst banks and made 
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the tunnels of qanats collapse, necessitating major salvage work. 
Agriculture by irrigation requires high-level direction and consid-
arable capital resources, and it is these points which have led 
Wittfogel to discern a common social and political pattern in the 
irrigated areas of Asia, America and Africa, the "agro-managerial 
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hydraulic soc~ety". Even today, in a Persian province like 
Kirman the upkeep of the qanats is very expensive, because of the 
soft, sandy ground, and large landownership is the norm; the peasants 
are poor, peasant proprietorship is almost non-existent and the land-
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lord's share in crop-sharing agreements is high. 
Because of these considerations, the lead in irrigation constr-
uction had often to come from local rulers, landowners or notables. 
At Qazwin, the construction of qanats replaced earlier dependence on 
deep wells, and ~ustaufi mentions various governors of his home 
town as active in this work; amongst them was the governor whom 
Ma~ud of Ghazna installed soon after he had conquered the city, 
~amza b. Ilyasac, whose kariz was still in use in Mustaufi's own 
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day. At Qum, the qanats of Sassanid times had fallen into ruin, 
and the digging of over twenty new ones was the work of the Arab 
colonists who came there from KUfa, amongst whom the AshCari family 
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were especially prominent. We do not know whether the initiative 
in developing the irrigation system of Nishapur came from Arab or 
Iranian elements. Nishapur was never so predominantly an Arab 
military colony as Qazwin and Qum were, but it is recorded that 
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CAbdallah b. ~ahir, when he was governor of Khurasan, expended a 
million dirhams of his own fortune on qanats at Nishapur, and his 
interest in irrigation questions is shovm by his commissioning 
jurists from Khurasan and Iraq to compile an authoritative textbook 
on the legal aspects of qanats and the allocation of water. Accord-
ing to Gardizi, this Kitab al-quni was still the basis of current 
practice two centuries later. 41 The acyan of Nishapur dominated 
tlie life of the city in Samanid and Ghaznavid times, and their work 
as public benefactors touched many aspects of Khurasanian life. 
F'or instance, Abu'l-Qasim CAli al-Mu~~awwic (d. 376/986), a member 
of one of the most outstanding of Nishapur families, the Mikalis, 
was a great benefactor of Farawa, building there riba~s and endowing 
them with auqaf, and constructing qanats in many villages of the 
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region. Such men felt that charitable works like these were part 
of the social responsibilities of their class, but they also furth-
ered their personal interests as landowners. 
Chapter Three 
The topography and demography of Nishapur 
Nishapur was of some importance in Sassanid times, but in 
the early Islamic period it was eclipsed by Merv, the capital of 
Khurasan and the bastion of Muslim arms in the north-east. Nishapur 
was a "spontaneous" and not a "created" town, as the Arab garrison 
43 towns were. It had a garrison, as the name of one of the quarters 
of the city, al-ijira, shows, but it was not a key defence point as 
Qazwin or Merv were. The city's political rise in Islam seems to 
be connected with the success of the Abbasid daCwa in Khurasan. 
Abu Muslim built a Friday mosque and a Dar al-Imara with a cupola 
and four basilican Iwans in the style employed by al-ijajjaj at 
1:fa.si ~. 
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But Nishapur did not begin to overtake 1ierv in political 
and administrative importance till CAbdallah b. ~ahir made it his 
capital. Its comparatively dry and healthy climate, compared with 
the damp and febrile one of M.erv, probably favoured its rise. 
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During the ~affarid occupation, some public building was done: 
CAmr b. Laith enlarged Abu Muslim's wooden mosque into a splendid 
structure with columns of fired brick, gilded tiles as ornaments, 
eleven doors with marble columns and a roof formed of three compart-
45 
ments each with its dome. 
In the lOth century, Nishapur assumed the lay-out of a typical 
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eastern Islamic city, with a tripartite formation. It had a citadel 
(quhandiz, ~i~~), from which a road ran into the adjacent city proper 
(shahrastan, madina). There were gates from the citadel into the 
city proper and into the suburb (birun, raba4) which surrounded 
them both. The markets were situated in the suburb or outer city. 
Around the Great Square and the Lesser Square were market halls 
(khanbarat) where commercial transactions were done, and warehouses 
(fanadiq) where the various wares were stored and where the great 
merchants were to be found. Below these were humbler warehouses, 
caravanserais, workshops and booths, filled with such artisans as 
hat-makers, shoemakers, cordwainers and ropemakers. Highest in 
wealth and prestige were the clothiers, whose market halls and 
warehouses accommodated merchants from almost every region of the 
Islamic world. 47 These commercial and industrial quarters of the 
city were teeming and chaotic and this aspect of the place dis-
pleased the fastidious Maqdisi, otherwise favourably impressed by 
its prosperity. In a critical passage he adverts to its unclean 
streets, jumbled-up khans, foul baths, sordid shops and dilapidated 
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city walls. This uncontrolled development seems to have affected 
the local people. Maqdisi alleges that boorishness (jifa') was 
their salient characteristic; turbulence and faction were engrained 
in them so that they had no respect for authority, for the ~~tasib, 
kha~Ib, imam or mudhakkir. 48 
Surrounding the city were its walls. In such a rich province 
as Khurasan, walls were an important factor in security. They did 
not hold up a determined invader - Curzon remarked that Nishapur 
''has certainly been destroyed and rebuilt more than any other city 
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in the world'' - but they did give protection against lesser marauders 
like brigands and cayyars and against long-ranging nomadic bands. 
Hence if a town rebelled, it was often punished afterwards by the 
razing of its walls, so that it might better feel its dependence on 
its master. 
When Fraser crossed the Nishapur plain, he saw that all the 
villages dotted over it were in the form of square forts with towers 
at the corners; these may have been built to keep off Ozbeg raiders, 
but were more probably a feature of the region from much earlier 
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times. The walls of Nishapur itself are mentioned at several 
points in the city's history. As re-founded in Sassanid times by 
ShapUr I, Nishapur is said to have been laid out on a chess-board 
pattern with walls 15,000 paces round, and after the transference of 
the city's population from the suburb of Shadyakh back to the old 
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site in 1232, the new city again had walls 15,000 paces round. 
However, these walls were not necessarily massive stone ramparts. 
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The number of times in which the city fell into the hands of conqu-
erors shows that the walls were far from impassable. In the 19th 
century Nishapur had merely a mud wall and ditch around it, and at 
many periods before this its defences can have been little more 
elaborate. When in 1038 a single band of Turkmens appeared, the 
acyan immediately wrote off the town as indefensible (see below, 
Part V, 494, 505 ). Likewise, the walls around the town of 
Baihaq or Sabzawar consisted at this time of a wall which, though 
strong and provided with platforms from which the defenders could 
fight, only reached the height of two men. Spears could easily 
reach the top and cavalrymen could use their swords there. Hence 
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in 1071-2 Ni~am, al-Mulk had it raised. After the Ghuzz devastat-
ions in 1153 and after the move to Shadyakh, the new area of settle-
ment at Nishapur was enclosed in a wall, but because of population 
losses consequent on the Ghuzz' disruption of Khurasan's economy, 
the wall was of a reduced circumference. When Shadyakb. was rebuilt 
after an earthquake in 1208, the wall's circuit was only 6900 paces. 
When a Ghurid army under Ghiyath ad-Din appeared at Nishapur in 
597/1200-1, the walls seem to have been fairly substantial, for 
the Sultan thought that he would have to use battering-rams against 
the garrison holding it for the Seljuqs. But in the event, two of 
the towers collapsed of their ovm accord from the weight of the def-
enders on them, "in such wise that not one brick remained upon 
another, and Nishapur was taken". 
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The zone of Persia where clay was the basic building material 
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extended eastwards through Khurasan until the rocky core of Afghan-
istan was reached and stone could be procured. The initial offens-
ive of the Seljuqs against the Ghaznavids came to a halt in the 
region where this geological change occurs, and Balkh, in the mountain 
zone, remained in Ghaznavid hands till 1059, twenty years later. 
The lack of a cheap, substantial building material has always been 
one of the bottlenecks of Khurasanian life. The traditional materials 
in Khurasan have always been clay and sun-dried brick. Even fired 
brick only came into use gradually during the Islamic period, and 
timberwork was only generally to be found in areas like the well-
-wooded Caspian provinces. These limitations of material have given 
a distinctive bias to the architectural development of eastern 
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Persia, seeR for example, in the absence of large doming. It is 
not surprising that questions of building materials and fortification 
interested Khurasanians. We see this clearly in Na~ir-i Khusrau's 
account of his travels. He always shows an intense interest in 
walls and defences, especially when they are of stout stone. He 
describes the splendid fortifications of places like Mayyafariqin 
and Amid before dealing with anything else there, and shows especial 
interest in their gates, which were wholly of iron and not wooden. 
As he progresses through Azerbaijan, Armenia, Diyarbekr, Syria and 
Palestine, his interest in the defences of their towns is sustained. 
Clearly, this pre-occupation represents the interest and envy of a 
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man coming from a land where stone is a luxury material. 
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In assessing the size and population of Nishapur, we must 
proceed by inference. We need not assume that because of their 
richness, the towns of Khurasan were vast agglomerations of popul-
ation; importance was not correlative with sheer size. The towns 
derived their importance from their being centres of trade, industry 
and agricultural marketing, and did not need to be large for this. 
In the oases of Khurasan, town and countryside were interdependent 
and the boundaries between the two ways of life often fluid. The 
acyan of Nishapur held estates and gardens in the countryside out-
side the city. The Samanid Vizier Abu'l-Mu~affar Barghashi had a 
garden in the village of Mu4ammadabad outside the city, a village 
which was so popular for residences that land-values there were very 
high (see below, Part V, 505 ), and Baihaqi's master, Abu Na~r-i 
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Mishkan, had a house and garden there. This village adjoined 
Shadyakh, the suburb to the south-west of the city and to the south 
of the modern town of Nishapur, and in Samanid and Ghaznavid times 
it was the seat of the Diwan of Khurasan, away from the insalubrious 
city. Here MasCud of Ghazna built a palace with courts and kiosques, 
and here Ma4IDud's minister ijasanak (see below, 347-51 ) had a 
palace which MasCud appropriated for use as a residence for official 
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guests after ijasanak's fall. Shadyakh, already a popular resid-
ential area in the time of CAbdallah b. rahir, who had built a palace 
and stationed his troops there, took the place of the old city of 
Nishapur after the Ghuzz attack of 1153, until in 1232 to people 
moved back to the old site. 
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A limiting factor in the growth of the Khurasanian towns was 
the problem of provisioning. Although much food came from local 
gardens and orchards, we have seen that Nishapur had to import meat 
and grain from outside the Nishapur oasis (above, 302-3 ). We do 
not know how this traffic was organised. Grain could be born on 
the backs of beast of burden and cattle and sheep could be driven in 
and slaughtered on the hoof. But for other, more perishable commod-
ities, a system of transport and distribution would have been requ-
ired. Inadequate communications,the endemicness of banditry and the 
arbitrary behaviour of the political authorities, all these discour-
aged potential entrepreneurs from putting their abilities and 
capital into such channels. The small-scale traffic in such luxury 
foodstuffs as the melons of Khwarizm and Transoxania, which, accord-
ing to ath-ThaCalibi (La~a'if al-macarif, 129), were in the 9th 
century exported to Iraq, does not invalidate this point. ffioreover, 
rural cultivators did not generally look further than the main 
town of their rustaq or oasis as a market for their surplus produce 
or for any cash crops which they might grow; and here again, the 
fiscal demands of the political authorities often discouraged 
farming at too high a level above subsistence. 
This comparative inelasticity of supply and distribution, 
together with the exactions of governments, helps explain the 
grievous famines which attacked both town and countryside in Khurasan 
whenever adverse physical conditions arose. cutb! portrays graphic-
ally the horrors of famine in Khurasan when in lOll the crops failed 
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after an exceptionally heavy winter. In Nishapur alone (cutbi 
probably means the whole oasis) 100,000 people are said to have 
died. People ate plants from the fields and boiled down old bones; 
newly-buried corpses were exhumed, and human flesh sold openly on 
the streets; parents ate their own children; and men were enticed 
away and killed and their fat melted dovm, so that people were 
afraid to stray outside the central part of the city unless armed 
and in groups. Ibn Funduq says that the famine arose less from a 
dearth of provisions than from a disease which caused voracious 
hunger (Cillat-i jUC-i kalbi), so that the more people ate, the less 
they were satisfied. Yet there were at one time in this crisis 
considerable quantities of unsold corn stored away in Nishapur; and 
we have other instances of the curious localness of many famines, 
where places suffered tragic dearths whilst adjacent regions were 
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enjoying plenty. 
In inferring the size and population of Nishapur, we can get 
some indirect help from Na~ir-i Khusrau again. He was a native of 
Khurasan and a typical member of the Persian secretarial class. 
He served first the Ghaznavids and then the Seljuqs, working for 
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Chaghrr Beg as a financial official at Merv. From his official 
experience, we may regard him as a judicious and accurate observer, 
and his interest in questions of topography, population and economic 
life is manifest throughout the Safar-nama. During his travels, his 
standards of comparison were always with his Khurasanian homeland. 
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Thus Jerusalem, with 20,000 inhabitants, was a "great city". The 
Qarmathian capital of La~sa in Bahrain, which could field 20,000 
armed men, and had also its women and children and 30,000 slaves, 
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had "all that constitutes a great city". The towns within the 
Fa~imid empire of Egypt, Palestine and Syria all impressed him 
tremendously, and it is not likely that his well-known ShiCI 
sympathies influenced him here unduly, for he shows in general a 
spirit of fairness and tolerance. He estimated the population of 
Tripoli at 20,000, and even Askea6n impressed him as a great city. 
New Cairo, al-Qahira, dazzled him, and he estimated the population 
61 
of Old Cairo, Mi~r, at five times that of Nishapur. 
Khusrau's observations confirm what has just been emphasised, that 
the cities of Khurasan did not need to be greatly populous to be 
economically important. Perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 would be a fair 
estimate for the population of Nishapur in the early 11th century. 
Chapter Four 
The ~~abiyyat of Khurasan: religious sectarianism 
and social ferment 
The localism of Khurasanian life has already been stressed 
in connection with economic affairs. The same localism operated 
in the sphere of ideas and personal relations. Frequently it 
expressed itself in extreme opinions in religion and politics -
the two being closely connected in Islam - which contemporaries 
designated as taca~~ub or ca~abiyya. 
We may begin by noting Maqdisi's information on the ca~abiyyat 
of Khurasan. One of Maqdisi's claims to be the greatest Muslim 
geographer of his age lies in the element of sociological observat-
ion he gives, marking his work off from the jejune cata1guing of 
~ 
place-names, local products, roads and stages which characterised 
the earlier, road-book type of geography. Some of his dicta, e.g. 
that ports and towns on rivers are centres of vice, zina' and~~~' 
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or that regions surrounded by rivers and waters have turbulent 
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and rebellious populations, seem curious to our ears ; but the 
sections which he consecrates to the religious opinions and fanat-
icisms of the various provinces are of outstanding value. 
Maqdisi stresses that in general, Khurasan was orthodox in 
religion (mustaqim). He excepts from the Ahl al-jamaca only the 
pockets of Khawarij in Sistan and the districts around Herat and 
"the people who wear white" in the rural parts of Hai~al, i.e, the 
provinces along the upper Oxus, "whose beliefs approach zandaqa". 
These must be counted under a heading he has previously given of 
"rural sectaries", allati IT'r-rasatiq, amongst whom he names the 
ZaCfaraniyya, Khurramdiniyya, Abya4iyya and Sarakhsiyya. Of the 
latter, followers of CAbdallah as-Sarakhsi, he speaks with respect, 
that they are people who practise asceticism and seek God's presence. 
The ZaCfaraniyya must be the followers of az-ZaCfarani, 'Nhom al-
Baghdadi describes as a man of Ray and whose teachings stressed 
the uncreatedness of the Qur'an. It is interesting to see the 
other two sects, descendents of two of the most powerful movements 
of Iranian national protest, al-Muqannac•s Mubayyiqa and Babak's 
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Khurramdiniyya, identified with the peasantry and the countryside. 
The first of these two sects had arisen in 775 in the Zarafshan 
basin, and had united Iranian discontent with the Abbasids, Turkish 
restiveness under Arab political control and al-Muqannac•s own 
religious claims to be an incarnation of God's Spirit which had 
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passed through Abu ivluslim to himself. Babak's movement of "the 
people in red", Mul:jammira, was really a rebellion in Azerbaijan 
against the Caliphate, which continued for several years and event-
ually spread to many other parts of Persia before Babak was caught 
and executed in 838. Babak himself was militantly anti-Muslim and 
his movement included dualist and neo-Mazdakist elements. Other 
Iranian religious movements were more specifically Khurasanian: 
Bihafarid was born at Zauzan; Sonpadh seems to have come from 
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Nishapur; and Ustadhsis' movement arose in Badghis. 
These episodes illustrate the long history of disturbance and 
ferment in the Persian countryside, for orthodox, institutional 
Islam affected the urban populations and the landowning classes 
more than the peasantry. The towns were more open to new influences 
than the countryside, Moreover, the urban and mercantile ethos of 
Islam gave the merchant and artisan classes certain advantages, 
where Zoroastrianism, with its taboos and its elevation of the 
land and natural elements over the artificiality of commercial life, 
had constricted them. The landowners had a political and social 
motive for adopting Sunni Islam, for by doing this they preserved 
their social and tenurial privileges. The peasants, with their 
minds turned inwards by the agricultural round and the struggle 
against natural conditions, were least touched by these considerations. 
Superficially Islamised, their social discontent and hatred against 
authority often erupted in the form of heterodox Muslim movements, 
in which extreme ShiCI and messianic ideas mingled with older 
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Iranian beliefs; ~oroastrian currents are often discernible, al-
though none of the uprisings seems to have been led by an orthodox 
Zoroastrian. It is not therefore surprising that remnants of these 
movements and sects should linger on in the rural and mountainous 
parts of Khurasan. They had little specific intellectual or doctr-
inal content, a fact which made it easy in the lOth century for 
IsmaCili daCis to work among them. It also made it easy for any 
ambitious adventurer, like the Mahdi who arose in Chagha.niyan in 
934. This false prophet attracted to his side large nu:abers of the 
"ignorant masses" (camma-yi juhhal), before the local ruler, Abu 
CAli AJ:mad Chaghani, suppressed it on behalf of the Samanid govern-
ment; but his supporters lingered on long after his death, awaiting 
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their leader's return. In the 11th century, these only vaguely-
-articulate voices of protest come only occasionally within the 
purview of contemporary writers, but it is hard to believe that 
there were no religious elements in the peasant jacqueries we so 
frequently read about. 
Thus Maqdisi, when he describes divisions within the Islamic 
jamaca in Khurasan, is thinking primarily of the town populations, 
which were largely Sunni in outlook but had fierce sectarian divis-
ions within this wider unity. The ijanafi law school already predom-
inated in his time and was to continue gaining ground under the 
patronage of Turkish dynasties in Khurasan and Transoxania. But 
ShafiCism was still very influential. In the lOth century it 
made much progress in Transoxania through the teaching of Mu~ammad 
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b. CAli al-Qaffal ash-Shashi (d. 365/975-6), called by al-Ijakim 
66 al-BayyiC the greatest ShafiCI scholar of his age there. Iv~aqdisi 
names several towns on the northern edge of Khurasan and in the Syr 
Darya basin where it was dominant: Shash, Ilaq, ~us, Nasa, Abiward, 
~araz, ~anghaj, the environs of Bukhara, Sinj, Dandanqan, Isfara'in 
and Juyan. In the 13th century, Khiva remained ShafiCI when the rest 
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of Khwarizm had become ijanafi. It seems that in Maqdisi's time 
Sh~fiCism was receeding in a northwards direction, but substantial 
portions of the peoples of Hera.t, Sistan, Sarakhs, Merv and Merv ar-
-Rudh were still ShafiCI. Furthermore, the kha~Ibs at Nishapur and 
in one of the two Merv jamiCs were ShafiCis, and in the Merv jamiCs 
the !ialat was performed according to both the Ijanafi and the ShafiCI 
rites. The third main Sunni element in the Khurasanian towns was 
that of the Karamiyya sect, who are described as having a strong 
party (jalaba) in Herat and Gharchistan and several khanqahs in 
Merv, the upper Oxus provinces and Transoxania. We know from both 
the historians and the heresiologists that the Karamiyya were a 
vociferous and pushing group in Nishapur for at least two centuries 
(see below, eh. 6 ). Maqdis! mentions that there was a sizeable 
minority of MuCtazila in Nishapur; eastern Islam was to be an 
enduring stronghold of the sect. He also mentions the ShiCa as a 
minority in the city, and the community of CAlids there was accorded 
the respect normally given to descendants of the Ahl al-Bait (see 
below, eh. 8 ). But it is clear that at this time (se. c. 980) 
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moderate, Twelver ShiCism was not yet a major factor in the Sunni 
towns of Khurasan. F1inally, Maqdisi mentions odd reminiscences of 
earlier Islamic sects. The Jahmiyya predominated amongst the people 
of Tirmidh and the Qadariyya amongst the people of Kundur; and the 
ruler of Gharchistan, the Sher, followed the practice of Ibn 
MasCud in certain matters of ritua1.
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Maqdisi then passes to the ca~abiyyat of Khurasan, commenting 
that there were very few places without them. In Nishapur, emnity 
existed between the western side of the town, where it rose up to 
Manishak, and the other side of the town, by the quarter of al-ijira; 
originally, there had been no religious element here, but latterly 
it had become a ShiCI-Karami struggle, an illustration of how a 
purely secular division easily acquired a sectarian religious tinge. 
In Sistam, the ijanafi Samakiyya opposed the ShafiCI ~adaqiyya, and 
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the ruler had to intervene to stop the resultant bloodshed. At 
Sarakhs, the CArusiyya were ijanafi and the Ahliyya ShafiCI. In 
Herat there were the Karamiyya and the CAmaliyya (these last pre-
sumably received this name from their opposition to that section of 
the Karamiyya which denied the efficacy of good works; cf. Maqdisi, 
38). At Merv, the people of the town proper, the Madaniyya, opposed 
the people of the Old Market. At Nasa, the people of the Khanah 
quarter opposed those who lived at the top end of the market; at 
Ab!ward, the Kardari group opposed the people of the upper part of 
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the town. Thus whilst some of these factions were grouped around 
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a religious watchword, others were purely geographical, between 
different parts of the town, and we can only guess at the social 
issues involved here. It is very likely that many of them had no 
rational basis, but arose from an ingrained love of faction and 
partisanship. 
rPhe local ca~abiyyat of Khurasan fell within what seems to 
have been a wider feeling of dislike between eastern and western 
Persia; on at least two occasions in Baihaqi, Sultan MasCud stresses 
the dislike of the people of Ray and Jibal for the Khurasanians. 
A reason for this may lie in the different political fortunes of 
the two halves of Persia after the 9th century, the identification 
of the west with the Buyids and the east with the more orthodox 
Samanids and Ghaznavids, and in the different economic and commerc-
ial pulls of the west and Khurasan. But perhaps we should not stress 
this rivalry too much; the threat of Ghaznavid imperialism was 
enough to make the west suspicious of anything coming from the east. 
A further element of unrest in Khurasan was the bands of 
vagabonds and irregular troops, cayyarun, ~aCalik, who infested 
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town and country alike. Complaints about them in the historians 
are perennial. Their ubiquity and their continued existence over 
the centuries suggests that these bands were continually being 
replenished, by desperadoes who loved a lawless life, by peasants 
forced out of agriculture though lack of land or through fiscal 
oppression, by discharged and unemployed soldiers, etc. In the 
early lOth century we hear of one Mu~ammad b. Hormuz, called Maula 
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~andali, who was discharged from the Samanid army as being too old, 
so went off and stirred up "all the people and riff-raff of Sistan" 
72 against the local Samanid governor. The disturbance in Persia 
caused by the Oghuz invasions favoured the spread of brigand activ-
ity; in the west, Basasiri had to march into Ahwaz against Kurdish 
and Arab robbers who had taken advantage of the Turkrnen depredations 
73 to cloak their own spoliations. Sometimes cayyar bands arose 
from lawful vigilante groups of citizens which got out of hand. 
In 11th century Iraq, the citizens of Baghdad went out against the 
predatory Bedouins infesting the neighbourhood, "and that was one 
of the causes for the increase of cayyariTn and the spread of evil-
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-doers". In Sistan, bands of muta~awwiCa were formed against 
the Khawarij, and out of one of these arose the ~affarids. The 
Ta'rikh-i Sistan shows that for two or three centuries after this 
the cayyars remained a powerful element in the province. They seem 
to have been organised there with a definite chain of military 
commands. The later ~affarids were often dependent on their support, 
and when the Samanids and Ghaznavids intervened in Sistan, the cayyars 
were the core of local resistance. As a result, to the author of 
the Ta'rikh-i Sistan, cayyari is a term of praise, to be equated 
with muruwwa. 
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In most Islamic towns there was an unruly core 
of rnobsters who could be stirred up on any pretext, religious or 
lay, out of sheer love of violence; in Baghdad in the early 11th 
century, it was often the cayyarun, who took advantage of SunnY-
ShiCI hostility, and not the Buyid Amirs or the Caliph, who were 
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the real masters of the city.76 
We have detailed information about a sharp outbreak of viol-
ence in 1034 between the two Khurasanian cities of Nishapur and 
~us, in which the ~usis were joined by a contingent from Abiward 
and by other lllischief-rnakers. During an absence at the Sultan's 
court in Ghazna of the governor of Khurasan, Suri (see above, Part 
I, 182-4 ), the people of ~us and Abiward rose, under the leader-
ship of a man who had been an official (mudabbir) in the administrat-
ion of the Ghaznavid Amir CAbd ar-Razzaq at Tus. They marched 
over the mountain range separating Nishapur from ~us, down through 
the village of Bushtaqan, intent on plundering Nishapur: "making 
an uproar, tumult and din, they came running and hurrying along, just 
as if all the gates of the caravanserais in Nishapur had been flung 
open". Fortunately for the Nishapurians, the Sultan's general 
A~ad b. CAli Nushtigin was at hand, having just arrived from Kirman 
with part of his defeated army (see above, Part I, 185 ). He 
organised the townspeople, over 20,000 of them, who were armed with 
weapons, clubs and stones, and instructed them to make a frightening 
clamour against the ~usis with their shouting, drums and trumpets, 
"like the pandemonium on the Day of Resurrection". In the morning, 
the 'fllsis poured in "like ants and locusts", having 300 mounted 
men as well as five or six thousand armed men on foot. A~mad b. 
CAII had 2000 infantry and several hundred cavalry, and his tactical 
skill and training as a professional soldier enabled him to draw 
the ~sis into an ambush and then rout them. He pursued them for 
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three farsakhs as far· as the village of Khalanjuy. Gallows were 
set up in Nishapur and captured TITsis hanged and gibbeted. A~ad 
b. CAli also took members from the families of prominent men 
77 
(zuCam~') of the TITs district as hostages for future good behaviour. 
Spuler treats this as a rising of cayyars, "unzufriedener •••• 
Schichten". He suggests that Turkmen ravages may have deprived 
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them of their livelihood, and this may well be true. itlore detailed 
is the 1iarxian analysis of the Soviet scholar B. Zakhoder, who has 
no doubts that we have here a class-struggle, a rising of the prol-
t . t 79 e ar1a • He states that these events took place at the end of 
July or the beginning of August, 1034, when the harvest had been 
reaped and the cultivators were required to hand over a portion of 
their produce as taxation. In fact, the rising must have been in 
July rather tha.n early August. The first news that the attack of 
the 'flisis and Abiwardis was taking place and that AIJ.mad b. CAli 
was resisting it reached Ghazna some time in the second half of 
Ramaq.an = first half of August, although a full report did not 
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come till late in Shawwal = early September. The swiftest and 
most direct route between Nishapur and Ghazna, that up the Heri Rud 
and through Ghur, took fifteen days, but because of the difficult 
terrain it was only used when exceptional haste was needed; the 
more usual and longer routes were through northern Afghanistan or 
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through Sistan and Bust. In any case, this seems an early date 
for the crops to have been gathered in. But Zakhoder is right in 
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drawing attention to the relative statuses of Nishapur and TUs and 
to the fact that since the early 9th century Nishapur had eclipsed 
the other city in importance. By the 11th century Nishapur, the 
administrative capital of the province, stood as the seat of a 
hated fiscal system. So the ~Usis took advantage of the absence 
from Khurasan of the head of this system, the civil governor SUri. 
This administrative jealousy seems to have been alluded to by 
A~mad b. CAli in his letter to MasCud as taca~~ub •••• az qadim 
ad-dahr, but there may well have been elements of irrational hatred 
as well. Tus, like so many of the Khurasanian towns, was a factious 
and turbulent place. Maqdisi calls it "a house of bandits and a nest 
of rebels" and Ibn Funduq singles out the cayyars of ~us as the 
distinguishing element of the population there. Sectarian divis-
ions within it were exacerbated by the existence of two great 
symbols of ShiCism and orthodoxy in the nearby village of Sanabad, 
the tombs of the Eighth Imam CAli ar-Ri~a and of the Caliph HarUn 
ar-Rashid. Nishapur suffered too from cayara, and all these intern-
al disruptive. forces could in each case be focussed on the nearby, 
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rival city~ 
That violence like this was not exceptional in Khurasan at this 
time may further be shown from the vicissitudes of Baihaq as record-
ed by its historian, Ibn Funduq. In 998 the Sabzawar region was 
attacked by raiders from ~us, Isfara'in and Juwain, who had banded 
together to devastate the oasis and to block up the qanats; these 
marauders were routed by stout warriors summoned from the nearby 
villages. The contingent from one of these, Divrah, was led by the 
local Salar of the Ghazis. There was in Baihaq itself a family, 
the Salariyan, descendants of one Abu'l-CAbbas al~Au~sin b. CAli 
al-Mu~~awwic, a former Ra'Is of the tovm. 83 Ghazis were a prominent 
element in tbe local defence forces of the Khurasanian towns at this 
time; they were recruited from old soldiers, enthusiasts for the 
faith, etc., and at times, cayyars might be incorporated in their 
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numbers. Hence the Salar of the Ghazis was an important member 
of the acyan of his town • tae;t ef UieB:aJH::l:P pl ayQc;;l a ._ igllif2 cant 
~ Such a local force could not always stand against a prof-
essional army in the field, but was valuable for warding off nomads 
or bandits, as here at Baihaq. Baihaq suffered again in 1006 when 
one ~mad Tuvangar besieged the town for a month before he was 
killed. The Turkmen invasions unsettled the whole of the Khurasanian 
countryside, but at the opening of the 12th century the peasantry of 
the Baihaq oasis suffered also from the depredations of the a~~ab-i 
qilaC; it -is not clear whether these were rural Cayyars or perhaps 
IsmaCilis. What peace there was in Khurasan in the second half of 
the 11th century came from the strength and unity of the Seljuq 
Sultanate; after the death of Malikshah in 1092 and the beginning 
of succession disputes within his family, the Cayyars got the 
upper hand at Baihaq until a police force of armed citizens and 
their slaves suppressed them. 85 
Chapter Five 
The acyan and orthodox ulema of Nishapur 
We turn now to examine some aspects of the social structure 
of the city. Our material concerns primarily the classes of 
landowners, acyan and bourgeoisie, from which came most of the 
religious leaders and teachers and the local administrators of 
the city. The ulema and ~ufis of Nishapur included many scholars 
and mystics whose reputations and influence spread far beyond Khur-
asan, so that the materials for their lives are plentiful. 
However, the biographers treat their subjects primarily as men of 
religion, for this was the aspect of their lives which they regarded 
as being of eternal value. Matters of everyday life and of local, 
secular affairs were considered to be of only transient interest, 
and the authors of the biographical collections and ~abaqat are 
only marginally interested in them. But the historians of the 
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period are frequently concerned with the intrusion of religious 
questions into political and secular affairs, and in their treat-
ment of events we get a certain corrective to the more narrowly 
theological interests of the biographers. 
The ulema were by birth and social status closely linked with 
the class of town notables who filled civil offices in the city, 
often as semi-hereditary charges. For although in some ways Islam 
made the modern catch-phrase "equality of opportunity" a reality, 
there was always a counter-feeling that the arcana of many offices 
and professions were best handed down within one group or family. 
So just as rulers sought their aides from Vizieral or secretarial 
families, so municipal charges like the offices of ra'Is or ~4I 
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were often kept within a restricted group. There was a common 
bond between the ulema and the lay notables in that many of them 
had landowning or property interests. These might be private 
interests or else might come from offices held. The state allotted 
salaries to officials like _g!cJ.Is a.nd kha~Ibs, but sometimes these 
were augmented by private munificence in the form of assignations of 
lands to-go with the office. Thus the Faqih Abu M~ammad al-MuCalla 
b. Alpnad, who was for a while ·Ra'Is of Nishapur during the Ghaznavid 
period, endowed estates and property for successive holders of the 
~4a' of Nj.shapur to enjoy; some of these endowments were still 
. 87 left in Ibn Funduq's t1me. Where there was some divergence of 
outlook was in their respective attitudes to the external secular 
power, i.e. the Ghaznavid overlords of Khurasan. T~e viewpoint of 
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the lay elements was an immediate ones how best could the social 
and economic interests of the city be furthered and protected? The 
religious classes had a deeper consciousness of being members of 
the whole Islamic community as well as of a particular city in 
Khurasan. Furthermore, they regarded the sovereign as the protector 
of orthodoxy and of the established order, and these considerations 
had ··to be reconciled with the local interests of Nishapur. 
Of the lower classes, the shopkeepers, artisans, labourers, 
gardeners, domestic slaves, etc., we know little. The sources echo 
the usual attitude of the Muslim literate classes and lump them 
altogether as the turbulent and unstable ghaugha 1 or mob. The 
prevalence of the cayyars has been mentioned above. A further elem-
ent of violence in Nishapur seems to have been the Turks employed 
in domestic service and perhaps too in domestic industry; we hear of 
robberies and assaults committed by drunken Turkish slaves. Indeed, 
there seems to have been an appreciable Turkish element in the 
Khurasanian towns before the Seljuq invasions, not all of whom were 
from the servile or labouring classes. Ibn Funduq has a section on 
the Aulad at-Turk of Nishapur and Baihaq, whom he describes as once 
numerous and as including faqihs and imams. Names like "at-Turki", 
"'rarkhan", "Khaqan", etc. occur in biographies of the Nishapur 
ulema, and al-Farisi mentions a Dar at-Turk in Nishapur ( = here, 
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a Turkish quarter). Nevertheless, despite the contempt of the 
upper for the lower classes, there are no signs of any real class 
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hatred or jealousy between the ruling strata and the democracy. 
Religion was always there to bridge the gap - not the systematised 
theology of the ulema, but the less inhibited piety of the dervish 
communities, not yet formally organised into ~ariqas, but exercising 
their power through the personal saintliness of the local leader 
and his convent or khanqah. We shall see such influence well displ-
ayed in the person of Shaikh Abu SaCid. 
We have noted Iviaqdisi 's information on the madhahib of Khurasan 
(above, 318 ff.). If it is true that over the course of centuries 
the Ijanaf'I rite gradually became dominant in the north-east, in the 
11th century the intellectual appeal of ShafiCism was commanding 
it to some of the keenest minds among the ulema. At this time, 
the AshCaris were making orthodox kalam an incisive weapon against 
the MuCtazila. Al-AshCari's own legal affiliations are dubious, 
although most authorities attach him to the ShafiCis after his 
conversion from the MuCtazila; certainly, in the 11th century his 
theology came to be specially identified with ShafiCism. That 
Nishapuri scholars of such eminence as Abu Mu~ammad Juwaini and his 
son Abu'l-MaCali, the Imam al-ijaramain, should fervently teach 
ShafiCism and should pass on their learning to al-Ghazzali, increased 
the attraction of ShafiCism for the learned classes. After the 
blast of official disapproval under the later Buyids and early 
Seljuqs had quietened down, the patronage of men like Ni~am al-11ulk 
and the promotion of AshCari and ShafiCI teaching in the madrasas 
enabled these teachings to achieve full toleration and respect in 
334. 
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the east. It seems that in the east ShafiCI purism in emphasising 
traditions from the Prophet and in rejecting accretions to the 
corpus of ijadith recommended it to many pious minds, although from 
the numerical point of view, the ijanafi rite was probably more 
popular with the masses. 
Nevertheless, the attractions of ShafiCism were by no means 
wholly intellectual. In the early 11th century it was widely adopted 
by many Khurasanian ~ufis. Shaikh Abu YaCla Is~aq ~abuni, who was 
the brother of one of the most prominent Nishapur ShafiCis, IsmaCil 
~nbuni (see below, 342-3 ) and who frequently acted as his 
brother's deputy in preaching, was himself a ~ufi. A certain 
JaCfar b. ijaidar Harawi (d. 481/1088) is described as "Shaikh of 
the AshCari ~ufis 11 .90 In his youth Shaikh Abu SaCid b. Abi'l-Khair 
imbibed AshCarism from several eminent Khurasanian scholars. His 
teachers at Merv were Abu CAbdallah al-iju~ri, himself a pupil at 
two removes of ash-ShafiCi, and Abu Bakr al-Qaffal. Then he passed 
on to the Imam Abu CAli Zahir b. ~mad at Sarakhs. Abu CAli had 
been active in promoting the ShafiCI rite in Sarakhs, and was one 
of several Imams, including ijumaid Zanjuya in Shahrastana, Farawa 
and Nasa; Abu cumar Farabi in Ustuwa and Khabushan; Abu Lubaba 
hlaihani in Abiward and Khabaran; and himself, Abu CAli Faqih, in 
Sarakhs, who had been spreading ShafiCism and combatting the 
ruuctazila in these regions. Shaikh Abu SaCid therefore became a 
ShafiCI, and in this period, asserts the Shaikh's biographer 
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MulJ.ammad b. al-Munawwar, many ~ufis previously following other 
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rites went over to ShafiCism. A few decades later, al-Ghazzali 
was able to unite ShafiCism with a deep respect for and insight into 
the ~ufi path. 
Ijanafism was the other great orthodox madhhab of the east, 
where it became linked with the Maturidi kalam, whose founder, a 
Samarqandi contemporary of al-AshCari, had been a firm follower of 
Abu ijanifa. It is often assumed that the ijanafi school was the 
most liberal of the madhahib and as such, commanded itself to the 
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Turks and Mongols when they came into the Islamic world. The 
Hanafi attitude in law did tend to be less strict than the ShafiCI . 
one, permitting as it did a freer use of~ and qiyas to supplement 
a narrow reliance on traditions from the Prophet, but the differences 
should not be pushed too far. Both the Maturidis and AshCaris were 
at one in their opposition to MuCtazili rationalism. Shaikh Abu 
SaCid's biographer is at pains to combat allegations that the 
ijanaf! rite is too easy and the ShafiCI one too rigid; the points 
of variance are only on secondary matters, and not on basic principles, 
he says. He frequently mentions opposition to the Shaikh and the 
~ufis in Nishapur by the A~qab ar-Ra'y. Although this term became 
a popular one for the ijanafis, its original application to them 
2 was, as Schacht has remarked (EI Art. "Abu IJanifa"), largely advent-
itious; and there is no reason to suppose that the IJanafis were at 
this time any more or less opposed in general to ~ufism than the 
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ShafiCis were. Indeed, CAli b. cutrunan al-Hujwiri, author of the 
pioneer treatise in Persian on ~ufism, the Kashf al~a~jub, was 
a keen ijanafi. 
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In Nishapur, the ijanafi party was headed by such prominent 
families as the fjaCidis and Tabanis. rrhe rite benefited from the 
patronage of Maljmud and MasCud of Ghazna; in Baihaqi, Malpnud speaks 
of it as the madhhab-i rast. 
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The Sultans often chose members of 
the great ijanafi families for diplomatic and other official missions 
(see below, 341 ). Royal patronage may have favoured the 
progress of the Sunni revival in the east in its aspect of madrasa-
-building; even in a remote corner like Khuttal, there were already 
95 by 1012 over twenty madrasas,each fully endowed with auqaf. It 
is clear that, whilst Ni~am al-Mulk's backing may have given the 
madrasa-building movement an impetus, it had begun well before his 
time. 
For the first forty years or so of the 11th century the Qa~I 
Abu'l-CAla' ~aCid b. Mu!J.ammad b. AJ:mad b. CAbdallah Ustuwa'I led 
the ijanafis of Nishapur. His wisdom made him a universally-regarded 
figure there, and in al-Farisi's biographical dictionary (see Biblio-
graphical introduction, 24 ) he is often simply called al-Qa~I, 
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the s!4I par excellence. He was born in 343/954 in the rustaq 
of Ustuwa. First his father taught him and then he was sent to 
learn adab from Abu Bakr Mulfammad al-Khwarizmi, fiqh from the QaQ_I 
Abu Na~r b. Sahl and tradition from several authorities. Soon the 
fame of his learning spread beyond Khurasan; al-Farisi describes 
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him as Imam al-Muslimin Cala '1-i~laq, and Ibn al~auzi, who does 
not normally concern himself with scholars unconnected with Iraq 
and Baghdad, accords him an obituary notice as head of the ~anafis 
in Khurasan. '.Phe Qac}I ~aCid made the Pilgrimage in 985, and was 
summoned to the Abbasid court in Baghdad to explain why in a fatwa 
he had refused to allow a covering (~unduq) to be erected over the 
tomb of the Caliph Harun ar-Rash1d near fiTs. The Qac}.I' s good 
sense and desire to keep down sectarian passions is shown in the 
reason he gave, that to have given a favourable reply would have 
. - 97 1nflamed the local Sh1ca. 
During lvlaljm1id's reign, he was in high favour as the leader of 
orthodoxy and the mainstay of social stability in Nishapur. He 
was famed as a scholar, and his personal handsomeness gained him 
the name of the "Moon of Nishapur". Malpntid made him tutor to the 
young princes MasCud and MuJtammad. F'or many years, Mal}.mud' s 
brother the Am1r Abu'l-Mu~affar Na~r was military governor of Nish-
apur and Khurasan. He was an enthusiatic ijanafi, and founded a 
madrasa in Nishapur for the Qa41 and endowed it with auqaf. 98 An 
important episode in the Qa4I's life was his protracted struggle 
for power in the city with the Karamiyya and their leader Abu Bakr 
MuJtammad b. IsJtaq (see below, 357-8 ). This eventually ended 
in a victory for the Qa41 and orthodoxy, with a congenial layman 
appointed ra'Is of the city instead of the Karami leader. 
The Qaqi had close connections with the powerful Mikali family 
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(see below, 343-51 ), from whose patronage he had benefited when 
still a young scholar. He was thus glad to intercede for two members 
of the family, Abu'l-Fa41 and Abu Ibrahim, when in 1030 Sultan 
MasCud came to Nishapur and heard mazalim. The two brothers had --·----
been deprived of their hereditary property and the revenues of the 
family auqaf had been diverted from the beneficiaries by a distant 
cousin of theirs, ijasanak, and by other Ghaznavid officials, during 
the period when ijasanak was ra'Is of Nishapur for Sultan Ma~mud. 
Thanks to the Qa4I's influence with his former pupil, the new Sultan, 
this intercession was successful. Moreover, MasCud appointed the 
Q~a-• Ab-'1 u -a- f R 99 G.1 s son u -~asan ~ ~ o ay. Three years later, the 
Sultan again remembered his connections with the Qa4I and appointed 
one of the latter's pupils to a diplomatic mission to Gurgan. The 
Qa4I's relations with the Tabani family of Nishapur were also 
cordial; Baihaqi used his Mukhta~ar-i ~aCidi for information on the 
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Tabani faqihs and their links with the Imam Abu ijanifa. 
During MasCud's reign, the Qa4I's advanced age and prestige 
made him the Grand Old Man of Nishapur. When in 1038 the Seljuqs 
first _appeared before Nishapur, he was the first person the acyan 
went to for advice, and in the previous year, the military commander 
in Khurasan, S~bashr, had consulted him on military and strategic 
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topics. By now he was no longer acting as day-to-day ~4I of 
the city, but had been succeeded at some time before the beginning 
of MasCud's reign by a man whom Samcani names as Abu'l-Haitham 
339. 
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cutba. Nevertheless, the ~aCidi family retained a- .grip on legal 
and religious offices in the city for many decades afterwards. 
Samcani says that the ~~a' of the city was still in his own day 
(mid-12th century) held by a ~aCidi. The family had many marriage 
connections with the ulema of Baihaq, and later came to fill the 
offices of ~~I and kha~Ib there. The Qa4I ~aCid died in Nishapur 
at the age of eighty-six in the summer of 1040, when the city was 
103 under Seljuq occupation. 
The careers of three members of the Tabani family of Nishapur 
show how the Ghaznavid Sultans exerted themselves to win over prom-
inent members of the religious and legal classes in l~urasan and to 
draw them into their service. The Sul ta.ns took pains to identify 
their imperialist political and military policies with the cause of 
Sunni orthodoxy and with the cornbatting of religious extremism, (see 
above, Part I, 132-4 ). Hence there was a pressing need for 
reliable, orthodox scholars to serve in the Sultans' entourage as 
advisers and diplomatic envoys and to fill religious and legal 
posts throughout the empire. In this way it was hoped to consolidate 
religious orthodoxy and political stability within the empire. 
The reputation of the Tabani family as ~anafi scholars and their 
links with the founder of that rite especially commanded them to 
Sultan Ma~mu~although he was not averse to employing good men from 
other rites; in 1001, for instance, he sent the well-known ShafiCI 
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Imam Abu Tayyib a~-~aCluki on a mission to the Ilig Na~r at Uzkend. 
Abu'l-CAbbas Tabani had been a pupil in Baghdad of Harun's Chief Qa~I 
340. 
Abu YUsuf, himself' the disciple of Abu f]anifa, and the Tabani family 
was always thereafter proud of this affiliation to the great Imam. 
The family prospered under the Simanids, and it was when Ma~mud 
was a commander in Nishapur for the Samanids that he first became 
aware of their reputation as f]anafi divines. So in 995 he invited 
the Faqih Abu ~ali~ Tabani to Ghazna, where he became head of the 
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~anafis there and taught in a madrasa. One member of the family, 
~asan Tabani, entered Ma~mud's service as a soldier, not as a civil-
ian; he fought against Abu CAli Simjuri and against the G.arak.hanids 
when in 1006-8 they invaded Khurasan, passing into :tllasCiid' s service 
and being present at his ally Shah Malik's victory in 1041 over the 
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Khwarizmians. But in the main, the Tabanis used their talents 
in the peaceful paths of religion and scholarship. 
In 402/1011-12 Ma~ud was negotiating a marriage alliance with 
the Ziyarid Manuchihr, whose father Qabus had just been killed. 
Khwaja CAli Mikali was in charge. The Sultan recalled to mind the 
fame of the Tabanis, and instructed Khwaja CAli that as he passed 
through Nishapur on his was to Gurgan he should 11 enquire whether 
there are any of the Tabanis left, and whether any of them can come 
to Ghazna and our court. Win these people over, and convey from 
us promises of favour, reward and benevolence". Although Khwaja 
CAli made much of both Abu ~adiq Tabani, Abu ~ali~'s nephew, and 
Abu 'rahir Tabani, no positive action yet resulted. But in 1023 
ijasanak returned from the Pilgrimage which in the end was to prove 
so inauspicious for him (see below, 348 ) • He brought Abu 
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~adiq and several others of the Nishapur ulema back to the Sultan 
at Balkh, where Ma~mud was preparing to meet his ally Qad!r Khan 
YUsuf. Abu ~adiq returned to Nishapur and was established by ijasanak 
in a madrasa in the Street of the Basket Weavers, but received ... 
a promise that the Sultan would summon him to Ghazna when he had 
finished with Qadrr Khan and with the Somnath expedition. This was 
fulfilled; Abu ~adiq was awarded a monthly pension and was shortly 
afterwards appointed Qaqi'l-Qudat of Khutta1.
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Abu ~ahir was appointed ~4I of ~us and Nasa by Ma~mud. MasCud 
continued this favour. He inherited from his father the policy of 
alliance with Qad!r Khan and the eastern branch of the Qarakhanids 
against their rival CAlitigin of Bukhara. In 1031 MasCud proposed 
a double marriage alliance with the court of Kashghar, and Qa4I Abu 
~ahir was one of the two envoys chosen to arrange this. His judic-
ial duties in ~us and Nasa were to be exercised by deputies, and as 
a reward, he was to add to his existing offices the ~4a' of Nisha-
pur. The negotiations in Kashghar dragged on for nearly four 
years. In 1034 the envoys returned, but Abu ~ahir died on the 
journey home through Badakhshan. MasCud's relations with the heir 
and second son of Qadrr Khan, Bughra Khan of ~alas and Isfijab, did 
not run smoothly, and in 1037 another embassy was sent to restore 
amity. Qaqi Abu ~adiq Tabani was commissioned to undertake this, 
again with promise of the ~qa' of Nishapur as reward. 
of eighteen months among the Qarakhanids was a great success, who 
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delighted in his disputational skill as a ijanafi scholar. 
34~. 
The ~~bunis were a prominent Sh~fiCI family in Nishapur. The 
nisba "soap-maker" suggests that the family arose from humble orig-
ins, but Samcani mentions nothing of their prehistory. By the 
Ghaznavid period they had become renowned for their learning and 
piety. CUtbi mentions a ~abuniyya madrasa in Nishapur where a copy 
of the fa.mous hundred-volume compendium of Qur'anic sciences made 
for the Amir Khalaf b. A~nad of Sistan was kept; this madrasa was 
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destroyed in Sapjat's time by the Ghuzz. The Kha~Ib Abu cuthman 
IsmaCil ~abuni (373-449/983-1057) belonged to the generation after 
He was well-versed in the religious and legal 
sciences, and it is recorded that while studying in the west he 
visited Abu'l-CAla' at MaCarrat an-NuCman. The Sunnis of Khurasan 
called him the "Shaikh of Islam" and his polemical fervour brought 
him the titles "Sword of the Sunna" and "Discomfiter of the Innovators". 
Prom his: compositions, several of vvhich were extant in Yaqut 's day, 
a Kitab al-mi'atain, a collection of a hundred selected traditions 
and a hundred stories about them (see GAL, I, 446, Suppl. I, 618), 
is alone extant. It was as a preacher and orator that he was best 
known to the people of Nishapur; Baihaqi says of his preaching that 
"all the eloquent ones threw up the sponge (literally, "threw down 
their shields") in comparison with him". When he was still a youth, 
great scholars like Ibn FUrak and Abu Is~aq Isfar~'ini used to come 
and hear him discoursing. Consequently, in 1035 Sultan MasCud 
appointed him to succeed his father in the official charge of kha~Ib 
of Nishapur, an office which he held for some twenty years. He 
343. 
was buried in a Nishapur rnadrasa; Samcani often visited his tomb, 
and his prayers there were invariably answered.110 
Although the QacJ.I ~aCid is frequently mentioned as an enemy 
of the ~ufis, IsmaCil ~abuni always appears in Shaikh Abu SaCid's 
biography as a warm admirer of the Shaikh. It seems that we have 
here an instance of a certaiij sympathy existing at this time between 
many ShafiCis and ~ufis. Both men had in early life studied trad-
ition from Abu CAli Zahir at Merv, and their friendship may have 
dated from then. fie find IsmaCil ~abuni among the ulema of Nishapur 
who pleaded with the Shaikh not to return to Maihana. During the 
Shaikh's stay in Ntshapur he had ·frequently attended his dhikrs 
and had, it is said, been at times drawn into religious ecstasy 
by the Shaikh's eloquence, so that he neither felt nor expressed 
any disquiet when the Shaikh finally exclaimed "there is no-one 
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within this shirt except God" (laisa fi'l-jubba siwa Allah). It 
is not easy to discern from the hagiographical nature of Shaikh 
Abu SaCid's biography whether IsmaCil ~abuni's enthusiasm for the 
Shaikh and his practices was really as unbounded as this, but it 
is likely that he was more sympathetic than others of the orthodox 
ulema. Certainly, his brother Abu YaCla Is~aq ~abiTni was himself 
a follower of the ~ufi path (see above, 334 ) and he may have 
influenced favourably his brother IsmaCil. 
The most influential of the Nishapur families, that of the 
Mikalis, has yet to be mentioned. This family produced many theol-
ogians, traditionists, poets and literary men, although in the 
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Ghaznavid period they were more prominent as administrators, off-
icials and sometimes soldiers than as pure scholars or divines. 
'.Pheir fame in the eastern Islamic world dated from the early Abbas-
id period. Samcan'i traces their genealogy back to Yezdegird II and 
Bahram Gur, but. it seems that Soghdia and not Persia was their 
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original home. Among their ancestors was a Shur Divasti, one 
of the local lords of ~ughd who was killed in 104/722-3 fighting 
the Arab invaders of Transoxania. The family now became Muslim, 
for Islamic names now begin to appear in their genealogy. The 
early Abbasids encouraged Persians to migrate to the capital Baghdad, 
and the Mikalis were in this way drawn into the cosmopolitan sphere 
of the Caliphate. Shah b. Mikal (d. 302/914-15) was a prot~ge' of 
the ~ahirids and was eulogised by al-Bu~turr. His nephew CAbdallah 
b. Mul].ammad was governor of Ahwaz in the early lOth century, after 
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starting out in the service of the ~affarids. His son Abu'l-
-CAbbas IsmaCil was educated by Ibn Duraid. Ibn Duraid wrote for 
him his Jamharat al-lugha and dedicated to him his ~~Ida in alif 
maq~ura, which spread the fame of the Mikalis in the Islamic world 
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as far as Aden and earned its author 10,000 dinars from them. 
Under Abu'l-CAbbas the family settled in Nishapur. In 958 the 
Samanid Vizier Abu JaCfar cutbi gave him charge of the Diwan · · 
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ar-Rasa'il, a post which he held till his death in 362/973. 
It was apparently Abu'l-CAbbas who became the first M1kali 
ra'Is of Nishapur, an office which his son Abu Mul].ammad CAbdallah 
IsmaCil later took over. IsmaCil was well-known as an authority on 
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poetry and law, and especially on the science of shuru~. When 
~·Jiaqdisi came to Nishapur, he stayed with him. Although in 364/97 4-5 
he refused to head the Diwan ar-Rasa'il he nevertheless was, like 
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Abu JaCfar became ra'is of Nishapur, and with the latter's grandson 
Abu'l-Qasim CAli we find the family fully involved in the circle 
of Ghaznavid officialdom. 
Khwaja CAli appears frequently in Baihaqi's pages. Ma~mud 
drew him to Ghazna, and he settled down there and became ra'is. The 
Sultan employed him in 1011-12 to escort his daughter to her future 
husband, Manuchihr b. Qabus (see above, 340 ) • On I1lal:].mud ' 8 
death he opportunely transferred his allegiance to the right man 
and was among those who sent to Ray encouraging MasCud to come east-
wards and assume the throne. Shortly afterwards, at the end of 
1031, Khwaja CAli organised the grand reception at Balkh for the 
envoy from Baghdad who came to announce the death of the Caliph al-
-Qadir and to get the Sultan's homage to his successor. For this 
ceremony Khwaja CAli was directly ordered by the Sultan to marshal 
all the ulema, ~~Is, faqihs, CAlids, etc. to meet the envoy; to 
erect stands and booths along the route of the procession to the 
mosque where the khu~ba in the new Caliph's name was to be pronoun-
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ced; and to see that the population did not become disorderly. 
His success here as an organiser and negotiator made him in 
1032 the Sultan,.s natural choice as leader of the Pilgrimage of 
Khurasan and Transoxania. 'rhe Caliph had just announced that he 
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had got the Buyid Amirs to put the route in order and to guarantee 
free access, and MasCITd himself had sent 2000 dinars for repair 
work along the route. Khwaja CAli was given a robe of honour, a 
ceremonial litter with gold fittings, a canopy (ghashiya) and the 
title of 11 Khwaja" (at that time a prized one, notes Baihaq_I, and 
not yet so debased as it had become by the time he was writing). 
During his absences from Ghazna, his son Abu'l-Mu~affar normally 
acted as deputy ra'Is. 
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A line of the Mikali family parallel to that of Abu Muqammad 
IsmaCil was that of his elder brother Abu'l-Qasim CAli (d. 376/986-7), 
known as"al-Mu~~awwiC"from his love of jihad, although he was also a 
scholar and traditionist and a patron of the ulema. He fought 
against the Greeks at Tarsus, and then returned to Khurasan and 
settled at Farawa, adjoining the Qara Qum where roamed the Oghuz 
nomads. He was a great benefactor to Farawa; he built two riba~s 
there with stores of arms and equipment and auqaf to maintain them, 
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and improved cultivation and irrigation by digging qanats and wells. 
Of Abu'l-Qasim CAli's sons, CAbdallah ijusain followed his 
father's ways and combined the callings of warrior and administrator. 
Gardizi gives him the title of Ra'Is, so he may at some time have 
held this position in Nishapur or some other town of Khurasan. He 
became katkhuda of the Ghaznavid general Begtughdt's army in 1035, 
but when that army was disastrously defeated by the Turkmens, he 
was unable to exchange his elephant for a horse and so flee. His 
Turkmen captors were about to kill him but were restrained by Chaghrr 
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Beg. Thenceforth he remained with the Seljuqs and cast in his lot 
with them; Ibn al-Athir lists him as Tughrfl's second Vizier, with 
the title Ra' Is ar-Rurasa'. 120 
CAbdallah ~usain's brother Abu Na~r Aqmad served for a time as 
ra'Is of Nishapur. cutbi praises his learning and quotes some of 
his verse and a specimen of an epistle of his addressed to Qabus b. 
Washmgir. He also praises the attainments of his two sons Abu'l-
-Faql CUbaidallah and Abu Ibrahim IsmaCil. The former was a fine 
prose and poetic stylist and a prolific author (Ibn Funduq gives. 
the titles of two of his books); he was also an authority on tradit-
ion and from 1031 until his death in 436/1044-5 gaves lectures in 
Nishapur which were widely attended by scholars. It was Abu'l-Fa~l 
and Abu Ibrahim who suffered dispossession from their lands and 
rights in Nishapur when ijasanak became ra'is (see above, 338). 
Early in MasCud's reign they regained their inheritance, and the 
Vizier A~mad b. CAbd a~~amad stayed at Abu'l-Fa~l's house when in 
121 1033 he passed thDough Nishapur. 
A further collateral bramch of the MikAlis gave birth to the 
famous ijasanak, whose proper name was Abu CAli ijasan b. Mu~ammad 
and whose fate is recorded in detail by Baihaqi. His father had 
supported Maqmud's interests in Nishapur during the last years of 
the Samanids. When his father died prematurely, the boy ijasan 
entered Ma~mud's service, where his handsomeness and frankness made 
such an impression that the Sultan called him by the hypochoristic 
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"!Jasanak", and this name stuck to him all his life. At one time 
348. 
he was ~aqib-Barid of Sistan. Court favour and family traditions 
gained him the riyasa of Nishapur; later, he exercised this office 
by a deputy, his kinsman Abu Na~r Man~ur b. Ramish, whilst he him-
self remained at court. Hence it is possible that some of the 
tyrannies attributed to him in Nishapur vtere done by his minions 
rather than by himself directly. 123 From his closeness to the 
Sultan, ijasanak was a candidate for the Vizierate after Maimandi's 
dismissal in 1024. Because of his lineage and personal wealth, and 
despite his youth and lack of experience in the central administrat-
ion, he was chosen Vizier. According to the Chief Secretary Abu 
Na~r-i lvlishkan, Maf:mud repented of his choice so.on afterwards, but 
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~asanak retained the Vizierate for the rest of the reign. 
The year before he was invested .as Vizier, ijasanak had gone on 
the Pilgrimage to the Holy Places, and because of the unsettled and 
dangerous state of the routes across Nejd, had returned through the 
Fa~imid territories of Palestine and. Syria. Whilst there he was 
injudicious enough to accept a khilCat from the Fa~imid Caliph a~-
-~ahir:and to convey letters of friendship to Ma~mud. The possibility 
of any intercourse between the Ghaznavids and his Fa.~imid enemies 
alarmed the Abbasid Caliph al-Qadir, and he accused ijasanak of 
Qarmathian, i.e. IsmaCili, sympathies. The Sultan regarded the 
charge as ridiculous and called the Caliph a doting old fool, but 
to appease him, the offending khilCat was sent back to Baghdad for 
b . 125 urn~ng. 
Ijasanak kept the Sultan's favour, but his high-handedness was 
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making him dangerous enemies. He espoused the cause of Prince 
Mu}fammad, whom MalJ.mud had designated as his heir, and went out of 
his way to offend Prince MasCud. So when KulJ.ammad's short-lived 
Sultanate collapsed, ijasanak was arrested at Bust. The prime mover 
in his condemnation on the old charge of being a Qarmathian was 
MasCud's new Vizier and confidant, Abu Sahl Zauzani (see above, Part 
I, 136-7 ), who hated IJasanak for the humiliating treatment he 
had received from him in the past. His promptings coincided with 
the Sultan's own desire to make a clean sweep of the ~~mudiyan, men 
of the. old r~gime, so his fate was doubly sealed, and in 1031 he 
was executed at Balkh. 
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SaCid Nafrsi pictures ijasanak as a symbol of Iranian national-
ism, the member of a family of pure Iranian ancestry hounded to 
death by the Arab Caliphs. ijasanak was certainly a great patron of 
Persian literature, and there are six ~~Idas dedicated to him in 
the diwan of Farrukhi. But the main factor in his fall was the 
Sultan's hostility; MasCud could have shielded ijasanak from the 
wrath of the Caliph, just as his father had done. It is, however, 
true, as SaCid Nafisi points out, that the actual execution was done 
in the face of popular disapproval; the crowd mourned deeply at the 
sight, especially the Nishapurians present, and refused to stone 
~asanak when ordered to do so by the authorities. A po:et of 
Nishapur wrote a moving elegy on him, including the verses: 
"They cut off his head, he who was the head of heads, the 
adornment of the age and the diadem of the land; 
Whether he was a Q.armathian, a Jew or an infidel, to be hurled 
down from the throne to the gallows was a dreadful thing".127 
ijasanak probably resembled other officials in that he did not 
hesitate to line his own pockets, and the rich presents which he 
brought back for the Sultan from his Pilgrimage may have been in part 
financed by his exactions. He had considerable property in Nishapur, 
including a fine palace at·Shadyakh, which was confiscated on his 
death by the Sultan and used to lodge distinguished travellers. 
The scale on which he lived and the size of his retinue are shown 
by the existence around this palace of booths (withaqha) which 
accommodated the five or six hundred personal ghulams he had. 
Comparatively distant branches of the Mikali family benefited from 
his influence in the state; one notable of Baihaq had a M1kali 
mother, and ijasanak secured him exemption from the kharaj on his 
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property in the village of Zamij. Yet the sources do not 
attribute to him exactions and tyrannies on the scale such as the 
Vizier Isfara'ini or the CAmid Sur! were guilty of in Khurasan. 
He was already by birth a rich man. The sympathetic attitude to-
wards him shown by the common people at his execution indicates 
perhaps that it was the rich, who could afford to be squeezed, who 
had suffered most from ijasanak. The confiscation by ijasanak of 
the property of Abu Na~r A4road's sons in Nishapur was doubtless in 
pursuance of some feud between the two branches of the Mikali 
family. A certain Mikal savagely abused ijasanak just before his 
execution, bringing down on himself the execration of the crowd. 
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cutbi stresses the many benevolent works in Nishapur done by ijasanak 
when he was ra'Is; he covered over the streets of the bazaar as a 
protection against wind and snow, the first time this had ever 
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been done, and expended 100,000 dinars out of his own pocket. 
We see from this story of the various branches of the lllikali 
family how adaptable its members were and how tenacious they were 
of their powers and privileges. rl'hey retained a grip on the riyasa 
of Nishapur which, though not continuous, err1braced the last decades 
of Samanid rule and most of the period of Ghaznavid rule in K.hurasan. 
'.rhe office of ra' Is or zaCJ:m was a key one in Khurasan at this time, 
for the dynasties controlling the province had their administrative 
capitals outside Khurasan at Bukhara and Ghazna, and were according-
ly compelled to leave the province with a considerable amount of 
local autonomy. The central government nominated the ra'Is and 
installed him with an official robe of honour, ~ailasan and durraca, 
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a horse and the title of "Khwaja-yi buzurg". He then became the 
channel between sovereign and subject, and was responsible to the 
central government for the internal security of the city. Whenever 
the sovereign visited the city, he marked him out from the rest of 
the acya.n by special honours. The ra 'Is was expected to organise 
official festivities or receptions fordistinguished visitors. If 
the Sultan's army appeared in the neighbourhood, he and the local 
representatives of the administration had to arrange supplies for 
the army. If he was especially trusted by the ruler, he might be 
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used for a diplomatic mission. Furthermore, once nominated to 
352. 
the riyisa, there was a good chance of acquiring for one's descend-
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ants an hereditary grip on the office. 
The ra'Is had to be a man of social status and accumulated 
wealth. Leadership in the organisation of public works and charities 
was expected of him. He had to patronise the ulema and keep open 
house for travellers and for the needy. So his personal means had 
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to be considerable. Moreover, he had to be persona grata to 
the rest of the acyan, for his leadership of them was more by 
persuasion and counsel than by coercive power. It was therefore 
natural that the ra'Is should be chosen from the haute bourgeoisie 
of the city. These various conditions were in Nishapur well 
filled by the Mikalis, who had accumulated wealth from their estates 
and auqaf, and also, it seems, from trading and manufacturing inter-
ests; one Mikali courtier at Ghazna had the name "Bazzaz", and 
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Baihaqi mentions Mikali boots. Yet we have seen that, although 
their social position and wealth was bound up with Khurasan and in 
particular, with Nishapur, they were not restrictedly provincial in 
outlook. Members of the family served various dynasties in turn, 
from the ~ahirids to the Ghazhavids, and at least one Mikali 
adapted himself to the hew Seljuq regime. All in all, the Mikalis 
are a striking example of the qualities which gave Khurasanian 
life much of its characteristic resilience and energy. 
Chapter Six 
'.J.lhe Karamiyya. 
The early 11th century marked the zenith of fortune and 
power for a religious sect which flourished in Khurasan and 
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especially in Nishapur, that is, the Karamiyya. Barthold. 
described the sect as"pietistic", but in practice it was extremely 
activist and distinguished by its intolerance and persecuting zeal; 
in Nishapur, at least, it caused a great amount of social and pol-
itical commotion. Its founder was Abu CAbdallah Mu~ammad b. 
Karam as-Sagazi an-NishaptirY (d. 255/869), who was born in Sistan 
of Arab descent, but studied and spent much of his life in Nishapur. 
He was an ascetic and hell-fire preacher, and held the doctrine of 
anthropomorphism to an extreme degree, if the allegations of his 
opponents are to be believed; his tenets were summed up in a 
treatise,CAdhab al-qabr, which is no longer extant but which in its 
day achieved considerable fame in Islam. He preached his doctrines 
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in Ghur, Gharchistan and the countryside of l~urasan, denouncing 
both Sunnis and ShiCis alike, and appealing especially to the 
peasants and riff-raff of those regions. Finally, Mu~ammad b. 
Karam arrived in Nishapur with a group of adherents frorn Gharchi-
stan, where he had been working, comprising weavers and others from 
depressed classes. Thus it was perhaps the social and political 
implications of his activities, as much as the theological ones, 
which drew upon him the wrath of the governor Mu~ammad b. ~ahir, 
who imprisoned him for some time; at this time, the countryside of 
Khurasan was much disturbed by sectaries and the Arab ruling classes 
were understandably suspicious of any new movement which seemed to 
attract a large following from the lower classes. 
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Nevertheless, the sect became established in Hishapur and put 
down strong roots there. At the same time, its adherents spread to 
other parts of Islam. In the lOth century there were Karami groups 
and khanqahs in Baghdad, Jerusalem and l~s~a~, where they even had 
their own quarter. But Khurasan remained the nucleus of the sect, 
which had considerable strength in the lands along the upper Oxus, 
where Mu~ammad b. Karam had first begun his propaganda; in the 
lOth century their khanqahs were to be found in Guzgan, Khuttal 
and :[i,arghana, as well as at Merv and Samarqand. It was suggested by 
, 
J. Ribera y Tarrago that these khanqahs, together with the madrasas 
of the Karamiyya which are later heard of, were educational instit-
utions, and that their existence in Nishapur was a stimulus to the 
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growth of the orthodox madrasa movement there, but this is unlikely. 
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In the latter half of the lOth century, the Kararniyya in 
Nishapur ,.vere led by Abu YaCqub Isljaq b. Malpnashad (d. 383/993), 
famed for his preaching and evangelistic fer~our; he is said to 
have converted over 5000 People of the Book and Zoroastrians in 
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Nishapur. Abu YaCqub's son Abu Bakr Muitammad b. Is~aq succeeded 
to leadership of the sect after his father's death. The piety and 
asceticism of Abu YaCqub had mad.e a deep impression on Sebuktigin 
when he was in lthurasan, and had actually converted him to the sect's 
belief's. Consequently his secretary A-bu' 1-:b'atlj Busti penned the 
lines: 
"The only true legal system ( fiqh) is Abu lJanifa' s, just as 
the only true religious system (din) is Muljarnmad b. Karam's; 
Those who, as I observe, disbelieve in Iluljamrnad b. Karam's 
system are a vile lot indeed (ghair kiram)". l39 
Ma~mud inherited this sympathetic attitude towards the Karamiyya, 
and in the earlier part of his reign supported them as a conservative 
force and as a weapon against MuCtazili or IsmaCili religious· 
radicalism. l40 
For his part, Abu Bakr Muljamrnad used this favour to further his 
plafl:s and to establish a temporal ascendancy within I~ishapur over 
the acyan and over other members of the religious classes. Already 
·uhen the Qarakhanid invaders occupied Nishapur in 1006, they feared 
the strength of his party in the city so much that they carried him 
off with them. He escaped when the Sultan's army approached, and 
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became even more favoured in Maljmud's eyes. Under pretext of 
ferretinp~ out Ba~ini heretics, he set up a reign of terror in 
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Nishapur, so that 11 people saw that his saliva was deadly poison 
and his delation meant ruin". A favourite practice of his was to 
extort money as the price of silence about alleged heretical procliv-
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ities. He played a prominent part in the trial and execution in 
403/1012-13 of the li,a~imid daCI at-1.Paharti. This man had come on 
an open and peaceful mission to Ma~mud from the Caliph al-ijakim. 
When he had reached Herat he had been arrested, sent back to Nishapur 
and interrogated by Abu Bakr Iv.i.uJ:ammad, who pronounced his doctrines 
baseless but dangerous. 
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AbU Bakr MuJ:ammad's pursuit of anything 
smacking of unorthodoxy also brought him up against the ShiCis of 
his city (ar-Raw~fiq), whose new mosque he had razed, and against 
the ~ufis, in particular, against Shaikh Abu SaCid. Even famous 
scholars like the AshCari divine Mu~ammad b. al-ljasan Ibn Ftirak, 
who had come to Nishapur to teach and who was the fierce opponent 
of the Karamiyya, was harried by the sect. They accused him of 
heresy and had hi~ summoned before the Sultan at Ghazna. Ibn FUrak 
vindicated his orthodoxy, but it was allegedly they who had him 
poisoned on his way back from the capital in 406/1015-16. Likewise, 
the biographer of the ulema of Nishapur, al-ijakim al-Bayyic, fell 
foul of the Karamiyya; they smashed his minbar and prevented him 
leaving his house for the mosque. 144 
The peak of Abu Bakr Mu~ammad's power came when Maqmud, revers-
ing the normal policy of giving the riyasa of the city to a leading 
member of the lay acyan, made him ra'Is. He continued to parade 
hypocritically in thewoollen cloak of an ascetic, but he had a well-
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-disciplined following to attend him and to execute his commands, 
headed by a personal adjutant (~ajib). l45 In harrying the Ba~inis 
and the ~ufis he had. the support of the Qaq.I f?aCid and others of 
the orthodox ulema, but events now moved towards a breach between 
these two strong-minded personalities. Although the ensuing 
struggle was fought out on the theological plane, the real question 
at issue was over the temporal power in Nishapur. 
After returning from his Pilgrimage of 402/1011-12, the Qagi 
~aCid came to Mal}mud's court at Ghazna. In a theological discussion 
there, the Qaqi brought up the unorthodox ideas held by the Karam-
iyya, their anthropomorphism and consequent attribution to God of 
what did not befit Him. When summoned to reply, Abu Bakr Mul}.ammad 
denied all the allegations and thus saved his skin, but the Sultan 
ordered local governors in Khurasan to investigate members of the 
sect and to purge the madrasas and minbars of them. The next stage 
was that Abu Bakr Muljammad again tried to clear himself by bringing 
a host of witnesses to testify for him, so the Sultan appointed 
the Chief Qagi of Ghazna, Abu Mul:J-aramad Na~ilJ-I, to preside over a 
court of enquiry. At this, Abu Bakr MulJ-ammad and the Qaqi ~aCid 
ac·cused each other of anthropomorphist and MuCta~ili beliefs resp-
ectively. But the governor of Khurasan, Ma~mud's brother Abu'l-
-Mu~affar Na~r, testified to the Qaqi's pure ijanafi faith and the 
Sultan refused to believe that he could have become a MuCtazili. 
Finally, Mal:J-mUd dismissed AbU Bakr Mu~ammad from the riyasa, 
and to please the Qa4I, reappointed a layman. With the appointment 
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·of ijasanak (see above, 347-51 ) the office returned to the class 
of the acyan and to the Mikali family in particular. IJasanak 
took draconian measures, with a severity, according to cutbi, sur-
passing that of Ziyad b. Abihi, against the Karamiyya in Nishapur. 
'J:lhe most tyrannical of them were jailed in fortresses. Abu Bakr 
Mul].ammad's spoliations were recovered from him and he was enjoined 
to fade away into a life of seclusion and contemplation. IJa.sanak 
then warned other members of the religious classes, especially 
the CAlids, that their favoured position and the respect they were 
accorded depended wholly on their obedience to the secular power. 
They for their part agreed with this, recognising that the Sultan 
was the Shadow of God on earth and that nothing would avail them 
except obedience and extreme circumspection ( al-mail ila '1-ghuluw 
1" '1 . t• -d) 146 1 -l.q ].~~ • 
This was the end of the Kar~mi bid for power in Nishapur, and 
they were never allowed a second chance. The sect continued to be 
strong in Nisha.pur. It is unlikely, pace Barthold (Turkestan, 290 
n,2), that the Qa~I ~aCid and Abu Bakr Mu4ammad ever became friends 
again. On the contrary, we know that emnity between the two famil-
ies persisted eighty years later. Ibn al-Athir records under 488/ 
1095 civil strife in Nishapur between the ijanafis and ShafiCis on 
one side, led respectively by the Qa4I Abu SaCid Mu4ammad b. A4mad 
b. ~aCid and Abu'l-Qasirn, son of the Imam al-ijaramain Juwaini, and 
the Karamiyya on the other, led by Ma~ashad, which ended in the 
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killing of many of the latter and the razing of their madrasa. 
rphe Ka.ramiyya persisted as a sect in Khurasan a.nd Transoxa.nia 
well into the 13th century. 148 
Chapter Seven 
The community of ~ufis in Nishapur, and in particular, that 
grouped around the famous Shaikh Abu SaCid b. Ab1'1-Khair Maihani, 
has been mentioned in passing. In the development of Islamic myst-
icism, the ~ufis of Khurasan played an outstanding part. It is 
not necessary to posit for ~fism an origin in the East, say in 
Indian Vedanta, in the transmission of which Khurasan would certain-
ly have played a mediating role. But it found a congenial home on 
Persian soil, and at an early date produced one of the best-known 
~ufi pantheists, Abu Yazid ~aiiUr Bis1ami (d. 261/874 or 264/877-8). 
Al-Hujwiri atributes the spread of ~ufism in Nishapur and Khurasan 
to Abu cuthman SaCid b. IsmaCil al-ijiri, whose preaching was very 
popular in Nishapur; and by the 11th century, he says, 
, , 
nit would be difficult to mention all the Shaykhs of Khurasan. 
I have met three hundred in that province alone who had such 
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mystical endowments that a single man of them would have .been 
enough for the whole world. This is due to the fact that the 
sun of love and the fortune of the ~uf{ path is in the ascendant 
in Khuras~n". 149 
The career of Shaikh Abu SaCid, who lived in Nishapur for 
roughly the decade 1024-34, is known in detail through his biography, 
the Asrar at-tau~Id fi maqamat ash-Shaikh Abi SaCid (see Bibliograph-
ical introduction, 29-30 ). His career shows ~ufism in the 
stage before it became institutionalised into formal tariqas, but 
when great shaikhs were already the foci of devotion and spiritual 
enthusiasm, with large bands of murids dwelling in the shadow of 
their baraka. It also illustrates the tensions which were generated 
in a city like Nishapur where the ruling stratum was prosperous, 
conservative, orthodox in religion and jealous to preserve the 
political status quo within the city. Into all this, the Shaikh 
brought a new way of life and behaviour. His spiritual gifts drew 
many followers to his side from the Ghaznavid official class, the 
city acyan, the merchants, shopkeepers and master craftsmen, but the 
ruling stratum was suspicious of the Shaikh's powers of leadership 
.. 
and his atfactiveness to the lower classes, and fears of :social 
disturbance are explicitly mentioned in his biography. 
There are also signs that Abu SaCid's personal philosophy of 
life struck a discordant note in the busy, commercial atmosphere of 
Nishapur. For as head of his khanqah, he followed the ~ufi doctrine 
of tawakkul to the extreme, relying on benefactions and presents from 
·I) 
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sympathisers, which· were, however, not infrequently extorted by 
methods approaching spiritual blackmail. Often his right-hand man 
and major-domo in the khanqah, ijasan-i Mu'addib, was at his wits' 
end to make ends meet and to find where the next meal was coming 
from. Yet the Shaikh would lavish money on entertainments and 
luxurious living whilever the money lasted. This fecklessness drew 
censure from the more staid members of the community; amongst the 
bourgeoisie of 11th century Nishapur the virtues of circumspectness 
and carefulness (iqti~ad, !~la9) were as cultivated as amongst the 
bourgeoisie of Merv and Khurasan in the 9th century as described by 
al-J~~i~ in his Kitab al-bukhala'. On two occasions the Shaikh 
was specifically accused of the vice denounced in the Qur'an of 
israf, profligacy or extravagance, on one of these occasions by the 
m~tasib of Nishapur; but then,al-Hujwiri noted, he was never one of 
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those shaikhs who vaunt the superiority of poverty over wealth. 
For Abu SaCid lived like a great prince of the church. The 
local s!4.I at Kharaqan was not the only person to find a gap between 
what he expected of a ~ufi and ascetic, and the way of life which he 
found the Shaikh actually enjoying: 
"The Qa4I came in and gave a greeting. Then he saw the Shaikh, 
lolling back asleep on four cushions like a sultan, and with a 
dervish sitting by his feet massaging them. The Qa~I said, 'I 
thought to myself, what sort of poverty is this? How can this 
man, living in such luxury as this, be considered poor? This 
man is a king, not a ~ufi or dervish'"• l5l 
We hear of Abu SaCid giving a .banquet for the ~ufis of Nishapur, 300 
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of them all told, of roast lamb and almond confectionery; and of a 
feast on a far grander scale held at the village of Bushangan {see 
above, 301 ). An open invitation was proclaimed, and 2000 
people, of both high and low estates, came to the celebration, at 
which aromatic sandalwood and 1000 candles were burnt, even though 
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it was daytime. When he rode out across the countryside, it was 
not on the ass, traditionally associated in the east with holy men, 
but on horseback, with his faithful steward holding the stirrup. 
In the streets of the city, his retainers would carry him in state, 
since he attracted considerable numbers of novices, murids, who 
153 always provided him with an escort. The offerings of these murids 
formed a fair proportion of the Shaikh's income, although he also 
drew contributions from such varied classes as the rich merchants 
and, after he had left Nishapur for Maihana, from members of the 
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administration installed by the Seljuqs. As well as the murids, 
there were the m~ibban or Cazrzan, sympathisers who pledged them-
selves to follow the ~ufi way as far as possible in their everyday 
callings {thus corresponding roughly to the tertiaries or lay brothers 
of the mediaeval European religious orders and to the cashiqan of 
later Muslim dervish orders like the Bektashis). These came from 
the ordinary people, artisans, shopkeepers, etc., and when added to 
the professed murids, swelled the number of potential retainers 
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which the Shaikh could call on. 
The Shaikh's popularity with the masses in Nishapur aroused 
the suspicions of the acyan and ulema. The ulema were from the 
.0) 
doctrinal point of view mistrustful of ~ufism in general, and they 
noted the gap between the conventional picture of a ~ufi ascetic and 
the pomp of the Shaikh's household. This conservative opposition 
embraced all sects and rites. The leaders of the orthodox legal 
schools were prominent, led by the Qaqi ~aCid, and the Imam al-
-~aramain's father, Abu Mu~ammad Juwaini, was so strongly opposed to 
Shaikh Abu SaCid when the latter first came to Nishapur that no-one 
dared mention his name in his presence. l56 The CAlids and ShiCis 
of Nishapur were another element of the conservative religious estab-
lishment (see below, 369-71 ), and were as keen against the 
Shaikh as any Sunnis, even cursing him openly in the streets as he 
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passed. Above all, the Karamiyya hated him, and from the mention 
of Abu Bakr Mu4ammad in this connection, it seems that the latter 
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still remained influential in the city. Finally, not all the 
~Ufis were solidly behind the Shaikh. There was in Nishapur a 
moderate party of ~ufis, led by Abu'l-Qasim Qushairi, who were con-
cerned to vindicate ~ufism's right to a lawful place within the 
community of Islam, and who therefore deprecated any extremism 
which might prejudice this. Qushairi was both an AshCari in theology 
and a ~ufi, and he composed his Risalat al-Qushairiyya fi Cilm 
at-ta,awwuf to show how ~ufism accorded with orthodox beliefs and 
practices. Qushairi seems in particular to have been dubious about 
the orthodoxy of some of the Shaikh's mystical poetry, about the 
hearing of music in his dhikrs or majalis-i samac and about the 
propriety of dancing (raq~) to induce ecstasy. l59 
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According to Abu SaCid's biography, all the currents of oppos-
ition came to a head when the Qa41 ~aCid and Abu Bakr Muqammad 
drew up a written indictment of the Shaikh's misdeeds and sent it 
off to the Sultan at Ghazna. In it, the Shaikh's sybaritic life 
and his concentration on music and dancing rather than the teaching 
of orthodox doctrine were mentioned. But his accusers made a further 
charge, that public security was being threatened, that the majority 
of the cawamm had joined the Shaikh and that a general fitna was 
imminent in the city. The Sultan's reply gave the ijanafi and ShafiCI 
imams a free hand to inflict the ultimate penalty demanded by the 
Sharica, and it was resolved to hang the Shaikh and his followers. 
The episode ends, as do all similar ones in the biography, with the 
frustration of their knavish tricks by the Shaikh's spiritual 
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powers, and his accusers turn about and become his supporters. 
Nicholson believed that this story might not be entirely fict-
itious, and it undoubtedly reflects the tension which must have 
existed between the Shaikh and the orthodox ulema. As Nicholson 
observes, their charges were substantially true and the Shaikh made 
no effort to deny them. If there was a reconciliation of the two 
sides, it cannot have been all that cordial, even though Muqammad 
b. al-Munawwar, the Shaikh's biographer and descendant, mentions 
several joint meetings of the spiritual leaders of Nishapur for 
discussion and disputation, at which such great figures as Shaikh 
Abu SaCid, Qushairi, Abu Mu4ammad Juwaini and his son, the Qa~I 
~~Cid, Abu Bakr Muqammad the Karami leader, Ismacrl ~ibnni, etc., 
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were present. Possibly some sort of respectful modus vivendi 
had been reached. 
The appeal of the Nishapur ulema to the central government 
implied that they expected the dynasty's attitude to the ~ufis to 
accord with their own. The policy of the Ghaznavids was to encourage 
any form of orthodox religion which could play a part in securing 
political and social stability.· They were not insensible to the 
appeal of saintly men, as the visits of the Nishapur shaikh Abu 
SaCid Mu4ammad Khargushi (d. 406/1015-16) to Maqmud's court show. 
According to Shaikh Abu SaC1d Maihan1's biography, when in 1049 the 
Shaikh died, one of his disciples obeyed his dying master's injunct-
ion and went to the court of Ghazna to beg the 3000 dinars for a 
debt outstanding on the Shaikh's khanqah. The Sultan paid up immed-
iately, and added 1000 dinars to erect a canopy over the tomb and 
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another 1000 for the envoy's travelling expenses. However, in 
one place in Baihaqi, Sultan MasCud refers to the ~ufis as "long-
-moustached ones" (suhan-sablat: literally, "with moustaches like a 
file") and expresses his general opinion of them thus: "He would 
always joke, when he saw a dervish who was a notorious hypocrite 
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and who wore a dervish cloak, 'His heai+ is blacker than his cloak'". 
Whilst he was ra'Is in Nishapur, ijasanak was also a great opponent 
of the ~ufis. Perhaps we might formulate the dynasty's attitude 
in these terms: it regarded individual holy men with respect, 
whilst recognising that among the ~ufis were many tricksters. It 
was suspicious of ~ufi shaikhs who collected great bands of followets 
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around themselves, thereby creating a nexus of loyalties which 
could not directly be controlled by the central government or its 
local agents. The orthodox religious leaders, on the other hand, 
were frequently employed in state offices like the ~qa' or the 
khi~~' and were thus amenable to pressure and control. 
B. Zakhoder has suggested that at this time, ~ufism in Khurasan 
was really a religious cloak for political activity secretly directed 
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against Ghaznavid rule there. He is right in pointing out that 
Abu SaCid had many links with the class of merchants, traders and 
shopkeepers; his own father had been a perfume-seller and grocer 
(ca~t!£) in Kaihana, and for supporting his khanqah he depended much 
on the generosity of this class. Yet this class was not by its 
nature anti-Ghaznavid; the Shaikh's own father, Baba Bu'l-Khair, 
had been such a warm admirer of Sultan Ma~~d that he had frescoes 
painted on the walls and ceiling of his house at Maihana depicting 
the Sultan, his name and titles, his retainers and his panoply 
of war. 165 
But Zakhoder goee on to assert that ~fism and the 1ariqas 
were the agents of the nobles and ruling classes in Khurasan. He 
quotes the appeals of the acyan of Khurasan to the Qarakhanids 
against Ghaznavid oppression, and the resulting stimulus to the 
Turkmens' invasions (cf. BaihaqY, 412), and suggests close relations 
between the acyan and ~ufis of Khurasan on one side and the Oghuz 
on the other. These assumptions have no solid evidence behind them. 
The Turkmens were received in Khurasan with resignation rather than 
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with positive joy. We know nothing of a ~ufi conspiracy against 
the state in Khurasan. Mu4ammad b. al-Munawwar tells a story of 
how when they were overrunning Khurasan, the two brothers Tughrrl 
and Chaghrr Beg came to the Shaikh at Maihana for his blessing. 
The latter told them that their successes were being dictated by the 
Divine Will, and went on to say.' to_·· Chaghrr, "We have given you 
rule over Khurasan", and to Tughr!l, "We have given you rule over 
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Iraq". It is not necessary to take this story seriously; the 
type of anecdote where the wise man meets with and encourages 
someone whm is to achieve f~ture greatness is a common enough one, 
and in another part of his biography, the Shaikh allegedly meets 
the young Ni~am al-Mulk and prophesies his coming rise to power. 
Nor does it seem that the ~ufis were direct agents of the ruling 
classes' ambitions; although Abu SaCid had supporters in all ranks 
of society, most of his fiercest enemies in Nishapur were from the 
ruling classes of the acyan, the local officials and the ulema. 
Where unrestrained ~ufi activities seemed to threaten the established 
social or religious order, these classes were at one with the 
central government in Ghazna. 
Chapter Eight 
The Sayyids 
The Sayyids or CAlids were in the first part of the 11th century 
a class enjoying considerable respect and prestige in Khurasan, as 
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in many other parts of the eastern Islamic world. This respect 
accorded to them was independent of political factors, for the 
progress of political ShiCism was now being checked by a Sunni 
revival. The Sayyids themselves were a small minority in Khurasan. 
Outside the ranks of the IsmaCilis, who had achieved forms of organ-
isation such as that of the ~~imid daCwa, ShiCism was still a diff-
used body of unsystematised beliefs rather than a closely-knit sect. 
Within it, the moderate, Twelver, JaCfari ShiCa were a conservative 
rather than a revolutionary force. Such an attitude was forced on 
them in Khurasan by the political environment. The successive dyn-
asties which reigned there - the Tahirids, the Samanids and the 
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Ghaznavids - were all orthodox Sunni powers (in so far as the ~aff-
Urids showed any religious feelings, their sympathies lay with the 
Khawirij, but their dominion in Khurasan was brief). Both the 
extravagances of ShiCism in western Persia and the Caspian provinces, 
and the expansionist policies of the Dailami tribesmen there, who 
had adopted ShiCism as an expression of their own particularism 
and of Iranian national feeling, stimulated the rulers of Khurasan 
to make it a bulwark of orthodoxy. 
Within these circumstances, the moderate ShiCis could neverthe-
less exist peacefully in Khurasan. The price for this tolerance 
was that they should engage in no political activity and should 
subordinate themselves strictly to the temporal power. Although 
the Ghaznavid Sultans were themselves strictly orthodox, they were 
prepared to leave them in peace; this point was clearly explained to 
the Nishapur CAlids after the episode of the Karami bid for power 
(see above, 358 ) . During the first Seljuq occupation of 
Nishapur in 1038-9, the Naqib of the CAlids showed himself as one 
of the most faithful of the local leaders to the Ghaznavid connection 
(see below, Part V, 509 ) . When the Fa~imid ~ at-~aharti 
was arrested and brough~to the court at Ghazna, it was a ShiCI 
divine, ijasan b. ~ahir b. Muslim, who took the lead in the interrog-
ation. As an CAlid, the descendant of al-ijusain, he was able to 
demonstrate the falsity of at-Taharti's claim to be an envoy of the 
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true Caliph-Imam, and so recommended his execution. The Sayyids 
of Khurasan integrated themselves into the social structures of the 
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towns and into the ranks of the landowning and mercantile classes, 
and were little inclined to pursue revolutionary policies. There 
is no evidence to show that they encouraged or approved of the 
various Ziy~rid and Buyid attacks on the S~m~nids in Khurasan, and 
the victory of untutored Dailami adventurers would have been 
inimical to their material interests. 
Ibn Funduq describes the coming of the CAlids to Khurasan and 
Nishapur in the latter half of the 9th century: 
"Mu}J.ammad Zabbara b. CAbdallah al-Mafqud was Amir of Medina, 
and his son Abu JaCfar !4mad was a mighty commander. Now there 
was in the land of Tabarist~n the One who Summons to God, one of 
the Imams of the Zaidis, and the people of Tabaristan gave their 
allegiance to him. There arose a contention between him and the 
Daci, so he departed to Nishapur and settled there. His son, the 
Sayyid al-Ajall Abu'l-ijusain M~ammad b. A4mad b. Mu4ammad az-
-Zabbara, was born and brought up in Nishapur. .(m extensive fol1~. 
·owing- 'of people gathered ··r'ound him ·arid di(l a'll'egiance :to him as 
Caliph. ~kim Abu CAbdallih al-ijafi~ records in his Ta'rikh 
NishabiTr that for a while they pronounced the khu~ba in his name 
as Caliph. Then the Amir CAbdallah b. Tahir, governor of Khur-
asan, gave him his niece, the daughter of his brother CAli b. 
Tahir, in marriage. The Sayyid al-Ajall Abu Mu~ammad Ya4ya b. 
MU4ammad was born of them, and became the influential Naqrb and 
Ra'Is in Nishapur; they- used to call him "Sayyid of the House of 
the Messenger of God". His son was the Sayyid al-Ajall Abu'l-
~usain MuQammad b. Ya4ya, who was Naqib and Ra'Is in Nishapur 
and highly respected. They placed him too in the khu~ba as 
Caliph, and a group of pe~e gathered round him. This AbU'l-~usain 
YaJ;lYI was a highly-cultivated man: he knew the Qur'an_ by heart, 
was a rawi for poetry, was a traditionist, was able to relate 
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history, was skilled in genealogies and was eloquent. They gave 
allegiance to him at the time when the Fortunate Amir Abu'l-~asan 
Na~r b. A~mad [301-31/914-43] ruled. He was carried off to 
Bukhara and kept there some time. Then they set him free, gave 
him a robe of honour and assigned him a regular pension. He was 
the first Khurasanian CAlid to be given a pension from the royal 
treasury; they called him, therefore, ~~~ib al-arzaq. Abu'l-~usain 
Mu~ammad b. Ya~ya lived over a hundred years. His son Sayyid-i 
Ajall Abu CAli Mu9ammad was the most noble of sayyids, was Naqib 
and Ra'Is and was a great preacher and deliverer of homilies. 
There were always large concourses of people in his house. He had 
a brother, Sayyid Abu CAbdallah al-ijusain, known as Jauharak. He 
was an impetuous youth, and a quarrel arose between him and the 
sons of Sayyid Imam Abu CAbdallah al-ijusain b. Da'ud the tradit-
ionist. The followers of the Imam Mu11alib1 Shaficr, May God be 
Pleased with him, considered it advisable to help the sons of the 
Sayyid Abu CAbdallah, and the niqaba passed from this line to the 
other one, and the sons of the Sayyid-i Ajall Abu CAli became 
dispersed". 
Ibn Funduq then goes on to say that the Sayyid-i Ajall Abu JaCfar 
M~ammad was Naqib and Ra'Is of Mashhad-i fUs for a time, that he 
himself possessed the patent from Sultan MasCud appointing him and 
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that ThaCalibi praised him in his poetry. 
Thus we see from this passage, and from others in the Ta'rikh-i 
Baihaq, how the CAlids came first to Nishapur and then spread to 
other towns of Khurasan like Baihaq, and how they established their 
right to such important positions as the custodiamship of the shrine 
of the Eighth Imam ar-Ri4a at Mashhad. That many of the Khurasanian 
CAlids came there from the Caspian provinces, where ShiCism had had 
a powerful hold since the end of the 8th century, is confirmed by 
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several entries in al-Fariei's Siyaq li-ta'rikh Nishabiir (see 
Bibliographical introduction, 23-4 ). In particular, several 
came to Nishapur from Gurgan, as the nisbas "Gurgani" and nAstar~badhi" 
show. He mentions, among others, Sayyid D~CI b. Mahdi, Mu~ammad b. 
Jacfar a~-~ufi al-AstarabadRI, who died at Baihaq in 405/1014; and 
Abu'l-Qasim ijamza b. YUsuf as-sahmi al-Gurgani, who came to Nishapur 
in 406/1015-16 in a delegation from Manuchihr b. Qabus to Sultan 
Ma~ud. 170 
In general, the Sunni authorities did not interfere with the 
CAlids so long as their political interests were not menaced by 
ShiCI activity. The CAlids seem to have been on good terms with 
the fahirids; it is true that latterly, the Tahirids let their 
connections with the Abbasid Caliphate grow weaker. The family of 
Sayyid Abu JaCfar . 4~mad, the first of the line to settle in 
Nishapur, acquired marriage links with the ~ahirids. His own mother 
was a daughter of Tahir b. al-ijusain Dhu'l-Yaminain, the first 
~hirid governor of Khurasan (205-7/820-2), and later, a daughter 
and grand-daughter of Amir CAli b, Tahir b. CAbdallah b. Tahir were 
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given in marriage to the family. In the next century, it seems 
from the passage quoted that the Samanid government at first viewed 
I 
Sayyids of Nishapur as a potential danger to political stabi~y 
there, but eventually came to regard them with tolerance. 
Once established in Nishapur, Abu JaCfar Aqmad's family 
Assumed the niqaba as a natural right. The Naqib was marshal of the 
CAlids in each town, and within its social structure, ranked as one 
374. 
of the foremost of its acyan. It was he who kept the registers of 
the CAlids, ansab al-ashraf, in each community. The birth of each 
child and the death of each person was carefully recorded here in 
order that purity of .lineage might be verifiable, for CAlid birth 
always gave prestige and often gave entitlement to useful fiscal 
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Privileges. The office was a prize, and the citation above 
describes how a prolonged dispute arose among the sayyids of Nishapur 
and how the niqaba was diverted from one brother to another. In the 
course of the dispute, the ShafiCI ulema lent their weight to one 
side, and in 1005 the dispossessed claimant transferred to Baihaq. 
At Baihaq, too, a quarrel began among the sayyids over a question 
173 
of precedence and was ultimately referred to the Sultan in Ghazna. 
Where a considerable portion of a town's population was ShiCI, 
the Naqib was the natural leader and spokesman for the whole town, 
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with a position corresponding to that of the Ra'is. Like him, 
the Naqib was in a semi-official position vis-\-vis the central 
government, as surety for the good behaviour of the ShiCI community. 
The Sultamfor their part treated the Naqibs with some deference. 
When at the outset of his reign, MasCud was at Ray, he was concerned 
to win over the notables of the city, newly conquered from the 
BUyids. He gave robes of honour to several of the acyan, but it 
was the S!qi, the Ra'Is and the Naqib of the CAlids who got more 
expensive ones than the rest, and the importance accorded here to 
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the religious leaders, both orthodox and ShiCI, is notable. 
Because they came generally from the educated classes and 
375. 
perhaps because of their prestige as descendants of the Prophet, 
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the Sultans sometimes used sayyids as diplomatic envoys. The 
social standing of the sayyid.s of Khurasan in the 11th century is 
shown by their marriage connections with the highest families. 
A branch of the famous Arab family of Muhallabis which had settled 
in Nishapur in the middle of the lOth century and had subsequently 
become frequent holders of the riyasa at Baihaq, gave a daughter 
in the early years of the llth century to the local sayyids. In 
the next century a collateral branch of Ni~am al-Mulk's family 
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became allied to the sayyids of Baihaq. In numbers and material 
strength, the sayyids were a growing influence. In 1095 we hear of 
the sayyids of Sabzawar collecting a military force of their own, 
marching to a neighbouring settlement in the Baihaq oasis, KhusrG-
jird, breaking down its gate and burning down one of its quarters 
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in revenge for an insult to one of the leading sayyids of Sabzawar. 
Sayyids were among the richest men in Khurasan in this century; one 
Abii'l-ijasan M~ammad b. Mull-ammad, who taught in the two Friday 
mosques of Nishapur in Majalis al-imla', had great estates, property, 
merchandise and trading capital in Samarqand. 
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Several centuries 
later, under the ~afavids, the sayyids were to become dominant in 
Persia; though still very much a minority in our period, the bases 
for this triumph were quietly being laid. 
It has been remarked that the Ghaznavids were prepared to leave 
the moderate ShiCis in peace, provided that the latter eschewed all 
376. 
interference in politics. Towards ShiCI extremists,- however, the 
Sultans were implacably hostile. The IsmaCilis were suspect 
because of their religious and social radicalism, their wide intell-
actual appeal, and above all, for their political linkage with the 
In Persia and Transoxania the IsmaCilis seem to 
have aimed especially at converting the ruling classes to their 
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doctrines. The Ghaznavid Sultans were anxious to demonstrate their 
orthodoxy and their support for the Abbasids; the happy outcome of 
the execution of the daCI at-Taharti was that "when the newsof the -
execution of the envoy from Egypt reached Baghdad and the firmness 
of the Sultan's faith became known, the tongues of calumniators 
and the reproofs of censorious ones were silenced, and his name was 
always mentioned with praise' and honoured at the court of the 
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Commander of the Faithful". 
The IsmaCili daCwa seems to have begun work in Khurasan around 
the opening of the lOth century, after it had already been active 
for some fifty years previously in Ray and Jibal. The succession 
of the Khurasanian daCis in the first half of the lOth century is 
known from a list in Maqrizi's history of the Fi~imid Caliphate, 
the Ittica~ al~9.unafa'. The succession after 943 is obscure, but 
at least one later d~CI is mentioned, and the well-known daCI Abu 
YaCqub Sijistani worked in Sistan till he was executed by the Amir 
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Khalaf b. A4mad {reigned 964-1003). We have little explicit 
detail about IsmaCili activity in Nishapur during the Ghaznavid 
period, but IsmaCilism retained adherents there as it did in many 
377. 
of the cities of Transoxania and of Buyid Persia. 
were always - and had to be - expert practitioners of taqiya. 
The Karami leader Abu Bakr Muqammad was active in Nishapur persec-
uting IsmaCilis, who had become bold enough openly to build their 
own mosque {see above, 356 ). Sultan Ma~mud himself harried 
the so-called Qarmathians of Multan; Sind was the one region of the 
eastern Islamic world where the IsmaCilis for a while secured 
temporal power. Furthermore, he celebrated the conquest of Ray from 




The Dhimmis were not so prominent in Khurasan in this period 
as they were in Iraq and western Persia. Maqdisi attributes to 
the province "many Jews, few Ghristians and various classes of 
184 
Zoroastrians". On the eastern fringes of Khurasan, Buddhism 
had been the major cultural influence of pre-Islamic times, with 
the monastery (vihara) of Balkh achieving special fame. There had 
been a famous fire-temple near Nishapur, and the mountainous parts 
of Khurasan were some of the typical refuge-areas where Zoroastr-
ianism long persisted. Ibn Funduq mentions two ancient, sacred 
trees in the Baihaq oasis, which were venerated by the Zoroastrians; 
one of them was cut down by order of the Caliph al~utawakkil, but 
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the other remained standing till 537/1142-3. 
In the Sassanid period, Nestorian Christianity spread widely 
379. 
within the Persian empire, and its Patriarchal seat was in the 
capital, Ctesiphon. Most of the chief cities of Khurasan and 
the east, and to a lesser extent, those of Transoxania and Khwarizm, 
had by the end of the Sassanid period their own Christian commun-
ities, often with a bishop over them. These Christian communities 
in the Sassanid lands never enjoyed anything more than bare toler-
ance, for the Zoroastrian state church was a fiercely persecuting 
one. However, away from the direct surveillance of the Emperors 
in the west of Persia, the Christians of the eastern Iranian world 
enjoyed somewhat more freedom and tolerance. The Nestorian church 
had metropolitan sees of Parthia (se. the Nishapur area), Margiana 
(Merv), Herat, S1stan and the Caspian provinces, the first two of 
which achieved metropolitan status by the 6th century. In the 
province of Parthia, the diocese of Abarshahr ( =- Nishapur) is 
shown as united with that of fUs in the records of the Synod of 
497. In the early years of the 11th century, the Metropolitan of 
Merv was the most important Christian dignitary of Khurasan, but 
a Bishop of fijs is still mentioned as late as 1279. Nevertheless, 
the numbers of the Christians can never have been great, and they 
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must always have been a diminishing band in Khurasan. 
Jewish communities in Khurasan, such as those at Merv and Balkh, 
begin to be mentioned in the Islamic period from the late 9th 
century onwards, when their financial contributions for the support 
of the Mesopotamian academy of Pumbeditha are recorded. Not only 
was the Rabbanite-Karaite division present among the Jews there, but 
380. 
both the Rabbanite and Karaite Jews of Khurasan developed their 
own peculiarities of ritual and law which distinguished them from 
187 
their Mesopotamian co-religionists. The Jews in Persia seem 
to have been more numerous than the Christians, and towns of the 
Jews with the name "Yahudiyya" were found at Isfahan and in Guzgan, 
188 
at the later Maimana. 
The religious and intellectual strength of the eastern Persiam 
Dhimmi communities was by the 11th century weak, and they made no 
contributions to the cultural life of the Islamic world comparable 
with those of the more numerous Iraqi or Syrian or Egyptian commun-
ities. This may be in large part ascribed to their remoteness from 
the centres of spiritual life and enthusiasm in the west. The 
Nestorians spent much of their energy on the work of evangelising 
parts of Central Asia and the Far East, but the laxness of eccles-
iastioal lifernd the waning of faith in the eastern Iranian congreg-
ations was shown by several causes c~l~bres and scandals amongst 
189 
their hierarchy. We must also compare the brilliance and 
superiority of Muslim scholarship in Khurasan, which led many 
Dhimmis to desert their own faiths for that of Islam. 
Shaikh Abu SaCid's biography makes a few references to the non-
-Muslim communities of Nishapur in his day. The Shaikh's spiritual 
powers were shown on various occasions by the conversion of large 
numbers of Jews and Christians there; a similar achievement was 
recorded of the Kar~I leader Abu Yacqub fifty years before (see 
above, 355 ) . The Shaikh also converted Zoroastrians 
381. 
there. His conversion of forty of the Christians of Nishapur is 
described in detail. He was outside the church of the Christians 
(kilYsYya'yi Tarsayan). He called to the pictures of Christ and 
Mary hanging from a platform erected in front of the church to fall 
down if they acknowledged Mu~ammad and his religion as true; the 
pictures fell down with their faces towards the KaCba, and because 
of this miracle, several of the onlooking congregation were convert-
190 ed. 
The profession with which the Dhimmis were frequently associated 
in Islam, that of medicine, was still practised by them in the east 
during the Ghaznavid period. A Zoroastrian physician attended 
Shaikh Abu SaCid when he was ill, and was converted by his baraka. 
Although the Ghaznavid Sultans were such staunchly orthodox Sunnis, 
they did not scorn the use of DhimmY physicians; MasCud had a 
Jewish one called YaCqub-i Danyal, and Bahramshah a Christian one, 
Abu SaCd Mau~ili. 191 
Notes to Part III 
Chapter 1 
1. the respective roles of the eastern and western halves of the 
country in the development of Persian culture have been the 
subject of much argument among archaeologists and art histor-
ians: Sarre and Herzfeld have attributed the dominant role to 
the west, whereas Hartmann, Strzygowski and Diez have championed 
the east. Barthold attempted to harmonise the two views. See 
the discussion in Minorsky, "Geographical factors in Persian 
art", BSOS, IX, 1937-9, 647-52. 
2. Ibn Ba1~u~a, III, 7-8, describes crypto-Muctazila as a majority 
of the ulema of the Khwarizmian town of Zamakhshar, a century 
after the Mongol invasions; cf. also, Spuler, ~' 155-7. 
3. ijudud, 102-12; Le Strange, Eastern lands ~f the Caliphate, 382ff. 
4. YaCqubi, Kitab al-buldan, ed. A.W.T. Juynboll, Leiden 1861, 5; 
Curzon, Persia and the Persian question, London 1892, I, 8. 
5; Markwart, A catalogue of the provincial capitals of Eranshahr, 
ed. G. Messina, Rome 1931, 45-7, 52-3; idem, Eran!ahr, 74-8. 
The interpretation of "Abar-shahr" from "cloud-city" or "upper-
-city" is based on Volksetymologie. 
6. E. Herzfeld, "Khorasan: Denksmalsgeographische Stucl.ien zur 
Kulturgeschichte des !slams in Iran", Der Islam, XI, 1921, 
148-52. 
383. 
7. cf. YaCqub b. Laith's words to the Caliph's envoy in SN, eh. 
III, 15-16. 
8. I~~., 254; Maqd., 316; Ibn Baba, Kitab ra's mal an-nadim, f. 
196b. 
9. this feeling against officials from the old Buyid lands can 
be traced clearly in the sources. The SN, eh. X, 69, puts into 
Ma4IDud of Ghazna's mouth, as justification for his attack on 
Ray, that~ra,i dabirs are malevolent Ba~ini and Khariji sect-
arias, and that he is coming with an army of sincere, Muslim, 
~anafi Turks. A ra'Is of Isfahan denounced to Barkiyaruq how 
c - .. Iraq1s with IsmaCili sympathies had infiltrated into the diwans, 
so the Sultan began deliberately to favour Khurasanis at the 
expense of~raqis (Anushirwan b. Khalid, in Bundari, 95-6). 
Rawandi complains volubly that with the Khwarizmshahs' occup-
ation of Persia, tyrannical ciraqi "AshCari and Rafi41" officials 
have insinuated themselves into the administration, whereas 
the Seljuqs maintained the pure faith (Ra4.at a~~udur, 30-2). 
In all these cases, by "Iraq" is meant, of course, crraq CAjami, 
western Persia, as Rawandi specifies. 
Chapter 2 
10. cf. the list in Maqd., 323 ff., of the products of Bulghar 
imported through Khwarizm and those from the land of the Turks 
imported through Chach. 
11. Baih., 417. 
12. Muqammad b. al-Munawwar, Asrar at-ta~Id fi maqamat ash-shaikh 
Abi SaCid, ed. V. A. Zhukovsky, St. Petersburg, 1899, 140; 
TB, 53. 
13. Asrar at-tau~!d, 254; Muqammad b. Ibrah!m, Histoire des Sel-
joucides du Kerman, ed. Houtsma, Leiden 1886, 25-6, 49. 
14. Safar-nama, 106; Maqd., 321. 
15. Ibn al-Jauzi, al-Munta~am, VIII, 88, cf. Mez, Renaissance of 
2 
Islam, Eng. tr. 475; Maqd., 315; I~~., 282; I ijauq. , 452. 
16. ijudud, 103; I ijauq.; 434. On the inhibiting factor of fuel 
shortage, causing the abandonment of silver mining in Badghis, 
see ijudud, 104. There is a good modern description of the 
Dinar-Sari defile in C.E. Yate, Khurasan and Sistan, Edinburgh 
1900, 212-15, and an early one in Baih., 448-9. 
17. Yate, op. cit., 357. 
18. Maqd., 326; I~~., 258; I ijauq. 2 , 434; ath-ThaCalibi, La1a'if 
al~acarif, 115-16; Curzon, Persia and the Persian question, 
I, 264-7; E. Bretschneider, Mediaeval researches from eastern 
Asiatic sources, London 1910, I, 175. 
19. cf. Mez, op. cit., 459 ff., and C.S. Coon, Caravan, the story 
of the Middle East, London 1951, 165-8. 
20. Von Kremer, Cu1turgeschichte des Orients, II, 291.2. The cattabi 
and ,saqla1fini brocades of Nishapur were comparable with those 
of Baghdad and Isfahin, and the city produced an especially 
21. 
22. 
fine and this cloth named after itself, Sabfiri cloth (La1a'if 
al-macarif, 116). 
2 [ III, 75, 81. 
Maqd., 323; I~~., 255; I ijauq. , 452; ~~' 102, 105; I Ba11•, 
thus in Baihaq in the early 12th century, it was a cloth-merchant, 
Mll4ammad Bazzaz, who was accorded the title Fakhr at-Tujjar 
(TB, 128). 
23. Maqd., 336; al-Khwarizmi, Mafatiq al-Culfim, 67-8. 
24. Asrar at-ta~Id, 193-4, 219; TB, 111. On the rustaq as a unit 
of Khurasanian life, see B. Zahoder, "Selquklu devletinin 
kuru~urgu strastnda Horasan", Belleten, XIX, 1955, 496-7. On 
Nishapur in general, see E. Honigmann, EI1 Art. "Nishaplir", 
and his references to the literature, and especially to Marquart, 
Eran~ahr, 74-5, Le Strange, Eastern lands, 382-8, and Curzon, 
op. cit., I, 260 ff. 
25. Asrar at-ta~Id, 126-7, cf. R. A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic 
mysticism, Cambridge 1921, 40-1; Mustaufi, Nuzhat al-qulUb, tr. 
Le Strange, 147-8. 
26. Maqd., 315; J.B. Fraser, Narrative of a journey into Khorasan 
in the years 1821 and 1822, London 1825, 391; Clavijo, Embassy 
to Tamerlane, tr. Le Strange, London 1928, 181-3. 
27. Maqd., 326 n. e; La~a'if al-macarif, 114-15; cf. Mez, Renaissance 






Maqd., 313, 319; Samoan!, Kitab al-amsab, GMS facs., London 1912, 
f. 3la; Yate, Khurasan and Sistan, 180. 
MuCin ad-Din Zamchi, Rauqat al-jannat fi au~af Harat, f. 36b. 
TB, 146-7. 
2 Maqd., 300; I~~., 274; I ijauq. , 446. 
2 Maqd., 313, 325; I~~., 281; I ijauq. , 445, 452; Fraser, op. cit., 
Appx. B, [41]; Yate, op. cit., 362-3, and also, 183-4, on the 
importance of the chamans of Khurasan at the end of the last 
century. 
33. on the qanat, see Quatremere, Histoire des Sultans Mongols de 
la Parse, Paris 1836, 183 n. 50, with further references to 
European travellers; Curzon, Persia and the Persian question, 
I, 115 n. 1; Lambton, Landlord and peasant, 217 ff.; A. Smith, 
Blind white fish in Persia, London 1953, passim. In early 
34. 
386. 
Islamic times the people of Ray were famed for their skill 
at tunneling (Minorsky, Abu Dulaf MisCar ibn Muhalhil's travels 
in Iran {c. 950 A.D.), 53). 
2 Maqd., 329; I~~., 255; I ijauq. , 433; Yaqut, MuCjam, IV, 857; 
Nuzhat al=qulub, tr. 147; Mez, Renaissance of Islam, 414-15; 
Frye, "City chronicles of Central Asia and Khurasan. The Ta'rix-
-i Nie'~pur", Togan armaganr, 413. 
35. the Merv system was dealt with by Barthold, "K istorii Mervatt, 
ZVOIARO, XIX, 1909, 115-38; for Qum see ijasan al-Qummi, Ta'rikh-i 
Qum, ed. Sayyid Jalal ad-Din, Tehran 1313/1935, 40-56; and for 
Qazwrn, ijamdttllah Mustaufi Qazwini, Ta'rikh-i guzida, GMS facs., 
833 - -
36. 
London 1910,/abr!dged tr. Browne, London 1913, 228-9. 
2 
Ta'rikh-i Qum, 40-53; I~~., 255; I ijauq. , 433; Mafati~ al-
-culnm, 68-9; Fraser, Narrative of a journey into Khurasan, 406; 
cf. Mez, op. cit., 449 ff. The technical terminology of the 
Diwan al~a• explained in the Mafati4 al-Culfim, 68-72, relates 
primarily to the irrigation system of Merv. 
37. elaborated in his Oriental despotism; but his whole thesis has 
been trenchantly criticised by E. Pulleyblank in JESHO, I/3, 1958. 
38. Lambton, Landlord and peasant, 269, 275, 311-12. 
39. Ta'rikh-i guzida, loc. cit. 
40. Ta'rikh-i Qum, loc. cit. and 240 ff.; Lambton, "An account oft 
the Tarikhi Qumm", ~' XII, 1947-8, 589-90. 
41. Rauqat al-jannat fi au~af Harat, ff. 66a-b; Gard., 8. 
42. Kaqd., 320 n. s, 333-4. For the Mikalis, see below, Ch. 5. 
386 fl· 
Chapter 3 
43. cf. G.E. von Grunebaum, "The structure of the Muslim town", in 
Islam, essays in the nature and growth of a cultural tradition, 
London 1955, 144-5. 
44. cf. Herzfeld, "Khorasan: Denk:smalsgeographische Studien 
172. 
" . . . . ' 
45. Maqd., 316. Baih., 47, mentions a mu~alla constructed by 
YaCqub b. Laith in Nishapur. 
46. 
47. 
cf. Mez, Renaissance of Islam, 412; Von Grunebaum, op. cit., 148. 
2 
I~t., 254-5; I ijauq. , 432-3; cf. Le Strange, Eastern lands, 
383-4. 
48. Maqd., 33, 315-16. Cf. also the satirical verses about Nishapur 
given in Yaqut, MuCjam, IV, 859. 
49. Curzon, ·Persia and the Persian question, I, 262. 
50. Fraser, Narrative of a journey into Khurasan, 388. 
51. Mustaufi, Nuzhat al-qulub, tr. 147. 
52. TB, 53. 
53. TN, 75, tr. I, 380-1. 
54. cf. Herzfeld, op. cit., 160-3, with a list of information on 
building materials in Persia compiled from the Arab geographer,, 
and A. Godard, "Khoras'in", Athar-e Iran, Anna:Y,~ du service arch-
~ologique de l'Iran, IV, 1949, 7-150. 
55. Safar-nama, 4, 5, 8-9, 12, 14-17, 63. 
56. Baih., 359, 484, 608-9. 
57. ibid., 38, 149, 395. Material on Shadyakh has been assembled 
by SaCid Nafisi in the notes to his edition of Baihaqi, II, 897-
-914. 
58. CUtbi, II, 125-8; Jurb., 200-2; TB, 175-6; IA, IX, 158; cf. 
Turkestan, 287-8. 
59. Safar-nama, 1-2, 70. 
60. ibid., 25, 109. 
61. ibid., 14-15, 45, 54-5, 69. 
Chapter 4 
62. Maqd., 36. 
63. ibid., 37, 323. I ijauq. 2, 439, 441, mentions pockets of Khawarij 
in the countryside of Badghis. On the ZaCfaraniyya, see al-
Baghdadi, al-Farq bain al-firaq, tr. A.s. Halkin, Tel-Aviv 1935, 
11-12. 
64. cf. G.H. Sadighi, Lea mouvements religieux iraniens, Paris 1938, 
and Spuler, Iran, 196-206. 
65. Gard., 37-8; IA, VIII, 216. 
66. Subki, ~abaqat ash-ShafiCiyyat al-kubra, Cairo 1323-4/1905-6, 
II, 176-8; I Khall., tr. II, 605-6. 
67. !aqut, MuCjam, II, 512. 
68. Maqd., 323. 
69. it is noteworthy that this division was originally introduced 
by the Arabs, according to the Ta'rikh-i Sistan, 336. This 
same source mentions another taca~~ub there which arose in the 
town of Uq in 341/952-3 between the Shanguliyan and the {?) 
zaturuqitan; its basis is unknown, but it was still of signif-
icance a century later (ibid., 325, cf. 364-5, 367). 
388. 
10. Maqd., 336. The question of the ca~abiyyat of the towns of 
Iran has recently been examined by Cahen, with particular refer-
ence to Maqdisi's information; see his Mouvements populaires et 
autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du moyen agw, Leiden 
1959 (originally in Arabica, V-VI, 1958-9), [27]- [30]. 
71. cf. Spuler, ~' 437, and Cahen, op. cit., [36] ff., who dist-
inguishes the ~aCalik as essentially rural and the cayyarffn as 
urban groups. 
72. Gard., 23-4; TS, 297 ff.; IA, VIII, 52-3, under 300 A.H. 
73. IA, IX, 409, under 445 A.H. 
74. IA, X, 17, under 455 A.H. 
75. Gard., 11; TS, 192 ff. and passim, esp. 328 and 363, where 
officers of the cayyaran, sarhangan and naqiban, are mentioned; 
Naldeke, Sketches from eastern history, tr, J.S. Black, Edinburgh 
1892, 177-9; Barthold, "Zur Geschichte der ~affariden", N~ldeke-
I, 
-Festschrift, Giessen 1906,Al77-B7; Cahen, op. cit., [47]- [48]. 
76. cf. IA, IX, 126 (393 A.H.), 246 (416 A.H.), and passim 
77. Baih., 423, 426-9; IA, IX, 296; cf. Minorsky, Ell Art. "':t'iis". 
78. Spuler, Iran, 121. 
79. Zakhoder, "Selguklu devletinin kurulu11u srras!nda Horasanu, 518-19. 
80. Baih., 423, 426. 
81. ibid., 536. According to Ahmad Ali Kohzad, "Along the Koh-i 
Baba and Hari Rud", Afghanistan, Kabul, VI/1, 1951, 2-4, the 
northern route via Mazar-i Sharif from Kabul to Herat is 830 
miles, the sou~hern one via Sistan 726 miles but the central 
route through Ghiir only 540, or by an alternative route, 628 miles. 
82. Ma qd., 316, 319 n. c; TB, 28; cf. IA, X, 366, under 510 A.H., 
where long years of friction culminated in the razing of the 
Mashhad CAli by the Sunnis of TUs. 
83. TB, 51, 124, 267. 
84. at Samarqand in 1004, when the head of the local cayyars 
brought 3000 men to the Samanid al-Munta~ir's side against the 
Ilig Khan Na~r (Gard., 64; CUtbi, I, 341; Jurb., 147). 
85. TB, 51, 59, 97, 267, 274-5. 
Chapter 5 
86. that rulers should choose their ministers, secretaries, etc. 
from families which specialised in those professions is a 
common recommendation of the Mirrors for Princes; see for exam-
ple, Adab al~uluk, ff. 36b (Vizier), 39b (Mustaufi), 43b (Chief 
ijajib), and SN, eh. XLII, 176 ff. (Vizier). 
87. TB, 172. 
88. Asrar at-tat14Id, 133-4; TB, 126; Frye, "City chronicles of 
Central Asia and Khurasan. The Ta'rix-i NI~apiTr", 407-8. 
89. L. Gardet and M.M. Anawati, Introduction a la th~ologie musul-
~' Paris 1948, 60-2; W.M. Watt, EI2 Art. "AshCariyya". 
90. al-Farisi, as-siyaq li-ta'rikh Nishabur, ff. 46b, 5la. 
91. Asrar at-tau~Id, 17-18, 22-3; cf. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic 
mysticism, 6. 
92. see for example, Spuler, Die goldene Horde, die Mongolen in 
Russland 1223-1502, Leipzig 1943, 219. 
93. Asr~r at-ta~!d, 18-22, 84 ff. (cf. Nicholson, op. cit., 28-32), 
133-5; Kashf al~a~jub, tr. Nicholson, London 1936, xii, cf. 




ijaramain's father,/Abu Mu~ammad Juwaini, was equally violently 
opposed to the Shaikh when·he first came to Nishapur. 
94. Baih., 209. It is probable that Maqmud gave his allegiance to 
the ijanafi rite, after perhaps an early flirtation with the 
Karamiyya (see below, Ch. 6). There does not seem to be any 
support in the historical sources for the anecdote in I Khall., 
tr. III, 342-3, which is given on the authority of the Imam al-
~aramain's Mughith al-khalq fi ikhtiyar al-a9aqq, of the 
Sultan's changing from ijanafism to ShafiCism, although it may 
have been tales like this which led Subki to include a section 
on Maqmud and his father in his T.abaqat, IV, 14 ff. 
95. Baih., 210. 
96. as-Siyaq li-ta'rikh NJshabur, ff. 4lb, 42a, etc. 
97. op. cit., ff. 74a-b; al-Munta~am, VIII, 108. 
98. Asrar at-ta~Id, 91; Baih., 38, 198; cutbi, II, 330-1; Jurb., 260. 
99· Baih., 40-1 (cf. Lambton, Landlord and peasant, 51 n.3), 211. 
100. Baih., 198, 376. 
101. ibid., 536. 
102. ibid., 49; Samcani, Ansab, f. 31a, cf. Baih., 359; a1-Munta~am, ---- --
1oc. cit. 
103. Samcani, f. 31b; a1-Farisi, as-Siyaq li-ta'rikh Nishabfir, f. 
74b; a1-Munta~am, 1oc. cit. Various other members of the family 
are mentioned by al-Farisi and in the TB. 
104. cutbi, II, 28; Jurb., 112. Samcani, f. 352a, makes Abu Tayyib 
and his father Abu Sah1 Mu~ammad ijanafis, but I Kha11., tr. I, 
606-7, correctly makes him a ShafiCI, as also appears fro~ 
Subki's article on the father (T.abaqat, II, 161-3). 
Confusion seems to have arisen from the fact that the SaClUki 
family was originally ijanafi, but many members adopted ShafiCism 
(cf. ibid., II, 98, where Abu ~ayyib's paternal uncle, Abu ~ayyib 
391. 
!4mad, is described as al-ijanafi nasaban ash-5hafiCI madhhaban). 
105. Baih., 198-9. "Tabani" is the spelling given by Samcani, f. 
l03a, who derives this nisba from a place at wasi~. 
106. Baih., 689. 
107. ibid.' 208-10. 
108. ibid.' 83-4, 197-8, 211, 425, 528-9; cf. Turkestan, 294-5, 299-
-300. 
109. Samcani, f. 346b; cutbi, I, 375 ff.; Jurb., 158. 
110. al-Farisi, ff. 38a-39b; Samcani, ff. 346b-347a; Iaqut, Irshad, 
II, 348-9; Subki, Tabaqat, III, 117-29 (deriving from al-Farisi). 
Al-Farisi also considered IsmaCil ~abiTni's brother Abu YaCla 
Is4aq, the former's son and his two daughters, as worthy of 
mention as scholars (ff. 39a-b, 46b, 63a, 66b). 
111. Asrar at-tau4.Id, 156-7, 166-7, 194, 257 (cf. Nicholson, Studies 
in Islamic mysticism, 73), 294. 
112. Samcani, f. 548b. 
113. TS, 237, 273. 
114. Yaqut, Irshad, VI, 490; I Khall., tr. III, 40; Subki, Tabaqat, 
II, 145. 
115. Samcani, ff. 548b-549b. A large amount of material on the 
Mikali family has been assembled by SaCid Nafisi in the notes 
to his edition of Baihaqi, III, 969-1009, with a genealogical 
table on p. 1008. On the orthography of the name Mikali, see 
SaCid Nafisi, op. cit., III, 969. 
Yatimat ad-dahr, IV, 417-18. 
116. Maqd., 186; samcani,~548b~549a. There is also a notice of him in~ 
117. Baih., 18, 286-7, 290 ff. 
118. ibid., 246-7, 357, 360; al-Munta~am, VIII, 69. On the ghashiya, 
see Quatremere, Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks, I, i, 3-7. There 
is a brief notice of Khwaja CAli in Tatimmat al-yatima, II, 106-7. 
392. 
119. Samcani, f. 549a; Maqd., 320 n. s, 333-4. 
120. Baih., 481, 484; Gard., 100-2; IA, IX, 359. 
121. CUtbi, II, 34-5; Jurb., 173-4; Baih., 373; al-Farisi, f. 85b; 
TB, 117 (Ibn Funduq mentions the Mikaliyan only briefly; they 
were not essentially a Baihaq family). There is a long section 
on Abu 1 1-F'agl 1 s literary works in Yatimat ad-dahr, IV, 354-81. 
122. cutbi, II, 321; Jurb., 257; Athar al~zara', f. llla. 
123a Bailla, 3ee Q, Naea'im al a'i!!!,, f£. 77b 78&, At'bar aJ MRHli:Pi 1 , 
123. Baih., 146; CUtbi, II, 326; Jurb., 258; Athar al~zara 1 , ff. 
lllb, 113b. 
124. Baih., 366-8, Nasa 1im al-as~ar, ff. 77b-78a, Athar al-wuzara 1, 
ff. 112a-114a, describing in detail the process by which ijasanak 
was chosen. 
125. Baih., 181-3 ~ Elliot and Dowson, History of India, II, 91-3; 
Gard., 96-7; IA, IX, 239; al-Munta~am, VIII, 16; Athar al-
-wuzara1, f. lllb, according to which the khilCat was torn 
into four pieces and burnt at Ghazna. 
126. Baih., 52, 64, 178-89 ~ Elliot and Dowson, op. cit., II, 88-
100; Gard., loc. cit. 
127. SaCid Nafisi, op. cit., III, 996; Baih., 187-9. 
128. ibid., 38, 187, 395, 411; TB, 108-9. 
129. Baih., 186; CUtbi, II, 328-9; Jurb., 258-9. 
130. Baih., 610. 
131. ~., 23, 36, 247. 
132. thus at Mazinan in the Baihaq oasis, Sultan Maqmud appointed 
a man as ra 1is and deputy of the civil governor of Khurasan, 
and the man's descendants continued to be rulers of the district 
(TB, 169). 
133. cf. SN, eh. IV, 26; Zakhoder, "Sel~uklu devletinin kurulu~u 
srras!nda Horasan", 510; Turkestan, 234. 
393. 
134. Baih., 40-1, 129, 184. 
Chapter 6 
135. this chapter is based on Bosworth, "The rise of the Karamiyyah 
in Khurasan", MW, L, 1960, 5-14. For further references to the 
sect, see ibid., 5 n. 1, to which should be added L. Massignon, 
Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique 
musulmane, Paris 1922, 230-42. 
136. references in Bosworth, op. cit., 6 n. 2. The persistence of 
the sect in Ghar down to the end of the 12th century is attested 
to in several sources; see further, Bosworth, "The early Islamic 
history of Ghur", to appear shortly in the Central Asiatic 
Journal. 
137. references in Bosworth, "The rise of the Karamiyyah:in Khurasan", 
7-8 ns. 6, 8, 10. 
138. Samcani, f. 477a. 
139. TS, 339; CUtbi, II, 310; Jurb., 254. 
140. according to an anecdote in the Athar al-wuzara', ff. lllb-
112a, Maqmud was originally a great admirer of the sect and its 
holy men; but see Bosworth, op. cit,, 9 n. 13. 
141. CUtbi, II, 77, 310-11; Jurb., 182, 254. 
142. CUtbi, II, 311-2; Jurb., 254. Ma~d himself followed this 
ugly practice of extorting money from citizens in return for a 
certificate attesting to sound belief; cf. IA, IX, 283 (the first 
page of this numbering). 
143. cutbi, II, 237-50; Jurb., 237-9; Gard., 71; Samcani, f. 102b; 
Subki, IV, 16, quoting the lost history of Herat by Qa4I Abu 
Na~r Fami. 
144. al-Farisi, f. 3b (this passage translated in Bosworth, op. cit., 
13-14); Asrar:at-tau~Id, 84 ff., cf. 119, 163; Subki, III, 52-4, 
68. 
145. cutbi, II, 311; Jurb., 254; Asrar at-tau9Id, 89. 
146. cutbi, II, 311-25; Jurb., 254-8; cf. Turkestan, 289-90. Al-
though this period in Nishapur, when the riyasa was in religious 
hands, proved to be exceptional there, this became the norm in 
other parts of eastern Islam. In particular, Bukhara had several 
lines of local religious leaders who wielded very great author-
ity within the city. For the most famous of these, the ~udur 
of the Al-i Burhan, see Turkestan, 326-7, 353-5, and o. Pritsak, 
"Al-i Burhan", Der Islam, XXX, 1952, 81-96. 
147. IA, X, 171; TB, 268-9, recording this fitna as occurring in 
~afar 489. 
148. see SaCid Nafisi, notes to his edition of Baihaqi, II, 964-7. 
Chapter 7 
149. Kashf al-ma~jub, tr. 134, 174. Elsewhere in his book, Hujwiri 
laments the decline of ~ufism in "his own country", but as V. A. 
Zhukovsky has pointed out, this can only mean the Ghazna region 
("Persian Suf~sm", BSOS, V, 1928-30 [=a tr. of the literary 
parts of the preface to his edition of Hujwiri's text, Lenin-
grad 1926], 481-7. 
150. Asrar at-ta~Id, 127, 134-5; Kashf al-ma4jub, tr. 21. 
395. 
151. Asrar at-ta~Id, 179, cf. 109-10. 
152. ibid., 104, 126-7, 161. 
153. ibid., 151, 159, 194, 208. 
154. ibid., 84, 113-5, 147-8, 419, 435. 
155. ibid., 211, where m~ibban are described as coming from the 
ahl-i dunya u bazariyan. 
156. ibid., 110. 
157. ibid., 120, 131-2. 
158. ibid., 84, 119, 163. 
159. ibid., 97-8; I. Goldziher, Vorlesungen uber den Islam, Heidel-
berg, 1910, 175-6; Zhukovsky, "Persian Sufiism", 478-9; cf. 
Nicholson, Studies in Islamic mysticism, 33 ff. 
160. Asrar at-tau~Id, 84-91; Nicholson, op. cit., 28-33. 
161. Asrar at-ta~Id, 275-8, 294. 
162. IA, IX, 247; Asrar at-tau4,Id, 453-7. The reiging Sultan in 
1049 was CAbd ar-Rashid b. Ma~mud. 
163. Baih., 513. KBpruluzade Mehmed Fuad observes that clipped 
beards and long, drooping moustaches were also a feature of 
Central Asian shamans (Influence du chamanisme turco-mongol 
sur les ordres mystiques musulmans, Istanbul 1929, 19). 
164. "Selguklu devletinin k:urului§U srrasrnda Horasan", 513-6. 
165. Asrar at-ta~Id, 14. 
166. ibid., 205-6; Zakhoder, op. cit., 516. 
396. 
Chapter 8 
167. according to Maqd., 323, "the children of CAli are held in 
the highest esteem there [se. in Khurasan]". 
168. CUtbi, II, 247-9; Jurb., 238-9. 
169. TB, 254-5, cf. 54 ff. Al-Farisi mentions the family under the 
biography of Sayyid Abu Man~ur ~afar b. Mu~ammad b. A~mad b. 
Mu~ammad b. Zabbara (d. 410/1019) (as-Siyaq li-ta'rikh Nishabur, 
ff. 77b-78a). 
170. ibid., ff. 59b-60a, 63b, cf. also, 6lb, 78a, 79a. 
171. TB, 55. 
172. cf. C. van Arendonck, EI1 Art. "Sharif"; Mez, Renaissance of 
Islam, 147-55; i.M. Uzun~ar~Il!, Osmanl! devleti te§kilat!na 
medhal, Istanbul 1941, 11. 
173. TB, 55-6, 255. 
174. at Amul in Gurgan, the Naqib was the town's spokesman against 
Sultan MasCud's claims (Baih., 460 ff.; see above, Part I, 
175. Baih., 23. 
176. ibid., 17; it is also recorded that MasCud's enemy CAlitigin 
employed them (ibid., 349). 
177. TB, 57-8, 77, 92. 
178. ibid., 269; the Seljuq Arslan Arghun demolished the main wall 
and citadel of Sabzawar as a punishment for this. 
179. al-Farisi, f. 14b. 
180. cf. S.M. Stern, "The early IsmaCI11 missionaries in north-west 
Persia and in Khurasan and Transoxania", BSOAS, XXIII, 1960, 
81-2. 
397. 
181. Jurb., 239. 
182. Stern, O;E• ci t., 77-90. 
183. Stern, "IsmaCili propaganda and Fa~imid rule in Sind", re, 
XXIII, 1949, 298, 303; Nazim, Sul~an Ma~ud, 83, 96-9. 
Cha;Eter 9 
184. Maqd., 323. 
185. TB, 281-3; cf. Barthold, "Zur Geschichte des persischen Epostt, 
ZDMG, XCVIII, 1944, 141-2. 
186. Marquart, Eran~ahr, 75-6; Sachau, "Zur Ausbreitung des Christen-
turns in Asien", AbhPAW, 1919, No. 1, 17-21, 63-8; A. Mingana, 
"The early spread of Christianity in Central Asiaa a new docu-
ment", BJRL, IX, 1925, 318-20; on Christianity in Khurasan and 
Transoxania, Barthold, Zur Geschichte des Christentums in 
Mittel-Asien, Tfibingen-Leipzig, 1901, 21 ff.; on the Christians 
of Persia, Spu1er, Iran, 209-15. 
187. W.J. Fischel, "The Jews of Central Asia (Khorasan) in mediaeval 
Hebrew and Islamic literature", Historia Judaica, New York, VII, 
33-47; on the Jews in Persia, see Spu1er, Iran, 215-7. 
188. Mez, Renaissance of Islam, 37; ~udud, 107, 131; Le Strange, 
Eastern lands of the Caliphate, 203-4, 424-5. 
189. Mez, O:E• cit., 33 n. 
190. Asrar at-tau~Id, 120-1, 143, 168-70. 
191. ibid., 145-6; Baih., 235; Adab a1-muluk, ff. 13a-b, tr. 197-8. 
Part IV 
The appearance of the Seljuqs 
Chapter One 
Introductory: the early connections of the Turks 
with the Islamic world 
From the 11th century onwards, the Islamic world became increas-
ingly ruled by Turkish dynasties. Although this meant changes in 
the direction of supreme political power, the Islamic world did 
not in the Great Seljuq period become significantly more oriental-
ised; the Mongol invasions were more notable in this respect. But 
the coming of the Turks did bring changes in the economic and social 
sphere, in particular, with regard to land tenure and land utilisat-
ion. Relative to the existing population, the numbers of the incoming 
nomads were not large, and for long the Seljuqs felt themselves to 
1 be a small band among a potentially hostile non-Turkish majority. 
But pastoral nomadism is an extensive and in many ways wasteful 
way of life, and the Turkmens' beasts did considerable damage to 
the existing rural economies of many parts of the Middle East (see 
400. 
below, Part V, 502-4 ). On the other hand, many of the 
changes in land tenure in the Persian world had already begun 
under the Buyids, and the Turkish and Mongol invasions merely 
speeded up processes already in movement. 
European orientalists have often viewed the decline of the 
S~manids and their replacement by Turkish dynasties with a certain 
sadness as marking the final victory of Turan in its long struggle 
with Iran. The Shah-hama is given an autumnal, elegiac quality 
2 
and made the swan-song of old Iran. It is true that oven the last 
two millenia the frontiers of the Indo-Iranian world have gradually 
shrunk southwards; whereas in classical times Indo-European peoples 
like the Massagetae, Scyths, Alans and Sakae roamed the steppes 
from the Ukraine to the Tien-shan, almost all the lands north of 
the Atrek and the upper Oxus are today Turkish. It is also true 
that Firdausi considered that there was a natural antipathy between 
the two racial groups, "two elements, fire and water, which rage 
3 
against each other in the depths of the heart". Yet it seems un-
likely that Firdausi .Meant to write an allegorised account of the 
fall of the Samanid empire; the work of turning the exploits of the 
old Iranian heroes into poetic form had already been begun by 
Daqiqi at a time when the Samanids were at their apogee. 
Although Firdausi makes the Oxus the traditional boundary between 
Ir~n and TUran, and although the defence of the north-eastern frontier 
against pressure from Central Asia has always been one of Persia's 
historic roles, there was never in practice a hard-and-fast division 
401. 
between the two racial groups. Turkish peoples had long been famil-
iar to the Iranians, for the successive invasions of steppe peoples 
had brought them ,into the Iranian world and had often left pockets 
of them behind when the tide of invasion had receded. Some of these 
incomers seem to have been Indo-European, at least in leadership, e.g. 
the Sakae and Kushans, but others, like the Ephthalites or White Runs, 
were Turkish or Mongol in origin. Moreover, we are speaking here 
of confederations of peoples, which often comprised many differing 
racial elements. 
The valleys and upland pastures of the upper Oxus lands were 
especially attractive to Central Asian peoples. Several of the emp-
ires founded by these peoples centred on this region, from which 
armies could be sent out into Persia or into the Indian plain; the 
Ephthalites, whose rulers bore the Turkish princely title of "Tigin", 
ruled from Bamiyan. 4 In the early Islamic period there were Turkish 
elements in much of what is now Afghanistan, and in Ghaznavid times 
Khalaj and Oghuz Turks nomadised on the plateau between Kabul, Ghazna 
and Bust (see further, above, Part I, 92-3 ). 5 Thus the east-
ern margins of Khurasan had admixtures of Turkish peoples from an 
early date, and it is likely that by the time Firdausi wrote, the 
stark antithesis of Iran and TUr~n was more a literary and historical 
preconception of the Persian national consciousness than an exact 
description of the state of affairs. J~i~, a sympathetic observer 
of the ShuCubiyya movement but an Arab himself, seems to have seen 
this. He recognised that there was a difference between Turk and 
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Khurasani, but did not place a rigid barrier between the two: 
"The difference between the Turk and Khurasani is not like the 
difference between the Persian and the Arab, or between Rumi and 
~aqlabi or Zanji and ijabashi, let alone what is even more dispar-
ate in constitution and in the difference separating it; on the 
contrary, it is like the difference between the Meccan and Medinan, 
or Bedouin and sedentary, or plainsman and mountaineer, or like the 
difference between the mountain-dwelling ~ayyi' tribesman and the 
plains-dwelling ~ayyi' ". 6 
Transoxania and Khwarizm were in intimate geographical and econ-
omic contact with the Turkish steppes. At the time of the Arab con-
quest Transoxania was a politically decentralised region of city-
-states, and its dominant social classes those of the feudal land-
owners or dihqans and the merchants. These Iranian governing 
classes always resisted heavy-handed and unintelligent control from 
outside, for their trade interests demanded that the':caravan routes 
across Asia be kept open, and this meant skill and conciliation in 
dealing with the peoples who controlled these routes. 
When there was internal disturbance, or when aggression from 
outside was threatened, the Transoxanian leaders not infrequently 
called in Turks as a counterbalancing force, either Turks from outside 
or else from those already settled within the region's borders. 
Narshakhi relates how the first settlers of the Bukhara oasis came 
from "Turkestan", i.e. the east. Later, a group of dihqans and 
rich merchants fled from the tyranny of the Amir of the oasis, Abruy, 
to the Taraz area and founded there the city of JamUkat. Meanwhile, 
at Bukhara itself, other dihqans and nobles called in the Turkish 
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Yabghu, Qara Jurin Turk (identified by Marquart as Ist~mi, ruler of 
the western Tiu-kiu, thus placing these events in the second half of 
the 6th century), against the oppressor Abruy. On the latter's 
defeat, Qara Jurin Turk's son Shir-i Kishvar (se. Il-Arslan) founded 
7 the city of Bukhara proper and reigned there for twenty years. 
In this case, Turks were called in from outside, but on other 
occasions, locally-resident ones were used. The rulers of Soghd 
used Turks from Ilaq, Chach, Farghana and Tukharistan against the 
Arab invaders, and these may have been residents of long standing 
or even aboriginals in Transoxania. BirUni and BalCami speak of 
the ancient border of iran and Tilran as being at Mezduran (which 
they explain as marz-i TITran) between Mashhad and Sarakhs. The 
legends centred round Afrasyab localise his exploits in Transoxania 
and his tomb at Ramitin near Bukhara. According to Ma~ud Kash-
ghari, all Transoxania was once a Turkish land,"but when the Iran-
ians (al-Furs) became numerous, it became just like Persian territ-
8 a 
ory". We are left with a general picture of/Transoxania which 
was not only familiar with Turks as mercenaries, slaves and traders, 
but also with them as local settlers and :landowners. 
A further factor was the economic and commercial links of Khwar-
izm and Transoxania with the Eurasian steppe. They received the 
products of the Volga lands, of Arctic Siberia or of China, and 
distributed them to the Islamic lands further south. For at this 
time, despite the distances involved, Khwarizm and Transoxania had 
direct links with the heartlands of the Caliphate. Already in the 
9th century commerce was sufficiently organised for the melons of 
Khwarizm (over which Ibn Ba~~u~a was later to become very rhapsod-
ical) to be sent in snow-packed containers to Baghdad; and the 
Abbasid Caliphs and their Viziers held valuable estates in Transox-
9 
ania and Khwarizm. The northern frontiers of Transoxania, such 
as the province of Isfijab, bristled with riba~s against the pagan 
Oghuz, KimHk and Qfpchaq, and ghazi warfare was endemic there. 
Nevertheless, there were long periods of peace during which normal 
normal life went on; despite its frontier position, the town of 
Isfijab was a populous agricultural and commercial centre which 
10 
dealt with the products of the steppes. Khwarizm was especially 
dependent on commerce for its prosperity and had connections with 
the Volga and Urals region. As early as Qutaiba b. Muslim's time 
there was an influential Jewish colony there with its own rabbis, 
and in the lOth century Khwarizmian traders used the Muslim kingdom 
of Bulghar as a base for their activities in western Siberia and in 
eastern Europe, where numerous place names attest to their trading 
colonies. 11 
In a region like Central Asia, the nomad and the sedentary 
cultivator are often in a symbiosis, each dependent on the other 
for certain basic products. The settled area supplies the nomads 
with flour and the finer cereals like wheat and barley, which they 
cannot easily grow themselves, with luxuries like sugar and spices 
12 
and with manufactures like arms and textiles. Transoxania was 
especially fertile and had an industrious population of merchants 
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and artisans, and so was normally able to supply the nomads with 
these goods. On their side, the nomads at this time fulfilled a 
role similar to that of the Bedouin of the Near East and North 
Africa and the Turkish and Persian nomads and transhumants of Persia 
in more recent centuries. They drove their herds to the frontier 
towns, selling there livestock, hides, wool and dairy products like 
clarified butter, cheese and ayran. Stock-rearing in Khurasan was 
replenished from sheep bought from the Oghuz, the Khalaj of Afghan-
istan and the people of Ghur; but the tenderest mutton came from 
the Oghuz' beasts. In Transoxania and Khwarizm, the Oghuz and 
13 
Qarluq supplied horses, sheep, asses, mules and camels. As well 
as supplying goods, the nomads also provided escort service for the 
caravans crossing the steppes, the equivalent of the Bedouins' 
khifara. From such contacts as these, a spirit of tolerance and 
trust often grew up. Under a bond resembling the Arabs' jiwar, Ibn 
Fa41an's caravan received shelter and hospitality from the Oghuz; 
according to Togan, relations like these were still kept up in the 
19th century between Muslim traders and the Kirghiz. In·;. the latter 
Period, there were never any religious qualms about liaisons with 
pagans, and money would be deposited with them or fresh mounts 
obtained. 14 
Finally, the trade in human beings linked steppe and settled 
zone and made Turkish mercenaries and slaves familiar in almost 
every part of the Islamic world. Turkish slaves began appearing in 
it during the Umayyad period when Arab armies raided through the 
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Caucasus to the Volga mouth and into Central Asia. Soon the slave-
-traffic became a large-scale commercial enterprise: which the civil 
powers endeavoured to control and draw profit therefrom. The farm 
(muqa~~) of a customs post in Azerbaijan on the road from the 
Caucasus sometimes fetched a million dirhams. In Transoxania the 
S~m~nid government issued licences (ajwiza) for the transit of 
15 
slaves. The governors of the eastern provinces regularly sent 
slaves as presents to the Caliphate. The father of Ahmad b. Tulun . . 
(ruled Egypt 868-83) had been presented to al-Ma'miTn by the Samanid 
governor of Bukhara and was of Toghuz-Oghuz origin. Concerning the 
price of these slaves, Barthold concluded from the evidence of Ibn 
Khurdadhbih that the average price of a Turkish slave in the 9th 
century was 300 dirhams. For the next century we have the words 
of Ibn ijauqal, although it is true that his information relates 
primarily to the outstandingly valuable slaves: 
"The most valuable slaves are those which come from the land of 
the Turks. Among all the slaves in the world, the Turks are incomp-
arable and none approach them in value and beauty. I have not 
infrequently seen a slave boy sold in Khurasan for 3000 dinars; 
and Turkish slave girls fetch up to 3000 dinars. In all the reg-
ions of the earth I have never seen slave boys or girls which are 
16 
as valuable as this, neither Greek nor one born in slave status". 
Some of the Turks to be found in Baghdad and other big cities 
were traders or artisans who had been attracted and chose to settle 
there; in Baghdad they fulfilled lowly tasks like baking, selling 
vegetables and stoking baths. But it was as soldiers that the Turks 
chiefly impressed people, and it is as a bullying and brutalised 
,.1 
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soldiery that the Arab folk-consciousness has perpetuated them in 
the "Arabian Nights". 
17 
F th T ks or . e ur were prized as soldiers 
rather than as domestic slaves, since their hardy steppe background 
gave them stamina and courage. Ibn ijassul praises the Turkish 
race for its pride: they are not content to be inferior to their 
masters in respect of mounts, food and drink and equipment, but 
demand equality of treatment; nor will they perform menial house-
hold tasks like cleaning, nor tend animals as domestic and agricult-
ural slaves do. FUrthermore, the nostalgia often felt by long-
,. 
-established, rather blase societies for the fresh, unspoilt barb-
arian credited the Turks with some of the qualities of the noble 
savage: 
"The '.Purks know not how to flatter and coax, they know not how 
to practise hypocrisy or backbiting, pretence or slander, dishon-
esty or haughtiness on their acquaintance, or mischief on those 
that associate with them. They are strangers to heresy and not 
spoiled by caprice; and they do not make property lawful by 
quibbles". 18 
To summarise. By the time of the Seljuq invasions, the Turkish 
peoples had become familiar to the Muslims as traders and as military 
slaves. Some of them were beginning to acquire estates and possess-
ions inside the Islamic frontiers. On the eastern fringes, such as 
Transoxania and Afghanistan, the two worlds of Iran and TUran had 
long been intermingled and the peaceful settlement of Turkish 
peoples was proceeding. So in some ways, the irruption of the Seljuq 
nomads merely speeded up processes which were already in operation. 
Chapter Two 
The early history of the Oghuz 
The Oghuz appear in history as a group of nine tribes, the 
Toghuz-Oghuz, who formed an important part of the Eastern Tiu-kiu 
confederation; they are amongst the Turkish peoples apostrophised 
19 
in the Orkhon inscriptions of the 8th century. The prominence 
of this group within the Tiu-kiu empire is reflected in the words 
of the author of the ijudud al-Calam when he says that "the kings 
of the whole of Turkistan in the days of old were from the Toghuz-
ghuz", and the Oghuz-Qaghan, grandson of Yafith, progenitor of the 
Turkish race, plays a large part in the legends retailed by Rashid 
20 
ad-Din and AbU'l-Gh~z!. The Toghuz-Oghus were closely connected 
with another component people of the Eastern Tiu-kiu empire, the 
Uighur, if, indeed, the two are not identical. The names "Oghuz" 
and "Uighur" seem to have a common origin in a root meaning "people'', 
"population"; an intermediate, rhotacised form of "6ghuz", Ogor, is 
21 found in early Byzantine sources. 
The Eastern Tiu-kiu kingdom collapsed in 744 from internal 
attack by a coalition of the Turkish Uighur, Basmrl and Qarluq 
peoples. The Uighur Ilt~bir eventually succeeded to the Qaghanate, 
and it is likely that the head of the Oghuz now took over the office 
of military leader (Yabghu) for the horde's right wing, an office 
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formerly held by the Uighur chief. The Oghuz now became less and 
less a homogeneous ethnic group. The incorporation of defeated 
elements of a people into the victors' tribe was a common process 
in Central Asia. Moreover, weak groups would attach themselves to 
a strong leader and his following,and slaves would be acquired from 
conquered lands. As a result, famous names of the Eurasian steppe 
such as the Gepids in Pannonia and the Basmrl in Mongolia disappear 
suddenly from history, not because these peoples had been extermin-
ated, but because the defeated remnants had been incorporated in 
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another grouping. Among the twenty-two component tribes of the 
Oghus listed in the 11th century by Kashghari (Diwan lughat at-Turk, 
24 
ed. Besim Atalay, I, 55-8) are several which seem to be non-Turkish. 
During the course of the 8th century, the Oghuz confederation 
moved from the heartland of the Eastern Tiu-kiu empire, the Orkhon 
and Selenga valleys in Mongolia, westwards to the Irtysh, the Aral 
Sea and the Syr Darya. Stray elements of the Oghuz had already 
found their way two centuries or so before this into the upper 
Oxus lands and into the Qara Qum and Dehistan steppes, but it was 
410 •. 
this major migration across Siberia 
a which brought the Oghuz people 
as/whole into the field of vision of Muslim writers. Ibn al-Athir 
refers to it when discussing the origin of the Ghuzz who ravaged 
Khurasan during Sanjar's reign; he gives their original home as 
K.hi~a, and then quotes "some historians of Khurasan11 that they came 
in the first place from the remotest of the Turkish lands, the 
region of the Toghuz-Oghuz, during the reign of al-Mahdi (158-69/ 
775-85). Tabari mentions an attack of the Toghuz-Oghuz on Ushrusana 
in 205/820-1, and the Ghuzz appear in Baladhuri, apparently for the 
first time in Muslim literature. 25 
In the writers of the lOth century there are several references 
to this migration of the Oghuz and to their new position in the 
Siberian steppes. Abu Dulaf MisCar b. Muhalhil accompanied an emb-
assy from the Samanids to the western borders of China in 331/941 
and later wrote an account of the lands and peoples through which 
it passed. His information has to be handled with caution, for it 
is unlikely that he witnessed personally all the things which he 
describes, and he had a reputation among contemporaries for exag~er-
ation and fancifulness; but he places the Oghuz to the east of the 
Kimak of the Irtysh and before the Toghuz-Oghuz, who may be placed 
either at Kau-chang in the Turfan basin or on the Orkhon around 
26 
Qara Balghasun. MasCudi places the encampments of the Oghuz on 
the Irtysh, where their pastures bordered on those of the Kimak 
and Qarluq, but adds that they were already driving their flocks 
in winter as far as the Volga and crossing:the frozen ice to attack 
411. 
the Khazar lands and the Azov or Black Sea coasts. The existing 
Turkish peoples of the Aral Sea and Syr Darya region, like the 
Pechenegs and Bajghird, were being forced to move westwards to the 
Urals and South Russia, and the wars between the Patzinakitai and 
27 the Ouzoi now become known to us from Byzantine sources. 
According to MasCudi and Ibn ijauqal, the Turks had a town on 
the lower· Syr Darya, the "new town" of Yangi-kant (al-qaryat al-
-~aditha, dih-i nau: modern Jank!nt-kala), where there were Muslims 
living. Most of these Turks were Oghuz, including both nomads and 
sedentaries (bawadi wa 9~~ar). They were divided into three hordes 
(alinaf)', an Upper, Middle and Lower, and were pre-eminent among the 
Turks for their bravery, their short stature and their small eyes. 
Y~ngi-k~nt was the largest of three towns lying to the east of the 
Aral Sea, the others being Jand and Khuvara. The pagan king of the 
Oghuz used Y~ngi-kant as his winter capital and exercised political 
28 
dominion over the Muslim settlers there. Barthold surmised that 
these three towns had been founded by emigrants from Samanid Trans-
oxania with the assent of the indigenous Turks and tha~ they formed 
a bridgehead into the steppes for the trade with the Siberian 
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forests and with the Kim~k and Q!rgh!z. Yet there is no reason 
why these towns should not be purely Turkish creations; there were 
traditions of sedentary life among the Turks stretching as far back 
30 
at least as the Tiu-kiu empire on the Orkhon. Towns a little 
further up the Syr Darya, such as Sauran and Sighnaq, were Turkish 
ones; the whole of the middle stretch of the river was profoundly 
412. 
Turkish and the expanse between Jand and u~rar was held by pagan 
Qrpchaq and considered Dar al-kufr by the Muslims till the end of 
31 the 12th century. 
As a centre for the Oghuz and a spring-board for the expansion 
of the Seljuq family, the lower Syr Darya area merits our attention. 
We have very little literary evidence to help us here; the region 
had cultural and commercial connections with Khwarizm, but there 
was also frequent hostility between them. However, much light on 
these questions has recently been thrown by the researches of Soviet 
archaeologists, above all, by those of V.V. Struve and S.P. Tolstov. 
They have shown that this region, known to have been the home of 
peoples like the Massagetes and Sakae in pre-Christian times, had a 
rich barbarian culture in the first millenium of our era. The 
peoples living there were not pure nomads, but were also cattle-raisers, 
fishermen and agriculturists. The Ephthalites lived here before 
moving southwards into the eastern Iranian and Indian worlds, and 
the information of the Byzantine authors Procopius and Menander 
Protector that the Ephthalites were essentially dwellers in settle-
ments is thus confirmed. According to Tolstov, there is no break 
in the cultural history of the towns of the Syr Darya basin between 
the Ephthalite and Oghuz periods; the Oghuz culture of the lOth cent-
ury is a direct development of that of the Ephthalites in the 5th 
and 6th centuries. No doubt there was an ethnic continuity, with 
the incoming Oghuz imposing themselves as a new set of leaders but 
gradually integrating themselves into the existing population. So 
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by the opening of the 11th century the Oghuz had in part taken over 
the old sedentary traditions of the area and had become cattle-raisers 
and agriculturists as well as pastoral nomads, just as the Khazars 
had done in the similar conditions of the lower Volga. Idrisi 
(drawing on lOth century sources, including the geographical work of 
the Samanid minister Abu CAbdallah Mu~ammad Jaihani) and Kashghari 
describe the towns of the Oghuz as numerous, and on his map, Kash-
ghari shows the lower Syr Darya as the "land of the Oghuz cities". 
During the lOth century, the old Hunno-Turkish settlement of Y~ngi-
-k~nt in the delta was re-fortified and rebuilt, hence its name "new 
town"; today, archaeology and air photography have disclosed there a 
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rich complex of irrigation canals, citadels, walls and caravanserais. 
The Oghuz of the lower Syr Darya thus succeeded to a cultural 
and social heritage which had some fairly advanced elements in it. 
The region was particularly susceptible to fertilising currents from 
Muslim.Khwarizm and Transoxania, and it was their connections with 
these two provinces which gave the Seljuqs their opportunity to ex-
pand into the Islamic world. The Oghuz who remained in the surround-
ing steppes as pure nomads remained at a lower level of culture and 
social organisation, although those of them who nomadised in the 
vicinity of the trade route connecting Khwarizm with the Bulghar 
and Khazar lands on the Volga were not entirely isolated from 
33 outside influences. 
The condition of those Oghuz who wandered from the Dehistan 
steppes in the south through the fist Urt plateau to the mouths of 
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the Ural and Emba rivers and the Bashkir lands is known to us from 
the illuminating narrative of the Muslim traveller Ibn Faglan, 
concerning the value of which Togan has written, "Jede kleine Einzel-
heit in den Berichten Ibn Faqlans verdient jedenfalls entschieden die 
Beachtung und Aufmerksamkeit des Forscher". The account of his 
journey from Gurganj in Khwarizm to the land of the Bulghars on the 
middle Volga in 921-2 was previously only known from extensive passages 
given in Yaqut's article "Bulghar" in the MuCjam al-buldan, but A.z.v. 
Togan discovered a largely-complete manuscript of the original at 
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Mashhad. Whilst traversing the Ust Urt plateau, his embassy met 
an Oghuz tribe who were wandering "like wild asses" and living in a 
wretched state. Their women never veiled themselves and had little 
compunction about displaying their genitalia in public. Sick people 
were either left to recover as best they could or else turned out 
into the desert to die. Their personal habits were filthy: "they 
do not make ablutions after performing their natural functions, they 
do mot wash themselves after sexual contamination or anything like 
that, nor do they have any contact with water, especially in winter". 
However, the chastity of their womenfolk and their abhorrence of 
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pederasty are favourably commented on. 
As far as Ibn Fadl~n could see, these Oghuz were quite irreligious • . 
One of their military commanders, the "Lesser Y!nal", had been a 
Muslim, but had had to renounce the faith when the people had told 
him that he could not be one of their leaders unless he did that. 
What vague religion they had, consisted of the formal acknowledgement 
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of the existence of"the One God", Bir Tltngri, and the recognition 
of some kind of after-life for their great warriors. Slaughtered 
horses were thrown on warriors' tombs and effigies of men to attend 
t 36 them in the nex life were erected on them (balbals). These 
sketchy beliefs attest to little more than a primitive animism. The 
reverence for water, and especially for running water and springs, 
which was displayed by Ibn Fa~lan's Oghuz, was widespread among 
Turkish and Liongol peoples. The Orkhon inscriptions refer to "the 
Turks' auspicious Earth-Water" (Ttlrk iduq yiri subf) as a religious 
principle co-existent with "the Turks' Heaven" (Tilrk tltngrisi). 
Reverence for water was written into the Yasa or fundamental law 
of the Mongols: in Juzjani's words, "Whosoever should enter a piece 
of water, whether large or small, they were to kill him also, and 
likewise anyone who should wash his face at the edge of any water, so 
that the water from the washed face of such person should enter that 
water". 37 
Ibn Fa~lan mentions that these Oghuz had their qams or shamans, 
who took part in the burial rites of their great men, and he seems 
also to refer to the rites of shamans among the Bulghars, still only 
in part Islamised. The ijudud al-Calam says that the Oghuz. held their 
medicine-men (~abiban, pijishkan) in great veneration and allowed 
them a power of life and death. In the old Turkish tradition it was 
Oghuz, the grandson of Yafith, who held the magical rain-stone 
(yada-tash) which could bring victory in battle through control of 
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the elements. The early Seljuq tribal leaders seem to have set 
some store by soothsaying and magic to guide them in their movements 
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and campaignings; no doubt their soothsayers fulfilled a role sim-
ilar to that of the carraf of the ancient Arabs. At the battle of 
Dandanqan in 1040, the victorious SelJ"uqs h d th · d a e~r munajjim, an 
after the battle, when Tughrrl proclaimed himself ruler of Khurasan, 
the astrologer was rewarded, presumably for his correct prognostic-
ations. Among the Seljuq family itself, Qutlumush b. Arslan Isra'Yl, 
Tughrrl's cousin, was very skilled in astrological lore; according 
to Ibn al-Athir, this was thought remarkable, but as his rebellion 
later showed, Qutlumush represented conservative Turkmen feeling, 
and may have retained the beliefs and lore of older tribal life 
particularly tenaciously. 39 
Ibn Fa~lan also gives us information about the political and 
tribal organisation of these Oghuz whom he met. Their ruler, he says, 
is called the Yabghu, a title of military origin which goes back, as 
we have seen (above, 409 h to the time of the Eastern Tiu-kiu 
empire. His deputy was called the Kudh~rkin, apparently the KUl-
-~rkin of MahmUd Kashghari. These two had the moral authority of 
•·- .......... #. - ••• - ......... "1"-· . ' .. .. 
tribal chiefs, and were perhaps descended from the ruling families 
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of the Turks in the steppes. However, the actual direction of 
military and political affairs was done by the man called by Ibn 
Faqlan ~a9ib al-jaish, se. S~bashr or Subegi. It was to this leader, 
and not to the Yabghu, that Ibn Fa41an presented his credentials, 
handing over letters from the Abbasid court and giving special 
presents. Under the Subashr were several subordinate military comm-
41 
anders with the titles ~arkhan (Tark~n), Yrnal and (?) Y.gh.l.z. 
417. 
On the whole, the Oghuz were in a less advanced state than 
other Turkish peoples like the Khazars on the lower Volga or the 
Qarluq in the Semirechye, who in the lOth century were constituting 
themselves as the nucleus of the later Qarakhanid confederation. 
Politically, they were disunited. They had no Qaghan of their own, 
but only the Yabghu as their head. The title of Qaghan and the 
theoretical dominion of the steppes passed to the Uighur and the 
Qarakhanids, but the Seljuqs were never to assume it. Turbulence 
and fragmentation were characteristics of the Oghuz people which 
early appeared. In the Orkhon inscriptions, the rebelliousn~ss of 
the Toghuz-Oghuz is frequently mentioned. According to the ijudud 
al-Calam, "each of their tribes [se. of the Oghuz] has a (separate) 
chief on account of their discards with each other", and in the lOth 
century we hear of an important split which led to a section of the 
Oghuz taking over pastures in the previously-uninhabited Mangh!shlaq 
peninsula to the east of the Caspian. One of the reasons adduced by 
the Oghuz who in 1025 approached Ma~ud of Ghazna with a request that 
they be allowed to settle in Khurasan, was the oppression of their 
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own amirs. Even after the Seljuq Sultans had become rulers of a 
mighty empire in the Middle East, they never succeeded in exacting 
/. ~ f full obedience from their own Turkmen followers, and the debacle o 
Sanjar and the Ghuzz in Khurasan signalised the final failure of the 
Seljuq family to secure recognition amongst their own people for 
their supreme authority. 
Chapter Three 
The culture of the early Oghuz 
The kingdom of the Oghuz Yabghu on the lower Syr Darya was 
the springboard from which the Seljuqs launched themselves upon 
the Islamic world, and we propose now to look at the state of the 
Oghuz peoples at the end of the lOth century. At this time, the 
Oghuz were still pagan, and those of them who were steppe nomads 
were in a more backwards condition than the Turkish peoples along the 
northern and eastern frontiers of Transoxania, where Muslim mission-
ary activity was making much headway. 
Central Asia has always been receptive of the higher cultures 
and religions outside its borders. At various times, the peoples of 
the ~urasian steppes have adopted almost all the universal religions 
of Asia and Europe, such as Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, and some which are now extinct or nearly so, such as Manich-. 
aeanism and Zoroastrianism. Not surprisingly, this eclecticism 
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has given the region a tolerant outlook. It h as always been content 
to receive rather than to give, but Sinor has justly remarked that 
"in one sense it is perhaps an achievement in itself that it [se. 
Central As±a] gave birth to none of the conquering religions••. 43 
Certainly, episodes like the persecution of the Transoxanian Muslims 
by the sinicised Qara Khitay or the more recent rivalry in the steppes 
between the Buddhi~Kalmucks and the Muslim Kazakhs have been except-
ional. 
Manichaeanism and Nestorian Christianity expanded into Central 
Asia and made converts of whole peoples like the Uighurs of Chinese 
Turkestan in the latter part of the 8th century and the Keraits of 
Mongolia in the 12th century. Judaism flourished among at least 
the rulers and nobility of the Khazars. But Islam and Buddhism have 
made the most lasting impressions. Islam has been successful among 
the majority of Turkic peoples -the Yakuts being the main exception 
- even though much of Central Asia has lain ouDside the framework 
of institutional Islam. It was not easy to fit Central Asian peoples 
into the framework of orthodox Islam; often they were nomads or 
forest dwellers who could not easily come together for congregational 
worship, and whose tribal ways: of life were often little compatible 
with Islamic law. Only where there was some urban life and civilised 
tradition did centres of Muslim orthodoxy and scholarship, such as 
~shghar and Kazan, arise. 
It follows that it was not the orthodox theologians, the ulema, 
who evangelised Central Asia, but rather the itinerant ~ufis and 
420. 
mullahs. It is likely that a certain Nishapuri missionary, Abu'l-
-ijasan Muqammad al-Kalamati, who passed from the service of the 
Samanids at Bukhara to that of the Qarakhanids and died amongst them 
some time before 961, played a part in the conversion of the Qarakhanid 
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prince Satuq Bughra Khan, who assumed the Muslim name of CAbd al-Karim. 
In Maqdisi's time, there were several khanqahs of the Karamiyya in 
Farghana (see above, Part III, 354 ), and from them evangelism 
into the surrounding areas was done. Evangelisation by dervishes 
and mullalis has continued in the steppes until almost the present 
day, and it has only been slowed down by the counter-efforts of the 
Russian Orthodox Church after 1700. Islamisation has not always 
been total: syncretism has been an inevitable corollary of the tol-
erance and receptiveness of the steppes. There must have been cases 
where the shamans of the Turks became Muslim dervishes and thus kept 
their old prestige; Muslim evangelists must have been constrained to 
stress the miraculous and charismatic elements in their own practice 
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which resembled those of the old shamans. The social and cultural 
prestige of Islam was in itself a powerful attraction. It could be 
felt from the merchants who came from the Muslim lands to trade, even 
46 
though the merchants rarely functioned as direct proselytisers. 
As has been noted, the ~ufi preachers and the faqihs who went 
forth from the towns and riba~s of the Samanids' northern frontier 
scored important successes among the Qarluq peoples who made up the 
Qarakhanid confederation, such as the Chigil, ~ukhsi and Yaghma. 
The Oghuz and the kindred people of the Qtpchaq, who were moving 
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westwards from central Siberia to South Russia, were less affected 
by Muslim missionary efforts at this time. If the Oghuz had been 
affected by Manichaean or Buddhist influences, as were the Uighur, 
before their migration westwards in the second half of the 8th century 
(see above, 409-10 ), no trace of such beliefs is discernible in 
the lOth century; all that AbU Dulaf vaguely mentions is that the 
Oghuz had a "house of prayer" which contained no idols. 47 Signif-
icant of the Oghuz• low level of culture is the fact that they were 
complete strangers to writing. The old Turkish script, used in 
earlier times in the Orkhon and Yenissei inscriptions, by the 
Turgesh in the Semirechye and by the Manichaeans of Turfan, left no 
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traces among these western Turks. On the other hand, the Turks fur-
ther east remained to some extent literate through the adoption of 
the Uighur alphabet, which we find in full use among the Qarakhanids, 
where it was only later and gradually replaced by the Arabic one. 
From being illiterate, the Oghuz on the other hand adopted the 
49 
Arabic alphabet straight away, probably in the early 11th century. 
The Oghuz of the Syr Darya and the western steppes were more 
open to influences from Khwarizm and south Russia than from the Muslim 
lands further east. Khwarizm juts out into the steppes like an 
island of fertility and civilisation, connected with the lands to 
the south only by the Oxus and the narrow strip of cultivable land 
along its banks. The commercial links between Khwarizm and south 
Russia have always been close. A caravan route connected Gurganj 
422. 
with the Khazar capital of Atil on the Volga delta. Ibn Faqlan 
travelled along this way in a caravan of 5000 men and 3000 horses; 
50 the trip was made every spring, returning to Khwarizm in the autumn. 
In 1946 Tolstov found, with the aid of aerial photographs, the clearly-
-defined traces of the route between Gurganj and the lower Emba. on 
it were still standing splendid stone caravanserais and wells with 
stone covers, attesting to the importance which the Khwarizmians 
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attached to this route. There were also maritime links. MasCudi 
says that large ships sailed up the Volga with merchandise from Khwar-
izm; this must have been sent over the Ust Urt plateau to Mangh!shlaq 
for shipment, for it does not seem that there was ever in historic 
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times a navigable channel connecting the lower Oxus and the Caspian. 
The lOth century witnessed an increase in the volume of trade 
between Khwarizm and Bulghar and Khazaria, bringing about the political 
as well as the economic rise of Gurganj, which led eventually to the 
triumph in 995 of the local Ma'munid family over the ancient Afrighid 
Khwarizmshahs of Kath. In the lOth century, the Oghuz peoples formed 
a very loose, barbarian empire of vast expanse, from Talas and Chach 
in the east to the Bashkir and Khazar lands in the west and the 
Dehistan steppes in the south-west. Hence relationtwith the Oghuz 
loomed large in Khwarizmian political and commercial diplomacy. 
Diplomacy was often extended to military action. Ibn ijauqal speaks 
of regular campaigns against the Oghuz, and Biruni speaks of the 
Khwarizmian Faghburiyya festival, "of the king's expedition", held 
each autumn before the ruler set off on his annual expedition 
against the Oghuz. 
53 
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The cultural and religious connections of the two regions 
were potentially of significance for the Turkish peoples living 
along the connecting route. The Greek Black Sea colonies and Orth-
odox Christian Kiev Russia adjoined Khazaria, and there are ·tradit-
ions that both BirUni and al-Farabi were able to learn Greek language 
and philosophy in their native land of Khwarizm. Byzantine mission-
aries made Christianity one of the religions of the Khazars, and the 
Khazars' Judaism seems to contain influences from Byzantine Judaism. 
The Christianity of Khwarizm seems to have been Orthodox or Jacobite 
in complexion and not Nestorian, i.e. its connections were with the 
west and not the east. Biruni describes the Christians of Khwarizm 
as observing certain western festivals, and in the 14th century the 
Armenian King Haithon observed whilst passing through that the local 
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Christians acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch. 
Yet despite these influences and despite some evangelistic 
activity by the Muslims of Khwarizm and Bulghar, the Oghuz seem in 
the lOth century to have been totally unaffected by the higher relig-
ions. Zakariya Qazw!n!'s Cosmography, written during the 13th 
century but drawing on an earlier sources, describes Christianity as 
being widespread among the Oghuz, but Togan has rightly discounted 
this report, for which no definite evidence exists and which is in 
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The names of the four sons of Seljuq, MUsa, itself unlikely. 
Mika'Il, Isra'Il and y-unus, have been traced to Jewish influences 
stemming from the Khazar court, but all we can really deduce from 
this is that these Biblical names had a certain cachet among the 
424. 
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steppe peoples. The successes of Christianity in the western 
steppes came later and affected primarily the Qrpchaq, successors 
there of the Oghuz; the Codex Cumanicus, a Gospel text and some 
western hymns in a carefully~latinised transcription of Turkish, is 
an enduring monument to Qrpchaq Christianity. 57 
From the early 11th century, the term "TUrkmen" comes into use 
as a synonym for the south-western Turks, the Oghuz and Qrpchaq. 
Kashghari extends its use to the Qarluq, but this was not an accepted 
usage, and the term "Tilrkmen" is never used in contemporary histories 
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for the Qarakhanids or their followers. In the lOth century 
Maqdisi speaks of thaghran Cala 't-Turkmaniyyin in northern Transox-
ania. Gardizi and Baihaqi almost invariably call the Oghuz who 
harried the Ghaznavid frontiers "Turkmens", and Ni~am al-Mulk refers 
to the Seljuq tribesmen by this name, although the term Oghuz/Ghuzs 
continued in popular and official usage down to the Mongol period. 
The name "Turkmen" has been discerned in the transcription T'a-ldl-
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-mang of an 8th century Chinese encyclopaedia. By Kashghari's 
time the popular etymology from Persian Turk-manand, "resembling the 
Turks" was the accepted one. The most favoured modern view is that 
man/m~n is an augmentative suffix with intensifying force, so that 
the meaning would be "Turk pur sang'' (Deny, Minorsky), but Kotwicz 
saw in -mttn an Iranian translation of the Turkish suffix -~sh/ish 
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of "Titrglsh", and Pritsak takes -man/m~n to be a collective suffix. 
The distinction of "Turk" and "Turkmen" was a real one in the 
early 11th century and had a linguistic as well as an ethnic aspect. 
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Already we can distinguish a south-western Turkish dialect, that of 
the Oghuz and Qrpchaq. The distinction of "Turki" and "Ghuzzi" 
language was known to the Persian poet of MasCud of Ghazna's court, 
Manuchihri (d. c. 432/1040-1); he says that poetry in both dialects 
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existed at this time. It has just been mentioned that Kashghari 
linked the Oghuz and Qarluq politically as "Turkmens", but he was 
careful to attach the speech of the Oghuz to that of the Qrpchaq, 
distinguishing it from that of the Qarluq and the eastern Turks, his 
own dialect. He says that that the Oghuz change the true rrurkish 
(se. eastern Turkish) ~ :> }?_, !_ > i_, i_ > !' y > !_, dh > l. ( .> ~ 
amongst the Qrpchaq) and that both the Oghuz and the Qrpchaq omit 
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intervocalic -~- • 
Chapter Four 
The migrations into Transoxania and Khurasan of the 
Seljuqs and other Oghuz groups 
Kashghari (ed. Besim Atalay, I, 55-9) lists twenty-two tribes 
of the Ughuz, and says that the Qrnrq are the leading one, the 
tribe of the princes of the Oghuz. The Seljuq family - it does not 
seem originally to have been any bigger social unit than this -
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belonged to the Qrnrq. Our principal source for Seljuq beginnings 
is the anonymous Malik-nama, probably written for the young prince 
Alp Arslan shortly after the death of his father Chaghrr Beg in 
451/1059. Thus it dates from within a generation of the events which 
it describes. It is known to us from extracts in later historians 
like Ibn al-Athir, al-ijusaini, Barhebraeus and Mirkhwand. The inform-
ation given here has been thoroughly examined by Cahen, who has comb-
ined it with the evidence of other sources (such as the Ghaznavid 
ones, the Khurasanian one of Ibn Funduq's Masharib at-tajarib and 
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the Buyid one of Hilal a~~abi' 's son and continuator, Ghars an-
NiCma) to produce a critical account of the appearance of the 
Seljuqs down to their victory at Dandanqan in 1040. o. Pritsak 
has also dealt with Seljuq origins, but from the point of view of 
the Turcologist as well as that of the Islamic historian. The two 
scholars have differed on several points, with Cahen tending to 
uphold the older, traditional views against Pritsak's more speculat-
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ive ones. 
The ancestor of the Seljuq dynasty, Duq~q or Tuq~q, was called 
Tltmir-yaltgh "iron-bow11 from his bravery and strength. He served 
the "King of the Turks", the Yabghu of the Oghuz (oft en sp·el t B. y. ghu 
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or P.y.ghu in the sources). In Mirkhwand, the Yabghu is called 
"King of the Khazars 11 • Relations between the Yabghu and his servant 
became strained; according to the Akhbar ad-daulat as-saljuqiyya, 
Duqaq had opposed the Yabghu's plan to raid Islamic territory, but 
this is clearly a later touch to show that the Seljuq family were 
already moved by the divine light before their formal adhesion to 
Islam. Duqaq's son Seljuq was also in the Yabghu's service and held 
the important military office of SUbashr (interpreted in the Arabic 
and Persian sources as Qa'id al-jaish, Muqaddam al-jaish). However, 
the Yabghu's wife grew alarmed at the power and prestige of Seljuq 
and poisoned her husband's mind against him. Seljuq fled before the 
blow could fall, taking with him a hundred men from his family and 
retainers, 1500 camels and 50,000 sheep. He reached Jand near the 
mouth of the Syr Darya, where "God Most High flooded his heart with 
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His most holy light", and he sought instruction on Islam and the 
Qur'an from the local faqihs and ulema. Seljuq and his band then 
settled in the steppes near Jand 
' gathered together a band of Turkish 
ghazis and freed the local Muslim population from the exactions of 
the "envoy of the pagans" who came each year to collect taxes. 
Although Seljuq may have become nominally a Muslim, al-ijusaini's 
account records that when he had a dream in which he found himself 
urinating fire, whose sparks spread all over the world, it was a 
muCabbir (se. one of the Turks' shamans) whom he asked to interpret 
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this portent of universal dominion for his descendants. 
The locale of these events is the steppesJtretching from the 
lower Syr Darya to the Volga, the expanse over which the Oghuz 
Yabghu ruled, with his winter capital at Yangi-kant. The connections 
of the Yabghu, Duqaq and Seljuq with the Khazars of the Volga have 
·recently attracted the attention of scholars, especially as Abu'l-
-CAla' b. ijassul, the Ghaznavid official of Ray who went over to the 
Seljuqs and wrote a book for Tughr!l extolling the Seljuqs and 
attacking the Buyids, mentions a curious episode involving Seljuq 
(here spelt S.r.j.q) b. Duqaq. According to this, Seljuq struck the 
King of the Khazars with his sword, and this is cited to show the 
nobility and daring of Tughrrl's forebears. Barhebraeus says that 
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Duqaq was in the Khazar service and his son reared at their court. 
D.M. Dunlop has therefore assumed a connection between the Seljuqs 
and the Khazars and has suggested that the cause of Seljuq's flight 
to Jand may have been a final rupture with the Khazars. This is 
unlikely. The mention of the Khazars in the sources may be a recoll-
ection of earlier connections between th h but e Og uz and the Khazars, 
their relation in the second half of the lOth century were very 
hostile: the Khazars were now a declining political and military force, 
and in dealing with Vladimir of Kiev's Volga expedition of 985, the 
Russian Primary Chronicle speaks expressly of a Russo-Oghuz alliance 
against the Khazars. 
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In the whole episode we have an instance of the political dis-
unity and divisiveness of the Oghuz. The power of the Yabg~u., 
nominal head of the people, was being challenged by the SUbash! 
Seljuq, an over-mighty subject, and v1e have here the story of this 
dissident's expulsion. When·Seljuq reached Jand he in turn expelled 
the Yabghu's representatives from there. Thus began the bitter 
hostility between the older, ruling line of the Oghuz, that of the 
Yabghu and his nephew Abu'l-Fawaris Shah Malik b. CAli, and the 
Seljuqs, who could only be regarded as rebels. Seljuq's assumption 
of Islam gave what was potentially an additional motive for hostility, 
that of religion. In practice, it can have made little difference. 
The conversion of the Yabghu and his circle at Yangi-k~nt must have 
followed in the early years of the 11th century; Shah Malik had a 
full complement of Islamic names and his father had assumed the name 
CAli. In any case, it is far from certain that all the Turkmens 
who followed the Seljuq leaders southwards into Transoxania and 
Khurasan were Muslims, and perhaps only a lllli:nori ty were; their 
Violent behaviour was not conspicuously Muslim. 
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The terminus ad quem for the conversion of Seljuq and his 
family may be fixed at 992, for in that year Arslan Isra'Yl b. Sel-
juq was aiding the Samanids against the Qarakhanid Bughra Khan, who 
conquered Bukh~ra in that year. 69 The three sons of Seljuq, Arslan 
Isr~'Il, Mika'Yl and MUsa (the fourth, YUnus, died young) moved 
towards Transoxania and entered the service first of the Samanids 
and then of various Qarakhanid princes. Gardtzr records under 1003 
the conversion of the Oghuz Yabghu and his alliance with the last 
of the Samanids, IsmaCil b. Nu4 al-Munta~ir; and the Oghuz again 
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joined the latter the next year against the Ilig Khan Na~r. 
Cahen and Pritsak have differed over the identity of this Yabghu, 
whether the original holder of the title is intended or whether 
Arslan Isra'Il b. Seljuq, who is later found with the title, is intend-
ed. Cahen inclines to the traditional view, held, for example, by 
Barthold, that this Yabghu :Arslan Isra'Il, who had assumed this 
title in rivalry to the Yabghu proper and as an assertion of the 
Seljuqs' independence of his control. On the other hand, Pritsak 
denies that Arslan Isra'il could have assumed the title so early 
and asserts that it must have been the Yabghu of Y~ngi-k~nt and Jand 
who aided the Samanids. His stress on dating is a valid point, and 
it is also significant that Shah-Malik's kunya "Abu'l-Fawaris" points 
to Samanid connections, for this was a favourite name of the later 
Amtrs. 71 At whatever date the assumption by Arslan Isra'il of the 
old Turkish title may have taken place, it was an act of defiance 
towards the original Yabghu, for it implied headship of the whole 
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Oghuz people. It is possible that the Qarakhanids prompted this 
act as a display of hostility towards the S~manids' ally, the Oghuz 
Yabghu, especially as the Oghuz rulers of Yangi-kant and Jand cont-
of 
inued to be bitter enemies of the Qarakhanids as well as/the Seljuqs, 
and after the fall of the Samanids, they transferred their alliance 
to the Qarakhanids' enemies, the Ghaznavids. 
What impelled the Seljuqs and their followers to move southwards 
from Jand and seek pastures in the neighbourhood of Bukhara? The 
region was, of course, politically troubled: two old-established 
dynasties, the Samanids and the Afrighid Khwarizmshahs, had recently 
collapsed and two new ones, the Qarakhanids and the Ghaznavids, had 
arisen to fill the vacuum of power. There were numerous opportun-
ities for Turkish tribesmen to find employment as military auxiliar-
ies or as frontier guards. Economic factors may also have been 
involved. Several sources on the history of Central Asia speak of 
lack of pastures there and overcrowding among its populations. 
CAufi, and following him, Marvazi, say that the QUn, who seem to 
have been a Turkish people living with the Qay tribe (not to be con-
fused with the Qayfgh tribe of the Oghuz) in Mongolia, came west-
wards because of pressure on pasture grounds. ~ahir ad-Din Nishapuri, 
and following him, Rawandi, specifically say of the Seljuqs that 
"these noble ones left Turkestan for the province of Transoxania 
on account of the large number of families and the shortage of 
pastures", and Jamal Qarshi confirms that this took place because 
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of overpopulation (li-taza~umihim ahaliyaha). 
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It may well be that this was one of the motives impelling the 
Seljuqs to move southwards. Disputes over living-space were not 
infrequent in the steppes; these often ended either with a bloody 
struggle, after which the winners took over the losers' pastures, 
or else with an irruption into the settled lands which thereby 
served as a safety-valve. We know that the Seljuqs and their follow-
ers were in a wretched physical and material condition whilst they 
were spreading into Ghaznavid Khurasan. But the arguments of climatic 
change, increased dessication, overpopulation and economic pressure 
have often been put forward as facile explanations for complex 
population movements, and it is safest to treat the economic motive 
behind the Seljuq invasions as only one amongst several. 
One probable factor in the migrations of the Oghuz people at 
this time was pressure from the Qtpchaq and the associated tribe of 
the Qanghlr. The Qtpchaq were an old people who arose from the 
Kim~k of the Irtysh basin. Gardiz1 describes them as one of the 
seven constituent tribes of the Kim~k, but his information must have 
been quite old, for Ibn Khurdadhbih in the 9th century gives them 
as a separate people, the Khifshakh. On the other hand, the ijudud 
al-Calam says that although the Khifshakh had separated from the 
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Kim~k, their ruler (malik) still acted as deputy for the Kim~k. 
The geographers of the lOth century mention that the Oghuz and 
Kimak harried the northern frontiers of Transoxania; by the next 
century, the name "Kimttk" has disappeared from use, but Baihaq1 
says that the Qtpchaq were harrying the confines of Khwarizm at 
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Mascnd of Ghazna's accession (1030). Undoubtedly, important 
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ethnic movements were taking place at this time in the western 
steppes, leading to the occupation of South Russia by the Polovtsi 
or Comans and transforming the name of these western steppes from 
the older title "Oghuz steppe" to that of "Qrpchaq steppe". 
Pritsak plausibly conjectures that since .Shah Malik fled after the 
Seljuq occupation of Khwarizm in 1044 southwards into eastern 
Persia and not back to Y~ngi-k~nt, the lower Syr Darya had by then 
passed out of Oghuz into Q!pchaq hands. 75 
In the first three decades of the 11th century, the Seljuq 
family lived as condottieri on the Islamic frontiers, giving their 
services to whoever would promise them plunder and pastureland for 
their followers. Arslan Isra'Il married a daughter of the Qarakhanid 
ruler of Bukhara, CAlitigin b. Bughra Khan Harun, and eventually, 
the sons of Mlka'Il, Abu ~alib Tughrrl Beg Mu~ammad and Abu Sulaiman 
Chaghrr Beg Da'ud, joined him in CAlitigin's service and settled on 
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pastures at NITr-Bukhara or Nakhshab. Towards the end of the 
second decade of the century, in 1018 or 1021, a long-distance foray 
of the Turkmens under Chaghri Beg into Armenia and Azerbaijan is 
recorded by the historians (Mirkhwand amongst the Islamic ones and 
Barhebraeus, Matthew of Edessa and Vartan amongst the Syrian and Arm-
enian ones). Kafesoglu has devoted a special study to this expedition 
and has asserted its historicity as an exploratory, preparatory 
raid; but Cahen thinks that the historians' reports must refer to the 
raids made some ten years later and that some chronological confus-
. h d 77 1on as occurre • 
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There was no unified direction amongst the Turkmens as a whole, 
and no coherent policy; sections of them now alternated between the 
service of the Qarakhanids and of the Ghaznavids. When in 1025 
Maqmud allied with the eastern Qarakhanid ruler Qadtr Khan YUsuf of 
Kashghar against the latter's brother and rival CAlitigin, CAlitigin 
was temporarily driven out of Soghd and his Turkmen auxiliaries were 
also compelled to move. The Sultan felt that these Turkmens were a 
potential danger, so Arslan Isra'Il was captured and jailed in India 
for the rest of his life. His nephews Tughrtl and Chaghrr did not 
at this stage have sufficient prestige - their titles of "Beg11 imply 
no special primacy - further to impose the rule of their family over 
the Turkmens. Arslan Isra'Il's former followers then asked Malpnud 
for permission to settle on the northern borders of Khurasan and 
act as guards there, saying that they were suffering from the oppress-
ion of their Amirs. The Sultan hoped to imitate CAlitigin and use 
them as auxiliaries, and he allowed 4000 families of them, together 
with their baggage, sheep, camels, horses and mules, to cross the 
Oxus and settle near Farawa, Sarakhs and Abiward. 
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Deprived of Arslan Isra'Il's leadership, they degenerated into 
a complete rabble. Various minor chieftains led sections of the~, 
but there was no unified direction. They plundered the settled lands 
of northern Khurasan and their flocks were a menace to agriculture 
there (see below, Part V, 502-5 ). In 1027 the people of Nasa 
and Abiward complained of these depredations to the Sultan, and 
Punitive measures were taken, first by the governor of ~us, the 
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ghularn general Arslan Jadhib, and then by the Sultan in person 
(1028). A crushing defeat was inflicted on the Turkmens who now 
' 
scattered far and wide, some back into the Dehistan steppe and the 
Balkhan-Kuh hills, others westwards into Persia, where some of them 
found employment with local rulers. It was these whom Ibn KakUya 
of Isfahan (see above, Part I, 166 ) on more than one occasion 
enrolled into his service. r.rhey now became a cause of chronic 
unrest in the Ray and Jibal provinces. MasCud enlisted some of them 
under their leader Yaghmur at Ray in 1029 and brought them eastwards 
with him. They were then placed under one of his own slave commanders 
and used for an expedition to Makran, but they were never a reliable 
element. Yaghmur•s followers continued to raid Khurasan from the 
Balkhan-Kuh hills; and in 1033 the Ghaznavid commander Ta~Farrash 
executed fifty of their chiefs, including Yaghmur. He hoped thereby 
to clip their wings, but in fact he merely added the motive of 
79 vengeance to the violence of the remaining Turkmens. 
These Turkmens are the "Ciraqi" ones familiar from Baihaqi and 
Ibn al-Athir, so-called because of this penetration of theirs into 
western Persia or Ciraq CAjamr. From Baihaqr and Ibn al-Athir we 
learn the names of some of their leaders: Yaghmur (who seems to 
have held a certain primacy), Buqa (Bogha), GBktash, Qtztl, Man~Ur 
and (?) Na~-oghlu (MUkrimin Halil Yrnan~, Anadolu'nun fethi, Istanbul 
1944, 37, reads "Anasr-oglu11). But it is clear that the "Ciraqi" 
Turkmens were composed largely of independent bands. 
80 In general, 
they remained separate from those bands which the Seljuq family led 
436. 
and there was hostility rather than solidarity between the two 
groups. The amirs of whose tyranny the "CI - - " 1 raq1s comp ained 
may have been members of the Seljuq family attempting to impose 
their authority. In their letter of 1035 to the governor of Khurasan 
Suri, the Seljuq leaders Musa Yabghu, Tughr!l and Chaghrr promised 
that if the Sultan would let them settle at Nasa and Farawa, they 
would act as guards against fresh Turkmen incursions from Balkhan-
-Kuh, Dehistan and Khwarizm, and would inflict punishment on the 
81 
"Ciraqi" Turkmens. 
Meanwhile, there remained in the Bukhara area Tughrrl, Chaghrr 
and MUsa Yabghu (this title, and the nominal headship of the Seljuq 
family, seems to have passed to MUsa by seniority after Arslan 
and the killing of Yusuf b. Mufa b. Seljuq by CAlitigin 
Isra'Il's death in imprisonment~. In practice, Tughrfl and Chaghrr 
were the directing brains behind the Seljuq bands' military advent-
ures. Concerning the composition of these bands, it is likely that 
the Seljuq leaders' successes attracted additional groups of Oghuz, 
and probably elements of other tribes, from the surrounding steppes. 
The Qrnrq begin to drop out of mention, but other Oghuz tribes come 
into prominence: the Iv!, the D~gar, the Salghur and the Avshar. 
All four of these appear in Kashghari's list of the tribes of the 
Oghuz (as Iva, Tugar, Salghur and Afshar), and they were to play 
important roles in the later history of the Seljuqs and their Ata-
begs: the Artuqids arose from the D~gar tribe, the leaders of the 
Salghur founded during the 12th century a dynasty of their own in 




A group within the Turkmen following of Tughrrl, Chaghrr and 
Musa Yabghu which has recently attracted the attention of Minorsky 
and Cahen was that of the Yinaliyan/Inaliyan. The three leaders 
crossed the Oxus in 1035 with 10,000 riders and with another group 
of Turkmens from Khwarizm who had no mounts and who had to go on 
foot, and made for Merv and Nasi. According to Baihaqi, the riders 
comprised both Seljuqiyan and Yinaliyan. 
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The latter group were 
led by Ibrahim Inal, whom the sources all take to be Tughr!l's uter-
ine half-brother, but whom Cahen thinks was probably a son of the 
Yabghu YUsuf b. MUsa b. Seljuq. What is certain is that these 
Inaliyan were not a separate tribal group; no such tribe is given in 
Kashghari. But there is the well-known Turkish title of rnal/ytnal, 
which is found as far back as the Tonyuquq inscription. The 
Mafatilj al-Culilm interprets yinal as "the wali-Cahd of the Yabghu or 
of any Turkish ruler", and Kashghari defines it as "son of a princess 
or vassal". We know that it was ~sed among the Oghuz, for Ibn 
Faqlan met the Yinal a~~aghir, who was one of their military comm-
anders. 84 Minorsky concludes that among the Seljuqs, the family 
of the Yinal had a special place and retained hereditary rights, so 
that their retinue and following had a separate, semi-independent 
existence; possibly the Qrnrq had been ruled by Yinals. In this way, 
the later pretensions of Ibrahim Inal, which were to lead in 1052 
to b more evpll."cable as the attempted assertion his execution, ecome ~ 
85 
of old tribal rights. 
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Part V 
The ascendancy of the Turkmens in Khurasan 
Chapter One 
Introductory 
The gradual ascendancy of the Turkmens falls within the reign 
of MasCud b. Ma~ud (421-32/1030-40). The military machine with 
which the Sultan attempted to stem the Seljuq advance has been 
described in Part II. Some of the strategic considerations involv-
ed will now be considered. It is not the aim here to construct a 
detailed narrative of military events in Khurasan, although there 
is ample material for it in the Ghaznavid sources of Gardizi and 
Baihaqi on one side and the pro-seljuq sources which draw on the 
Malik-nama on the other. Baihaqi's account can conveniently be 
, / 
read in A. de Biberstein-Kazimirsky's resume appended to his edit-
ion of the Diw~n of Manuchihri. The actual events will only be dealt 
with here in as much as they form a necessary background to the 
strategies and policies of the two sides. Finally, the first 
Seljuq occupation of Nishapur in 1038-9 will be analysed in detail. 
Chapter Two 
Sultan MasCud: the man 
The military machine described in Part II was founded by 
Sebaktigin and perfected by Ma~ud during an active career of over 
1 
forty years. MasCud inherited this machine, with a ·reputation 
of his own already forged in many battles. Ma~ud took the two 
brothers MasCud and Mu~ammad on his campaign of 1011 against the 
Ghfiri chieftain Muqammad b. SUri when they were both fourteen years 
old. He again took MasCud with him in 1015 when GhUr was invaded 
from Bust and Zamindawar and the region of Khwabin attacked. The 
"lion-hearted youth" distinguished himself as an intrepid cavalry-
man and archer; a single arrow of his killed the commander of a 
tower whose defenders had been causing the Muslims much trouble, 
thereby demoralising the pagan Ghuris and driving them to surrender. 
Because of this and similar deeds, Ma~ud next year made him!!!!-
-Cahd "for he saw and realised that when he departed from this 
--' 
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mansion of false reality, this mighty house _may it always endure _ 
would not be able to stand without him". At the same time, the 
Sultan made MasCud governor of Herat, although he did not take up 
this post till 408/1017-18. Since Herat was one of the great cities 
of Khurasan and a key defence point, the office was commensurate 
with his position as heir. It was whilst he was governor of Herat 
that his father in 1020 deputed him to invade GhUr from the north-
2 -western side. 
The close of Ma~ud's life found MasCud in the far west of the 
empire. On the conquest of Ray and Jibal from Majd ad-Daula in 
1029, the Sultan left the further pacification of this region to his 
son. MasCud campaigned vigorously against the Musafirids in Qazwin 
and Dailam and against Ibn ~akfiya in Isfahan and Hamadan, and later 
asserted that but for his father's death, he would have carved a 
3 
way through to Syria and Egypt. 
Already there had been one rift between Ma~ud and his son, 
when MasCud had fallen from grace and had been temporarily exiled 
from Herat to Multan. He had remained wali-Cahd, but had never 
regained his father's full trust. 
4 
Now, at the end of the Sultan's 
life, relations again deteriorated. Prince Mu~ammad's partisans 
were active at court pushing his interests and slandering MasCud, 
and Ma~ud's powers of judgement were beginning to fail; advancing 
age, illness and the effects of a lifetime of furious activity were 
5 now telling. Ma4mud accordingly transferred the succession to 
Muqammad. MasCud was at this point in distant Ray, and he later 
455. 
alleged that he had been deliberately left there with a weak force 
so that he would not be able to achieve any spectacular successes 
(in reality, it seems unlikely that Ma~ud would have hazarded his 
6 
recent conquests merely to spite his son). It seems that the 
Sultan was aware of the disparity in military experience and skill 
between his sons, and realised that in a struggle for power, MasCud's 
hand would be the stronger one. According to Juzjanr, Abu Na~r-i 
Mishkan showed bewilderment at his master's preferring Mll4ammad, 
out Ma~ud had replied, "I am aware that in every respect MasCUd 
excels M~ammad, and that after my time the sovereignty will fall 
into the possession of MasCud; and I use so much ceremony now that 
this poor M~ammad may during my lifetime experience a little honour 
7 
and gratification, which, after I am gone, will not be left to him". 
When the Sultan died, M~ammad succeeded in Ghazna according to 
his father's will. He rejected the idea of a division of power with 
his brother, himself to have Khurasan, Gpazna and India, and MasCud -
to have the new conquests in the west and the title of Sultan. But 
MasCud progressed triumphally eastwards to Nishapur, and at the end 
of Ramaqan 421/1030, the army of Ghazna deposed Muqammad at Tigin-
~bad when news arrived that the army of Khurasan had proclaimed 
MasCud Sultan. Even before this, a part of the army of Ghazna had 
8 
been inclined towards MasCud because of his military reputation. 
It has been necessary to sketch MasCud's early career and train-
ing, for, despite the fact that Maqmud was fortunate in coming 
forward when there was a power vacuum in eastern Islam through the 
456. 
collapse of the Samanids and the weakening of the BUyids, the empire 
was basically dependent on the military leadership of its Sultan. 
ri'he empire as Malpnud left it could only be kept going by a military 
genius of equal vigour, for it lacked as yet an adequate infra-
-structure of civilian administration to ensure continuity and 
stability. M~ammad's first Sultanate (he was again briefly raised 
to the throne by the rebels who in 432/1041 murdered MasCud) broke 
down because the other members of the Ghaznavid family, such as the 
Amir YUsuf b. SebUktigin and Ma~ud's sister ijurra-yi Khuttali, and 
the great Turkish slave commanders realised that M~ammad would 
never be able to hold the empire together. They feared that the 
army would become run down and that there would be no steady flow of 
booty for the state treasury and for the soldiers themselves. These 
factors overrode Maljmud's dying wishes. 
Whilever Ma~ud directed the Ghaznavid war machine, it went 
almost of its own momentum, but after his death, the political and 
military situation became more difficult than it had ever been in 
his own lifetime. MasCud took over the empire at its apogee, and 
had to hold together territories stretching from the Ganges to the 
Aral Sea and western Persia which had no unifying bond but the pers-
9 
onal one. Since therefore the personal factor is so important 
here, we must now consider how MasCUd's own character and capabil-
ities affected the running of the empire and its defence. Barthold's 
verdict on MasCud is severe: 
"[He] inherited only his father's faults. MasCud held the same 
457. 
high opinion of his power as Ma~mud, and like him wished to decide 
everything according to his own judgement, but lacking his father's 
talents came to disastrous decisions, which he obstinately main-
tained, paying no heed to the advice of men of experience. The 
tales of MasCud's prowess in the chase and in battle show that he 
was distinguished by physical bravery, but all the more striking 
is his complete lack of moral courage; in the hour of misfortune 
he showed himself more pusillanimous than a woman. In cupidity he 
yielded nothing to Ma~ud, and the overburdening of the inhabitants 
10 by forced levies was carried in his time to:an extreme degree". 
That he was physically brave is undeniable. At Dandanq~n he fought 
desperately with sword, lance and mace, w,hen most of his retainers 
had fled: "if on that day a thousand choice cavalrymen had stood 
by him and aided him, he would have successfully finished that affair; 
but they did not aid him". 
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Yet Barthold is right: the finer, moral 
element which raises bravado from the level of an instinct to true 
nobility of character, was lacking. Observers noted a decline in his 
character and resolution as his reign progressed. Earlier generosity 
gave way to avarice. Failing to weigh up correctly the relative 
claims on his attention of India and of Khurasan, he made several 
wrong strategic appraisals. As Turkmen pressure grew, we get the 
impression of a man harassed by circumstances and too small for his 
job. Baihaqi noticed a decided change in 1040 after the defeats at 
Dandanqan and Balkh, when the Sultan's melancholy grew deeper and 
his officials whispered to each other that he was "not the man he 
used to be". MasCud concealed his decision to abandon Ghazna for 
India, but it leaked out to his advisers, and he had to defend this 
458. 
abdication of responsibility by adducing the unfavourable prognost-
12 
ications of' his astrologers for a winter campaign in Afghanistan. 
It was fear of his master's growing capriciousness that made the 
Vizier A~mad b. CAbd a~~amad seek a special muwadaCa when he was -·--
appointed in 1040 to accompany Prince MaudUd's army (see above, Part 
I, 138-9 ). MasCUd's advisers had for long grumbled about his 
istibdad, the obstinacy of weakness, and had made unfavourable camp-
arisons between him and his father: 
"This lord is the reverse of his father in firmness and strength 
[lit. "liver"]. His father was a man of resolution and perspicacity. 
If he adopted some unsound policy and said, 'I intend to do so-
and-so', his despotic and kingly position made him speak out; and 
if anyone demonstrated the wise and unwise aspects of this, he 
flew into a rage and was voluble in insults and abuse. Then when 
he had reflected over the affair, he eventually came to the right 
decision. But this lord is of a different stamp; he acts irresp-
onsibly and without reflection". 
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All this gives an unfavourable picture of MasCUd, and we are also 
influenced by our hindsight, the fact that his father was successful 
and he was not. Moreover, the differences in personal character 
were not wholly decisive. It was rather the different circumstances 
which each of them faced which brought out varying traits of character, 
for MasCud was presented with problems such as his father had not 
had to tackle. 
Chapter Three 
Threats to the stability of MasCud's empire 
Ma~mUd's policy towards the Buyids had been generally one of 
non-intervention; he had been content with the old Samanid lands 
in Khurasan and with an assertion of suzerainty over the Ziyarids in 
the Caspian provinces. He had been unable to.:. resist meddling in a 
succession dispute among the Buyids of Kirman in 407/1016-17, but 
this brought no permanent success, and when later in his reign 
troubles again arose within the Buyid family there, Ma~ud made no 
14 
move to interfere. It was the Sultan's view that the weak rule 
of Majd ad-Daula and his mother Sayyida in Ray rendered that quarter 
innocuous; if a vigorous man had been ruler there, he used to say, 
he would have had to keep an army stationed at Nishapur. Sayyida 
died in 1028, and Majd ad-Daula's ineffectiveness drove him to invite 
the Sultan in against his own unruly Dailami troops; but when 
Maqmud arrived, he deposed the Bfiyid ruler. Ghaznavid arms then 
460. 
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penetrated into Dailam, Kurdistan and Fars against other local rulers. 
MasCUd took over these conquests, and had in the city of Ray a fine 
base for watching western Persia, a rich fiscal source and a popul-
ation which at least initially seems to have welcomed the prospect 
of stronger rule from the Ghaznavids (see above, Part I, 179-80). 
However, it was not easy to control this region from remote 
Ghazna or even from Nishapur, and Ibn Kak:Uya, whom MasCUd had sub-
dued in 1029-30 and left tributary in Isfahan, soon showed himself 
as a tenacious enemy. As soon as MasCUd left Ray to claim the throne, 
Ibn KakUya threw off Ghaznavid suzerainty. During the next few years 
he even occupied Ray for a while, but the Ghaznavid governor, AbU 
Sahl ijamdawi, drove him out of his capital Isfahan for two years 
16 
and seized his minister Avicenna's library of heretical books. 
But Ibn KakUya on more than one occasion recruited cavalrymen from 
the "Ciraqi11 Turlonens (see above, Part IV, 434-6 ) , and when 
the Ghaznavids were finally compelled to abandon Ray, it was he who 
17 
for a t ·m held J.·t Ibn vo~~ua's dynaml.·sm and the increasing l. e • A  
pressure of the Turkmens in Khurasan combined to squeeze the Ghazna-
vids out of western and central Persia; it is indeed remarkable that 
the Sultan's forces were able to defend this salient in the west 
18 
till as late as the winter of 429/1037. 
India had been the scene of some of Maqrnud's greatest triumphsj 
events like the sack of Somnath captured the imagination of the 
Islamic world as few others did. Ma~ud did his work well in 
northern India. The great confederations of Indian princes which 
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had caused him so much trouble had been broken by the end of his 
reign. The dynasty of some of his most persistent enemies, that 
19 of the Hindushahi Rajas of Waihand, came to an end in 1026. 
After the campaigns early in his reign against the Qarmathians of 
(see above, Part I, 168) 20 
lftul tan/ these heretics did not rise again till Maudud • s reign. 
Ma~ud's gains in the Doab and Ganges valley were all held by MasCud, 
and one fresh success, the capture of the "Virgin Fortress" of 
Hansi, some sixty miles north-west of Delhi, was achieved by the 
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Sultan personally in 1037. It was not always easy to control the 
Ghaznavid forces left in India, for the Sultan could only be there 
in person sporadically and the concentration in the garrisons of 
unruly ghazi elements made for turbulence. For some time after 
1033 India was disturbed by the rebellion of the Commander-in-chief 
there, A~ad Inaltigin, but this was quelled and the Sultan's 
authority restored. (see above, Part I, 169). 
However, there is a general point to consider here. Mahmud's . 
successes in India gave the empire a bias in that direction; in 
some ways, the empire in his time was an institution geared to the 
exploitation of India. Some indication of the importance which the 
Ghaznavid family itself attached to this function may be gauged 
from a letter which ijurra-yi Khuttali wrote to her nephew MasCud 
on his father's death; in it she describes Ghazna, with its face 
towards India, as the heart (~~l) of the empire, Khurasan as next 
22 
in importance and the rest as subsidiary. It was not surprising 
that MasCud too should feel drawn towards India, so that he tended 
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to neglect Khurasan and to minimise the dangers there. His advisers 
realised fully that if Khurasan and the west were to be defended against 
the Turkmens, the Sultan would have to give his whole attention to 
the task, but they found it hard to persuade their obstinate master 
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to agree to this. Without doubt, MasCU.d's refusal to concentrate 
sufficiently on the Turkmen threat in Khurasan allowed the situation 
there to get out of hand and enabled the intruders to secure a hold 
from which they could not in the end be dislodged. 
The most serious threat to MasCud's empire came from the Turkmens 
of Central Asia, and here he faced a more difficult task than had his 
father. Ma~mud made the Ghaznavids a major Centra+ Asian power in 
the face of hostility from the Qarakhanids, with whom he had divided 
the old Samanid dominions. An initial entente with them had not 
lasted long, and in 1006-8 the Ilig Abu'l-ijasan Na~r b. CAli (d. 
403/1012-13) had invaded Khurasan. 
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Thereafter,- the Qarakhanid 
family had been rent by internal discords and the Sultan had been 
able to take advantage of these and ally first with Abu Na~r ~ad 
Toghan Khan (d. 408/1017-18), ruler of the Semirechye and, until the .. 
latter years of his life, of Kashghar, and then with Qad!r Khan 
Yusuf (d. 423/1032) of Kashghar and Khotan. 
The alliance with Qad!r Khan, in which a personal meeting at 
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Samarqand and complicated marriage proposals played a part, was 
directed primarily at the brother of these two last Khans, CAli b. 
al-ijasan, known as CAlitigin, who captured Bukhara in 1020 and 
maintained himself there and in Samarqand till his death in 425/1034. 
Whilever he lived, CAlitigin was the most skilful and resolute . ·· 
463. 
of the Ghaznavids' opponents in Central Asia. His speedy re-estab-
lishment in Bukhara and Samarqand after his defeat by the allies 
Maqmud and Qadrr Khan in 1025-6 probably shows that the mercantile 
classes of the Soghdian cities found his strong rule and connections 
with the Turkish steppes favourable to their interests. The riches 
of these cities enabled him to subsidise Turkish tribesmen like the 
Seljuq family and to enrol them as allies. 
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Neither MaqmUd nor 
MasCud was able to make any decisive impression on CAlitigin's posit-
ion. After his death, the power of his sons was only broken by a 
rival branch of the Qarakhanids, the two sons of the Ilig Na~r, 
B~ritigin (the later Tamghach Khan Ibrahim, d.. 462/1068) and Mu4ammad 
CAin ad-Daula of Uzkend, when CAlitigin's sons had been weakened by 
the loss of the Seljuqs as auxiliaries. But at Maqmud's death there 
was something like a state of equilibrium in Transoxania, and Barthold 
surmised (Turkestan, 285) that the Sultan was not unpleased to see 
CAlitigin's kingdom as a counterpoise to Qadrr Khan's. 
Ma~Ud himself had two footholds to the north of Khurasan, one 
in Khwarizm and the other on the upper Oxus, comprising the crossing-
-point of Tirmidh and the regions of Chaghaniyan, Quvadhiyan, Wakhsh 
and Khuttal. He overthrew the native Khwarizmian dynasty of the 
Ma'mUnids in 1017 by sheer aggression: his ultimatum to the Khwarizm-
ians caused the murder by his troops of Abu'l-CAbbas Ma'mUn and so 
gave the Sultan a final motive for interfering, for the murdered 
ruler's wife was Ma~mud's own sister ijurra-yi Khuttali or ~urra-yi 
Kalj!. 27 The Sultan thus gained Khwarizm proper, with its capitals 
of Kath and Gurganj, its rich agriculture and its trade links with 
the Oghuz steppe, but also outposts along the southern edge of the 
Qara Qum, including Nasa and the riba~ of Farawa (modern Qizil 
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Arvat). These points were to figure prominently in the raids of 
the Turkmens across the desert. Furthermore, Maqmud could now 
turn the flank of the Qarakhanids; but in the event, the intervention 
of the Seljuqs and the generally conciliatory policy followed by 
Ma~ud's governor Altuntash combined to preserve CAlitigin from 
serious harm. 
The upper Oxu8 provinces had in the Samanid period been ruled 
by local dynasties, loosely tributary to Bukhara and descended either 
from the original Iranian lords or from Arab amirs, such as the Al-i 
Mu~taj in Chaghaniyan and the Abu Da'udids in Khuttal. Local dyn-
asties seem to have survived under Ghaznavid suzerainty, although 
their connections with earlier lines are not clear. According to 
the Chahar maqala, Fakhr ad-Daula Abu'l-Mu~affar Aqmad b. Mu~ammad, 
the patron of Farrukhi, was Amir of Chaghaniyan in Ma~ud's time; 
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he was apparently the last of the Al~i M~taj. In MasCud's time 
the wali of Chaghaniyan was the Amir Abu'l-Qasim, a son-in-law of 
the Sultan. No separate dynasty is mentioned for Khuttal in the 
early Ghaznavid period, unless the name of ijurra-yi Khuttali be a 
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reminiscence of some marriage connection with a local family there. 
The importance of these provinces to the Ghaznavids was primarily 
strategic; they served as footholds for attacks on the Qarakhanids, 
but they also had some economic and military value to the empire 
(see above, Part II, 247). 
Thus MasCUd inherited a strong position on the northern borders 
of his empire. But three new factors arose which combined to under-
mine this strength and to cause the collapse of the Ghaznavid hold 
on the Oxus valley and Khurasan. These were firstly, the loss of 
Khw~rizm; secondly, the impact of the Turkmens; and thirdly, the 
pressure of B6ritigin and the "CAlid" branch of the Qarakhanids, to 
use Pritsak's term. 
After the annexation of Khwarizm, Ma~mud had installed as 
governor there his slave general Altuntash, who assumed the tradit-
ional, pre-Islamic title of Khwarizmshah. Altuntash had begun his 
career with SebUktigin, and throughout his stay in Khwarizm, i.e. 
until his death in battle in 1032 against CAlitigin, remained perf-
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ectly loyal to the Sultans. It was really only his faithfulness 
which enabled them to keep some control over that quarter, for Khwar-
izm was remote from the core of the Ghaznavid empire and was virtually 
an island in the surrounding steppes, linked only to the south by 
the route along the Oxus. The strong-points of Amul-i Sha~~ and 
Tirmidh were important in maintaining communication with Khwarizm, 
and a convenient island at Tirmidh made it possible to bridge the 
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Oxus with boats; but the stretch below Amul was vulnerable to the 
attacks of CAlitigin and later of the Seljuqs, who crossed there and 
spread across the Qara Qum towards Khurasan. 
Altuntash was always aware of his key position, and realised 
equally that he was a potential target for the Sultans' jealousy. 
The steppes were at this time in some turmoil through the westward 
466. 
movements of Oghuz and Qtpchaq peoples (see above, Part IV, 432-3), 
and the frontiers of Khwarizm felt some pressure. Altuntash recruit-
ed Qtpchaq, Kujat and Chaghiraq tribesmen to keep the rest out, and 
he also possessed as many as 1500 Turkish ghulams of his own, a 
retinue of truly royal dimensions. 33 Tolstov has pointed out that 
Altuntash, whilst remaining loyal, adopted a policy of his own, ident-
ifying himself with the traditional interests of the province, and 
has suggested that his relationship with the Sultans resembled that 
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of Ma'mUn I b. Mu~ammad with the Samanids. As soon as he became 
Sultan, MasCud's s~spicious nature led him into direct action against 
the Khwarizmshah once efforts to lure him back to court at Ghazna 
had failed. Egged on by his ~q, Abu Sahl Zauzani (see above, 
Part I, 136-7 ), MasCud suborned the commander of the Kujat, 
Manjuq, to assassinate Altuntash, but failed. 
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Altuntash's son Harfin took over his father's army when he succ-
eeded him in 1032 as de facto ruler of Khwarizm, although MasCud 
refused to allow him the title of "Khwarizmshah", and two years later 
successfully had him murdered by his ghulams. Not unnaturally, 
Harun's brother IsmaCil Khandan became the Ghaznavids' bitter foe, 
especially as during Harfin's brief reign, a third brother had been 
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killed at the court of Ghazna in mysterious circumstances. The 
ease with which Khwarizm now fell away from the Ghaznavids showed 
that the connection of the two had had little firm basis; Khwarizm 
looked towards the steppes for its livelihood, and its true interests 
lay in being either an independent political unit or else being 
linked with a powerful Central Asian Turkish dynasty which could 
control the steppes. 
So MasCud's policy in Khwarizm ended in total failure. IsmaCil 
Khandan was eventually driven from his kingdom by the Sultan's ally, 
Shah Malik of Jand, but MasCud himself was by then (1041) dead. 37 
Even had the Sultan been still alive, his ally's victory would have 
been for him a hollow one, for the rivalry of MasCud and the sons of 
Altuntash had allowed the Turkmens to pour southwards and effectively 
cut off Khwarizm from the rest of the Ghaznavid empire. 
~he appearance of the Seljuqs in Islamic history and their 
wresting of Khurasan from the Ghaznavids are discussed above in 
Part IV. 
Finally, there arose in MasCud's reign threats along the upper 
Oxus, endangering Balkh, Tukharistan and Badakhshan. CAlitigin 
and his sons felt the Ghaznavid bridgehead of Tirmidh as a threat 
to their security. Moreover, when MasCud came eastwards from Nish-
apur to claim the throne and expected a struggle with his brother, 
he foolishly promised Khuttal to CAlitigin in exchange for military 
help. Since MasCud attained power peaceably, this help was not needed, 
but CAlitigin continued to claim his side of the bargain, and the 
Sultan's advisers soon saw that this encouragement to one of the 
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dynasty's shrewdest enemies had been an error of judgement. In 
1034 CAlitigin allied with the rebellious HarUn b. Altuntash against 
MasCud; HarUn was to attack Merv and CAlitigin was to march from 
Samarqand, take Tirmidh and ravage Chaghaniyan. CAlitigin's sons 
468. 
put the plan into effect after his death. A fierce but unsuccessful 
siege of Tirmidh followed and the Ghaznavid governpr of Chaghaniyan, 
Abu'l-Qasim, was temporarily expelled, but Harun's murder caused a 
. f h t. 1' t. 39 suspens~on o os ~ ~ les. 
A further cause of unrest here were the Kumejis or Kumijis, 
who dwelt in the Buttaman Mts. at the heads of the valleys running 
down through Chaghaniyan and Khuttal. It was probably CAlitigin 
who in 1034 stirred up the Kumejis against the Ghaznavids, when they 
raided Kbuttal, and in 1038 B6ritigin collected a force of 3000 from 
among them and devastated Khuttal and Wakhsh. Contemporary sources 
usually call the Kumejis "Turks", but they were almost certainly 
the remnants of some earlier Central Asian people like the Ephthalites 
or, more probably, the Sakae, since Ptolemy mentions a Saka tribe 
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of Komedoi. CAlitigin also stirred up the Turkmens, and as early 
as 1034 their raiders penetrated to Tirmidh, Quvadhiyan and Tukhar-
is tan. After Dandanqan, the Seljuqs were able to besiege Balkh for 
a while. The raiders were attracted into the upper Oxus valleys by 
the rich pastures there, where their own beasts could forage and where 
local livestock could be driven away. 
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There was a danger of raids 
from this quarter reaching the very heart of the empire, for the 
routes from fukbaristan through Baghlan, Bamiyan and across the Ghor-
band to the Kabul valley and Ghazna were not difficult. Whether the 
Turkmens could have held these regions permanently, however, is 
another matter; the subsequent course of Ghaznavid-Selju' relations 
suggests that they could not have held the~. 
Chapter Four 
The vendetta against the Ma~Udiyan 
MasCUd deliberately deprived himself of a rich fund of 
wisdom and counsel by repudiating many of his father's experienced 
officials and commanders. Instead, he surrounded himself with his 
own partisans, some of whom, like the CAri4 AbU Sahl Zauzani, had 
long supported MasCUd whilst his father was still alive, others 
of whom attached themselves to MasCud when his brother's Sultanate 
collapsed. In Baihaqi these are often called the MasCudiyan or 
Nau-khwastag>an, "parvenus", and contrasted with their rivals, the 
Ma~udiYan or Pidariyan; the division between the two groups emerges 
very clearly from his pages. 
Once established on the throne, MasCud began systematically 
to get rid of all those who had opposed or slighted him during his 
father's lifetime: those who had, so he thought, persuaded Maqmud 
to deprive him of the succession, and those who had been prominent 
in setting up Muqammad as Sultan. Shabankara'I describes succinctly 
1((0. 
the ascendancy of the MasCudiyan which now began: 
"When Sultan MasCud had been in Herat for a while, a youthful 
group who knew nothing about the real management of affairs (ghaur-i 
karha) and a gang of malevolent ones rose to power. Wherever 
there was some official or person who had been esteemed by Sultan 
Maqmud, they were unable to tolerate this state of affairs contin-
uing, and succeeded in the end in either jailing them all or 
driving them away from the court" 42 
Only one man, ijasanak, was forthwith executed on a trumped-up charge 
of religious heresy (see above, Part III, 348-50 ) • The a3sass-
ination of the Khwarizmshah Altuntash was attempted, but failed. 
(see above, 465-6, and below, 472-3 ). Several others were 
removed from their positions and jailed, and the early deaths of 
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some of them shows that their captivity was by no means pleasant. 
More than anyone else, ijasanak had incurred MasCud's hatred 
for the contemptuous way with which he had treated him as prince: 
he had accused him of squandering the wealth of Herat and Balkh 
44 
when he was governor of Herat, and had set Mushrifs over him. 
During Mul)ammad 's Sultanate, ijasanak had no longer kept the Vizier-
ate, but had kept considerable influence in administrative affairs. 
On the military side, the chief agent in setting up M~ammad had 
been the Chief ijajib CAli b. Il Arslan, called Qarib or Khwishavand 
from his kin relationship to Sultan MaQmud. When the latter had died, 
CAli Qarib had secured an ascendancy in civil as well as military 
affairs at Ghazna: "In this last period, all the Sultan's [se. 
M,h d' J f i were dealt wJ.·th by him and he became a universal -.u.tamrna s af a rs 
influence (na'ib-i kull), so that Viziers, secretaries and deputy 
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officials were all under his direction". 45 CAli Qarib was on bad 
terms with ijasanak, and soon decided to betray M~ammad and to bring 
over the army to his brother's side. But this switch did not save 
him, and shortly afterwards he was arrested,deprived of his ghulams 
and his wealth and jailed; MasCud assumed that one act of treachery 
46 might well be followed by another. 
MasCud's uncle CA~ud ad-Daula YUsuf b. SebUktigin had during 
the latter years of his brother's reign been military governor of 
Khurasan. When Maqmud had died, he had joined CAli Qarib in pro-
claiming Mu~ammad Sultan, but had later deserted to MasCud. On 
his accession, MasCud made much of his uncle and appointed him 
commander of a punitive expedition to Qu~dar, with further instruct-
ions to intervene, if necessary, in the adjacent territory of 
Makran. But he also charged YUsuf's officers to watch over their 
master, and his chief deputy and favourite was secretly made a 
Mushrif over him "so that he might count YUsuf's very breaths". 
MasCud not only mistrusted his uncle for his former support of 
Muljamrnad, but had also a grudge against him over a projected marr-
iage with one of YUsuf's daughters which had never materialised. 
The mission to Qu~dar was largely a ruse to get him away from the 
centre of power; when in 1031 YUsuf returned, he was arrested and 
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jailed, dying in captivity a year later. 
These people had been directly involved in Mll4ammad's Sultanate, 
but MasCud's suspicious nature led him to plot the fall of men who 
had had no part in this and who had even promoted his own interests. 
In 1031 two of his father's Turkish generals, Eryaruq, Commander-in-
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-chief of the army in India, and As!ghtigin Ghazi, who had succeeded 
Arslan Jadhib as commander in Khurasan, were arrested and imprisoned, 
the latter dying in jail three years later. It was not even that 
they were clearly of the Ma~udiyan and ipso facto suspect to the 
new Sultan; it was the Ma~udiyan old guard, objecting to the two 
generals' arrogance and disrespect, which largely engineered their 
fall. Eryaruq had been tempted by the resources to hand in India 
and had been suspected of disloyalty in Ma4roud's reign, for he had 
refused to return from India when ordered to by the Sultan. But 
As!ghtigin had several claims on MasCud's gratitude. As commander 
of the army in Khurasan, he had declared for MasCud on his father's 
death and had brought over the people of Nishapur and the army to 
his side. He had then become so high in the Sultan's favour that 
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MasCud had reportedly loved him "just like one of my own brothers". 
Nevertheless, relates Baihaqi, the intrigues of the Ma~udiyan, 
resenting As!ghtigin's comparative youth and his overbearingness 
towards them, accorded with the Sultan's fears of this over-mighty 
subject. Both Eryaruq and As!ghtigin had large retinues of their 
own ghulams and could wield substantial military power, and this 
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determined the Sultan's decision to overthrow them. 
MasCud was emboldened by these successes to move against the 
Khwarizmshah Altuntash, most powerful and experienced of the provinc-
ial governors, and one who had become - for the geographical and 
political reasons explained above -virtually independent. 




claimants regarded him as a figure embodying impartiality and 
reasonableness. MasCud appealed to him for military aid, and Altun-
tash's advice was one of the factors which persuaded the leaders in 
50 
Ghazna to go over to MasCUd. He came to attend Sultan MasCud at 
Herat and addressed him on the need to cherish old and experienced 
counsellors. But despite the Sultan's welcome of him as "excellent 
commander, uncle'', Altuntash's fears were aroused by the fall of 
CAli Qarib and by the insinuations of evil-wishers in the Sultan's 
entourage, and he hurried back to Khwarizm on the plea that the 
thaghr there against the Qipchaq and other Turkmens could not be 
neglected. MasCud was forced to hide his suspicions about the 
"wolf's offspring', as Altuntash's calumniators were calling him, 
and to blandish him, for his skill and advice in renewing the alliance 
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with Qadir Khan YUsuf against CAlitigin were necessary. Altuntash 
himself was never taken in by this outward show of friendliness and 
never returned to the Sultan's court. He was apprised of the Sultan's 
attempt to have him assassinated and struck first against the 
trai~ors involved. It was feared after this that Altuntash would be 
driven into an open declaration of independence and an alliance with 
CAlitigin, but he did in fact remain loyal to the Ghaznavids and 
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shortly afterwards died fighting for them. The full effects of 
the episode were not seen till Altuntash's two sons succeeded him 
in Khwarizm (see above, 466-7). 
Although MasCud freed !4mad b. ijasan Maimandi and restored him 
to his old office of Vizier, thereby being able to draw on Maimandi's 
474. 
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counsel for the remaining three years of Maimandi's life, the 
removal of many other able and experienced servants deprived the 
Sultan of their services at a time when the empire was facing many 
serious problems. The MasCudiyan who rose to favour were often 
sycophantic and encouraged their master in dubious courses. Fortun-
ately, an element of continuity and wisdom remained at the core of 
the bureaucracy in men like Abu Na~r-i Mishkan and the Viziers 
Maimandi and ~mad b. CAbd a~~amad. Beyond the inner circle of 
officials and advisers, the fiction was always preserved that these 
plottings and dismissals were never the work of the Sultan himself 
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but always of his "evil counsellors"; but since the Sultan's 
word was law, the ultimate responsibility was clearly his. The 
resultant atmosphere of intrigue and insecurity affected the confid-
ence of those officials and generals who had survived from Maqmud's 
reign, so that the Sul tan:'s istibdad and inferiority to his father 
in judgement became axiomatic to them, The fall of their masters 
seems also to have affected the subsequent behaviour of the ghulams. 
These retainers were normally re-distributed among the Sultan, his 
family and his generals (see Part II, 235-6 ), but ghulams former-
ly belonging to the Amir Ynsuf b. SebQktigin, to CAli Qarib, to 
Eryaruq and to Asfghtigin Ghazi are specifically mentioned as being 
amongst those who deserted to the Seljuqs in Khurasan at an early 
date. 55 
Chapter Five 
The struggle in Khurasan with the Turkmens: political, 
military and strategic considerations 
The Seljuqs and their Turkmen followers filled up the 
steppes adjoining northern Khurasan vacated by the "Ciraqi" Turk-
mens, but it was events in Transoxania and Khwarizm which stimulated 
their movement southwards. They had remained on their pastures 
near Bukhara in the employment of CAlitigin, who had attached them 
to himself "by promises and by subsidies" and who used them as 
military au~iliaries. The Malik-nama (in Ibn al-Athir and Mir-
khwand) mentions that discords arose between CAlitigin and the 
Seljuqs after 1029 and eventually caused the movement of the Turkmens 
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from the Bukhara district. The death in 1034 of CAlYtigin and 
the devolution of power to his two young and inexperienced sons 
and to their mentor the general QUnush or Tunush undoubtedly meant 
the end of the connection. At Harun b. Altuntash's invitation, 
476. 
they moved into Khwarizm, but in 1035 Sultan MasCud procured HariTn's 
murder, Khwarizrn became disturbed and the Seljuqs' old enemy, Shah 
57 Malik of Jand, gained control of much of Khwarizm. The Seljuqs 
were of necessity driven southwards into Khurasan. It would be 
unfair to ascribe this combination of events to MasCud's poor 
diplomacy, but his treatment of Altuntash's sons in Khwarizm lost 
him that province and created favourable conditions for the expans-
ion of the Seljuqs. 
The Sultan was absent in Gurgan during the winter and spring 
of 1034-5 when in 1035 Shah Malik drove the Turkmens out of Khwar-
izm. Ten thousand of the Seljuqiyan and Inaliyan crossed the Oxus 
and made for Merv. Their leaders' intentions were not at this time 
openly bellicose. The governor of Khurasan, Suri, received a very 
humble letter from "the slaves the Yabghu, Tughrfl and Da'ud, Mawali 
of the Commander of the Faithful", mentioning the tribulations which 
they had endured beyond the Oxus and throwing themselves on the 
Sultan's protection. They sought the grant of Farawa and Nasa, 
Promising to guard from there against any further incursions from 
the steppes and to send a hostage from among their leaders to the 
court at Gliazna. 
The Sultan's civilian advisers suggested a pacific answer, at 
least until the S&ljuqs had openly shown their bad faith - the 
Turkmens had specifically asked for the intercession of the Vizier 
A~ad b. CAbd a~~amad, with whom they had had previous dealings in 
Khwarizm _but the Sultan and his generals were bent on destroying 
477. 
the Seljuqs at the earliest possible moment. The account in the 
Malik-nama, which however puts the most favourable construction on 
the Seljuqs' actions, confirms Baihaqi that the Seljuqs had hoped 
to secure a foothold in Khurasan by peaceful · f 1 1n i tration, but 
had their proposals rejected by the Sultan: "When this news 
reached the leaders, they despaired of making a peaceful settlement 
with MasCud or of entering his service as auxiliaries. They sent 
their dependants and wives back to a safe place, started a policy of 
spoliation against the local people and became busy preparing for 
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warfare". 
A Ghaznavid punitive expedition led by the general Begtughdi 
was heavily defeated on the road to Nas~ in 1035. 59 So immense a 
haul of booty and military equipment fell into the nomads' hands 
that they were amazed at their own victory. The belief in Ghaznavid 
invincibility, in the inability of lightly-armed bands to defeat a 
trained, professional army, was still fixed in their minds. They 
ascribed their victory to God's Will and to their opponents' poor 
tactics rather than to their own ability: nwe were poor, now we 
have beco:ne rich, but Sultan MasCud is a great king and there is 
none other like him in Islam. If this has happened to his army on 
account of bad management and poor leadership, he has many [other] 
generals and armies, and we must not become over-confident by what 
has taken place". The Sultan had no option but to grant the Seljuqs 
Nasa, Farawa and Dehistan; the pill of reality was only superfic-
ially sweetened by the submissive language which the leaders used 
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towards MasCud. The Yabghu, Tughr!l and Chaghri were given patents 
for these three places. They also received the insignia and dress 
of governors, a standard, a two-pointed hat, sewn garments in the 
Persian style, horses amd bridles for them, a golden belt in the 
Turkish style and thirty pieces of uncut cloth· and were to be address-
~ 
as dihqans. It is interesting to note that each one of the three 
leaders sent his own envoy for the negociations and was to provide 
a hostage from his own circle; the Seljuq leaders did not regard 
themselves as a united body. 60 
The Sultan attempted to divide the Seljuq leaders, in particular, 
by detaching MUsa Yabghu, who now appears with the additional title 
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of Inanj (Inanj) Beg, from his nephews Tughril and Chaghrr. Marr-
iage alliances were proposed in an effort to secure some influence 
over the Seljuqs: a daughter of the CAmid of Khurasan, Suri, for 
Musa Yabghu, a daughter of the Ghaznavid amir CAbdus for Tughr!l 
and another free-born wife for Chaghr!. But only MUsa Yabghu accept-
ed MasCud's presents and was inclined to accept the proffered 
alliance, for the Seljuqs had by now become suspicious of the 
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Sultan's good faith. 
Their deference towards the Sultan was wearing thin. Emboldened. 
by their successes, they made fresh demands on him in the autumn of 
1036. They had found the pastures allotted to them on the desert 
fringes inadequate and now asked for a grant of Merv, Ab1ward and 
sarakha. Administration was to remain in the hands of the Sultan's 
existing officials, the ~!~ib-Diwan, the 3!41s and the ~!~ib-Barids, 
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but the revenues were to be handed over to the Seljuqs. In return, 
the Turkrnens were to be f 11 orma Y recognised as auxiliaries and 
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promised to serve wherever the Sultan wished. It was impossible 
for the Sultan thus to hand over these important commercial and 
strategic centres. The continued possession of Merv enabled some 
watch to be kept on the approaches to Khwarizm and Transoxania, where 
IsmaCil Khandan b. Altuntash and the sons of CAlitigin constituted 
hostile elements. Moreover, these bases would bring the nomads 
within easy distance of the heart of Khurasan and the great cities 
of Nishapur, Tus and Herat. 
The last piece of evidence we have for the over-estimation of 
C1haznavid power by the Turkrnens comes from the autumn of 1039 when 
they were actually in possession of Nishapur and on the brink of 
gaining the whole province of Khurasan. The three leaders met for a 
conference at Sarakhs, Tugh~rl coming from Nishapur and MUsa Yabghu 
from J:derv, and were accompanied by a concentration of tribesmen estim-
ated by Ghaznavid spies at 20,000. A difference of opinion arose. 
Tughrrl and the Inaliyan suggested moving on to western Persia and 
the Byzantine marches, as the "Ciraqi" 'rurkmens had done, for there 
was no opposing power there comparable with MasCud's, but only a 
series of local Dailami and Kurdish rulers. Chaghrr conceded the 
Sultan's superior resources in wealth and manpower, but pointed out 
their own advantages in superior mobility; hence, he said, they 
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should stay in Khurasan. The Seljuq leader had put his finger 
on a crucial point here: when the Gbaznavid armies were defeated, 
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the attendant losses of material were disastrous, whereas the Oghuz 
did not usually take their baggage into battle with them, and if 
defeated, could merely withdraw to the desert where they had left 
their belongings (see further, below, 484 ff. ) • 
'l,he episode raises the question of leadership among the Seljuq 
family. ~ince the Malik-nama was probably written for Alp Arslan, 
we would expect it to be favourable towards his father Chaghrr, and 
this is generally so. According to the Malik-nama, CAlitigin event-
ually turned against the Seljuqs (see above, 475 ) and tried to 
detach YUsuf b. Musa b. Seljuq frorn the other leaders; it was Chaghrr 
who restrained his brother Tughrrl from action against Yiisuf, point-
ing out to him that to split the family was just what CAlitigin 
wanted. According to Baihaqi, whom we would expect to be impartial 
here, the decision of 1039 to stay in Khurasan was Chaghrr's, against 
the views of Tughrtl and MUsa Yabghu; on the other hand, Cahen has 
concluded that he was a somewhat colourless and politically passive 
individual as compared with his brother Tughrrl. 65 The Mal ik-nama 
cites other instances of Chaghrr's percipience and magnanimity: 
that he restrained the Turkmens from pursuing the fleeing Ghaznavids 
after Dandanaan lest the Seljuq forces be dispersed, and that he 
released a thousand of the Ghaznavid officers and notables captured 
in battle, providing them each with a horse, clothing and provisions 
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for a. safe return to their own land. 
The sources differ on the topic of the plundering of Nishapur 
when the Seljuqs first occupied it in 1038-9. According to -Baihaqi, 
Tughr£1 gave special orders to Chaghrt and Ibrahim In~l that they 
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should not oppress the local people. In the source or sources drawn 
on by crmad a.d-Din, Ibn, al-Athir and Barhebraeus, Tughril forbids 
Chaghri to plunder the city, threatening to kill himself if his 
brother does so, for he has promised the Caliph's envoy that Nishapur 
a.nd the Muslims there would be spared. The problem of holding back 
barbarian Tur~nens when it was their natural instinct to despoil 
everything within reach was an acute one for the Seljuq leaders, who 
did not want totally to alienate the local populations; it was only 
really soluble by deflecting them westwards to the borders of Byzant-
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iwn. However, the Malik-nama records that Chaghri had assured the 
acyan of Merv, after the city had peaceably opened its gates to the 
Seljuqs, that there would be no pillage and that measures for the 
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restoration of the devastated surrounding countryside would be taken. 
Sultan MasCud seems to have regarded MUsa Yabghu as nominal head of 
the Seljuqs, as indeed his title implied among the Oghuz. Diplom-
atic contacts were made through him; .in 429/1037-8 he took an oath 
binding himself to restain the destructive proclivities of his 
followers and tribe (qaum u qabila), and it was to him that MasCud 
sent the severed heads of Turkmens whom he slew for violating the 
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agreement. But in practice, Tughr!l and Chaghri seem to have been 
the directing brains behind the Turkmens' movements, in so far as 
there was any central direction at all. 
across northern lnurasan and the Qara Qum desert, In the campaigns 
the advantages were at first sight all on one side. The Sultan had 
a numerous, experienced and well-armed body of professional soldiers 
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who had been trained and tempered in the many battles of himself 
and his father. The Turkmen bands were not numerous; probably there 
was no overwhelming superiority on either side. 70 The traditional 
skill of steppe peoples with the bow and arrow made the Turkmens 
fearsome in this respect, but their swords and other cutting weapons 
were of poor quality. For protective clothing, the nomads had 
usually only light jackets of skin and leather, although when Tughrrl 
entered Nishapur in 1038, a large proportion of his 3000 cavalrymen 
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had cuirasses (zirihs). This must have been exceptional, and the 
Turkmens may have acquired them in the booty left on battlefields by 
defeated Ghaznavid armies. 
The Turkmens were often in a miserable state, affected by the 
drought and famine conditions in northern Khurasan and by the buffet-
ings they received. from the rulers of surrounding lands. Baihaqi 
describes the wretched condition of the Seljuqiyan and Inaliyan after 
their defeat on the borders of Khwarizm in 1034; the fugitives from 
this lost their wives, children, baggage, beasts and all. The group 
of 20J horsemen with which Ibrahim Inal entered Nishapur in 1038 is 
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described as being very ragged and battered in appearance. From 
evidence such as this we can detect some economic motive in the 
Turkmens' incursions, the search for easier conditions of life and 
for better pastures. In the history of nomadic incursions from 
Central Asia, there was always a clearly-discernible rhythm of intens-
ttl d ·ns The wJ.'nter Rastures of the ity in pressure on the se e margl. • P 
nomads tended to be in better-favoured spots like the shores of the 
Oxus, Syr Darya, zarafshan, Chu or Issiq-G~l, where conditions were 
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slightly less harsh than in the deep steppe. Altuntash had allowed 
the Seljuqs and their herds to spend the winters on the borders of 
Khw~rizm, and according to Narshakhi, it was in winter that the ghazis 
of Bukhara went to man the 'b-+ 73 r1 a~s of Paikand against the hungry pagans. 
That the Turkmens had only limited political horizons when first 
they attacked Khurasan seems certain; only the total collapse of 
Ghaznavid arms there in 1040 and the defection of the Khurasanian 
cities from their old allegiance brought into the minds of leaders 
like Tughrfl and Chaghrr the possibility of establishing political 
dominion over the region. In the two decades before Dandanqan, the 
Turkmens were motivated primarily by economic considerations, the 
need to find additional pasture for their existing flocks and the 
desire to add to their wealth by increasing t~r flocks. They used 
the technique of sending small raiding bands deep into Ghaznavid 
territory which rounded up and drove off the flocks of the local 
population. Thus at the beginning of 1034 the regions of Tirmidh 
and Qubadhiyan were raided and the beasts there driven off, and in 
the follo·uing winter :F'arah and Zirgan in the Sistan and Bust area 
were similarly stripped of their herds. As early as the summer of 
1033 the far-sighted Abu Nafir-i .Mishkan sold off the 10,000 sheep 
which he had in Guzgan, fearing - rightly, as events showed - that 
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the nomads would get them if they were left there. These swiftly-
-executed raids had an importance beyond their purely material con-
sequences; they created within the Ghaznavid dominions an atmosphere 
of fear and of uncertainty as to where the next blow would fall, and 
so a certain air of defeatism 
75 of the bureaucracy. 
was current among the civilian elements 
The mobility and lightness of the Turkmen bands was their chief 
asset. Up to modern times, the nomads of the 1urasian steppes have 
had advantages over the professional armies of the civilised, settled 
powers. These latter have rarely been able to use in pitched battles 
their superior fire-power and knowledge of tactics. The raiders have 
snatched up their plunder and retreated back into the steppes before 
an engagement could be made; and pursuit of them has had little 
point, for the nomad has no possessions wotth capturing. Slaves have 
been the only really valuable commodity which counter-attacks have 
brought back. A Chinese chronicler in 617 complained of his country's 
forces' disadvantages as compared with the Tiu-kiu: 
"The Turks' superiority lies in their cavalrymen and archers. 
'Nhen they find themselves in an advantageous position, they charge 
forwards furiously; but if they spot any danger, they flee like the 
wind and disappear like lightning, without keeping any order. The 
bow and arrow are their teeth and claws, and the breastplate and 
helmet their normal dress. When on the move, their troops do not 
keep in any order; nor do they encamp in any fixed place, but anywh-
ere they can find pasture and water. hlutton and horsemeat form 
their army's diet. If they are victorious, they halt and plunder 
the enemy's belongings; but if they are defeated, they flee unash-
amedly. They never bother to mount guards at night or to take 
any precautions during the day; they never waste their resources on 
constructing fortifications or procuring provisions and food. But 
when the Chinese troops set off on a campaign, they set about it 
quite differently. If they have a battle with the f6rks, it is 
rare that they [se. the Chinese] are victorious". 
A raiding-party on the move was self-sufficient, provided that 
pasture could be found. Concentrated supplies from dried milk and 
dried meat were carried, and mares' milk was drunk in the form of 
qumrs • li
1
or long-distance expeditions, herds were driven along with 
the party. After receiving news of the Utrar massacre, Chinggiz 
fitted out an army for Transoxania, and made plans for a three-months' 
journey thither. Every ten cavalrymen were allotted three tughlr 
sheep, which were to be killed and their mutton 'dried, a cauldron 
and a skin for water, and this was to be supplemented from the herds 
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of mares they were to drive before them. 
These considerations were valid for the Turkmen invasions of 
Khurasan. The more mobile and frugal nomads wore down in the end the 
Ghaznavid armies, despite the facts that the latter were led by 
Turkish professional soldiers and that they had also behind them the 
accumulated experience of the Iranian military tradition. One of 
MasCud's courtiers said that "the steppe is father and mother to them, 
just as towns are to us", and Abu Na~r-i Mishkan said, 
"\Ve have to encamp with our army in any rocky place or area of 
scrubby undergrowth we can find, whereas this crowd [se. the Turk-
mensJ merely encamp on tillage and green vegetation and the 
most suitable spots. They can find the cold and flowing waters, 
whereas we have to drink from wat:erholes and cannot find cold and 
flowing waters. Their camels can forage freely on herbage and 
find pasture over a ~ide distance, whereas we have to keep our 
camels in the encampment, tethered outside our tents, for they 
cannot be left to pasture outside the camp. That is the reason 
why they have no heavy baggage, so that they can come and go, 
whereas we have heavy baggage, and the need to look after it keeps 
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us from going off to do other things". 78 
Since the Turkmens travelled light and s;nce 
4 each rider could operate 
as a self-sufficient fighting unit for quite a long period, they 
could afford to leave their baggage as much as thirty farsakhs from 
the main body. The Seljuqs realised this advantage. Baihaqi 
reports that Chaghrr himself attributed the defeat in 1038 of the 
Ghaznavid generals Begtughdr and S'llbashr to their being encumbered 
by their baggage and supply train. Although in 1039 the Sultan 
sent back to Ghazna for equipment suitable for steppe warfare (alat-i 
jang-i biy~b~n) and was then able to set off westwards from Herat 
with this lighter equipment, the Ghaznavid armies remained in this 
. 79 respect handicapped compared w~th the TuriDnens. 
Clearly, the Ghaznavid armies were hampered by their inferior 
mobility and their dependence on fixed bases where provisions, 
fodder and other war material was concentrated. They functioned 
essentially from the towns of'Khurasan and from the strong points, 
each under a kUtwal or castellan appointed directly by the Sultan, 
80 
where supplies were kept and valuables stored in times of danger. 
Hut the nomads deployed their raiding parties through the countryside 
and against the outlying agricultural villages of the oases. They 
did not waste time trying to reduce strong points or towns, a process 
for which they were ill-equipped both militarily and psychologically. 
Instead, they by-passed them and devastated the surrounding agri-
cultural areas, thereby starving out the urban centres and fortresses. 
Furthermore, they interrupted and cut off the caravan traffic upon . 
which the commercial economy of Khurasan depended to an appreciable 
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extent. It was only towards the end of the f ourth decade of the 
11 th century that the Turkmens got possession of great cities like 
Nishapur and Merv, and then it was by peaceful surrender rather 
than by conquest. 
'Phe Ghaznavid armies were led. by Turkish ghulam generals, such 
as Begtughd! and Sffbashr, until in 1038 the Sultan turned from his 
Indian concerns and took the field personally. It was the Turkmens' 
policy to avoid a pitched battle, for they realised that their advant-
age lay in hit-and-run tactics. They were reported to have said in 
their deliberations, 
''It is unwise to seek a pitched battle (ma~aff) with this 
sovereign. Let us keep to our own way [of fighting] and not be 
burdened with baggage and impedimenta. In this way we will gain 
the preponderance. We will not disperse, unless some difficulty 
arises, so let him [se. MasCud] go backwards or go forwards, just 
as he wishes (1). Winter has passed and summer has begun; we are 
steppe-dwellers and are well able to endure extremes of heat and 
cold, whereas he and his army cannot, and after suffering this 
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distress for a while, will have to turn back". 
:.'/hen the nomads could be cornered and forced into a pitched battle, 
the superior weapons and training of the Ghaznavid soldiers often 
told in their favour. But these advantages were often negatived by 
such human factors as divided command and ill-advised interference 
from afar by the Sultan, resulting in confused directions to the 
soldiers. The pitched battle on the road to Nasa in 1035 went first 
in Begtughdf's favour but later turned into a defeat. There had 
been an excessive number of voices in the command and a confusion of 
orders had followed; one commander had turned his men back for water, 
4bb. 
and this had been interpreted as flight and had led to a final, 
successful onslaught by the enemy. 
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The general Si!bashl: (Si.!bashl:' 
seems here to be a personal name and not a military office) was next 
placed in command of the army of Khurasan. He remained there for 
three years, during which the Seljuqs "were dodging him like a fox" 
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(yurawighunahu murawaghat ath-thaClab). Sttbasht's supposed dilat-
oriness led. to allegations at court that he was spending his time in 
Khurasan drinking and womanising and that he was either a coward or 
else secretly in league with the Seljuqs. Eventually, the Sultan 
gave him a specific order to engage the enemy, although this was 
against SUbashf's better judgement. He was in fact defeated near 
Sarakhs in 1038, and as a result, TUs, Nishapur and much of Khurasan 
were temporarily lost and Herat threatened. In a later apologia 
befor~the Sultan at Ghazna, S~bashr is reported by al~ijusaini to 
have said that he had been given an impossible task: "How can a 
physician restore an old man to his youth, or how can a traveller 
turn the mirage into water?". There is also the testimony of Baihaqi, 
that Subashr had been a very skilful -tactician in Khurasan, so much 
so that the Turkrnens had named him "the magician" ( ·-d-) 85 ~· But 
to the Sultan, it was always his servants who were at fault and 
never himself. 
Apart from the elusiveness of the Turkmens, the most notable 
factor in the failure of the Ghaznavid armies was their having to 
operate in a land racked by famine. Much of the fighting was done 
on the northern fringes of Khurasan, where the cultivation grew 
sparser and the desert steppes of the Qara Qum began and where the 
limited amounts of forage and water available were inadequate to 
supply a large army. The pr · · · 
ov~s~on~ng of the large Ghaznavid armies, 
with their baggage trains, strings of elephants and camp followings 
as well as their fighting men, presented terrible problems for the 
Sultan and his advisers. In part because of supply difficulties, 
it was not usual for professional Muslim armies to remain in the 
field for years on end, but by 1040 many Ghaznavid soldiers had been 
continuously on active service with SUbashr and MasCud for three 
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years. The Turkmens regarded Khurasan as a foreign land and had 
no concern for its economy and its agriculture; they plundered indis-
criminately and were quite prepared to let their flocks eat their 
way steadily across the agricultural oases. But to the Sultan, 
Khurasan was one of the richest jewels in his crown, and his armies 
could not afford to live off the land and denude it of wealth and 
supplies beyond a certain point. 
The damage from the Turkmens' depredations was a factor in the 
increasing savageness of the warfare between the two sides. On seeing 
the ravages done early in MasCud's reign by the "Ciraqi" Turkmens, 
the general Tash Farrash put to death over fifty of their leaders, 
including Yaghmur; their sons naturally treated subsequent struggles 
as wars of revenge. In 1035 the Sultan ordered that Turkmen prison-
ers should be trampled to death in the army camp by the elephants, 
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in the hope that this would be a warning to the rest. Only towards 
the end of the decade, when the struggle for Khurasan became a life-
-and-death one for the Ghaznavids, did the Sultan's starving armies 
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throw off restraint and vie with the T 1an 
ur ens in despoiling the 
province in the search for Supplies. The rival forces rode and 
marched over the face of Khurasan 
' whose inhabitants were faced 
with the normal burden of taxation and food requisitions by the 
Sultan's armies on the one hand, and with the devastations of the 
nomads and their flocks on the other. Long-term planning, a necess-
ity for highly organised agricultural and commercial communities, 
became impossible, food production declined, the value of lund dropped 
catastrophically (see below, 502~ ) and famine inevitably followed. 
The strategy of the Ghaznavid commanders became increasingly 
dictated by considerations of food and water supply. As early as the 
winter of 1034-5, the army at its Nishapur base was suffering from 
the cold and from lack of provisions, and it was in part this which 
prompted MasCud's decision to move westwards to Dehistan, where he 
had heard that ten ~ of wheat or fifteen ~ of barley could be 
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had for a dirham. The towns of northern Khurasan suffered espec-
ially badly. Sarakhs, once prosperous and populous, was ravaged and 
waterless when the exhausted army of the Sultan reached there in the 
summer of 1039. There was much skirmishing with the Turkmens over 
the possession of waterholes on the edges of the almost waterless 
Qara Qum. The army commanders protested at this time that their 
soldiers were discontented and too weak from lack of food and water 
to fight properly, and they blamed the CAri4 for his inadequate 
budgeting for the supplies required. Shortly before this, it had 
also -been alleged that Sfibashr had been cornering wheat and selling 
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it in the army bazaar at inflated prices. 89 
Nishapur was re-occupied by the Sultan and his army at the end 
of 1039. Famine was raging in the city itself and in the surround-
ing rustaq, with a man of bread fetching sixteen dirhams and with 
rnuch mortality from starvation. MasCud was forced to send camels 
250 miles westwards to Damghan in Qumis to fetch back food for the 
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army. The following spring, the army was in the ~us area, where 
bread and barley were quite unobtainable. The whole region had been 
denuded of crops and food. The governor of Khurasan, Suri, whose 
normal task it was to see that dumps of supplies were kept at various 
points for the use of the army, had so devastated and burnt the region 
that the local people and their beasts were dying of hunger. The 
army, now almost rebellious from lack of food, went on again to 
Sarakhs, but "the town was ruined and waterless, with not a blade of 
corn there. All the people had fled, and the plain and the mountain 
were just as if they had been scorched, being without a scrap of 
grass". 91 Consequently, this army, of which it had been said when 
first it was fitted out, "if it had been hurled against the pillar 
of Fate, that pillar would have collapsed, or if the succession of 
'Pime had been affrighted by its soldiers, it would have fled", was 
in a sorry state for fighting at Dandanqan. On the journey across 
the desert from Sarakhs to Merv, the drought conditions were except-
ional. Large watercourses were totally dry and no surface water 
was seen on the whole journey; after three days' ~arch the army had 
to dig to find water. The army's mounts suffered worst of all, 
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especially the horses; the state of the one-horse troopers was 
parlous and the palace ghulams were reduced to fiehting on camels. 
There were quarrels over the distribution of water from the meagre 
desert holes, inadequate even for the Sultan and his personal 
entourage, and this brawling contributed to the army's demoralis-
ation. For their part, the Seljuqs were aware of these difficulties 
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amongst their opponents and aggravated them by blocking up wells. 
Chapter Six 
Baihaqi's account of the first Seljuq occupation of 
Nishapur 1038-1039 
The Seljuqs first appeared at Nishapur in ShaCban 429/May 
1038, and we have a detailed account of this, sent to the Sultan 
at Ghazna in the form of a despatch from his local intelligence 
officer. This is in Baihaqi, 550-4: 
"A letter arrived from Abu'l-Mu~affar Juma:Q.I, the ~!Jtib-Barid 
of Nishapur. 93 He wrote that he was writing it in concealment 
and that it was only after much scheming that he had been able to 
despatch this messenger [the letter arrived between two and three 
months after the events described in it] • He explained that 
after the news arrived of SUbash!'s defeat, and twelve days after 
that event, Ibrahim Yina1 had appeared on the outskirts of Nishapur 
with 200 men. He sent an envoy with a message which said, 'I am 
the advance guard for fughril, Da'ud and Bighu. If you want war, 
I will go back and make [your choice] known; but if you do not 
want war, let me come into the city and have the khu~ba performed 
[in their name]. For there is a large army following behind me'. 
They escorted the envoy into the city. A great clamour broke 
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out there, and all the acy-an flocked to _ the house of the Qadi 
SaCid 94 and said t h' • 
• o J.m, 'You are our Imam and leader; what do 
you think about this message which has just arrived?' He replied, 
'What do you yourselves think about it, and what course of action 
do you contemplate?' They saJ.·d, •y · ou are quJ.te well aware of 
this city's position and J.'ts lack off t f or i ication; indeed, it is 
just like a grain of sand in the eye(?). Its people have no arms, 
and they [se. the Seljuqs] defeated a powerful army like the one 
which the ijajib S~bashr had. What power can we dispose of? This 
is our view'. 
The Qa~I ~aCid said, 'You have reasoned very well. Organis-
ing warfare is not the business of subjects (raCiyyat). You have a 
ruler, Amir MasCud, who has adequate forces. If this province means 
anything to him at all, he must necessarily send someone and secure 
his rule here. But as for the present, a great conflagration has 
flared up and a horde eager to set their hands to bloodshed and 
pillage has appeared: there is no course open except submission'. 
The Imam Muwaffaq, who was the ~!~ib-ijadithan 95 , and all 
the acyan agreed that 'there is no other reasonable course but this. 
If we do anything else, the city will be violently sacked. The 
Sultan is far away from us. We can justify our conduct to him later, 
and he will accept our explanation'. 
1.i'he Qa~I said, • When the Ilig' s forces under S~bashrtigin 
came from Bukhara, the men of Balkh resisted them until they set 
about massacring and plundering, but the men of Nishapur did the 
exactly what they are doing just now [se. submitted]. When Amir 
Ma~mUd, God's mercy be upon him, returned to Ghazna from Multan, he 
spent some time there putting affairs in order and then set out for 
Khurasan. When he reached Balkh, he saw that the Bazar-i CAshiqan, 
which had been constructed under his orders, had been burnt down, 
and he castigated the people of Balkh, saying, "What have subjects 
to do with war? It was natural that your town should be destroyed 
and that they should burn the property belonging to me [se. the 
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market] which used to bring in such revenues. You should have 
been required to pay an indemnity for th 1 b t h · e osses, u we ave par-
doned you; [only] take care it does not happen again. If any 
ruler proves himself the stronger [at a given moment] and demands 
taxes from you and protects you, you must hand over the taxes and 
thus save yourselves. ~fuy do you not consider the example of the 
men of Nishapur and of other cities, who submitted? They acted 
quite rightly in doing that, so that no plundering took place. 
V/hy do you not consider other cities, from whom no further taxes 
were demanded, since they had already been accounted for [by the 
previous masters] ?" They replied, "We are very sorry a.tld will not 
pursue such erroneous courses in future". The problem today is 
exactly the same as it was then•. They all agreed that it was 
indeed exactly the same. 
Then they summoned Ibrahim's envoy and gave him the reply, 
'We are subjects, and have a lord; subjects do not fight. Your 
commanders should come, as the town is open before them. If the 
province is of any concern to the Sultan, he will come after it 
or else send someone. However, you must know that the people have 
become apprehensive of you because of what has happened in the past, 
so that with regard to this policy which you have pursued in other 
places of plundering, massacring, killing and execution, you must 
adopt another course; for beyond this world lies another one, and 
like yourselves, ~~ishapur has seen much. The people of this region 
have the weapon of prayer in dawn vigils, and if our Sultan is far 
away, the Lord, He is exalted and magnified, and His servant the 
P~gel of Death are near'. 
rhe envoy went back. When Ibrahim Yinal had perused the reply, 
he moved to a position one farsakh away from the city and sent an 
envoy back again with a message saying, 'You have appraised the 
situation sensibly and have spoken very wisely. I have written 
this instant to our leader Tughril and acquainted him of the 
h 11 D-a•u-d and Bighu, who are at Sarakhs position, so that e may ra Y 
and Merv, and all the other numerous great men who are in other 
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places; and then ~ughril himself wh · · . , o 1s a Just ruler, w1ll come 
here with his retinue. Do not be downcast, f th · or e plunder1ng 
and unlawful behaviour which h t k as a en place up to now happened 
inevitably because of the rabble who were at that time carrying on 
warfare. Today things are different; effective power (~, the 
Province, wilayat) has passed to us; there is no need for anyone 
to become agitated. Tomorrow I h 11 t s a come o the city and instal 
myself in the Khurramak Garden, so that [all these things] may 
be made knovm 1 • 
When the aCy!n of Nishapur heard these words, their peace of 
mind was restored, and a herald went round the markets ar1.d. explained 
the situation so that the general public might be reassured. They 
laid out furnishings and carpets in the Khurramak Garden and pre-
pared food and got ready to go out and meet [him] • The Salar of 
Buzgan 96 , Abu'l-Qasim, a most capable and intelligent man, who 
had in the past been beaten and ill-treated by Suri, threw himself 
whole-heartedly into preparing the Turkmens' reception. The 
~a~ib-ijadithan the Imam Muwaffaq and the other acyan of the city 
collected together and went out to meet IbrahimYinal~ with the 
exception of the Qa4I ~aCid and Sayyid Zaid, Naqib of the CAlids,97 
who did not go. 
Half-a-farsakh from the cit~~ Ibrahim appeared with two or 
three hundred horsemen, a banner, two beasts of burden, and with 
the whole group having a generally ragged and battered aspect. 
When the reception committee came up to him, [they saw that] he 
had a splendid horse; he had a pleasing face and manner of speaking 
which encouraged everyone. He rode on. An enormous crowd of 
people had turned out to watch; older men, who had only seen 
Ma~ud's and MasCud's [well-turned out] forces, were secretly weep-
ing, although outwardly smiling at that procession and concourse. 
Ibrahim dismounted at the Khurramak Garden and they brought him 
large quantities of the food and refreshment which they had pre-
pared for him. Each day people came to greet him. On Friday, 
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Ibrahim went to the Congregational Mosq b · b ue, e1ng y now more 
smartly arrayed. The Salar of Buzgan had brought three or four 
thousand of the armed men under his comma d d h d d n , an a ma e an agree-
ment (mukatabat) with this group [se. the Turkmens] ; thus as a 
result of Suri's tyranny they became friends with each other, for 
the loss of Khurasan was really to be laid at Suri's door.(?). 
They had argued at great length with IsmaCil ~abtini the K.hatib 99 --·-
to persuade him quietly to pronounce the khu~ba. But when they 
pronounced the khu~ba in Tughril's name, a fearful hubbub broke 
out among the crowd and there was danger of an outbreak until they 
calmed [them] down, finished the service and went back. 
A week later some riders arrived and brought letters from 
~ughril to the Salar of Buzgan and the Imam Muwaffaq. He had 
written to Ibrahim Yinal that the acyan of the city were wise and 
praiseworthy in what they had done; they [se. the Seljuqs] must 
take care to act equitably towards them and towards all the populace. 
He had sent round instructions to his brother Da'ud and his uncle 
Bighu and to all the military commanders and their forces, and he 
was coming along personally in the advance force with his personal 
entourage to take care that the people of that district should not 
be harmed, since they had shown themselves submissive and percip-
ient of their own interests. 
The people were reassured by these messages. They laid out 
lOO 
furnishings and carpets in ijasanak's old garden at Shadyakh. 
Three days later ~ughril arrived in the city, and all the acyan, 
with the exception of the Qa~I ~aCid, went out to meet him. ~ughril 
was accompanied by 3000 horsemen, the majority of them wearing 
cuirasses. He himself had a strung bow over his arm, with three 
101 
wooden arrows fastened at his waist, and was fully armed. He 102 
v1ore a mulJtam tunic, a head-dress of Tawwazi cloth and felt boots. ----
He installed himself in the garden at Shadyakh, as did as many as 
possible of his forces who could be contained there, the rest en-
camping round the perimeter of the garden. They brought there 
large quantities of food and refreshment which they had prepared 
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and gave provisions to all the sold4ers. A h • s e went along, 
'fughril conversed continuously with Muwaffaq and the Salar of 
Buzgan, and the Salar carried out all his wishes. 
Next day the Qa11 9aCid, accompanied by his sons, grandsons, 
Pupils and a large group, went to pay his respects to ~ughril, 
after people had reasoned with him the previous night. Also, the 
Naqib of the CAlids and a group of Sayyids came along. The inter-
view took place when it was still not yet light. A small, disorder-
ly group of the mob had gathered round, and each one who got up 
spoke out boldly and addressed ~ughril. ~ughril had seated himself 
on the lord Sultan's throne at the front of the dais. 103 He got 
up when the Qa~I ~aCid came in, and they placed a cushion for him 
at the foot of the throne. Then he sat down. The Qa~I said, 
'May the sovereign's life be long! This throne which you are sitting 
on is Sultan MasCUd's. There are happenings like this [reversal 
of fortune] hidden in the Unseen, and no-one knows what further 
ones may be in store. De circumspect, and fear God, His name is 
exalted. Render justice, and listen to those who have suffered 
tyranny and who are in wretched circumstances. Do not give free 
rein to this army of yours for them to wreak oppression, for an 
act of injustice is an inauspicious event. I am fulfilling my 
duty in coming to greet you, and I shall not come again because 
I am occupied in study, and apart from that, I do not give my 
attention to anything else. If you want to go back with a piece 
of wisdom, this advice of mine will be sufficient'. 
Tughril replied, 'I do not want to incommode the Qa4I by 
his coming again; any other communication necessary can be done 
by messages.- I promise you I will take full account of what you 
have said. we [Seljuqs] are new and strange [to all this] and do 
not know the usages of the Perso-Islamic tradition· (rasmha-yi 
Taz1kan). 104 The Qaqi must not refuse sending advice to me in 
J ' He repl1.·ed, 'I will do that then'. future [if only by messages • 
th c - who were with him returned too. He turned away and all e a yan 
Next day he handed over administration of the city to the 
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Salar of Buzgan, who put on a robe of h . 
onour, a tun1c and a woollen 
robe, arranging this outfit personally on himself, and he also 
received golden saddle accoutrements of th T k' h t e ur 1s ype. Then 
the Salar went back to his house and assumed the duties of his 
office. The people saw him in the black woollen robe, endowed with 
the majesty of office, giving him the insignia of being Tughril's 
Amir. 
At present I myself [se. Abu'l-Mu~affar Juma4IJ am with 
Sayyid Zaid the Naqib of the CAlids, wh6 is showing himself very 
friendly and helpful. After [writing] this, my envoys are 
leaving, and through the good offices of this CAlid I am aule to 
complete this despatch". 
The other sources do not add much to this remarkable eye-witness 
account, but they do give some information about the attitude of the 
Seljuq leaders. Gardizi is wholly silent about the first Seljuq 
occupation. Most of the other sources are pro-seljuq ones, and often 
they reflect the Malik-nama (cimad ad-Din, al-ijusaini, Ibn al-Athir, 
Barhebraeus, Mirkhwand); we expect therefore to find a favourable 
construction placed on the Seljuq leaders' actions. According to 
crmad ad-Din, the Turkmens entered Nishapur in RamaQ_an. Their 
natural instinct was to plunder, but Tughrrl restrained them because 
it was the sacred month: "Do not tear away its sanctity and do not 
gnaw at its inviolateness, for nothing is to be gained by plundering 
I ~ 
t then J •••• Control yourselves for the remainder of the month, but 
do what you will after the Fi~r". Meanwhile, the Caliph's envoy 
arrived to restrain the Turkmens and to instil them with the fear 
of God. When the Fitr came round, Tughr!l in fact restrained his -·-
tribesmen, but he only deterred his brother Chaghrr from pillaging 
500. 
by threatening suicide and by promising the Turkmens 40,000 dinars, 
the greater part to be levied on the local people and the rest to 
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come from Tughril's own pocket. Ibn al-Athir gives most detail 
on the Seljuq occupation in his entry for the year 429. He says 
that in that year, Chaghrt entered the city, changing nothing there, 
and that Tughril followed later; then comes the episode about Chaghrt's 
106 
intended pillaging. Mirkhwand is brief: the people rejoiced at 
Tughril 1 s coming, and the Culama', fuaaha 1 , acyan, ru 1 as a', wulat 
107 
and umara 1 all sent presents and promised submission. Al-~usaini 
only mentions in passing that Chaghrt came to ~us and that the not-
ables of Nishapur came to meet him. ~ahir ad-Din Nishapuri also 
places 'I'ughril 's coming in Ramaqan 429. He says that Tughrtl mounted 
MasCud's throne at Shadyakh, and that this caused unrest among the 
people until a herald went round proclaiming that no-one would be 
· h t B 'h - lOB hurt by the incomers; these details accord w1th w a a1 aq1 says. 
Chapter Seven 
The attitude of the aCy'an of Nishapur towards the 
incoming Seljuqs 
To understand why the acyan of Nishapur and of other Khurasan-
ian towns for the most part surrendered peacefully to the Turkmens, 
we must recall briefly what has been said about the economic and 
commercial interests of the province, the agriculture of its fertile 
oases, the manufactures of its urban craftsmen and the long-distance 
trade organised by its merchants and financiers. Its interest lay 
in stable, firm government. The Khurasanians expected to pay taxes, 
but required in return adequate defence. The Ghaznavid connection 
had not in the reign of Ma~ud been wholly a matter of force majeure 
exerted from the outside by the Sultan, for at the outset, the 
r~gime had been supported by the landowners, merchants and notables 
of K.hurasan as politically and economically useful. 
However, MasCud was hard pressed by the Turkmens and was finding 
it difficult to govern Khurasan from Ghazna. His military prestige 
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was ceasing to counterbalance the dl'sadva t f · n age o geograph1cal 
distance. Since contemporary thinking placed a cleavage between 
rulers and subjects, there was a tendency towards conditional obed-
ience which negatived the theological motive for obedience. Loyalty 
suffered when the ruler could no longer provide protection. Towards 
the end of MasCud's reign, the tacit contract with the people of 
Khurasan crumbled. Instead, local forces reasserted themselves and 
the cities salvaged what remained of their interests and came to 
terms individually with the Seljuqs. A similar process of _transfer 
of allegiance may also be seen in Transoxanian history. The commerc-
ial interests of the Soghdian cities necessitated their being on 
good terms with the steppe peoples through whose territories the 
Soghdian caravans passed; hence the comparatively smooth accessions 
to power of dynasties like the Qarakhanids and the Qara Khi~ay. 
When the Turkmens entered Khurasan, they brought with them the 
only permanent wealth they possessed, their herds of horses, camels 
and above all, sheep. The nomads' first demands on the settled 
populations were for pastures. But the oasis plains around the great 
cities like Nishapur, Merv and Herat were highly fertile and thickly 
dotted with villages. Agriculture was intensive and there were 
complex irrigation systems of canals and qanats. The irruption of 
the nomads and their herds into such a highly-developed economy was 
a tragedy. If the forest hunter is the most carefree of men -
those among the Mongols regarded their pastoralist brethren as tied 
down to an intolerable life - the steppe pastoralist also has an 
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irresponsible attitude to nature and the land. Unlike the agri-
culturist who must conserve his seed and thl'nk of future years, the 
nomad is a true ibn al-waqt. This irresponsibility makes him the 
terror of settled peoples and his close-cropping sheep more feared 
than his arrows. 
It is only rarely that the sources allude explicitly to the 
menace of the herds, but Baihaqi was not speaking figuratively when 
he said that the "Cir~qi" Turkmens had in the latter part of Malpniid 's 
reign "devoured Khurasan as if it were food laid out for hunting 
falcons". Mrrkhwand has a brief yet illuminating description of 
the distressed state of the Nishapur area early in 1038: "That 
region became ruinous, like the dishevelled tresses of the fair ones 
or the eyes of the loved ones, and became devastated by the pasturing 
of [the Turkmens' J flocks (ba-Caliq-i charpayan furii manda)". Bar-
hebraeus seems also to allude to these facts when he says of the 
hordes following Tughrtl: n •••• and no one district •••• is able 
to support them for more than one week because of their vast number. 
And from sheer necessity they are compelled to depart to another 
109 
quarter in order to find food for themselves and their beasts". 
The Turkmens' herds caused economic disturbance in other parts of 
Persia. Vlhen Seljuq raiders first appeared in Sistan "they devast-
ated the land, seizing provisions and fodder and pasturing their 
herds". Mu:Q.ammad b. Ibrahim records it as a virtue of Qavurd b. 
Chaghrr Beg Da'ud that the immense numbers of beasts required to 
supply his kitchens were not a burden on the people of Kirman but 
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were pastured well out in the steppes there. 110 
The ravages of the flocks in Khurasan were aggravated by the 
trampling of rival forces across the land · t :b" · , 1n errup 1ng agr1culture, 
and commandeering crops as food for themselves or else destroying 
them lest they fall into the enemy's hands we h 1 d • ave a rea y seen 
(above, 483, 489-91) how the Turkmens drove off the beasts they 
found and how both sides practised scorched-earth tactics. We may 
further cite the information given by Ibn Funduq on the state of 
affairs at Baihaq. This town suffered badly from a Ghaznavid command-
er sent there with an army in 1037. The army encamped in the oasis 
and started to plunder. Then the commander ordered the cutting-
down of the pistachio-nut trees of the villages because their oily 
and resinous wood made them good fuel for the ovens, and finally 
ordered the whole lot to be felled and sent off to Ghazna. Hence 
the Khurasanians called him "the commander who makes a clean sweep, 
~ajib-i Pak-rub". This came on top of seven years of Oghuz raiding; 
in the seven years before 1038 no sowing had been possible outside 
the boundaries of the town of Baihaq, but only in the gardens and 
orchards protected by the outer wall. During this time, mutton had 
been unobtainable; only venison, veal and eggs had been procurable, 
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and these had been scarce. 
The position of the densely-populated towns thus became parlous. 
A city like Nishapur could not normally feed itself (see above, Part 
III, 302-3 
). The towns now found it difficult to draw food from 
the surrounding countryside. 
There followed general famine and depop-
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ulation. Land fell out of cultivation and peasants 
took to flight, 
swelling the bands of cayyars and other malcontents. 
When in 1037 
Tughrfl and Chaghrr occupied Merv Ch 
' aghrr wrote letters and had pro-
clamations read inviting those who h 112 ad fled to return to their homes. 
In the Nishapur district, land values plummeted, and it is possible 
that this contributed to the decline of the dihqan and small land-
owner class into peasant status. I 1039 40 th n - e small owners 
(katkhudayan) of the city were reduced to selling the roofs of their 
houses to buy food, and a dang of land could be had for a dirham. 
In the adjacent village of Mu~ammadabad, where land having trees, 
tillage or vineyards had formerly fetched the high price of 3000 
dirhams per juftvar, it now fetched only lOO dirhams, and Baihaqi 
heard that during famine conditions it was being offered at a juftvar 
for a man of wheat. It is recorded by al-Farisi that the fortunes 
and property of one ancient Nishapur family, the Mu •.arnmalis, declined 
do much from the ravages of famine and the Turkrnens that they were 
113 
obliged to move to Baihaq. 
It was not surprising that the landowners and notables of Khur-
asan often decided that it was less damaging in the long rum to come 
to terms with the Turkmens, even where resistance was feasible. If, 
as the acyan stated to the Qa4I eyacid, Nishapur's defences were at 
this time weak, other cities like Merv, Herat and Balkh were adequate-
ly protected, and the towns on the northern rim of Khurasan, such as 
Nasa, Abiward and Sarakhs, were heavily forti lied against attack 
from the steppes. Within Nishapur, the Salar of Bilzgan disposed of 
a large armed force (above, 497 ) which could per~aps have been 
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used for resistance. The t· 
men lon of the Imam Muwaffaq _ as being the 
~aqib-ijadithan is particularly int t' 
- --- eres lng, for it seems to point 
to the existence in Nishapur of a body of local 
vigilantes, whose 
task no doubt was the preservation f · t 
o ln ernal order and the defence 
of the city against bandit and cayyar depredations. 
The factionalism 
and social disturbance endemic in Khurasan at th is time have been 
mentioned (above, Part III, h t ) c ap er 4 , and we know that at this 
time of economic dislocation and shaky local d · · t t a m1n1s ra ion, Nishapur 
was troubled with cayyars; one benefit which the Seljuqs are said 
to have brought when in 1040 they re-entered the city was relief 
f th C - 114 rom e ayyars. 
The writer has not found other mentions of ~adithan (Arabic pl. 
~dath) in Nishapur or other Khurasanian cities at this time, 
although we know that vigilante bodies flourished in Sistan (see 
above, Part III, 325 ). The term ~dath was used in the 11th 
century for the para-military vigilante and police bands of citizens 
of the Syrian and Mesopotamian towns, but does not seem to have been 
current in Khurasan. In the latter region we have the ubiquitous 
cayyars; and Cahen has recently sought to discover whether the 
Persian cayyars are not in some way the counterparts of the ~dath 
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of further ws~t, without however reaching any clear conclusions. 
Thus we can only conjecture what was the composition of these putative 
ijadithan of Nishapur and what were their duties. We do not know 
whether they were recruited from the bourgeoisie and upper classes, 
as were the later Fityan of the Caliph an-Na~ir's time, or whether 
the Ahd~th of Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, etc. and they resembled more -·~ 
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the Anatolian Akhis of Rtim Sel · d Juq an early Ottoman times in being 
d The latter seems more likely. 
base on the urban craft and trade associations./ Cities like 
Nishapur, Aleppo, Damascus and Qonya were all great industrial 
centres, and Cahen has in fact detected some early Persian traces in 
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the later Akhis. In Nishapur, the leader of the ijadithan, the 
Imam Abu Mu~ammad Hibatallah b. Mu~ammad al-Muwaffaq, was a ShafiCI 
c~lim, son of a~~! and grandson of the famous scholar Abu'~-Tayyib 
Sahl b. Mu~ammad ~aCluki; al-Farisi says that his family had been 
ru'asa' 
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and imams and leaders of the !~~ab al-~adith for 150 years. 
Massignon and B. Lewis have discerned a strong religious current in 
the early Islamic gilds, but they have suggested that this was often 
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heterodox and even IsmaCili-tinged rather than orthodox. Be this 
as it may, the ~adithan of Nishapur could presumably have been used 
to defend the city against the Seljuqs if there had been any strong 
will to resist. 
Instead of holding out in the uncertain hope of Ghaznavid help 
arriving, the acyan of Nishapur, in particular the lay elements, 
made terms with the Seljuqs. Ghazna was very distant, and their 
interests were primarily local, Khurasanian ones. In the previous 
year of 1037, Sultan MasCud had been warned that the people of 
Khurasan had become resigned to giving allegiance to the Seljuqs, 
and in their fat~-nama to the Caliph after Dandanqan, the Seljuqs 
claimed that "the notables and prominent people" of the province 
had appealed to them for protection. 
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This section of society 
had in the past suffered much from the tyranny of the Ghaznavid civil 
soe. 
governor Suri. Ni~am al-Mulk's father was harried by Suri for not 
squeezing enough taxation out of his carnal ( 
_____ see above, Part I, 183). 
His ill-treatment of the Salar of Bu-zg-an 
1
·s specifically mentioned 
in Baihaqi's account (above, 496 ). But who exactly was this 
Salar of Buzgan? Al F-ar1· - · h" 
- Sl g1ves 1s full name as Abu'l-Qasim CAbd 
as.-S.amad b. CAli al-BuzJ·an-1 120 and describes his knowledge of tradition. 
owner 
He may have been a great property/and landowner, and the title of 
"Salar" may have come from some participation earlier in life in 
warfare or ghazw on the frontiers of Islam. In this case, the force 
of men which he headed may have been tenants from his estates whom 
he had armed or else former ghazis settled in the Nishapur area 
whom he had mobilised. 
The interplay of local interests with vestigial loyalty to the 
Gha.znavids can be traced in Baihaqi's account. The record. of Ghazna-
vid government over the past years had sapped the loyalty of the lay 
elements among the Nishapur acyan. The Imam Muwaffaq, although a 
member of the religious institution, was caught up with the ijadithan 
and other secular interests in the city, and threw his weight to the 
side of peace with the Seljuqs. But for the other religious leaders 
and scholars, there was something of a dilemma. They came from the 
leading families of Nishapur, were connected by birth and marriage 
with the lay acyan and shared with them interests in landowning and 
and commerce. On the other hand, the ulema and scholars were the 
1 "th" I lam and from the Ghaznavid most cosmopolitan of scho ars Wl. J.n s ~ 
Sultans' encouragement of Sunn! orthodoxy and employment of learned 
men as diplomats and officials owed h t th 
' muc o at dynasty. The 
Sultans had always understood well how conservative religious inter-
ests could be a prop to the secular state. 
Hence theremust at this time have been a tug of loyalties among 
some at least of the leading religious figures in the city, and the 
reserved attitudes of the Qa~I ~aCid and Kha~Ib IsmaCil ~abuni 
reflect this. Whenever the Sultans had visited the city, the Qa~I 
and his sons had always been singled out for special honour. Offices 
like the 3!~a' and the khi~aba were state-appointed and state-salaried. 
Yet the Qa~I could not be blind to the pressing threat to his native 
city, and he contented himself with giving level-headed advice to 
the other notables and with maintaining a correct but cool attitude 
towards Tughrrl. 
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Although the Ghaznavids were staunch Sunnis, 
they had ranged the moderate, Twelver ShiCis on their side (see 
above, Part III, 369-71 ). Here in Nishapur, the Sayyid Zaid 
sheltered the chief intelligence officer of the Sultan and hung back 
from welcoming the Seljuqs. In sending orders to the CAlids that 
they were to help his ~!~ib-Barid Abu'l-lu~affar Juma~I, MasCud 
counted them among his most reliable supporters in the city, and 
on his re-entry there, gave the Naqib and the CAlids robes of honour. 
As a parallel to this attitude of the religious classes, we 
may quote events in Sistan a few years later, in Maudud b. MasCud's 
reign. The local ruler, Abu'l-Fa~l Na~r b. ~mad, a scion of the 
Saffarids was attempting, latterly with Seljuq aid, to throw off . ' 
Ghaznavid control. As in Nishapur, it seems to have been the 
religious classes who clung most strongly ·to the Ghaznavid connect-
510. 
ion. Maudud attempted to rally his own partisans in Sistan until 
at the beginning of 1044 Abu'l-Fa~l swept down on them and jailed 
them, who comprised a 3!1!, two faqihs and two amirs. 122 
The interpretation given above of the ambivalent attitude of 
the religious classes in Nishapur differs from that put forward by 
Cahen, that the knovm Sunni orthodoxy of the Seljuq chiefs made 
them acceptable when they appeared before the city. 123 It has been 
suggested here that material considerations were uppermost in the 
minds of most of the lay acyan, the preservation of their interests, 
and that the religious classes were to some extent still swayed by 
loyalty to the Ghaznavids. Neither group could look forward to the 
coming of the barbarian Turkmens with positive enthusiasm, for their 
Islam was at the most nominal only, and even their leaders were 
marginally affected by religious considerations ( cf. the original 
attitudes of Tughrrl and Chaghrr over the question of sacking the 
city, above, 499-500). 
The subsequent careers of the two leaders of the Nishapur 
notables who favoured surrender as the lesser of two evils, the 
Salar of Buzgan and the Imam Muwaffaq, shows that they realised from 
the outset that the Seljuqs' star was now in the ascendant in Khur-
as an. The former was appointed the Seljuqs' administrative repres-
entative in the city (above, 498-9 ). ~ahir ad-Din NishapiTri 
describes him also as Tughrfl's first Vizier, and as being at the 
time of Dandanqan the Seljuqs' "Vizier, helper, counsellor and 
executive"; the decision after the battle to write to the Caliph 
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for confirmation of Tughr!l's kingship is attributed to him. The 
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Imam Muwaffaq left with the SelJ'uqs when they evacuated Nishapur 
in 1039, being too compromised with th em to stay and face the return-
ing Ghaznavids. He was later installed as administrator of the city 
for the Seljuqs, and it was during that period that he recommended 
to Tughril Abu Na~r Kundur1, one of the many former Ghaznavid 
ff . . 1 h d . 125 o ~c~a s w o passe into Seljuq serv~ce. 
When MasCud temporarily re-occupied Nishapur in 1039, he 
appointed as Ra'Is not one of the local notables, whose loyalty had 
proved dubious, but one of his own permanent officials, and this man 
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behaved harshly towards th~acyan. But Ghaznavid rule had little 
longer to run. The next year, the Seljuqs returned, this time for 
good. ~oth lay and religious elements found it easy to make their 
peace with the new rulers, and indeed, we find the Q~~I 9acid's 
eldest son in favour with Tughril and used by him for a diplomatic 
. . 127 
rnlss~on. 
There are references to other towns of Khurasan making their 
o•·.·n terms with the invaders wh~s~it still nominally under Ghaznavid 
rule. Like Nishapur, the Merv oasis suffered from the attacks of 
the Turkmens and the ravages of their flocks, so that towards the 
end of 1037 the "prominent men of the ulema and the best-known of 
the worthies" surrendered the city on condition that the Turkmens 
did not harm the populace. Tughril and Chaghri entered, and amongst 
other things, gave orders for the restoration of devastated lands 
and estates. 128 Complaints were frequently made to the Sultan by 
local com~anders that local populations were making agreements with 
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the Seljuqs. In 1039 the people of Ab Iward handed over the town's 
citadel to them. 
Shortly after his temporary re-establishment in 
Nishapur, MasCud had to lead a punitive expedition against a group 
in the snow-covered mountains near Tus . ' who had made an agreement 
with the Seljuqs and, it seems, joined them in their depredations. 
That allegiance was refused because the Ghaznavids were no longer 
able to provide protection is shown by what happened at Sarakhs; 
just before Dandanqan, the people refused taxes to the Sultan, since 
they were already pressed by the Turkmens, and fortified themselves 
. t h. f 129 aga1ns 1s orces. 
The cost of keeping the Sultan's armies in the field bore 
heavily on Khurasan, so that even the loyalty of the more eastern 
districts, of Badghis, Guzgan and Tukharistan, was strained, although 
the terrain there was mountainous and unsuitable for the nomads to 
operate in. 
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Law and order broke down there and Cayyars flourished. 
In a desperate effort to raise money, the Sultan in the summer of 
1039 levied a. tax on Herat and the nearby regions of Badghis and Ganj 
]ustaq of a million dirhams. It was allotted to the army as berate, 
and the troops collected it violently, on the pretext that the people 
had been in collusion with the Turkmens. Consequently, several of 
the acyan fled. The rot spread to official employees of the dynasty. 
Amongst those jailed for collusion was the Na'ib-i Barid of Herat, 
M. hk- the CAmil a nominee of the Chief Secretary Abu Na~r-i lS an; 
Sentenced to be skinned alive because after Abu Tal~a Shaibani was 
S~bashr's defeat and the appearance of the Seljuqs before Herat, he 
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had gone out to welcome and entertain them. The excesses of the 
Sultan's own armies alienated many people in this area. In the 
summer of 1040, an army travelling from Ghazna to Balkh started 
plundering en route; the exasperated local people informed Chaghrr 
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of the army's approach and gave the Seljuqs help in other ways. 
Chapter Eight 
The Seljuqs' attitude to power at this time 
We conclude with some observations on the attitude to power 
of the Seljuqs at this time, in as much as this is determinable 
for us. It is necessary always to remember that the Seljuqs 
were barbarians; their supplanting of the Ghaznavids in Khurasan is 
a classic example of successful barbarian infiltration across the 
borders of civilisation. We have pointed out that the Turkmens' 
contacts with Perso-Islamic culture and religion had not been of 
long duration and had been only superficially accepted; moreover, 
the Oghuz were among the less advanced Turkish peoples of Central 
Asia (see above, Part IV, chapter 3). Hence it is not in order here 
to quote the past political achievements of Turkish peoples, such 
as the empires of the Huns, the Tiu-kiu or the Uighur, either on 
grounds of chronological continuity or on the grounds of identity 
132 . t . . of achievement; the formation of a nomad~c s eppe emp~re ~s a 
very different process from the formation of a settled, sedentary 
state. 
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Our information suggests that the Turkmens 
were impelled to 
overrun Khurasan by a combination of l't· 
po 1 lcal and economic circum-
stances - the pressure of political en m· · Kh - . 
e 1es 1n war1zm and Transox-
ania and the necessity of finding food a d t f . . 
n pas ure or the1r fam1lies 
and beasts. Certainly the dr' · f t 
' lVlng ac or of pure hunger ~ust not 
be neglected. The Seljuq leaders Tughrtl and Chaghrr were men of 
skill and acumen, and during the course of the Turkmen invasions had 
additional responsibilities thrust upon them; as they took over more 
and more of Khurasan, they gradually assumed the role of protecting 
power there. But even for the leaders, this was a slow and novel 
process to embark upon, whilst for the rank-and-file of Turkmens it 
always remained an incomprehensible role; to them, the sole function 
of a chief was to lead his followers to plunder. 
The Seljuqs led their tribesmen across the Oxus in 1035, and 
at this early date the three leaders Tughrtl, Chaghrt and MUsa 
Yabghu called themselves "Mawal'i of the Commander of the Faithful". 
~:owever, Cahen is probably reading too much into this when he views 
this as a remarkable indication that the Seljuqs· were already seeking 
the cachet of orthodoxy and Caliphal recognition; such phrases were 
stereotypes and the Seljuqs were at that time a band of desperadoes 
in whose activities few signs of future greatness were as yet discern-
ible. 133 The Turkmens were for long overawed by Ghaznavid prestige, 
and as late as 1039 Tughrrl thought of moving to western Persia 
· able to the Ghaznavids where there was no oppos1ng power compar 
( b 479 ) But the occupation of Nishapur in 1038 see a ove, • 
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was a turning point, for the Seljuqs then found themselves masters 
of Khurasan's administrative capital. It was natural that Tughr!l, 
proud of his success, should seat h1'mself upon M d ascu 's throne at 
Shadyakh as the successor there to the Sultan , and Ibrahim Inal's 
first demand on entering the city had been for the khutba to be --·-
pronounced for the Seljuqs (above, 493 ) . According to Cimad ad-
-Din, Tughrrl behaved like a fully independent ruler: "He forbade, 
he gave orders, he made grants, he levied taxes, he administered 
efficiently, he abolished things, he ordered affairs correctly, he 
abrogated them and he presided every Sunday and Wednesday over the 
. t. t. f -1· " 
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H 1 1nves 1ga 1on o ~~~ • _e a so began calling himself as-sul~an 
al-muca~~~ and Rukn ad-dunya wa'd-din. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that these sources which depend on the Malik-nama exagerrate the 
degree of Tughrfl's political sophistication at this time. Ibn al-
-Athir adds that the Seljuq leaders continued to pronounce the khu~ba 
in Khurasan for Sultan MasCud mistakenly (cala sabil al-mughala~~); 
possibly the Seljuqs at this time continued to place MasCud's name 
there after their own, as if some degree of his suzerainty in 
135 
hhurasan were still recognised. 
When in 1037 the Seljuqs entered Merv, Mirkhwand records that 
on Tughrrl's advice, Chaghrr nominated nuwwab and Cummal and gave 
orders for the restoration of agriculture and estates; here again, 
the Malik-nama may be exagerrating the Seljuq leaders' sense of 
at the time. 
136 Previous contacts with the 
social responsibility 
l taug
ht them something of prevalent administrat-
Ghaznavidsmust have 
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ive ways. When the three leaders were granted N -
1 asa, Farawa and 
Dehistan, they received the dress 
and insignia of Ghaznavid govern-
ors; at Nishapur, the Salar of Bu-zgan- was · t d 
1nves e as Tughrrl's 
deputy with a similar outfit (above, 499 
). It is likely that 
those members of the Nishapur notables who went over to the Seljuqs 
guided Tughrrl further into the regions of Islamic administrative 
and diplomatic procedure. Before this, the Seljuqs had some assist-
ance from secretaries and faqihs in their diplomatic exchanges with 
Sultan MasCud. Baihaqi mentions that they had as an envoy "a danish-
~ from Bukhara, advanced in age and eloquent", and after Dandanqan, 
the Seljuqs' fat4-nama to the Caliph was taken by one Abu Is~aq 
al-FuqqaCI. However, the Seljuqs had not acquired anything approach-
ing a chancery of their own, for on this occasion they used writing-
-materials sv.lvaged from the Ghaznavid dawit-khana which had been 
left on the battlefield. 
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Against this evidence of nascent political consciousness must 
be set the plundering instincts which were innate in all the Turkmens, 
including at least at the outset, leaders like Chaghrr and Tughrrl. 
The Seljuqs were all unfamiliar with the usages and way of life of 
civilised existence. Wlien in 1040 the Seljuqs entered Nishapur for 
the second time, Tughrtl is said to have tasted almond confectionery 
(lauzinj) and said that it was excellent ~~mach except that there 
was no garlic in it; other Turkmens tasted camphor but exclaimed 
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'" In the1·r desire for plunder, the masses ''This is bitter salt. • 
d to destroy the administrative capital of of Turkmens were prepare 
the province which they were in process of taking over and to alienate 
the classes which their leaders would have to depend on for guidance. 
Apart from Tughrrl and Chaghrr, it does not seem as if any other of 
the leaders showed awareness of the new horizons opening up before 
them; thus the division between the supreme ruler and his entourage 
on one side, and the mass of tribesmen on the other, which was to 
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